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ABSTRACT 
This longitudinal research analyzes the construction of Estonian national 
identity in the country’s largest and oldest daily newspaper Postimees in 
relation to the European Union (EU) in the course of Estonia’s EU accession 
process 1997-2003. I combine media studies with political science, EU studies 
and nationalism studies to scrutinize this period as an example of a ‘formative 
moment’. During this formative moment the EU became ‘the new official 
Other’ in relation to which a new temporary community, Estonia as a 
candidate country, was ‘imagined’ in the paper.  
The study is based on the assumption that national identity as a normative 
process of making a distinction between us and Others occurs in societal texts, 
such as the media. The overall framework consists of critical discourse analysis 
in three phases. Text level refers to the media content whereas the evolution 
of the categories of writers of the opinion articles during the accession process 
is approached as a discourse practice. The formative moment stands for 
sociocultural practice as wider societal context. The empirical data consists of 
1780 opinion articles of Postimees.  
First, in the text level a characteristic feature of this formative moment is 
the open normativity of identity. In three discourses formed on the basis of the 
empirical data, European Estonia, Independent Estonia and Humble Estonia, 
the question of ‘who we are’ is challenged both internally and externally by 
‘who we should become’. Internally, the aim is to socialize the newspaper’s 
readers into becoming informed, rational and realist citizens. Externally, in 
relation to the EU, the necessity to become European, independent or humble 
is emphasized in the pertinent discourses.  
Second, four categories of writers, namely Staff Journalists, Cultural and 
Political Elite as well as the Readers (letters to the editor), emerged from the 
analysis. The analysis shows that in the beginning of the accession process only 
a limited group of people, mostly journalists and political decision makers, 
wrote about the EU. By 2003, however, both the number of articles as well as 
the variety of authors had multiplied several times. This shows, how a new 
community, Estonia as a candidate country, is first ‘imagined’ by a small 
number of people and then expands into the wider public.  
Last but not least, this formative moment can be seen as a disciplining 
sociocultural practice. Here a link between normative public discussion and 
critical public opinion towards the EU during country’s accession process can 
be drawn. Even though the newspaper tried to ‘bring the EU closer to the 
people’ this attempt was accompanied by top-down discussions downplaying 
everyday problems. This study also shows the paradox of how a necessity to 
improve us and become someone else is communicated in the public 
discussion in parallel to claiming that ‘Estonia as an EU member does not have 
to change much’.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of Estonia’s accession process to the European Union (EU) 
dominated and shaped the country’s social reality during the change of the 
millennia. The Europe Agreement between Estonia and the EU was signed in 
1995 and at the end of the same year Estonia submitted its application for full 
membership of the EU. At the time, ten former socialist bloc countries, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania applied for EU membership.1  
According to the recommendation of European Commission and the 
decision of the Luxemburg European Council in 1997, accession negotiations 
were opened with six of these countries - Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Hungary and Cyprus - in March 1998.2 As Andres Kasekamp (2013) 
writes, the inclusion of Estonia among the first group has been characterized 
as a tremendous breakthrough for Estonia, which at this point was a little-
known post-Soviet country. Also, the EU’s decision was depicted as a great 
surprise because the geopolitical perception of that time held that Western 
organizations should not cross the ‘red line’, the border of the former Soviet 
Union (Kasekamp 2013, 100; see also Raik 2003, 47).  
In the debate concerning the pros and cons of Estonia’s EU membership, 
the majority of the country’s political elite, the national media channels, 
including the largest daily newspaper Postimees, as well as the representatives 
of the cultural and economic elite were pro-EU. The main argument of the pro-
EU camp saw Estonia’s membership as necessary for preventing future threats 
to the country’s sovereignty, and avoiding the neutrality of the interwar period 
that lead to the Soviet occupation of fifty years (for example Herd and Löfgren 
2001, 274). As Merje Kuus (2002c) writes, the premise of this strong elite 
support for international integration was that EU and NATO memberships 
unequivocally located Estonia in the West. This was considered inevitable, 
since a failure to clearly demarcate Estonia’s location in the West would have 
placed Estonia in the geopolitical ‘grey zone’ between East and West, and 
inevitably into the Russian sphere of influence (Kuus 2002c, 305). Secondary 
pro-EU arguments concerned the benefits of economic development 
possibilities inside the EU. 
Nevertheless, the Estonian situation resembled the general tendency 
characterized by Göran Therborn, in which people in positions of political, 
cultural, economic and spatial centrality tend to support EU membership, 
whereas people on the periphery are skeptical (Therborn 1995, 249). In 
Estonia’s case, this meant that despite frequent changes of government in 
1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the national policy aimed at attaining EU 
                                                          
1 Malta and Cyprus also applied for EU membership at the time. 
2 Negotiations began in 2000 with the other six countries. 
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membership as soon as possible remained constant (Raik 2003, 44, 47). 
Nevertheless, the public opinion towards Estonia’s EU membership during the 
accession process was quite critical3 (for example Vetik 2003, 257-258, 261; 
Pettai 2005, 42, 45-47; Feldman 2001, 8 and Berg 2002, 118-119). In the 
referendum on EU membership in 2003 67% voted Yes and 33% voted No 
(turnout for the referendum was 64%). These were the lowest pro-EU 
accession votes (along with Latvia) among candidate countries at the time.  
Due to the cleavage between the official aim to join the EU as soon as 
possible and critical public opinion that made the result of the referendum far 
from certain (Raik 2003, 47), a range of studies were conducted  during the 
accession process to find out the reasons for the low level of EU support. These 
studies showed that Estonian public opinion was reflecting continuous 
distrust towards the political elite, and therefore saw the EU accession process 
as a ‘project of the elite’ (Raik 2001, 63; Vetik 2003, 262-263; Pettai 2005, 43-
44, 51; Sikk and Ehin 2005, 29-30, 36). Also, the image of Estonia as a 
successful reform country depicted by various international actors (including 
EU representatives) in the international arena was not appreciated in the same 
way inside the country (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 43, 46; Lauristin 2003 
and Raik 2003, 188). One of the reasons for the low level of support was 
concern about the effects of international integration on Estonia’s sovereignty 
(for example Kuus 2002b, 394). Last but not least, on the basis of the semiotic 
model indicating interaction as a basis of identity, Raivo Vetik (2003, 266) 
points out that due to the absence of dialogue between Estonia and the EU, the 
latter was perceived as a possible threat, which lead to a reactive identity in 
the form of confrontation with the EU (see also Vetik et al. 2006). 
In view of seeing the public discussion and public opinion tightly 
interlinked as well as taking into account that the Estonian media was the most 
important information channel for the public in relation to the EU accession 
process (Kaasik 2001; see also Sikk and Ehin 2005, 31-32), it is rather 
surprising that systematic analysis of Estonian media from this period are 
rare. More precisely, instead of studying the national debates as fields of 
political action, the tendency has rather been to reify the dominant narratives 
of the political elites, as Sami Moisio (2006, 444) characterizes the process in 
a range of candidate countries. This kind of approach ignores the idea that 
Estonia’s EU accession process can be seen as a period of rapid and continuous 
change in society and that the media had a significant role in reflecting the 
changes (Fairclough 1995, 61). As “a sensitive barometer of sociocultural 
change” (Fairclough 1995, 52) media texts enable scholars to scrutinize and 
draw conclusions about wider societal patterns and changes (for example 
Kunelius 1996, 393-394 and Kantola et al. 1998, 8).  
Nevertheless, a few media studies conducted during the access process do 
focus on the ongoing public discussion (Talts and Kirch 1998; Talts 2000; 
                                                          
3 A remarkable number of the people did not have a clear position on the Yes/No question. Kristi 
Raik (2001, 63) coined the term “euro apathy” to characterize the phenomenon. 
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Talts 2002 and Raik 2003, 155-199). These studies have been largely 
structured on the basis of a Yes/No axis, with a rationale of promoting the 
accession process by making visible the characteristics and problems related 
to the EU-themed public discussion of that time.  
The aim of the current study is to conduct a systematic media analysis of 
the largest Estonian daily newspaper Postimees focusing on the period of the 
country’s accession process. The period is framed in this research from the 
decision made by Luxembourg European Council in 19974 to start the 
accession negotiations until Estonia’s accession referendum in 2003. Apart 
from these two significant years, 1998 and 2002 (respectively the start and end 
of the accession negotiations) have been chosen for empirical analysis. 
Postimees, as Estonia’s oldest, largest and most stable daily paper, has 
uniquely in Estonia been published in one form or another since the middle of 
19th century and offers fruitful empirical data. During Estonia’s EU accession 
process, Postimees, like all Estonian language national daily newspapers, 
openly supported EU membership. This fact allows, to a certain extent, to 
extend the generalization of the results of this study to the rest of Estonia’s 
mother-tongue national papers.5 
However, instead of examining the campaigns for the Yes/No issue, the 
analysis focuses on the relationship between the EU and Estonia from the 
perspective of constructing national identity, which is a common denominator 
closely related to both Estonia’s accession process as well as the role of the 
media in contemporary society. Finnish scholars Mikko Lagerspetz and Henri 
Vogt (2004, 80-81) write that in Estonia the post-socialist reforms necessary 
for the EU accession were made possible by connecting these to the national 
identity and by doing so achieving consensus (see also Lagerspetz 1999, 388 
and Raik 2003, 64). For example, integration with Western-based political 
structures was explicitly legitimized by referring to inherited ‘Europeanness’ 
(Berg 2002, 115) and interpreting the developments as a return to previous 
stages in history (Lagerspetz 1999, 377). Consequently, identity used for 
instrumental purpose (Mole 2007a, 9), is seen as distinct from, and therefore 
not ‘spoilt’ by, the EU accession process.  
However, on the basis of the understanding that media constructs and 
continuously (re)-negotiates national identity (Mole 2007a, 4), this study does 
not scrutinize identity as a ready-made concept used during EU accession 
process. Instead the research design involves the role of the media in 
constructing national identity. I will start from the relationship between the 
media and the national identity and will then elaborate the characteristics of 
Estonian national identity constructed in and by the media during the EU 
accession process in relation to the EU.   
                                                          
4 The beginning of the accession process could be counted also from 1995 when the Europe 
Agreement between Estonia and the EU was concluded.  
5 While Estonian language newspapers dominate, Russian language newspapers serve the sizable  
Russian speaking minority (ca 1/3 of the whole population). 
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1.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY, MEDIA AND DISCOURSE 
As De Levita (1965, 29, 34) writes, the term ‘identity’ that originates from 
philosophy, was given a modern definition by William James who emphasized 
the relationship between self and other people. Thereafter, this distinction 
making has been addressed by different disciplines, including nationalism 
studies. On that basis national identity is seen to have a “double-edged-
character” capacity to define who belongs to and who does not belong to the 
nation (Triandafyllidou 1998, 593). This understanding enables us to see 
national identity as a “system of cultural representation” where a distinction 
between us and Others is made (Hall 1996, 612; see also Hall [1997]2003, 
234). 
However, for analyzing this system, a situation where investigating the 
national identity is “complicit with the nation’s own story” (Bennington 1990, 
121) has to be avoided. Namely, it is important to make a distinction between 
identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 4-6). The category of practice refers to the everyday social 
experience of the individual. It is based on people’s need to make sense of the 
chaotic world, since categorization helps to make a life that offers few explicit 
lines of division more understandable. By defining our location and that of 
Others in the social world, it enables us to make sense of our environment 
(Mole 2007a, 3-4). The category of analysis, on the other hand, enables 
scholars to depict the processes and mechanisms of identity (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000, 5). Here, for example the distinctions between us and Others 
brought into daily routines via language use in the media can be analyzed (see 
Kivikuru 2004, 37). 
In this study the category of analysis is used to scrutinize the relationship 
between the national identity and the media on two alternative basis. The first 
one is based on Benedict Anderson’s [1983](2006) idea about the routines and 
rituals related to the print media in forming “imagined communities” of its 
readers. As Lund et al. (2011, 49) explain newspapers in the 2000s still 
delivered the lion’s share of news production and the public debate, even 
though fewer people in contemporary society read a morning paper or watch 
the evening news (see for example Knudsen 2010, 43-46). Nevertheless, it has 
to be kept in mind that the current study is dated to 1997-2003, which as a 
time period preceded the emergence of both social media and smart phones 
and occurred when the role of the mass media in ‘imagining communities’ was 
clearer than nowadays. From two equally important and complementary 
aspects, namely the newspaper as an actor, which ‘imagines’ a community and 
the audience of the paper as a community ‘imagined’, I focus on the actor, 
Postimees as a cultural institution.  
The second basis for the relationship between the national identity and the 
media follows the logics that “nation is inseparable from its narration” 
(Bennington 1990, 132; see also Hall 1992, 613-614) and societies live in the 
stories that are told about them (Jokinen and Saaristo 2002, 12; see also 
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Alasuutari and Ruuska 1999, 7, 27, 29). Here, media is seen as one of the 
greatest storytellers of the modern communities (Schlesinger 1991 and 
Schlesinger 1996, 164-165). More precisely, the endless stream of everyday 
journalistic texts can be seen as a daily chronicle of us, stories maintaining the 
‘banal’ understanding of us as a community and our relationship with Others6 
(Billig 1995; see also Moisio 2003a, 41, 150). In these texts, issues like ‘where 
do we belong to?’ and ‘who we are?’ are described, analyzed, interpreted, 
debated and contested on a daily basis (Kantola 2007, 193).  
To incorporate these two approaches into the same study in the context of 
the relationship between the media and the national identity, I use critical 
discourse analysis. My elaboration is largely based on Norman Fairclough’s 
interpretation that is combined with the understandings of other authors (like 
Michel Foucault). To conceptualize discourse, Fairclough (1995, 18-19, 54-55) 
distinguishes between discourse as an abstract and as a countable noun. The 
first one refers to the media discourse as a whole, i.e. the discourse of 
Postimees. Discourse as a countable noun (one or many discourses) appears 
ontologically in the concrete form of particular texts (Fairclough 2010)7. 
Therefore, certain discourses can be depicted from Postimees as a result of the 
empirical analysis.  
Combining media discourse with discourses in the media enables us to 
understand discourse as a mixture of social action and interaction with a form 
of knowledge resulting from a social construction of reality (Fairclough 1995, 
18-19, 44-45). Thus, discourse is mapped as simultaneously a system of 
meaning/representation and a social practice of meaning giving (Raik 2003, 
27-28; see also Fairclough 1995, 2) that does not just represent but constitutes 
the world in meaning (Fairclough [1992]2003, 64).   
While the media texts are seen as central to analyzing discourses 
(Fairclough 1995, 16), the role of the actors in relation to discourses evokes 
various opinions. Actors are given a rather minor role in foucauldian 
understanding where discourses constitute reality and determine human 
existence (Foucault 1981, 86). This understanding is criticized by Fairclough 
for placing too much emphasis on representation and too little on agency and 
struggle, in which actors are able to establish their visions and interpretations 
as right and can exercise power (Fairclough [1992]2003, 28-29, 33-34, 36; see 
also Raik 2003, 26, 28). Similarly to the above mentioned, I also agree that the 
actors deserve attention, especially during major social changes (like the EU 
accession process) when the role of actors in (re)-producing discourses and 
(re)-constituting meanings acquires great importance (Raik 2003, 27).  
                                                          
6 To be precise, instead of Others, Billig (1995, 79) talks about ‘foreigners’ as a specific category and 
not merely any ‘other’ in the age of the nation-state. However, since I analyze the construction of Estonia 
as us in relation to the EU as the Other, the term ‘foreigner’ is not suitable here. 
7 The other aspects pointed out as parts of discourse, namely, nonverbal communication and visual 
images (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 38), are beyond the scope of the current study.  
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Applied to the current study, the role of actors focuses on Postimees as a 
cultural institution that produces media texts where the national chronicle of 
us is written on a daily basis. ‘Banality’ and ‘processuality’ of this chronicle 
make it extra useful to analyze the texts in terms of discourses. ‘Banality’ 
relates first and foremost to the discourse as meaning and ‘processuality’ to 
the social practice of meaning giving.  
The idea of ‘banality’ is based on Billig’s understanding that media 
describes and discusses the relationship between us and Others as well as our 
being and belonging in a banal manner on a daily basis (Billig 1995). 
Therefore, identity ‘written’ in the media texts differs from the national master 
narratives, hegemonic versions of understanding the nation. As a 
characteristic to master narrative it is a coherent whole that organizes events 
on the basis of the medium it is presented in and reason for which it is told. 
Narrative depicts nation as a unified group moving through history as a 
subjective image of the continuity of the nation containing also values and the 
norms (see Zerubavel 1995, 7 and Pääbo 2011, 39-40). The evidence used in 
this process is (partly) truthful, however distorted, since narratives are plotted 
in a way, in which life is not (Trouillot 1995, 6). For example, Heiko Pääbo 
(2011) basis his analysis of the potential of international identity conflicts in 
post-imperial space on the difference of Estonian, Georgian and Ukrainian 
master narratives in comparison to the Russian one.  
Unlike master narratives, explicit media content deals with everyday issues 
and is not plotted into a coherent whole. Therefore, for substantial 
characterization of the empirical data formed of media texts/content/articles8, 
I use the term ‘national identity stories’. In the current study, the Estonia-EU 
relationship dealt with during the Estonian EU accession process in the media 
is analyzed as a substance of these stories. However, since media seldom writes 
about ’identity’ it has to be ‘coded’ from the media content by discourse 
analysis, which shows how an opaque form of power is used to construct social 
reality (Fairclough [1989]2001, 33).  
In the context of media, the power used in constructing social reality is 
cumulative and based on the repetition of particular ways of handling issues 
(Fairclough [1989]2001, 45). Paradoxically, the repetition contributes to the 
invisibility of the strongest discourses that are taken for granted as matters of 
common sense without rhetorical devices to persuade audiences to see things 
in a certain way (Fairclough [1989]2001, 64 and Fairclough 1995, 45). This 
leads us to the second point, process of exercising power in (re)producing 
meanings (Raik 2003, 24). Here, I agree with the claim of Jenkins and Sofos 
(1996, 11) that elements like culture, language, history, territory etc. as “raw 
material” of nationhood are less important and interesting than the social-
historical processes that have mobilized these elements and promoted the 
proliferation of nations and nation-states. Therefore, instead of asking about 
the potential elements of national identity in the media texts as well as their 
                                                          
8 These three are used as synonyms in the thesis.  
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accuracy and relevance9, ‘processuality’ shifts the focus to how identity is 
constructed in these texts.  
This way, identity is not approached as a thing but a continuous process of 
meaning giving that produces a complex mixture of various views and 
practices on a daily basis (see also Hall 1992). Although not incorporating 
everything, it still aims to enable as many people as possible to recognize 
themselves (see also Lehtonen and Koivunen 2010, 236-237). Nevertheless, a 
normative distinction is made in the same process as to what characteristics 
are mobilized as typical for the group and which are marginalized as deviant 
(Riegert 2004, 11).  
Paradoxically, as a category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4-6), 
the ability to incorporate a variety of elements, including conflicts is seen to 
make national imaginaries powerful (Kantola 2010, 238). On the other hand, 
as a category of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 4-6), national identity 
can be scrutinized as a banal normative process where a distinction between 
us and Others as grounds for this collective identity is made (see also Hall 
1992; Hall 1996, 4 and Mole 2012, 1-3).  
1.2 ESTONIAN ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EU: THE 
NEW OFFICIAL OTHER AND THE FORMATIVE 
MOMENT  
So far, I have mapped the relationship between media and the national identity 
in terms of discourse analysis whereas in the following part of the study, 
Estonia’s EU accession process is incorporated into the same process. This 
enables me to analyze how a distinction is made between us and the Other, in 
the current case Estonia and the EU, at the level of discourse as well as to deal 
with a dialectical relationship between the discourse and the wider social 
reality.  
As one basis for national identity, Anna Triandafyllidou (1998) 
characterizes the universalism of particular. Namely, “world is made up of 
nations, all of equal worth and value because they are all unique” 
(Triandafyllidou 1998, 595). Therefore, the particularity of the national 
identity is mapped on the universal basis, as a nation amongst other nations 
(Billig 1995, 73, 83, 85; Bennington 1990, 121-122). As part of the same 
process, our uniqueness is used as a specialty that enables us to define our 
nation as different from, or superior in comparison to, other nations (for 
example Hall 1996 and Bennington 1990, 132). As Anna Roosvall and Inka 
Salovaara-Moring (2010, 11) write, the early survival of nations depended on 
their ability to claim and defend their territory both in material and symbolic 
                                                          
9 In case of Estonia, one could depict the ‘national elements’ of both Estonian and Russian language 
communities. Thus, for analyzing the elements of identity, empirical data should include both Estonian 
and Russian language texts.   
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dimensions. Therefore, solidarity within a nation has been built partly on a 
sense of possible victory and is connected to potential and desirable 
superiority over other nations. In brief, usually the issue concerns positive 
distinctiveness, not just distinctiveness (Mole 2012, 6).   
Nevertheless, it is not justified to reduce any relationship between us and 
Others into the relationship between us and Others. For example Anna 
Triandafyllidou writes about three types of ‘significant others’:  the  dominant 
nation from which the ingroup tries to liberate or distinguish itself, rival 
nations that contest part of ingroup’s homeland and external Others who 
threaten ingroup’s sense of uniqueness and authenticity (Triandafyllidou 
1998, 602). Therefore, the possibility of seeing Others as different from us, 
threatening to us or us as superior to Others, refers to the variety of otherness 
(for example Connor 1993, 386; Schmitt 1996, 26-27; Wæver 2002, 24 and 
Petersoo 2007). This is also in accordance with the criticism towards fixed and 
static understanding of us-versus-the Other division as a fallacy based on 
structuralist logic (for example Soja and Hooper 1993, 184-200; see also Mole 
2012, 3). In line with the criticism, this study understands both the concepts 
of us and Others as well as the relationship between them as flexible process. 
As an example of this flexibility, the specific features of analyzing the EU as 
the Other for Estonia deserve further attention. Although focusing on the EU, 
I do not claim it to be the Other but admit that various Others of Estonia could 
be scrutinized. Here I disagree with Triandafyllidou’s (1998, 600) argument 
that at any time there is one significant other for each nation which affects the 
formation of its identity and claim instead that for instance the neighbouring 
countries, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Sweden could all be focused 
on as Estonia’s Others. Although the difference of these Others would affect 
the emphasizes of the national identity constructed in relation to them, the fact 
that all above mentioned are states/nations make them also similar to each 
other and different from the EU as the Other. As a starting point, the 
relationships with neighboring and/or other significant countries are 
supposedly based on notions of co-existence without further (voluntary) 
integration, whereas during the accession process the Estonia-EU relationship 
was based on Estonia’s attempt to become part of the EU.  
In this context the characteristics of how Estonia as us is constructed in 
relation to the EU, an international organization, as the Other deserves further 
attention. Even though the EU has had an important role in Estonian 
development since the beginning of the 1990s (for example Lauristin and 
Vihalemm 2009, 8-12) and ‘Europe’ has been present in Estonian national 
identity constructions for a much longer period (often accompanied by an 
understanding of the EU as a concrete phenomenon of Europe10), the position 
                                                          
10 Even though it is easy to agree with the idea of Europe being a broader concept than the EU, 
‘Europe’ has still increasingly come to be defined in terms of the EU and these two terms were frequently 
used as synonyms or overlapping categories during Estonia’s accession process (for example Miniotaite 
2003, 214-215; see also Salovaara-Moring 2006, 112-113). Similarly, the impact of European integration 
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of a candidate country during the accession negotiations brought a new official 
dimension to this relationship. In practice, the accession process meant that 
the EU set the rules and norms for socializing the candidate countries, which 
the candidates were supposed to follow in order to reorganize their societies 
(see Schimmelfennig 2000, 111).11 As central guidelines, the Copenhagen 
criteria, containing the norms in the political, economic and legislative sphere 
can be depicted. Thus, from the Estonian perspective, starting the accession 
negotiations can be interpreted as an institutionalization of identification with 
Western values and norms (Miniotaite 2003, 217). In this process, the 
unproblematic and accepted understanding of Estonia as an integral part of 
Europe (for example Kirch and Kirch 2001; Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b; 
see also Lagerspetz 1999, 389 and Feldman 2001, 9-13) was challenged (see 
Mälksoo 2006 and Pettai 2005, 58-60).  
Since newspaper content by default deals with everyday issues, one can ask 
whether or not the guidance to the candidate countries combined with 
dissatisfaction with the ongoing situation and the necessity to improve society 
accompanied by a new official EU relationship also gave the identity 
constructed in the media a contradictory and openly normative aspect. This 
suggests that instead of the superiority of us, the identity stories in Postimees 
indicate the EU’s superiority (Other). In terms of discourse analysis the issues 
of normativity, contradictions and superiority can be seen as an example of 
how discourses are conditioned, reproduced and transformed by social reality, 
and explains how the accession process as a social reality is constitutive to the 
identity discourses in Postimees.  
This leads us to the second point of a dialectically constitutive relationship 
between discourse and social reality. Since dialectically constitutive, apart 
from social reality being constitutive to discourses also discourses constitute 
to social reality by legitimizing particular attitudes and practices. In the 
current case, it can be assumed that normative and contradictory identity 
discourses legitimize the position of the EU as ‘the new official Other’ and on 
that basis the EU accession process can be analyzed as a “formative moment” 
(Ringmar 1996, 83). Indeed Erik Ringmar (1996) defines the formative 
moment as the time when questions of identities suddenly come to the fore, 
old identities break down and new ones are created in their place; all because 
new stories are being told and submitted to audiences, and new demands for 
recognition are presented. In this process, where various actors participate 
                                                          
has been widely dealt with as Europeanisation (for example Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, 1) 
and the ‘Europeanisation’ or ‘Europeanness’ of individual countries has come to be measured by the 
intensity of institutional relations with the EU and by the adoption of its organizational norms and rules 
(for example Katzenstein 1997, 262; see also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 501).  
11 Concerning the norms set by the EU, Merje Kuus (2002b) has criticized the idea of viewing the 
enlargement process as simple adoption of political norms by the applicant countries. I agree with her 
point but simultaneously claim that in public discussion the enlargement process was largely depicted 
as ‘one should follow the EU’s orders’. 
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with their viewpoints (see also Moisio 2003b, 108 and Lehti 2003a, 114), old 
identity stories get challenged by the new emerging ones (Ringmar, 1996, 83). 
As Ringmar writes: 
However, since the applicability and value of a new interpretation 
rarely is self-evident, meanings do not replace each other according to 
some pre-established rules of succession. Instead formative moments 
are periods when meanings are contested and fought over with the 
help of all sorts of rhetoric and propaganda. 
Ringmar 1996, 85  
In this process, power relations are understood as relations of struggle where 
power is not simply exercised but fought over (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
1999, 24, 62), because it is not a permanent attribute of any social grouping 
(Fairclough [1989]2001, 57). In terms of identity, any power struggle related 
to the formative moment challenges the ‘banality’ of the identity.12 In this 
process national identity is put into practice through discursive struggles in 
which societal actors aim at establishing their visions and interpretations of 
Estonia in relation to the EU in the articles of Postimees (see Fairclough 1995, 
2 and Raik 2003, 28). Even though constructed implicitly in the daily topics 
and thus invisible (Billig 1995, 20), construction of identity in this process is 
at the same time openly normative. As an actor in forming this daily 
chronology, Postimees offers a space for the other societal actors, structures a 
discussion and last but not least, expresses its own position.   
As a research problem I state that the Estonian accession process 
to the EU can be seen as an example of a formative moment, at 
which point the emergence of the EU as ‘the new official Other’ 
challenged the national identity discourses in Postimees by evoking 
a struggle between being (who we are) and becoming (who we 
should be/become). Simultaneously, in the everyday chronology of 
the paper a new temporary community (Estonia as a candidate 
country) was imagined. 
In this connection, two further points have to be made.  
First, the current research is a case study that analysis Estonia’s EU 
accession process during a certain time period. Nevertheless, the periodization 
of these years can and has also been made on an alternative basis. For example, 
Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 5) write that the time from 1995-1998 can be 
seen as a period of economic stabilization and the start of the period of 
integration with the EU and NATO, whereas 1999-2004 stands for a 
preparation for EU accession, as well as growing inner tensions.  
                                                          
12 Michael Billig has defined “banal nationalism” as the ideological habits which enable the 
established nations of the West to be reproduced (1995, 6) whereas I distance myself from the fixed 
categories of ‘West’ and ‘East’ and use it for analyzing Estonia.  
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Also, instead of dividing time periods into formative and non-formative 
moments, or claiming that the EU accession process was the most formative 
moment Estonia has experienced, my aim is to show the above mentioned 
period as an example of how the concept ‘formative moment’ works while 
applied to empirical research. Nevertheless, I am aware that either a longer or 
a shorter period could have been chosen for analyzing the formative moment. 
For example, Sami Moisio (2002) refers to the end of the Cold War in Eastern 
European countries as a time when new questions were asked about their role 
in Europe, and new narratives were told of their identities. This period was, 
thus, a constitutive moment for new identity narratives to be created (Moisio 
2002, 110).  
In the case of Estonia, the first half of the 1990s has been characterized as a 
period of rapid and dramatic changes at the institutional level. During this 
period, a new and ambitious political and economic elite was able to launch 
radical liberal reforms, which helped Estonia to become one of the leaders of 
transition (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 20). This period could have been 
studied as a formative moment. One can claim that another formative moment 
occurred during Estonia’s EU accession in 2004, because Estonia stood at the 
crossroads and had to make fundamental choices (Vihalemm et al. 2012, 13).   
Secondly, this study follows the legacy of emphasizing the importance of 
becoming in relation to identity, which reflects the inherently processual 
nature of collective identity formation (Calhoun 1994 and Mälksoo 2006, 278). 
As Stuart Hall argues, identity is about using resources of history, language 
and culture in the incomplete process of becoming rather than being (Hall 
1996, 4; see also Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring 2010, 14). In connection with 
analyzing this process, I focus first and foremost on the normativity aspect.  
Finally, in order to scrutinize the construction of national identity as a banal 
process that occurs daily in media texts (opinion articles of Postimees), 
involves the paper as a cultural institution, and is closely related to the wider 
social reality (EU accession process as formative moment), I use Fairclough’s 
([1989]2001; 1995) model of critical discourse analysis. The analysis is based 
on the epistemological understanding of discourses as abstract entities, which 
are established on the basis of repetition and recurrence over time and in 
diverse social sites (Fairclough 2010). The empirical data from four years 
enables the study to focus on the recurrence of discourses whereas other social 
sites remain out of the scope of the empirical analysis. However, identity 
discourses (as a countable noun) are also put to the context of the former 
studies and the discourse of Postimees (as an abstract noun) is compared to 
Estonian official EU enlargement/integration discourse (see Raik 2003).  
Fairclough’s ([1989]2001; 1995) model of analysis is based on the 
understanding of discourse depicted above and consists of three dimensions. 
First, the text level, refers to media texts. Discourse practice means in the 
current study, the analysis of the production of the media texts and 
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sociocultural practice13 focuses on a wider societal matrix of the discourse 
(Fairclough 1995, 16). The interrelations between the three dimensions show 
how discourse is constituted by and is constitutive to social reality. ’Criticality‘ 
of the analysis refers to the aim to reveal hidden connections between language 
and power: by focusing on the linguistic elements, the objective of the analysis 
is to reveal the hidden determinants in the system of social relationships 
(Fairclough [1989]2001, 4 and Fairclough 1995, 4). Last but not least, since 
critical discourse analysis can be seen as a constantly evolving method 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 59), the model is adapted on the basis of 
the premises and interests of this research.  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Apart from the Introduction and the Conclusions, the dissertation consists of 
five major chapters. The second chapter elaborates the idea of approaching 
national identity in discursive terms by further bringing media institutions 
and their texts together.  
The third chapter focuses on three levels of analysis: text (representation, 
relations and identities), discourse practice and sociocultural practice as well 
as the relationship between these three (Fairclough [1989]2001, 21 and 
Fairclough 1995, 57-62). The text level grounds the empirical analysis in the 
division of us-versus-the Other (Estonia-EU) relationship, and the elements of 
relations and identities are operationalized. In the context of the discourse 
practice, the actors – Postimees and the journalists’ profession in Estonia are 
initially elaborated. The focus then switches to the authors of the opinion 
articles published in Postimees to scrutinize how the new community is 
imagined. The sociocultural practice of the analysis is dedicated to the 
formative moment. I analyze the formative moment on the basis of academic 
texts as well as articles in Postimees. The articles are categorized into 
construction and usage of the formative moment in Postimees. Both discourse 
practice and sociocultural practice are dealt with in connection with the 
discourse of Postimees, not separately in case of each discourse.  
The fourth chapter maps the principles how the newspaper articles are 
selected and analyzed.  
The fifth chapter covers the main empirical part of the study. In this 
chapter, I return to the text level and analyze how, on the basis of us-versus-
the Other relations, the opinion articles of Postimees construct national 
                                                          
13 In some of Fairclough’s works, apart from social practice, social structures are also emphasized, 
since the author(s) combine(s) constructivism and structuralism for mapping the dialectical relationship 
between structures and practices (for example Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 48; also Fairclough 
[1989]2001, 14). In this study, the model of Fairclough (1995, 59) is followed that includes “sociocultural 
practice” and I do not deal with the relationship between societal practice and social structure.  
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identity. I define three identity discourses: the discourse of European Estonia, 
Independent Estonia and Humble Estonia. Each discourse is analyzed at both 
the level of representation (in Chapter 5) as well as relations and identities (in 
Chapter 6).  
The final chapter draws up the conclusions of the study.  
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2. MEDIA CONTENT AND MEDIA 
INSTITUTION IN TERMS OF CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
Even though the link between nation as a community and the media in today’s 
societies has been widely accepted, answers to the questions about their exact 
relationship reflect a range of understandings. For example, while analyzing 
the relationship between the media and the nation, the most crucial aspects 
maybe defined as media technology, institution or content. Mirca Madianou 
points out that studies focusing on the role of the media in nation formation 
tend to emphasize media as technologies, whereas those dealing with 
maintenance and reproduction of the nation tend to be based on the form or 
the content of the media (Madianou 2005, 16; see also Edensor 2002, 10-11).  
Concerning the formation of the nation, modernist scholars Ernest Gellner 
and Benedict Anderson have linked common culture and education as parts of 
the processes of modernization and industrialization to the spread of 
nationalism and the birth of modern nations (Madianou 2005, 12, 14). As 
Gellner (1983) writes, the establishment of the cultural institutions, of which 
media is one, has been crucial for dividing the regional populations into 
nations (see also Gellner 1996, 105-110). More concretely, Gellner writes the 
media automatically engender the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective 
of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted. The 
core message, Gellner claims, is not only that the language and style of the 
transmissions is important, but that only those who can understand them, or 
can acquire comprehension, are included in the moral and economic 
community. The converse is also true. Those who cannot comprehend are 
excluded from that community (Gellner 1983, 121-122).  
In “Imagined Communities” ([1983]2006) Benedict Anderson 
communicates a similar idea, emphasizing the significance of ‘extraordinary 
mass ceremony’ related to the newspaper as a medium. In the almost 
simultaneous consumption (Anderson [1983]2006, 35), each communicant is 
well aware that the ceremony they perform is being replicated simultaneously 
by thousands of others, of whose existence they are confident. The key aspect 
is the ability of the media to draw people together in fellowship and 
commonality (see also Carey 1989, 18).   
While Gellner and Anderson focus on the formation of the nation and the 
role of the media as cultural institution in this process, other scholars 
emphasize the importance of media content in relation to the daily 
maintenance of the nation. Maintenance can be managed by talking explicitly 
about the nation (during Independence Day, for example) and, as Hobsbawm 
(1992, 142) explains by making national symbols part of the life of every 
individual and therefore breaking the boundaries between the personal and 
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public life of citizens. Furthermore, the logic of Michael Billig’s (1995) “Banal 
Nationalism” allows a nation to be daily maintained in a ‘banal’ way.  
Billig (1995) agrees with Anderson’s point about the importance of the 
newspapers in the reproduction of nationality, but also criticizes Anderson for 
neglecting the content of the media texts. Billig questions the idea that a 
feeling of national community is produced by the knowledge that all over the 
nation people are performing the daily ritual of reading the same newspaper. 
As an example, he argues that the ritual of reading sports results can produce 
a divided as opposed to a homogenous sporting community (see also Mihelj 
2011, 25). Thus, Billig (1995, 125) emphasizes the direct operation of the media 
through their messages, stereotypes and deixes rather than the possibility for 
a reading ritual, or the perceived feeling of community gained through 
reading, as the key sphere of interest.   
In Billig’s understanding media content has a central role in constructing 
nations and national identity as an ordinary process taking place on a daily 
basis even though the media texts hardly ever deal with the issues clearly 
stated as ‘national identity’ (Billig 1995, 93-127). Billig provides various 
examples of this ‘ordinariness’. He points out the division of the newspaper 
into domestic and the foreign news (our country versus foreign countries), the 
presentation of the weather forecasts covering the territory of a (nation) state 
and the usage of the terms us and here in the articles as references to the nation 
and its territory (Billig 1995; see also Saukkonen 1999, 51). 
In order to combine the research interests of the current study to the above 
mentioned understandings of the relationship between the media and the 
nation, a deeper elaboration of three aspects is needed. First, in order to apply 
to the current study Billig’s basic idea that media constructs a national us on a 
daily basis, further elaboration of ‘national identity’ as a concept is needed. In 
the following three sections I will deal with the concept as a discursive 
normative process that keeps us together and makes a distinction between us 
and Others. Second, in the current study the formation and maintenance of 
the community are combined in a form of Estonia (as existing state and 
society) and Estonia as a candidate country (as new community). Third, to be 
able to analyze national identity and community by focusing on the media 
content and media as cultural institution, an analytical framework is 
necessary. Therefore, I scrutinize the whole process as a three dimensional 
discourse analysis containing a level of text (consists of representation, 
relations and identities), discourse practice and sociocultural practice 
(Fairclough 1995, 57-62). 
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2.1 NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A DISCURSIVE 
NORMATIVE PROCESS 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A DISCURSIVE PROCESS 
In this study, the understanding of the national identity as a discursive process 
is based on two media-related aspects. I first differentiate between identity 
stories and master narratives. Secondly, I identify the relationship between 
identity stories and peoples’ self-identification.   
It is rather usual to emphasize the narrative character of the identity where 
the stories have been pointed out as discrete events interlinked into a 
meaningful history (Bhabha 1990). As Estonian historian Marek Tamm writes, 
a narrative template is a very common way to conceptualize national identity, 
as an essential device for guaranteeing the coherence of the events of the past 
(Tamm 2008, 502, 505, 510-511). As a result of this process, the ‘master 
narrative’ as dominant and widely accepted story of the nation can be taken as 
an example. 
However, this study takes a different approach towards the story of us. In 
order to distinguish between the coherent narrative templates and the 
contradictory stories characteristic to the media texts, I would call the stories 
of us as discursive, not narrative, emphasizing the role of the actors as well as 
potential confrontation between the stories. My aim is not to show how odd 
things are used to construct meaningful history but to deal with these odd and 
often contradictory things as part of banal everyday stories. This way, as 
Jansen (2012, 79) writes, it is possible to show that national identity is often 
incongruous and frequently tension laden. Furthermore, it also has to be noted 
that while in relation with narratives, the importance of history and cultural 
memory are emphasized, in the current study the stories are based on everyday 
topics and not historical events. 
Another point that deserves further attention is the relationship between 
the identity stories of the media and peoples’ self-identification. Mirca 
Madianou (2005) criticizes analyzing identities on the basis of the media 
content as an example of the top-down perspective and textual determinism. 
As an alternative approach, she emphasizes the need for a bottom-up 
perspective that will examine identities as lived, performed and articulated by 
the people (Madianou 2005, 3, 19, 48, 129, 131). Thus, instead of asking if the 
media provides ‘social glue’ to bind people together into nation, the actual 
question is what impact if any media have on the ways people talk about 
themselves and the nation (Madianou 2005, 2).  
Here it has to be noted that Madianou’s understanding and analysis of 
identity is based on the people’s manifold self-identification that the media 
may or may not influence, whereas the understanding of national identity as 
stories of us presumes that identity is constructed in the media texts. 
Therefore, these stories can also be analyzed on the basis of the media content 
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without, however, drawing causal connection between the media content and 
the self-identification of the people.  
Nevertheless, it still has to be noted that the lack of a causal connection 
cannot be equated to the non-existence of any link. First, I agree with the claim 
that the media contribute to creating a common communicative space where 
the majority of people participate and that either include or exclude 
(Schlesinger 2000 and Madianou 2005, 56, 73-74). In this process, particular 
phraseology is made available to the people for thinking and talking about the 
nation. Furthermore, representations about the nation, for example its place 
in the world and its relationship to Others, are offered in these spaces 
(Madianou 2005, 19, 129). 
Second, I agree with Madianou’s point that it is misleading to assume that 
people necessarily adopt the views presented in the media since they might 
contest them (2005, 15, 17, 129). In the current study, this point refers to the 
views concerning Estonia’s EU accession. The EU accession process and 
forming of Estonia as a candidate country fits rather well to the claim that the 
less direct experience individuals have with a given issue area, the more people 
will rely on the news media (Zucker 1978, 227; see also Suhonen 1994, 47-53). 
As d’Haenens and Mattelart (2011, 237) write especially in connection with 
unfamiliar topics that are far removed from people’s daily lives, media 
functions as a substitute for the real experiences and constructs the social 
fabric of people’s lives (see also Vallaste 2013, 65 and Past and Palk 2005, 64). 
For example, the vocabulary of the accession process had launched neologisms 
like ‘Euro negotations’, ‘Euro norms’ etc., that have become familiar through 
the media and taken into usage by the wider public.  
Furthermore, since Estonian accession was decided by a binding 
referendum, EU related public opinion as well as the media’s role in forming 
it was continuously surveyed by opinion polls. Therefore, the data obtained 
from the various opinion polls can be combined with the media analysis to 
reveal the potential links between these two data sets as common 
denominators characterizing the whole process (see also Raik 2003).  
NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTING US  
The discursivity of national identity clarifies the importance of the media in 
relation to national identity stories, whereas in this section I will deal with the 
question, of how and on the basis of what is identity constructed. Even though 
Billig’s (1995) notion of banal nationalism enables us to understand identity 
as a discursive process that takes place on a daily basis in the media texts, his 
keys for scrutinizing how it is done, are not applicable to the current study. For 
instance, the weather forecasts and sporting sections analyzed by Billig are out 
of the scope of the current study.  
In principle, I could focus on the usage of us and here in the media texts 
that would probably lead to the conclusions that in Postimees, the word us 
refers widely to the nation but probably also to some other community(ies) 
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(see Rosie et al. 2006). Nevertheless, such a simple analysis does not say much 
about how Estonian national identity in relation to the EU is constructed in 
Postimees.  
One way to solve this problem would be to focus on what can be 
characterized as aspects of Estonian national identity in the media texts. The 
aspects can be defined by combining the legacy of Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft 
([1887]2001) as a community that resembles the Herderian concept of 
Kulturnation to that of Gesellschaft. The last one is a complex and 
interpersonal society built on socially established bonds of belonging under 
the same authority and common territory as the basis for membership 
(Tönnies [1887]2001; see also Jenkins and Sofos 1996, 11-13 and Smith A. D. 
1998, 8-24). Using the categorization of Hans Kohn (1965), Eastern 
nationalism is based on the ethnic origin, boundaries of language, tribe, or 
religion, whereas in the Western case, citizenship and state boundaries are 
seen as a cohesive force (for example Robinson et al. 2001, 963-965).14  
Even though the Gemainschaft-Gesellschaft and Eastern-Western 
nationalism both aim at explaining the developments in various countries 
and/or among different nations, they both are also ideal types that rarely exist 
(see also Jenkins and Sofos 1996, 13). Rather, various mixtures of the ideal 
types are used to distinguish those who belong to the nation from those who 
do not (Triandafyllidou 1998, 597, 599; Saukkonen 1999, 144-145; Robinson 
et al. 2001, 964; Michaels and Stevick 2009, 228). The variety of these 
mixtures can also be one reason why ‘nation’ as a concept has been criticized 
for the ambiguity and the lack of a clear meaning (Snead 1990, 231; see also 
Kivikuru 2004, 20).  
For instance, ethno-methodologist Anthony D. Smith has defined nation 
on the basis of historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public 
culture, common economy and legal rights and duties (Smith 1991, 14). In his 
latter version of the definition the economy has been removed and legal rights 
and duties replaced by common laws and customs (Smith 2002, 15; see also 
Guibernau 2004, 127). Concerning Estonians, language, education, traditional 
culture, secularity, being democratic and peaceful, rural and maritime, 
homogenous, and always lived in their current territory have been mapped as 
crucial aspects (Pääbo 2011, 87-96; see also Berg 2002, 111-113 and Mole 
2007b, 160-161). 
Nevertheless, in connection with the media analysis, the aspects also raise 
new questions. First, the analysis based on the ready-made aspects of identity 
in the media texts is not in accordance with the idea of banal nationalism. 
Indeed, the whole idea of ‘banality’ emphasized by Billig (1995) refers to the 
                                                          
14 The division into cultural and civic nation should not be confused with the understanding of 
cultural identity, separate from national identity. As Ullamaija Kivikuru (2004, 26) explains there are 
usually a multitude of cultural identities in society since the community is stronger if it allows many 
flowers to flourish. However, cultural identity as well as the more detailed difference between the cultural 
and national one remain out of the scope of interest of this study. 
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inconspicuousness of the national identity instead of any explicit exposure in 
the media content. 
Second, by looking for the ready-made aspects from the texts makes the 
position of the EU as the Other a rather ceremonial one, since replacing the 
Other would not have any effect on us. Therefore, instead of studying identity 
as a process, focus would be on a static picture of us. 
Third, from the methodological perspective it is rather problematic to make 
qualitative analysis by applying the ready-made categories to the empirical 
data. Nevertheless, the problem cannot be solved by choosing a quantitative 
methodology, since the aspects of national identity mentioned by Pääbo (2011) 
might not be available in the media texts in the same form. On that basis, the 
research could lead to conclusions that the articles deal with a lot of other 
things apart from these aspects, and not all the aspects are necessarily present 
in the media content. Thus, the question arises if, on the basis of analyzing 
‘only the media’, any conclusions about the identity could be drawn.  
To overcome this problem, I claim that it is necessary to start from the 
question how identity is constructed. The question of what it is made of, is 
secondary. Some of the above mentioned national aspects might still have an 
important role in the process, however, not as static elements but as norms 
used for constructing the identity as a daily chronology.  
NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A NORMATIVE PROCESS  
Citrin et al. (2001, 72-76) distinguish between three dimensions of national 
identity. Two of these are elements of social identity theory (Tajfel 1978): the 
cognitive dimension (identification as) and the affective dimension 
(identification with). The third is the normative dimension, which refers to the 
particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive. More 
concretely, the normative dimension contains notions about its members, 
their core values and goals, the territories they ought to occupy, and their 
relations to other nations as constitutive norms (Citrin et al. 2001, 75-76; 
Abdelal et al. 2009, 19; see also Robins and Morley 1993, 390).  
On the basis of this dimension, us can be defined as unique and 
homogeneous in relation to both the internal as well as the external Others. 
Nevertheless, as a dark side of this process, a sense of superiority to the other 
nations/countries has been depicted by scholars (see Section 1.2, also Billig 
1995, 81; Sullivan et al. 1992; Citrin et al. 2001, 74; Riegert 2004, 11 and 
Kivikuru 2004, 24). 
In order to analyze this normative process, the logic of Brubaker and 
Cooper (2000, 4-6) can be used to distinguish between identity as a category 
of practice and a category of analysis (see Section 1.1). In the category of 
practice, the question is about making sense of ourselves, of our activities, of 
what we share with, and how we differ from Others. Following the logic of 
Foucault, the process can be seen as an interrelationship between power, 
knowledge and truth. For Foucault ([1976]1980) power is not a restrictive, but 
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a productive society-wide network that offers tools for shaping reality. Thus, 
power constructs its field of knowledge as a truth and there is no knowledge 
outside the power relations (Foucault [1976]1980, 59, 89, 93-94 and Foucault 
[1975]1979, 27-28). As a result, certain discourses lose their conditional nature 
and get a dominant position of truth, i.e. ‘how things really are’ (Foucault 
[1969]1972, 153-154; see also Rantanen 1997, 20). 
Due to the power of discourse, the construction process remains unnoticed, 
self-evident and hidden. On that basis, the category of analysis is necessary for 
scrutinizing how these ‘truths’ are constructed in the discourses. Particularly, 
how discourses systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault 
[1969]1972, 49) and reproduce the positions of subjects in social relations 
(Raik 2003, 26).  
Mother tongues connected to national identity can be taken as examples. 
While the category of practice recognizes and accepts the importance of the 
mother tongue for the people, the category of analysis neither aims at 
measuring its importance nor tries to answer the question of who ‘really’ 
belongs together on the basis of mother tongue. Rather, the question is how 
this position has been acquired, but more importantly what are the 
consequences from the perspective of mapping us and distinguishing us from 
Others in the discourses. Thus, the issue of how the relationship between us 
and the Other (external but also internal) is constructed as a consequence of 
the normative process, as opposed to the norms of Estonian national identity, 
deserves the main attention.  
OLD AND NEW COMMUNITY: FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE 
National identity as a research object also raises the question about the 
community. Since the newspaper articles selected for the empirical analysis 
deal with the relationship between the EU and Estonia presumably ‘Estonia’ 
stands for a state, not a nation. However, before drawing the conclusion that 
instead of national identity, state identity should be scrutinized on the basis of 
the media content, certain characteristics of the media deserve further 
elaboration.  
Even though various terms are used in media texts daily, only a fraction of 
these is defined in connection with the usage. Thus, the term ‘Estonia’ allows 
the paper to refer to Estonia as a state, Estonian society, Estonian people or a 
mixture of all these. In the current study, however, one more aspect can be 
added, namely Estonia as a candidate country. Even though the term 
‘candidate country’ refers to the state level, I assume that the public discussion 
dealing with the candidate country as a community includes all the above 
mentioned levels: nation, society and state. Furthermore, I assume that even 
though no explicit distinction between Estonia and Estonia as a candidate 
country is made in the media content, analytically one can still deal with these 
as two partly distinct communities. Therefore, in addition to the daily 
maintenance of Estonia as a community that has taken place in the content of 
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Postimees both before and after the accession process, forming Estonia as a 
candidate country can be depicted in the current case.  
At this point further clarification is needed on how forming a community 
that commonly refers to the emergence of the nations, is understood in 
relation to the candidate country. Due to the constructivist basis, I distance 
myself from a primordial understanding of nations that can be ‘woken up’ 
when the right time comes, and understand nations as modern communities. 
Therefore also ‘national’ is defined as a modernist concept in connection to 
modernization as a wide umbrella concept that can be divided into the 
understanding of economic, political and cultural modernists emphasizing 
different aspects of modernization. An example of the cultural modernists, 
who are most relevant to this study is Ernest Gellner and the opinion that 
modern society is held together above all by a shared, standardized high 
culture (Gellner 1983, 57; Gellner 1996, 106-107, 109; see also Edensor 2002, 
2-4)15.  
Alternatively to modernists, ethno-methodologist Anthony D. Smith claims 
that even though nation is based on modernist phenomena, it cannot be 
created/invented out of nowhere but is based on the myths, historical 
memories, values, symbols and ethnic identities that have their roots in pre-
modernist history (Smith 1998, 190-198; Smith 1995, 189-194; Pakkasvirta 
and Saukkonen 2005, 36-37 and Remy 2005, 54-55).  
In the context of Estonia, scholars have noted that nationalism and the idea 
of nation was emerging before the creation of own state (for example Hroch 
1985; see also Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 9 and Remy 2005, 67). 
Therefore, Western European experiences of the states waiting for the creation 
of the nation are not automatically applicable to the emergence of the nation 
in Estonia.  
The same can be said about forming the candidate country. Instead of a 
ready-made state waiting for the nation, we are dealing with the re-formation 
of the whole society and state into a candidate country. In Estonia’s case, this 
re-formation has meant transformation that was mostly targeted towards the 
political and economic sector of the country. On this basis, we can ask if, as a 
byproduct of this process, a candidate country identity emerged. However, a 
clear difference between forming a nation and a candidate country can be 
found in the temporal aspect. Nations are formed permanently whereas in the 
case of the candidate country, the question is about a temporary community 
aiming at EU membership. Thus, we have a schizophrenic situation, where in 
an ideal case, the formed community ceases to exist as soon as possible.  
In order to meld the formation of a community with the construction of 
identity, it is necessary to come back to the role of the media in this process. 
On the basis of Madianou’s (2005) division between the studies that focus on 
                                                          
15 On the other hand, Sabina Mihelj categorises Gellner on the basis of the emphasis he gives to 
economic processes. In connection with the culture centered approach to the nationalism as a modern 
phenomenon she mentions Elie Kedourie, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm (Mihelj 2011, 71-74). 
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the role of the media in nation formation and the ones that deal with the 
maintenance and reproduction of the nation (see also Edensor 2002, 10-11) 
the current study includes both sides. From the perspective of analysis this 
means analyzing formation of the candidate country simultaneously with the 
maintenance of Estonia in a situation where the newspaper does not make a 
clear distinction between these two processes. Therefore, a perspective on the 
media in the process of ‘imagining communities’ is needed.  
The term “imagined communities” was coined by Benedict Anderson who 
sees national communities as imagined because, as he claims “the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson [1983]2006, 6). In this way, Anderson argues, all 
communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are 
mediated and therefore imagined ([1983]2006, 6). Anderson focuses on the 
establishment of the nations at a macro level by emphasizing two processes: 
the development of the print technology and the economy of capitalism that 
enabled the mass production of books and newspapers ([1983]2006, 33-34, 
46; see also Madianou 2005, 15). Consequently, written languages started to 
develop bringing about the spread of newspapers and novels as simultaneous 
mediated communication to the masses (Anderson [1983]2006, 33-35). Thus, 
as Madianou (2005, 15) explains, for Anderson the print media made the 
nation possible, since people reading the same papers recognize themselves as 
part of an imagined community.  
Paradoxically, as Mihelj (2011, 14-15) points out, references to Anderson’s 
legacy have mostly focused on the eloquent metaphor of ‘imagined 
communities’ and thus the media content, whereas the material and 
institutional basis of the media has received less attention. While Anderson 
did not elaborate any further as to how exactly the discursive ‘imagining’ of the 
communities takes place, De Cillia et al. (1999) argue that the idea of an 
‘imagined political community’ becomes reality through discourses 
continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people and 
disseminated through systems like education, mass communication and larger 
social gatherings. Since various authors point out national imaginaries in the 
media content as the legacy of the imagined communities (for example 
Kantola 2010, 240 and Esparza 2010), the question arises what added value 
does dealing with ‘banal stories of us’ and the ‘imagined communities’ as two 
distinct approaches bring to the media analysis. In order to answer this 
question, both approaches are elaborated in the framework of discourse 
analysis.  
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2.2 IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND BANAL 
NATIONALISM IN TERMS OF DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
Applied to this study, three dimensions of Fairclough’s discourse analysis 
bring flexibility to the relationship between the media, identity and 
community and enable the research to focus in parallel on ‘banal stories of us’ 
and ‘imagined communities’ as part of the same whole. As a result both media 
texts as well as material and the institutional basis of the media in forming a 
community is scrutinized (Mihelj 2011, 14-15 and Madianou 2005, 16).  
Here also the criticism expressed towards both approaches deserves 
attention. As Mirca Madianou (2005, 15) writes, the theory of Anderson is 
speculative, based on assumption of a strong media, not the empirical analysis 
showing the role of the media. Similarly, Sabina Mihelj (2011) argues it is 
misleading to assume that any facility of communication is uniquely 
predisposed to serve as a purveyor of national imagination, since facilities of 
mass communication are able to accommodate different kinds of imagined 
communities. Thus, she continues, the shared facilities of communication may 
represent an indispensable, but not sufficient, means of achieving and 
maintaining cohesion within certain group, and of spreading national 
imagination (Mihelj 2011, 25). 
I agree with Mihelj (2011) and Madianou (2005) that on the basis of 
facilities and commodities of communication (here print media and 
newspapers) it is problematic to assume a linear correlation between the 
media and its audience as a homogenous nation. Nevertheless, I am not ready 
to drop Anderson’s idea, but claim that the dilemma could be solved with the 
help of flexibility that focus on discourses brings to the whole process. 
In this way media content as banal stories of us is analyzed as text level. By 
contrast, imagined communities are approached as a discourse practice, which 
Fairclough (1995, 58) has elaborated, as various aspects of the processes of 
text production and text consumption (see also Richardson 2007, 75). The 
distinction made between the production and consumption of the media texts 
enables the study to analytically differentiate ‘imagined’ (consumption) from 
‘imagining’ (production) communities. Therefore, it is possible to refer to the 
media as a cultural institution that offers a public arena to societal actors for 
forming communities, without analyzing empirically the communities formed 
(consumption). Logically, conclusions also are drawn about the production, 
not the consumption aspect.  
Due to discourse analysis, banal stories of us constructed in the media 
content become flexible, since at the text level, identities might be constructed 
in the same articles in different discourses (see also Madianou 2005, 25). Thus 
the assumption that national identity is constructed in the media texts does 
not mean that the whole newspaper would emphasize the nation as us. 
Accordingly, while Rosie et al. (2006) criticize Billig’s claim that us present in 
the newspapers refers by default to the nation and argue that in Scottish 
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papers us might also stand for the local or regional identity (Scottish instead 
of British) as opposite to the national one, this study claims that instead of the 
either/or issue, both national and regional us can be communicated in the 
same media texts. Applied to this study, the question is, however, not about 
the construction of a regional or national us but about maintaining the 
national us together with forming us as a candidate country.  
To summarize, even though it is improbable that a systematic or conscious 
distinction between Estonia and Estonia as candidate country had been made 
in the media content, I still assume that it is fruitful to analyze both the text 
level, as well as the discourse practice, in order to scrutinize the emergence of 
the new community. This way, on the basis of the media content, conclusions 
about the formation and maintenance of the identity story can be drawn 
whereas the discourse practice offers a perspective to the media as a cultural 
institution in a process of forming (or imagining) the candidate country as a 
new community. 
This leaves us with the third dimension of the discourse analysis, 
sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995, 16, 57). In the current study, the 
empirical conclusions about both the content and the production of the daily 
chronicle of us are drawn in the context of the formative moment (Ringmar 
1996, 85-87) as a sociocultural practice. 
2.3 FORMATIVE MOMENT IN TERMS OF DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
In connection with mapping sociocultural practice, two aspects must be 
pointed out. First, I agree with Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 23, 26) that 
all practices are reflexive, since discourse forms a significant part of it. Namely, 
all practices involve use of language and discursive constructions that 
constitute part of practice, and thus the practices are partly discursive and also 
discursively represented (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 37). Second, 
practices as production of social life are related to the network of other 
practices (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22-23). 
Both aspects make sociocultural practice flexible and open to 
interpretations. For example, the level of abstraction can vary from the 
concrete societal developments to the more abstract phenomena. 
Nevertheless, the suitability of the level is related to the research object: a more 
abstract object indicates an abstract approach to the practice leading to 
appropriate selection from the network of practices. For instance, in the case 
of analyzing the EU accession from the political or economic perspective, the 
practice could be a transformation of the whole society, which has to a great 
extent meant a transformation in language (new terms, ways of talking about 
things etc.).  
The current study views the Estonian accession process through a society-
wide but more abstract perspective, which is also the reason the study 
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approaches sociocultural practice at an abstract level as the special formative 
time period when Estonia was ‘moving from the East to the West’. This 
includes, though, both the identity aspect as well as the transformation of 
Estonian society at that time. 
The literature that deals with identity usually focuses on the temporal 
context. For example, Billig refers to ordinary times when the identity 
discussion remains unnoticed due to its banality, as well as to well-known 
occasions when ordinary routines are suspended, and the state celebrates itself 
on the basis of certain conventions (Billig 1995, 44-45; see also McIntosh et al. 
2004, 46). Some of these occasions can be characterized as media events, 
defined by Dayan and Katz (1992, 1-54) as special, widely known and 
celebrated occasions targeted spontaneously at the nation as a whole, as 
highlights cutting the everyday routine. Scholars have divided these into three 
categories: contests (as, for example, the Eurovision Song Contest), conquest 
(for example, the first man on the moon) and coronation (like royal 
marriages)16.  
Even though national celebrations and media events do cut the everyday 
routine by offering longer or shorter breaks for common celebrations, they still 
do not make the time special. As Madianou (2005) explains, Billig’s (1995) 
banal reproduction of nationalism and the celebration of the nation through 
the festive media events (Dayan and Katz 1992) are not contradictory to each 
other but can occur in parallel. Nevertheless, there is a broad understanding 
that the construction of identity becomes actual and visible at times of 
unplanned and unexpected moments of crises that differ from the 
conventional national celebrations. In Billig’s terms we can conceptualize this 
process as moving from banal nationalism symbolized by un-waved flags to 
hot nationalism characterized by waved or saluted flags, from maintaining to 
(re-)establishing a community (Billig 1995, 43).  
Similarly, Erik Ringmar contends that not all times are ‘normal’ but there 
are moments when questions of identities suddenly come to the fore. He 
conceptualizes these as “formative moments” when old identities break down 
and new ones are created in their place (Ringmar 1996, 83). Ringmar uses the 
concept of the formative moment to explain why Sweden went to war in 1630. 
Therefore, the radical identity discussions and re-formations are accompanied 
by wider societal changes. As previously elaborated, Estonia’s EU accession 
process can also be seen as a similar example.  
In order to be able to use the formative moment as a sociocultural practice, 
it has to be elaborated from two perspectives related to the current study. First, 
my aim is to analyze the developments of the 20th and 21st centuries as 
formative moment. This aim means that the discursive aspect of sociocultural 
practice, i.e. the issue of the public discussion and the role of the media in 
                                                          
16 Fifteen years later, Katz and Liebes (2007), the revised the categories to include a new trio– 
disaster, terror and war - for media catastrophes and disasters. 
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connection with creating new identity stories and submitting these to the 
audiences, becomes crucial. Nevertheless, the role of the media is not limited 
to the processes taking place during the formative moment, but also occur up 
to the formative moment. In this way, instead of dealing with the changing 
identities in the context of the fixed and objectively formative moment, the 
formative moment is socially constructed and reproduced by the societal 
actors. As a result, this certain time period starts to live a life of its own as part 
of the network of practices and can in turn be used as an explanatory power to 
reason the societal developments (see also Madianou 2005, 19).  
Second, the definition of the formative moment as a certain time period 
indicates both a beginning and an end. However, in the current study, where 
the formative moment is applied to Estonia’s EU accession process, the 
temporal character of both the formative moment and the formed community 
– Estonia as EU candidate country – deserves attention. Thus, this formative 
moment is characterized by maintaining Estonia and forming Estonia as a 
candidate country in relation to the EU.  
2.4 SUMMARY 
The aim of this chapter has been to elaborate the multifaceted relationship 
between national identity, community and the media. In order to reach a 
coherent framework, the relationship was operationalized in terms of 
discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995). In the Table 2.1. the concepts of Billig, 
Anderson and Ringmar, which create a basis for media analysis, are positioned 
in the framework of discourse analysis. 
Table 2.1. National identity in terms of discourse analysis: text, discourse practice and 
sociocultural practice. 
 Text* Discourse practice Sociocultural practice 
Author Billig Anderson Ringmar 
Concept story of us imagining 
communities 
formative moment 
Focus of 
empirical analysis 
national identity 
stories 
national communities time depicted as a 
special one 
*Text consists of representations, relations and identity (Fairclough 1995, 57). 
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3. FORMATIVE MOMENT OF SETTING THE 
NORMS AND IMAGINING THE 
COMMUNITY  
In the following chapter my aim is to operationalize national identity in the 
framework of discourse analysis in order to analyze it from the perspective of 
representation, relations and identities, i.e. the three aspects of text level 
(Fairclough 1995, 57-58). These aspects are based on Halliday’s (1978) 
understanding of the functional linguistic theory, in which representation 
refers to the ideational and relations and identities to the interpersonal 
function17. An ideational function deals with the issues of knowledge whereas 
interpersonal function focuses on social relationship and social identity 
(Fairclough 1995, 17-18).  
I will combine these three aspects with the issues of belonging (where do 
we belong to?) and being (who are we?) that enables the study to scrutinize 
the relationship between Estonia and the EU as a representation of the text 
level and the question of belonging. The second question, (who we are?) offers 
a way towards the relations and identities as internal us-versus-Others 
relations constructed in the media content. In both questions the focus is on 
the distinction making process between us and Others.  
Last but not least, formative moment as a sociocultural practice is dealt 
with at the end of this chapter. In between these two aspects, discourse 
practice is analyzed on the basis of the societal actors who construct identity 
in Postimees. 
3.1 TEXT LEVEL: NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE MEDIA 
CONTENT 
As Zygmundt Bauman (1993) writes Others and/or strangers can be seen as 
the precondition for our never-ending quest to fasten our individual identities 
on a relentlessly moving landscape of uncertainty, where identity can be 
temporary, tentative and fragile. Thus, instead of a single relationship between 
us and the Other, there are several Others and several relationships, all of 
which are in continuous motion (see Section 1.2; Moisio 2008, 83). For 
example, Harle and Moisio (2000) write about relations between Finland and 
its neighbors Sweden and Russia, claiming that while Russian military force is 
seen as a threat and nuclear power plants considered to be dangerous, those 
of Sweden are not. 
                                                          
17 Halliday (1978) also uses the phrase textual level to refer to grammatical aspects of the texts, which 
this study does not analyze. 
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Nevertheless, the same Other can be given alternative meanings in relation 
to us during different times (Billig 1995, 81). For example, the ‘Baltic Germans’ 
were the ruling class of the Baltic provinces of Estland (part of current Estonia) 
and Livland (parts of current Estonia and Latvia) for almost seven centuries 
(Smith D. J. 2002). As Pille Petersoo (2007) writes, Estonian population 
deeply resented the German upper class until the first Soviet annexation of 
Estonia (1939-41) forced the majority to leave. After their departure, and 
during the occupation by Soviet forces, the Baltic Germans were no longer seen 
as a threat to Estonian culture, as reflected in the more positive writings about 
them (Petersoo 2007, 122).   
Of these two examples, the one about Finland and its neighbors is based on 
heterogeneity in space (various Others at the same time), whereas the 
changing attitude towards the Baltic Germans shows how the position of the 
Other changes in time. However, both cases can also be taken as examples of 
the static approach. Even though conceding that instead of one Other several 
can be depicted, each single relationship is considered to be a rather 
homogenous whole. Similarly, despite illuminating a change of the us-versus-
the Other relationship, the change does not lead to ambivalence but to a new 
fixed understanding of the Other.  
In order to see us-versus Others relationship as an ambivalent process one 
has to include a discursive aspect based on the struggle over meanings. The 
relationship is seen to be constructed in discourses that can be read from 
various texts, including the media texts. For example, Maria Mälksoo (2009, 
66, 68-69) writes about collective identities as triadic structures where 
between the us and Others lies a space for negotiations between the us and 
Others. Likewise, Daniel Esparza (2010) has depicted the EU in relation to 
Czech national identity as being both friendly and unfriendly on the basis of 
the perceptions of the world18. 
A firm basis to the perceptions of Others can be found from the 
international relations (IR) theories, namely realist, liberalist and 
constructivist schools19 that explain states’ agency in the international arena 
from certain perspectives. It is also common that scholars who use these 
theories position themselves either as realists, liberalists or constructivists and 
analyze world political events from their perspective. This study, however, 
takes a different approach. Even though the overall framework of this study is 
constructive, I use the perceptions of IR schools as background that enables to 
map us-versus- Others relationship.  
                                                          
18 Here it is important to make a distinction between the EU as manifold Other and being for or 
against EU membership, since these two do not necessarily have a linear correlation. On the basis of the 
media texts it can be said that the EU might not have be seen as a good partner for Estonia. However, 
membership might still have been considered as the best option for Estonia as a small country in an 
unfriendly world.  
19 For a wider overview about the us-versus-the Other problem in international relations, see 
Neumann (1999, 20-37). 
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US AND OTHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Both realism and liberalism as two rationalist schools have neglected the 
identity formation of actors, whereas the founder of the constructivist school 
Alexander Wendt (1999) depicts the way Others are understood in the cases of 
the realist, liberalist and constructivist perception of the world. Wendt (1999, 
257-259) argues, in the case of realism, Others are seen as enemies (Hobbesian 
culture), in the case of liberalism as rivals (Lockean culture) and in the case of 
constructivism as friends (Kantian culture). 
According to the realist school, power is a central force and the main object 
of study in an anarchical international system (Pääbo 2011, 53). The 
distribution of capabilities within that system determine states’ foreign 
policies by forcing states to certain actions (Waltz 1990, 29–30; Proedrou 
2010, 445; see also Moisio 2008, 87). In particular, however, realism is more 
concerned with structures than with agents.  
Since the realist school sees Others as enemies on the basis of Hobbesian 
culture, they are also supposed to be deeply different from us (Wendt 1999, 
260-263). The distinction is made on the basis of the axis of good and bad 
(Harle 1991, 18, 41). More concretely, the idea that the bad Other is threatening 
the good us, refers to the Other’s aggressiveness, violence and destructiveness 
(Silverstein 1989, 903-905; Zur 1991 and Harle, 1991, 15) and therefore also to 
the importance of military security.  
In the case of liberalism, based on Lockean culture, Others are seen as rivals 
whose intentions differ from the ones of the enemies (Wendt 1999, 279). While 
in connection with realism, it is claimed that the Other is trying to destroy, 
enslave or fundamentally alter us, rivalry recognizes the right of us to exist as 
a free subject even though it tries to ‘steal’ from us (Wendt 1999, 260–261, 
279-281; see also Moisio 2008, 88). States are seen as capable of having an 
‘‘an expanded sense of Self’’ (Wendt 1999, 293) that in turn produces a capacity 
for other-help (see also Moisio 2008, 88). Therefore, liberalism recognizes 
reciprocity in international relations: cooperation among states at the 
international level is based on an understanding that in case they share mutual 
interests, cooperation, for example in the form of international organizations 
enables to make common benefits possible (Keohane 1996, 468-470).  
Both realism and liberalism see that states act on the basis of material 
capabilities thus bracketing the ideational factors or seeing the interests and 
identities of states largely as fixed and given (Groeneveld 2012, 16). While 
rational schools see that states favor the kind and degree of horizontal 
institutionalization that maximizes their net benefits, constructivism 
emphasizes ideational and cultural factors to the degree, in which the actors 
inside and outside the organization share a collective identity and 
fundamental beliefs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 509-510, 513). 
Unlike rational approaches, constructivism disagrees on the issue of 
anarchic structure of the international community by claiming that the 
structure does not work without actors. Thus, the international world is seen 
to consist of both ideational and material factors (Groeneveld 2012, 19), the 
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structures and actors are seen to constitute to each other, and practices of 
actors to determine the character of anarchy (Pursiainen 1998, 175).   
Here, it has to be noted that the term ‘constructivism’ is used, in connection 
with the international relations theories, in two senses. First, as stated above, 
constructivism is seen as an IR school that focuses on the ideas and norms as 
a basis for identity as opposed to material interests guiding states’ action. Since 
Others are seen as friends, each other's security is not just instrumentally 
related to their own, but literally is their own (Wendt 1999, 297–307). This 
means that the cognitive boundaries of us are extended to include the Other, 
so that the security of the Other becomes a property of us (Wendt 1999 and 
Moisio 2008, 88). 
The second option, used in, but not restricted to, IR theories, is 
constructivism focusing on how us-versus- Others relationship is constructed, 
not what it is based on or formed from. Even though it has been claimed that 
actors make decisions on the basis of their perceptions of us and Others 
(Wendt 1992, 396-399; Proedrou 2010, 446; Hansen 2002, 1-13 and Ehin and 
Berg 2009, 8), constructivism does not map the content of these perceptions20. 
From this perspective, foreign policy is a mutual construction of us and Others 
in relation to each other that can be analyzed for understanding how Others 
and the world are understood as well as what message about us is transmitted 
to the world (Jakniunaite 2009, 119). Here, constructivism is no longer an 
alternative to the realist and liberalist school but can be used for scrutinizing, 
for example, how the realist or liberalist logic is used for constructing 
identities. 
As a whole, the current study is based on the second understanding of 
constructivism, since I claim that identities are constructed in the media. 
Simultaneously, constructivism as an idealist IR school is used as a 
background theory together with realism and liberalism in forming the 
discourses. However, since instead of the relationship between the states in 
the international arena, construction of Estonian-EU relationship in 
Postimees is analyzed, the usage of IR theories as a background for analyzing 
us-versus- Others relationship deserves further elaboration from two 
perspectives.  
First, even though some branches of constructivism emphasize that it is 
important to take into account “the domestic identity relationships between a 
state and its society and how these stand with regard to other states in the 
world” (Hopf 2009, 295), as well as point out the influence of the domestic 
discourse on state’s foreign policy decisions (Hopf 2009 and Groeneveld 2012, 
13), the majority of IR studies are based on the idea that states perform on 
international level as unitary entities. This study, however, does not analyze 
the impact Postimees has on the foreign political relationship between Estonia 
and the EU. Instead of that, IR theories are used to scrutinize the basis of the 
arguments authors of the paper adopt while writing about this relationship. 
                                                          
20 I would like to thank Kristi Raik for her valuable comments concerning this point. 
 42 
 
Since opinion articles are unofficial texts written by various representatives of 
society, one can also expect some heterogeneity in the writers’ perceptions of 
the world that form a basis for the discourses in Postimees.  
Another issue that needs further attention is the focus on Estonia’s relation 
with the EU as an international organization, instead of a relationship between 
two states. Even though rationalist schools see international organizations as 
instrumental associations that are designed to help states pursue their 
interests more efficiently, organizations are not seen as purposive and 
autonomous actors, but as instruments of states in international politics 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 509). This makes it problematic to 
apply to the EU, which does not carry state-like features (for example Manners 
2002, 239, 240), the IR theories above that theorize relationships between 
states. For example, issues like the axis of good and bad, and military security, 
as well as a possibility to see the EU as an enemy who tries to destroy Estonia 
or a rival trying to steal from Estonia, sound rather utopian. To overcome the 
problem, I will start from previous studies about Estonia-EU relations during 
the accession process. 
EU ACCESSION PROCESS: CONFIRMATION OR CHALLENGE TO 
ESTONIAN EUROPEANNESS 
The studies about the relationship between Estonia and the EU during the 
accession process, offer two opposite interpretations of Estonia as being or not 
being European. In the first, the integration is seen to confirm that Estonia is 
European, whereas in the second, the idea of Estonia as European is 
considered to be challenged by the same process. From the perspective of 
discourse, this is an example of contingency of meanings of Estonian EU 
accession process (see also Raik 2003, 24-25).  
According to the first interpretation, Estonia’s integration to the EU was 
part of “Return to Europe” (Feldman 2001, 9), a process shifting Estonia 
culturally and geopolitically West on the map (Feldman 2001, 9-11; see also 
Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b). In this process the EU represents a concrete 
phenomenon of Europe. Since Estonia is seen as an integral part of Europe’s 
economic, political and cultural life, at least since the Middle Ages (Feldman 
2001, 10), culture, religion21 and history had widely been used as norms in the 
accession debates for mapping the a way back to Europe as a revival of 
historical justice (see also Berg 2002, 113).  
Apart from using Western heritage to legitimize EU membership as a 
natural development for Estonia, it was also used to impose on the EU a moral 
obligation to accept Estonia and other Central and Eastern European 
                                                          
21 On the basis of Estonian statistics, 54% of the population aged 15 and older does not feel an 
affiliation to any religion (http://www.stat.ee/65352/?highlight=religion). Thus, the country can be 
characterized as being rather secular. Despite these statistics, the Christian background has been one 
argument in reasoning Estonian Europeanness during the accession process (see also Kuus 2002a, 97).   
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countries as members (Lagerspetz 1999, 388). The last point can be seen as an 
example of us presented to Others (see also O’Connor 1993) where Western 
heritage stands for an identity matter that complements to the practice of the 
accession process in a form of how we want you to see us (see also Light 2001, 
1055). 
At the same time, while seeing the EU (and NATO) as representatives of 
Western Europe, Europe or the West in general, a clear distinction was made 
between Estonia and Russia based on a dichotomy of Europeanisation and 
Russification as good versus bad (Berg 2002, 111). In this process, the East 
(Russia) was used to show Estonia’s differences from Russia as well as its 
similarities with Europe (for example Moisio 2002, 92-93, 101-102; Mälksoo 
2006, 276; Lagerspetz 1999, 388; Mole 2007b, 161-162; see also Salovaara-
Moring 2010b, 54). Thus, the aim has been to make the border with Russia as 
firm as possible while the other borders become more permeable (Merritt 
2000, 244, 255-256 and Berg and Oras 2000, 604). As Merje Kuus (2003) 
contends, security has been used in this process as one of the main arguments, 
even though rather than having been pushed to the West by a threat of 
invasion, Estonia has been pulled in by common values (Kuus 2003, 574-578; 
see also Talts and Kirch 1998, 105).  
On the basis of the second, opposite interpretation, the EU accession 
process challenged the idea that Estonia had always been part of Europe. 
While in the former examples, Estonia’s belonging to Europe was mapped on 
the basis of culture, history, geography etc., here Estonia’s integral 
Europeanness was challenged by the official rules and regulations set by the 
EU during the accession process. As a result, one deals with the transformation 
of us, indicated by the EU (and other international organizations) not the 
simple relocation of us to the West.  
The process has been depicted as an example of international socialization, 
Europeanisation where the formal and informal rules, procedures, policies 
and norms are constructed, diffused and institutionalized. These norms, 
procedures, policies, and rules have first been defined and consolidated at the 
European level and then incorporated into domestic institutions, policies, 
identities, and discourses (Radaelli 2000, 4; see also Schimmelfennig 2000, 
109-112; Schimmelfennig 1998, 198-200; Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 6, 
14). Thus, the issue is about teaching and learning community values and 
norms by reinforcement (Schimmelfennig 2000, 111, 123; Schimmelfennig 
1998, 221, see also Miniotaite 2003, 216-217). In this process, the accession 
states have been learners or adopters of European norms (Kuus 2004a, 473; 
Aalto and Berg 2002, 264; Kuus 2004a, 474; Nielsen et al. 2009, 253 and Raik 
2003, 101)22 under the EU’s supervision (Miniotaite 2003, 217). Integration is 
conceived as a kind of graduation from Eastern Europe to Europe, a process 
in which the accession countries must prove that they are willing to and 
                                                          
22 For the idea of being learner see also in Neumann 1999, 78.  
 
 44 
 
capable of internalizing EU values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2000, 111 and 
Kuus 2004a, 477). 
On that basis it is not surprising that the EU has been depicted as a 
normative power (Manners 2002, 240, 252 and Manners 2006). The claim 
refers to the EU acting in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way on the basis of 
its normative constitution, substantive normative principles. The most 
essential of these is ‘peace’, which is based on political, civil, and economic 
freedom, and democracy, which is based on the rule of law and good 
governance (Manners 2008, 45-46, 48-59 and Manners 2002, 242-244). 
Accordingly, scholars have scrutinized the role of the EU in promoting 
democracy (for example van Elsuwege 2006; Raik 2006 and Stewart 2006), 
conducting reforms (for example Nyman-Metcalf 2006, 111-112) or forming 
transition agenda (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 6) outside its boundaries.  
At this point, two issues have to be specified. First, from the perspective of 
the national identity, the relevance of the norms set during the official 
accession process depends on how the identity is understood. In the case of 
dealing with the aspects of identity like history, culture etc., taking over EU’s 
legislation, acquis communautaire, and reforming the society according to the 
guidance of the EU can be largely left out of the substantial scope of the 
national identity. However, as Wendt (1994, 390) explains, from the 
constructivist perspective one can also say that the actor will gradually 
internalize new identity by changing its own beliefs about what it is, while at 
the same time the actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each 
other and see themselves as us bound by certain norms. Thus, the EU can be 
seen as an example of constitutive institutions that “contribute to shaping 
actors’ identities” (Schimmelfennig 1998, 211). This enables the study to 
analyze, how the identity stories (as being) are challenged in the discursive 
struggle of becoming. 
Second, even though this research does not use the term ’normative‘ to 
refer to the EU as objectively and universally good and valuable, the EU was 
during the accession process nevertheless trying to impart to the candidate 
countries “its vision of the good world” (Nielsen, Berg and Roll 2009, 253). It 
was done through the institutionalization of the rules and norms 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 503) as “politics of conditionality” 
(Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan 2013, 1269) where candidate countries 
complied with the EU’s conditions due to the incentives of membership and 
the EU had a crucial role in reshaping their political, economic, and legal 
systems (see also Raik 2003, 95-116). Thus, on the basis of the German 
example, Hörschelmann (2001, 986) writes that the comparison between East 
and West almost always changed into a comparison of East with West where 
one was ascribing “normality” to one side only whereas the Other had to 
measure itself against that.  
The idea that the candidate countries, including Estonia were depicted by 
the EU as not European or only partly European (for example semi-insiders, 
as claimed by Aalto 2006) has been pointed out by scholars as part of the wider 
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construction of Eastern Europe and a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and 
exclusion as Europe, but not Europe (Wolff 1994, 7; Mälksoo 2006, 276; 
Moisio 2002, 98-99; see also Hobson 2004 and Flockhart 2008). This notion 
was originally invented in the eighteenth century (Wolff 1994, 7), when 
Eastern Europe became one of the generalized Others necessary for Europe’s 
self-image (Neumann 1999, 143-160; see also Salovaara-Moring 2010b, 51-
52). From this perspective, the EU enlargement has been depicted as a 
manifestation of this dual framing of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (Kuus 2004a; Mälksoo 2004 and Mälksoo 2006, 276). As Merje 
Kuus writes, various Othering processes made them appear as not-yet-fully 
European, thus constantly seeking confirmation of their Europeanness from 
Europe (Kuus 2004a, 472-474, 483-484; Jakniunaite 2009, 119, 123; see also 
Kuus 2004b, 194).  
In more theoretical terms, this can be seen as an example of how frontiers 
and boundaries between us and Others are crossed and transgressed 
(Bennington 1990, 24). For mapping this condition, Victor Turner’s concept 
of liminality as an ambiguous borderline condition, of the state of being 
“neither here nor there” but “bewixt and between” (Turner [1969]1991, 95) has 
been used (for example Mälksoo 2006; 2009 and Salovaara-Moring 2010b, 
49-50). According to Turner liminality is a period marking the passage of the 
ritual subject through “a cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes 
of the past or coming state” (Turner [1969]1991, 94). Constructing candidate 
countries as liminal Europeans (Mälksoo 2006, 276 and Mälksoo 2009, 67) 
therefore means locating them in a liminal space neither developed nor 
underdeveloped, neither learned nor wholly ignorant, as Europe but not quite 
Europe in the process of becoming mature Europeans (Kuus 2004a, 476).  
While studies that analyze the accession process as a ‘return to Europe’ 
focus on how Estonia maps itself as European, here the EU is the entity that 
maps the candidate countries and sets conditions for becoming European. As 
Merje Kuus (2004a) writes, East Europeans are framed as naïve and immature 
entities who need to overcome the ‘mental straightjacket’ of communist society 
and the relationship between the West and East-Central Europe is therefore 
construed on the basis of the viewing the (Western) subject and the monitored 
(Eastern) object (see also Hörschelmann 2001, 986 and Smith 2001, 221). 
Conclusively, also the issue of our superiority over the Other depicted in 
connection with identity (see Section 1.2 and Section 2.1) has to be revised. 
The superiority of the EU over Estonia as the Other can be depicted from this 
process whereas, as Maria Mälksoo (2006, 276) points out, not much analysis 
on, how Estonia and other Central and Eastern European countries have 
responded to being constructed as liminal Europeans has been done.  
The studies that deal with Estonian agency during the accession process 
communicate various understandings of the country’s position. Gregory 
Feldman (2000, 407) writes that as a small country with a lack of economic 
resources, political capital on the international scene, and military strength, 
Estonia does not see that it could dictate the terms of its international 
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relations. Rather the country adapts to the trends spanning Europe to avoid a 
situation where the appeals to the uniqueness and superiority of Estonian 
nation would have the counterproductive effects of alienating Estonia’s 
Western benefactors. Also Kristi Raik (2003, 101) writes about asymmetrical 
and one-directional process where Estonia as one of the applicant countries 
has adapted itself to EU rules and adopted its patterns.  
At the same time, the idea of Estonia following the EU norms in the 
learning process has also been questioned as being too simplistic (Kuus 2002c, 
302; see also Moisio 2009, 103), even though it is admitted that the accession 
countries observe and mostly follow EU recommendations in their policy-
making (Kuus 2004a, 478). Indeed 
 [T]he EU enlargement process should be viewed not in terms of 
wholesale adoption of political norms by the applicant countries but, 
rather, in terms of selective appropriation of political narratives for 
the specific political strategies of specific political groups in these 
countries. 
Kuus 2002b, 394 
Thus, Estonian statecraft selects the views that suit its strategies instead of just 
relaying the views that are prevalent or influential in the West, and the 
“learning process” (Kuus 2004b, 203) involves also the appropriation of these 
Western norms by specific groups inside the country (see also Kuus 2007a, 99 
and Raik 2003, 113, 191-194).  
I agree with the points raised by Merje Kuus (2004b; 2007a) but in relation 
to the current study, an additional specification has to be made: in the place of 
the statecraft, media represents an Estonian agency. Therefore, the accession 
process is not dealt with from the perspective of Estonia as a candidate country 
in relation to the EU, but the one constructed in Postimees. The two above 
mentioned issues, how the EU constructs Estonia and how Estonia as the EU’s 
Other responds to the construction of its identity by the EU (Mälksoo 2006, 
276) are included in the same process. 
CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE MEDIA 
In order to use IR theories, Europeanisation and normativity as a basis of 
analysis, all three concepts need to be adapted to media studies. To start from 
the perspective of IR theories and Europeanization, research has claimed that 
in connection with the foreign news coverage a strong nationalistic bias can be 
depicted, e.g. journalists tend to defend what they understand as national 
interests (Trenz 2009, 41). Also, in the case of dealing with EU related issues, 
national media tends to stick to the national perspective, thus confirming the 
idea of the media as a national story teller by incorporating integration into 
national stories of us. In this process, the relationship between us and the 
Other means that a nation’s visions of Europe are compatible to its visions of 
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itself (Wæver 2002, 25). This enables the study to presume that the difference 
between international organizations and the states as Others (see Section 1.2) 
is not entirely communicated in the media. Thus, even though hostile and 
friendly perceptions of the world are indicated by the IR theories to analyze 
relationship between the states, I assume that combining these to 
Europeanisation and a question of superiority, offer a fruitful framework to 
analyze Estonia-EU relations in the media texts23.  
From IR theories, liberalism indicates sympathetic attitude towards 
international cooperation and EU’s superiority is admitted on the basis of 
Europeanisation process. The constructivist claim that states form ‘anarchy’ 
(Wendt 1992) means in the current context that Estonia and the EU are seen 
as actors who in principal have equal possibilities to influence things. The idea 
about the EU as part of wider hostile world where small Estonia has to survive 
is based on the logic of the realist school. Despite the fact that in the foreign 
political arena the EU has never really threatened Estonia, in the articles of 
Postimees one could still depict the EU as dangerous, or even fatal, for instance 
from the perspective of Estonian language or culture. Also here, the EU’s 
superiority over Estonia is admitted. However, while in relation to 
Europeanisation the issue is about the EU as an authority appreciated by 
Estonia, here the relationship is seen to have an authoritarian character. 
Coming to the second point, I see normativity of Estonia-EU relations as a 
basis that enables the study to make a distinction between being and becoming 
communicated in the media content. Here, becoming is seen somewhat 
differently from what Mikko Lagerspetz (1999, 386) has mapped as a logic of 
transition: having a given normal state of society which will be reached 
through a teleological process and the end of socialism enables to return to the 
rationality of the “normal order of things”. On the basis of similar logic, 
Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) argue that by the time Estonia joined the 
EU, the main task of the post-communist reforms seemed to be completed and 
Estonia had stepped into the new millennium as a ‘normal’ free-market society 
(see also Vihalemm 2003, 598 and Pavlovaite 2003, 240, 245). 
Similarly, the issues about whether it is possible that the Baltic countries 
are “finally and truly belonging to Europe” (Jakniunaite 2009, 131) or, as 
membership in the EU and NATO, to gain Western recognition of their 
“European subjectivity” (Mälksoo 2009, 69) are carried by the same logic but 
based on another viewpoint. The scholars who emphasize the liminality of the 
Estonian position inside the EU do so on the basis of the EU perspective (the 
EU still does not regard Estonia as ‘truly European’)24 whereas the claims of 
Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) about a ‘normal’ country are based on the 
Estonian perception of itself as a country who has made the about-turn from 
                                                          
23 In this point one has though to note the paradox that out of three IR theories constructivism is the 
only approach considering identities, recognition etc. as a basis of action.  
24 In the article of Eiki Berg (2007, 49-50), also being in between has been depicted as Estonian self-
positioning.  
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the East to the West in various spheres of life as part of the transition process 
(see also Vihalemm 2005 and Vihalemm 2007, 793). 
Although the current study distinguishes between being and becoming, the 
research focuses not on the ‘normality’ as an end product but the daily struggle 
held in the media between being and becoming as equally normative phases 
of the construction of identity. The struggle is seen as a manifestation of a 
formative moment. In this process, becoming is openly normative whereas in 
the case of being, the norms are taken for granted as ‘truth’ in the foucauldian 
sense, and therefore, not noticed (see Section 2.1). From this perspective the 
idea of ‘finally becoming a normal European country’ does not mean that one 
moves from the normative to the non-normative phase, but that the norms are 
no longer explicitly stated.   
In sum, media texts as an indicator of societal changes offers a very good 
perspective to the self-perception of Estonia in relation to the EU during the 
accession process and therefore enables us to analyze national identity as 
banal normative process with the focus on both being and becoming as well as 
a struggle between these two25. In the overall framework of the discourse 
analysis (see Sections 2.3 and 2.4), so far a basis has been formed for analyzing 
representation of the text level (Fairclough 1995, 57), i.e. the relationship 
between Estonia and the EU. On that grounds, the issue about Estonia and the 
EU as equal partners or Estonia as a party willing or reluctant to learn from 
the EU can be answered on the basis of the empirical analysis.  
RELATIONS AND IDENTITIES: DEPICTING INTERNAL OTHERS 
After having clarified the framework necessary for analyzing representation, I 
now move on with what Fairclough (1995, 57-58) has mapped as the other 
parts of the text level, relations and identities. While representation deals with 
the division between the internal us and the external Other (Estonia and the 
EU), this section focuses on the identification of the writers in their articles as 
well as how they map the relationship between themselves and their potential 
audience by particular subject positions (Fairclough [1989]2001, 31-32). 
Accordingly, each discourse type establishes its particular set of subject 
positions and people are coming to be placed in a range of subject positions 
during the socialization process (Fairclough [1989]2001, 85).  
In the current study the process of inclusion and exclusion/alienation (or 
unification and separation) for making a distinction between the ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ citizens in the media in connection with the EU accession is 
analyzed. Like Ullamaija Kivikuru writes, the media shows “what kind of 
qualities good citizens should have and where the border with bad citizens 
                                                          
25 Apart from the public texts, the division between us and Others can also be analyzed on the basis 
of the self-identification of the people. Even though these can be seen as two complementary sides of the 
same process, in the current case, people’s experiences remain out of the scope of this study (see also 
Section 2.1). 
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lies.” (Kivikuru 2004, 33). In between these two there occurs the concept of 
ambivalent inclusion, including the particular and excluding the rest 
(Fairclough 1995, 181). 
Fairclough (1995, 181) has mapped inclusion as a common feature of 
political discourse that is based on claiming solidarity by placing everyone in 
the same boat. In this situation a leader has the right to speak for the people 
as a whole. The same has also been characterized by Zygmundt Bauman (1997) 
as a process of keeping the nation as proper citizens under control in a tight 
connection between the elite and the media. During the formative moment 
scrutinized in this study, mobilizing people for a certain goal can be taken as 
an example. In this process the main idea of exclusion is to rule out those who 
do not fit in the norm of a “member of the nation” (Bishop and Jaworski 2003, 
250). Sometimes the excluded ones are not just improper but a potential threat 
to the whole society.  
In Estonia’s case, the internal normativity and criteria of being accepted 
are most often related to the ethnic relations and the Russian-speaking 
minority (for example Laitin, 1998; Smith G. 1998; see also Kuus 2002a, 93). 
For instance, Merje Feldman (2001) gives an example on how scientific 
evidence, sociological surveys and ‘western commentators’ are used for 
confirming a true Estonian identity narrative as scientifically proven, and 
hence not open for discussion. She continues that the references to DNA 
evidence construct identity as a biological matter and loyalty to Estonia that is 
based on survey data is widely cited as an indicator of “Russian mindset” 
incorporated even into the Bases of the Estonian State Integration Policy 
(Kuus 2001, 16). Similarly, Huntington is referred to as a Western expert and 
his “[c]onflict between civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 22) is cited as a fact 
(Feldman 2001, 10-13; Kuus 2002a, 104; see also Aalto and Berg 2002, 262) 
26.  
At the same time in the studies conducted about Estonian national identity 
so far, the normative aspect in the form of keeping people under control has 
largely been missing. It can be reasoned with the importance of the ethnic 
aspects over the civic as a characteristic feature of Estonia (see Section 2.1; see 
also Piirimäe 2009, 45) where the nation was formed before the state. Later 
on, during the Soviet times the state was seen as the hostile Other against 
which (ethnic) national identity was reproduced. After 1991 when the Estonian 
Republic was re-established, the state has been widely considered as a 
protector of language and culture, as they are key elements for national 
identity (see also Galbreath 2005, 155). 
                                                          
26 While in the initial years of independence the constitution of boundaries within Estonia (between 
Estonians and Russian-speakers) and the border between Estonia and Russia was considerably 
overlapping (Merritt 2000, 255-256) and also Russian speaking inhabitants were seen as a threat to the 
national identity later on they have also been seen as a valuable human resource potential (for example 
Berg 2002, 115; see also Kuus 2003, 576).  
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In line with that also the idea about banal national identity constructed on 
a daily basis has got less attention in Estonia than the master narratives of the 
nation (see Section 1.1). The process has resembled the characterization of 
Sami Moisio (2003a, 101), although Moisio writes about Finland, in which the 
identity related suppositions are taken as a starting point that has to be 
protected as a true national history. In this process, where no distinction is 
made between a category of practice and a category of analysis (see Section 1.1) 
the researchers and their values are connected to the selected national story 
that one tries to confirm through the research. Logically, this approach omits 
the daily process of inclusion and exclusion, in which media tell people what 
they are obliged or not entitled to do, from the scope of identity.  
The current study holds similarities with the analysis that the Finnish 
scholar, Anu Kantola (1998) conducted while scrutinizing Finnish 
independence day TV programs. Kantola deals with the characteristics that are 
used for making a distinction between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ citizens, i.e. 
realism and sensibility (Kantola 1998, 60-63). Realism as the opposite of 
idealism27 refers to the maturity to understand the lack of choices. At the same 
time, it enables the ‘realists’ to get rid of the contradictions: they accept the 
situation as it is. In this way the actors become subordinate to the reality: since 
one is not capable of changing reality, all one has to do is to accept the things 
(Kantola 1998, 60-63). From the perspective of inclusion or exclusion, realism 
is thus an efficient way to keep the community under control. Instead of 
interpretations or choices one is talking about unchanging facts and 
circumstances. At the same time, as Kantola (1998, 58-60) writes, 
disagreement is seen as the greatest threat and those, who are considered to 
be responsible for breaking the homogeneity, are the ones excluded from us in 
order to save the rest of the community. Another characteristic feature of a 
proper citizen pointed out by Kantola (1998, 60-63) is the victory of sense over 
the emotions that enables one to make a division between rational and 
emotional people.  
While combining the distinction making basis, that Kantola (1998) depicts, 
with the IR theories as a background for forming the discourses, several 
parallels can be found. The basic idea of the IR realism is clearly in accordance 
with the realism described by Kantola. The main idea of liberalism, a 
theoretical approach considering international organizations to be significant 
in the world anarchy, can be brought to the level of the citizens as a norm of 
being informed about these important organizations (in this case the EU). This 
leaves us with IR constructivism and the rationalism found by Kantola (1998) 
as a characteristic of a proper citizen. This combination might seem rather 
artificial, not least because constructivism is the IR theory that is idealist not 
                                                          
27 Instead of ‘idealism’, I use the term ‘illusionism’ as an opposite to realism for making a distinction 
between an ideal as something one should aim at and the illusions that are pointless from the perspective 
of realism. 
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rationalist like liberalism and realism. However, since constructivist IR theory 
emphasizes also the role of the agency in forming the reality in the current 
study one can expect the citizens’ action to have a rational, not an emotional 
basis.  
SUMMARY 
The content of Table 3.1 is based on the arguments presented in the previous 
sections and also operationalizes the representation, relations and identities 
for empirical analysis. 
Table 3.1. Operationalization of representation, relations and identities. 
Formative 
moment 
Struggle Text level of discourse Question 
Appearance of the 
new Other (EU) 
Becoming vs being Representation 
(Estonia-EU) 
Where do we 
belong? 
Appearance of 
internal Others 
during EU 
accession process 
Becoming vs being Relations and identities 
(Inclusion-exclusion) 
Who are we? 
 
Even though the EU has been widely seen in Estonian academic texts as a 
concrete phenomenon of a wider Europe and the EU accession has therefore 
been dealt with as a ‘return to Europe’, in the current study the setting is 
turned the other way round. The EU is dealt with as ‘the new official Other’ 
whose superiority and ambivalence is formed in public discussion where the 
openly normative discursive struggle over who we are and where do we belong 
to was held during the accession process. In this struggle the taken-for-granted 
understanding of being was challenged by the necessity to become something 
else. 
The current section can be seen as a background theoretical basis that is 
used to form the discourses from the empirical data. The linguistic basis as 
another important aspect will be dealt with in the fourth chapter of the thesis. 
Before that, however, I focus on two other aspects of the discourse analysis: 
discourse practice and the sociocultural practice. 
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3.2 IMAGINING COMMUNITY AS A DISCOURSE 
PRACTICE 
From the text level and the media content, I now move to the processes that 
take place at the institutional level. In terms of the discourse analysis, I will 
deal with the discourse practice, as the issues connected to the production and 
consumption of the media texts (Fairclough, 1995, 58-62). Since discourse 
practice can be seen as a link between the text and sociocultural practice, the 
latter shapes texts by shaping “the nature of the discourse practice”, i.e. the 
ways the texts are produced and consumed (Fairclough 1995, 60). In the 
current study, this means interrelations between the media content (as text 
level), writers of the texts (as discourse practice), and the formative moment 
(as sociocultural practice) as constitutive to each other.  
From the text production and consumption, I focus on production, since I 
find it problematic to analyze the consumption of the texts on the basis of the 
media content as an empirical data (see Section 2.2). However, possible links 
between the media texts and the public opinion is discussed in the conclusions 
of the study. While Fairclough (1995, 49) has mapped the production of the 
media texts as series of transformation which link source events in the public 
domain to the consumption of media texts, I have chosen one aspect of this 
series of transformations. In relation to the production of the opinion articles, 
I analyze the journalists and other actors who perform as writers of the articles 
as an example of discourse practice.  
From the perspective of discourse analysis focusing on writers of texts 
might also raise questions, since scholars have controversial opinions 
concerning actors’ capability to change discourses as system of representation 
(Section 1.1; see also Mole 2012, 1). I agree with the scholars who emphasize 
the importance of actors claiming that no discourses exist without human 
agency (Richardson 2007, 28) even though the agency is opaque in cases when 
discourses get a dominant position of truth. However, these two options can 
also be seen as parallels, and not exclusive. As Richard Mole writes, discourse 
can condition and constrain political action or can be employed instrumentally 
by political actors to further their socio-political goals (Mole 2007b, 157 and 
Mole 2012, 1; see also Lagerspetz and Vogt 2004, 80-81). Consequently, on the 
last case writers as discourse practice are constitutive to the text level of 
discourses.  
Another constitutive relationship between discourse practice and 
formative moment as sociocultural practice also emphasizes the role of the 
actors. I follow the logic of Karsten Friis (2000) that while Foucault's 
understanding of discourses might not leave much room for political 
entrepreneurs, introducing agency does not necessarily imply a rejection of the 
foucauldian framework, since Ringmar’s formative moments can be seen as 
periods where there is more room and influence for agency (see also Browning 
2008, 60).  Therefore, instead of an unquestioned hegemony and the status 
quo, the struggle inside as well as between the discourses can be depicted (see 
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also Jokinen and Juhila 1991, 36). A same argument has been made by Kristi 
Raik who uses the term “power over discourse” in comparison to “power of 
and in discourse” (2003, 27). While the last two refer to the actors as 
constituted by stable systems of meaning, the focus of the first one is on change 
and agency.  
I start this part of the study with the position of media and journalists as 
well as close interconnections between the societal actors in Estonia as a small 
country. Actors are also connected to the formative moments that in this 
section are not limited to Estonia’s EU accession process only but refer also to 
other time periods of great societal changes. Focus on different periods also 
enables me to deal with the discourse practice as a process.  
ESTONIAN MEDIA: POLITICAL ACTIVIST IN HISTORICAL EVENTS 
For elaborating the role media and journalists have played in Estonia, I start 
from the relationship between universal and particular. As Balčytienė et al. 
(2011, 221-230) explain journalists in many countries around Europe work in 
rather similar professional environments: they use similar equipment, new 
media technologies, and share certain ideas (e.g. informational function of 
journalism) in their occupational ideology. The position of journalists is 
depicted as the one of modern professionals, “whose daily practices deploy, 
reproduce and recreate social imaginaries on the modern social order” 
(Heikkilä and Kunelius 2006, 67). At the normative level, the professionalism 
of journalists has also been connected to their responsibility to produce 
diversity oriented and sensitive media coverage (Jakubowicz and Süskösd 
2008, 33).  
At the same time columns, editorials and other forms of news analysis will 
never qualify as 'objective reporting', since the voice of the journalist is too 
loud or too central for them to be objective (Richardson 2007, 86). Rather, in 
opinion articles and commentaries the newspaper mobilizes public opinion, 
enters the arena as a political actor and puts aside the professional standards 
of impartiality and objectivity (Trenz 2007, 90). As Trenz argues, in the 
editorial, the journalists turn into essayists who dissociate themselves from 
daily events and unfold a more reflexive position and evaluation of long trends 
and contextualized problems (Trenz 2007, 90).  
In this process, journalists can be seen as part of the (national) 
intelligentsia who have an important position in connection with constructing 
nation as a social imaginary. This leads us to the second aspect, the situational 
and particularistic factors, since journalism is strongly influenced by factors 
like traditions and values of national journalism culture (Balčytienė et al. 2011, 
221-230). 
Paradoxically, the particular aspects of Estonian journalists as societal 
actors are rather similar to those pointed out in connection with the opinion 
articles. As Epp Lauk (1996) and Inka Salovaara-Moring (2009) write, the role 
of the journalist in Central and Eastern Europe has traditionally been regarded 
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more as a political activist and an advocate of certain values, than that of a 
content producer or manufacturer of the news for the market. Thus, the 
traditional role of a journalist has been closer to that of an intellectual, artist 
or writer – someone who spoke on behalf of the people and to the people (Lauk 
1996, 95 and Salovaara-Moring 2009, 99).  
Examples of this activist approach have a long historical background (see 
Høyer, Lauk and Vihalemm 1993). Epp Lauk (2008, 196) writes that from the 
mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Estonian press strongly 
contributed to the development of national identity and culture in national 
language and served as a safeguard of national language during the period of 
Russification in the late nineteenth century.   
Similar features are also characteristic to the Soviet period (1944-1991) 
when, from the perspective of journalists, the situation was rather ambiguous: 
while working within the framework of ideological brain-washing, some 
journalists were also involved in cultural resistance (Lauk 1996, 93). More 
concretely, as Epp Lauk (1996, 95) explains, national goals were not lacking 
from journalism despite official ideology but Estonian media tried to 
contribute to the objectives of national survival (including the survival of 
national identity as well as common native language) through ‘silent 
resistance’ that was mainly based on the preservation of traditional national 
cultural forms (see also Vihalemm 2006, 17). This can be seen as one example 
of what Inka Salovaara-Moring (2009, 118) has depicted as the hidden practice 
of nationhood that was characteristic to the situation before the national ‘new 
awakening’ at the end of 1980s28.  
Against this historical background, the leading position of the Estonian 
media during the ‘new awakening’ can be seen as a logical continuation of the 
former pattern. Several scholars argue that from 1987 until the restoration of 
independence in 1991, media were the most important mechanisms used for 
the political breakthrough in all Baltic societies (Vihalemm et al. 1997, 227; see 
also Lauk 1996, 93) and the changes in society could not have been the same 
without the direct involvement of the media (Vihalemm 2003, 587).  
As one feature of this phenomenon, the close cooperation between the 
media and the leaders of the political activities of that period has been pointed 
out. The media became a network, through which the growing political activity 
of the nation functioned and political opposition was organized (Vihalemm et 
                                                          
28 This name for the period distinguishes it from the Age of Awakening in the 19th century. 
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al. 1997, 227; Vihalemm 2006, 18 and Vihalemm 2003, 587-590). As Lauristin 
and Vihalemm argue  
The ability of the broadcast media, with their direct online access to 
the mass audience, to mobilize people and to stimulate protest 
movements was fully utilized by the Baltic opposition politicians. 
Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 25  
For example, the six hundred kilometer Baltic human chain from Tallinn to 
Vilnius on August 23, 1989 was not only broadcasted directly by all radio and 
TV channels in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania but was assisted by the media 
(Vihalemm 2003, 588). Similarly, during the Soviet military intervention in 
January 1991 and August 1991 coup, mass resistance was organized by media 
in all Baltic countries (Vihalemm et al. 1997, 227).  
Thus, it is not surprising that during the ‘new awakening’ the circulation of 
Estonian newspapers was the highest ever (the dailies Edasi 154 000 and 
Rahva Hääl 205 000 in January 1990)29 (Vihalemm 2003, 588 and Vihalemm 
and Kõuts 2004, 65). For example on the basis of a survey conducted by the 
Department of Journalism at Tartu University, the average Estonian in 1990 
read twelve newspapers and magazines regularly (Vihalemm 2003, 588). The 
period has been called also the zenith for Estonian Television (Šein 2004, 148). 
FORMATIVE MOMENT OF ESTONIAN MEDIA  
The characteristic feature of the examples given above is that scholars focus 
on the role of the rather stable media institutions in the radically changing 
society, whereas after Estonia regained its independence in 1991, both the 
media and the societal framework changed remarkably. In terms of discourse 
analysis media plays an important role in the diffusion of social and cultural 
changes and is, simultaneously, shaped by the same changes (Fairclough 1995, 
33, 51). Thus, the shift in the societal power relations manifested by general 
transformation process can be analyzed also at the level of media 
organizations (see also Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 24). Although this is 
also done in the Estonian case, most studies do not deal with it in the 
framework of shift in societal power relations.  
As Epp Lauk (2008) argues the media and journalists in Estonia during the 
transition years found themselves in a certain normative vacuum of the 
changing public sphere, in which the old patterns did not work and the new 
ones were yet to be introduced or adapted. In this process both the functions 
and roles of journalists as professionals and the media system in the changing 
society needed to be redefined and reshaped (Lauk 2008, 193). In terms of 
discourse analysis, the situation can be characterized as a time of rapid and 
                                                          
29 The same figures in 1998 were 65 200 for Postimees (a renamed Edasi) and 47 200 for Eesti 
Päevaleht as a successor of Rahva Hääl (http://www.eall.ee/tiraazhid/1998.html). 
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continuous change (formative moment) where the discourse practice of media 
(actors) are in continuous flux (see Fairclough 1995, 61). 
As an example of the situational and particularistic factors, one of the most 
significant changes that took place in Estonia in the first half of 1990s was a 
generational replacement of the editorial staff: the majority of the journalists 
were replaced by new, young and often also uneducated ones. At the same time 
the attachment of the young generation of journalists to the liberal model of 
journalism exported to Estonia largely by Western experts, changed the 
previously cooperative relationships between the political elite and the media 
which had been based on memories about common participation in national 
liberation movements (Vihalemm 2003, 589, 591; Lauk 2008, 194 and 
Salovaara-Moring 2010a, 115). Thus, the main trends of media development 
from 1991 till 1994 have been described by Peeter Vihalemm (2003, 589) as 
the emancipation of the media from the state and political forces as well as 
adaptation to the conditions of the open market. 
While interpreting the new relationship between the political elite and the 
media, contrasting aspects have been pointed out. Even though Estonian 
media was seen to have been relatively successful in obtaining political 
independence in comparison with some other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the lack of critical assessment of information provided by influential 
sources has been depicted as common to the journalistic culture in all post-
Communist countries, including Estonia (Vihalemm 2003, 589-590). For 
example, the leading print media invited politicians to write columns as 
unilateral sources and by doing so incorporated politicians into becoming part 
of the journalistic interpretation of political events (Vihalemm 2003, 589-
590). 
Thus, it is not surprising that a lot of similarities have been found from the 
way journalists and the political elite have interpreted the societal 
developments of Estonia. More concretely, since the politics of radical liberal 
reforms implemented in Estonia in the 1990s were seen to correspond to the 
interests and convictions of the youth, it was also widely supported by young 
journalists. Therefore, the journalists intuitively stood at the side of the 
‘winners’ - young, educated, well-paid and living in the bigger cities of Estonia 
- and Estonian media helped to form the climate of opinions that supported 
the implementation of shock therapy in the other sectors of society (Lauristin 
and Vihalemm 2002, 50; Vihalemm 2003, 590-591 and Vihalemm and 
Lauristin 2004, 21-22).   
The supportive attitude of the Estonian media towards the EU throughout 
the accession process can be seen as one example of the same phenomenon. 
According to opinion polls, Estonia’s accession to the EU was supported the 
most by the ‘winners’. Thus, the profile of the pro-EU side was rather similar 
to that of the new generation of journalists working in the national dailies.  
At the same time the support can also be interpreted from a universalist 
perspective. This perspective enables the study to point out the general 
tendency that, especially in connection with the foreign reporting, the political 
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elite and the national media tend to understand and map the idea of ‘national’ 
in a similar way (for example Riegert 2010, 199). In the current case the 
common understanding among journalists and the political elite (as well as 
other elites) means that EU accession is seen to be in accordance to Estonia’s 
interests.  
While changing the perspective from the media to the audience, the key 
changes at the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s were the simultaneous 
reduction in subscription figures and the public trust in the media. For 
instance, between 1990 and 1995, the circulation of Estonian national dailies 
fell by more than a factor of 3.5 (Vihalemm 2003, 592). However, the 
shrinking circulation did not mean an equally dramatic decrease in readers, 
since instead of subscribing or buying papers, people started to read 
newspapers in public libraries or at work, borrowed them from neighbors or 
friends, and also began to read the news on the Internet (Vihalemm 2003, 
592). During the first years of 2000s only about 5-10 per cent did not read any 
newspapers at all, whereas 25-30 per cent did not read newspapers regularly 
(Vihalemm 2006, 21).  
In the context of trust towards the Estonian media, Peeter Vihalemm 
(2003) contends that complaints in the media about the alienation of 
politicians from ordinary people had diminished the public trust in politics 
and politicians. However, as part of the same process, the media became 
embroiled by the growing cynicism of the public. As a result, public opinion 
polls indicated that trust in the media had fallen sharply between 1995-2002 
(Vihalemm 2003, 596-597).  
The same process can be interpreted on the basis of the distinction made 
by Fairclough (1995, 46) between social relations and social representations. 
Fairclough writes that these two can be at odds to each other: the media’s 
cynicism towards the political elite can be accompanied by legitimizing their 
agenda. As Kristi Raik (2003, 160) writes, Estonian media has been both too 
critical and not critical enough towards the political elite: it has been critical 
towards politics and politicians but not offered much substantive criticism of 
the government activities. Last but not least, in relation to the EU accession 
process it has to be added that concerning the information and knowledge 
about the EU, media was still seen as the most important source in the public 
opinion polls (for example Kaasik 2001).  
THE NEWSPAPER POSTIMEES 
The historical continuity of Postimees, being published in one form or another 
since the middle of 19th century is unique in Estonia. The paper is a successor 
to Perno Postimees which was established in 1857. In 1891, Postimees became 
first Estonian daily (Saks 2002, 196). During the Soviet time the paper was 
published under the title Edasi. 
In the current form, during the privatization process that encompassed the 
nation’s entire business sector following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Paju 
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2004, 29), Edasi became the first privatized paper (the employees took 
control), and was renamed Postimees. Later on the shares were bought by 
Heldur Tõnisson, an Estonian businessman from Switzerland and the son of 
Jaan Tõnisson who had been in the interwar years both an Estonian politician 
as well as the principle owner and editor-in-chief of Postimees. When, in the 
second half of 1990s foreign capital flowed into the Estonian media market 
(Vihalemm 2003, 592), the Norwegian company Schibsted bought 92% of the 
Postimees shares in 1998 (Saks 2002, 195-196).  
Characteristically in the first half of 1990s, several newspapers were 
established in Estonia (for example Hommikuleht in 1993 and Eesti Sõnumid 
in 1994), but rapidly became bankrupt or merged with other media. Neither 
Hommikuleht nor Eesti Sõnumid were published after 1995. Overall, the 
media market in the second half of the 1990s experienced a reduction of 
national newspapers from six national dailies in Estonian to four: two political 
national dailies, one business paper and one ’yellow newspaper’ (Vihalemm 
2003, 592, 595). The short life cycle of the papers is at least partly explained 
by the small size of the Estonian media market: of Estonia’s circa 1.5 million30 
inhabitants some 950 000 are Estonian-speakers (Vihalemm, Lauk and 
Lauristin 1997, 232). 
Unlike any other Estonian national daily newspaper, not only did 
Postimees avoid involvement in any mergers but has maintained a stable 
position in the national newspaper market, which currently consists of 
Postimees and Eesti Päevaleht (both Estonian-language national dailies), 
Äripäev (focusing on business and economic issues) and Õhtuleht (‘evening 
edition’ paper; Sõnumileht and Õhtuleht merged in 2000 into the SL-
Õhtuleht). In November 2005, a Russian language version of Postimees was 
established. This version contains both Russian language translations of the 
parent paper’s articles as well as some original Russian language articles (PM, 
04.11.2005). 
WRITERS OF POSTIMEES 
While in the previous sections, Estonian media in general, Postimees in 
specific and the role of Estonian journalists have been elaborated, one aspect 
that deserves attention in relation to analyzing the opinion articles is the forum 
offered by the paper. I agree with the aforementioned claims above that in the 
context of opinion articles, the ideals of objective journalism step aside from 
the media as a political actor and the paper performs as an arena for the wider 
public discussion (for example Eide and Hernes 1987 cited in Haavisto 2011, 
14-15). Therefore, opinion articles can be seen as easily comparable empirical 
data produced in a more or less similar form (expressing opinion) about issues 
that are considered to be sufficiently important to give them further coverage 
                                                          
30 The population has decreased since 1997. At the beginning of 2015, the population was close to 
1.3 million (http://www.stat.ee/12808). 
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and deeper analysis on the editorial pages. Since the opinion articles are 
written by various societal actors they enable the study to analyze opinions 
expressed by a variety of societal groups.  
Paradoxically, the limitations of the media as an arena also become visible 
in relation to the opinion articles, since the decision about what to publish is 
still made in the newsroom and not everybody gets access to the forum offered 
by the paper. Writer-wise, in case of the national media, the question largely 
concerns the overrepresentation of elites compared to the common people as 
those can express themselves in the letters to the editor. Accordingly, in 
relation to substance, the question concerns sticking to the mainstream 
positions that at the same time set parameters to the public discussion. More 
concretely, accepting certain statements as mainstream, relevant and natural 
means that that others have been de-legitimized as marginal and irrelevant 
(Kuus 2003, 574; see also Feldman 2001, 9). Therefore, in terms of discourses, 
dominant does not mean any unanimous understanding about things but a 
lack of credible competing discourses (Harle and Moisio 2002, 46). Since from 
the perspective of democracy the question of being represented or excluded is 
highly relevant, it will be dealt with later in the thesis. 
I start the analysis of the writers of Postimees with the categorization for 
dividing them into groups. This is a rather mechanical task in connection with 
two categories, Staff Journalists and Readers. The Staff Journalists category is 
based on unsigned editorials and columns signed by single journalists, 
whereas the second category consists of letters to the editor written by 
Readers. Since the Estonian term for the ‘letters to the editor’ is lugejakirjad, 
(letters of reader), the genre first and foremost refers to the writers identified 
only by name (and sometimes the city/village and/or the educational level) 
without any official titles31. At the same time some of these people also act as 
‘professional’ writers, commenting in their letters on various topics on a 
regular basis.  
However, when the writers of the letters to the editor were further 
identified by either or both a title and an affiliation, the writers were no longer 
categorized as Readers. Instead, the classification was made on the basis of 
their affiliation. Also, I categorized all these writers on the basis of their 
titles/affiliations that the paper printed and not on the basis of my own 
background knowledge about the writers. This choice is based on the overall 
constructivist logic of the study: the assumption is that reality is constructed 
in and by Postimees and focusing on the production of the reality means that 
I analyze how it is done in the paper instead of sticking to my own 
understandings of the ‘actual reality’.  
On the basis of the titles and affiliations present in Postimees, flexible and 
multiple roles of societal figures become clear. Flexibility has its roots during 
the ‘new awakening’ in the end of 1980s, when many prominent intellectuals 
                                                          
31 Sometimes, instead of the full name, the initials or the initial and surname were presented. In rare 
cases writers were referred to on the basis of their e-mail addresses. 
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and journalists became activists and politicians (Lauristin and Vihalemm 
2002, 25), thus shifting from one role to another (and sometimes also back) 
or performing in different roles at the same time. Consequently, as Merje Kuus 
suggests, Central and Eastern Europe’s new post-socialist political elites 
included many intellectuals who played a key role in bringing down the 
socialist regimes and by moving back and forth between intellectual and 
political work, the roles of politician and intellectual became rather 
indistinguishable (Verdery 1996, 106 and Kuus 2007b, 244). Also the political 
and social scientific discourses were closely interlinked (see also Lehti 2003b, 
21).  
On the basis of analyzing the writers of the opinion articles, a range of 
examples of the flexibility of the societal roles can be depicted. For example, 
these journalists who have been most represented among the writers of the 
analyzed opinion articles in 1997, such as Aivar Jarne, Paavo Kivine and Paavo 
Palk were no longer represented as writers at the end of the Estonian accession 
process32. Other societal actors like Ivar Tallo, Eiki Berg, Marju Lauristin, Igor 
Gräzin, Marko Mihkelson, Rein Taagepera, Ene Ergma and Jaan Leetsaar, 
were characterized in different years of the EU accession as 
professors/academic persons or as members of parliament and 
representatives of a certain party.  
While analyzing this dual role of Estonian intellectuals and politicians, as a 
background feature, one also has to take into account the society’s low trust 
towards politicians and political institutions during the EU accession process 
vis-à-vis the high credibility of academics as impartial experts, or the cultural 
elite in general as those who had maintained the national spirit of Estonia 
during the Soviet period. On that basis it has been claimed that these people 
often cultivated their intellectual aura and emphasized their literary and 
academic credentials in the political sphere (Kuus 2007b, 241). Therefore, 
being politically active but as an outsider of formal politics, the intellectual 
rather than the politician has been seen as an important source of legitimacy 
(Kuus 2007b, 242-245 and Moisio 2009, 106).  
From the perspective of discourse analysis, the flexibility of societal roles is 
related to intertextuality. The concept of intertextuality draws on Bakhtin’s 
works in which utterances are seen as links in chains, each building on 
previous elements and also shaped by the utterances expected to follow one’s 
own speech or writing (Bakhtin 1986 and Fairclough [1992]2003, 101-102). 
Here, at least two perspectives to the intertextuality in connection with 
producing the texts can be depicted. First, the same people performing in 
various arenas during different times means a mixture of discourse. For 
example, academics heading towards politics consciously or unconsciously 
contribute to the political discourse from an academic perspective. Second, 
                                                          
32 The most published author of the later years, Erkki Bahovski, worked for the paper from the 
beginning of the accession process, but was not writing about EU issues at the time. 
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people performing in various roles at the same time, means an even bigger 
textual mixture between journalistic, political and cultural discourse. 
Against the framework depicted above, it is not surprising that apart from 
the Staff Journalists and Readers as writers, two other large groups that could 
be depicted in all analyzed years were the Cultural Elite and the Political Elite. 
In addition to that businessmen, civil servants and representatives of non-
governmental organizations were represented as groups of authors. However, 
in 1997 non of these groups were clearly represented as authors whereas by 
2002 representation of businessmen had increased to 27 articles and civil 
servants to 32 articles. Compared to Staff Journalists, Readers, Political Elite 
and Cultural Elite, representation of businessmen, civil servants and 
representatives of the NGOs was marginal and/or irregular during the years of 
accession process. Therefore no separate categories were formed. Instead I 
gathered these into the category of ‘Others’ and excluded them from the 
further analysis as not being entirely comparable.  
Since the term ‘elite’, used in two categories, can be seen as a rather 
ambiguous one, the question who are and who are not counted as members of 
the elite as well as on what basis the division is made deserves further 
attention. I use the term with the aim of keeping the classification of writers as 
clear and simple as possible by forming large general categories instead of 
small and specific. The former also enabled the reduction of the category of 
‘Others’ and include a majority of the articles for analysis. 
At the same time the term ‘elite’ is used analytically without aiming at 
comprehensive substantial definition of who does and who does not belong to 
the elite. Nevertheless, the focus is on production not consumption: I have 
categorized writers on the basis of their titles presented in the paper, not the 
potential roles recognized in the society.  
Conclusively, the category Political Elite contains the Estonian President, 
Prime Minister, members and former members of the government and 
parliament, their advisors, leaders of the municipalities and representatives of 
the parties. Cultural Elite contains the representatives of the academic sector 
(students, lecturers, professors, rectors of the universities), musicians, writers, 
artists, composers, columnists, teachers, analysts etc. cultural figures of the 
society. In both cases a marginal quantity of foreign writers (representatives 
of other countries or the EU) can be discerned. 
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Table 3.2. Categories of Writers of articles published in Postimees during the EU accession 
process, frequency and percentage of annual.33 
Writers 1997 1998 2002 2003 
 N-
value 
% of 
annual 
N-
value 
% of 
annual 
N-
value 
% of 
annual 
N-
value 
% of 
annual 
Staff 
Journalists 
143 38.0 124 29.1 88 23.1 145 24.3 
Political Elite 101 26.9 120 28.2 81 21.3 75 12.5 
Cultural Elite 61 16.2 69 16.2 79 20.7 145 24.3 
Readers 56 14.9 70 16.4 44 11.5 142 23.7 
Other writers 15 4.0 43 10.1 89 22.8 90 15.1 
Total 376 426 381 597 
IMAGINING NEW COMMUNITY: FROM FEW TO MANY 
From the perspective of national identity, writers of the articles are actors who 
participated in the process of imagining Estonia as a new community 
(candidate country) in relation to the EU during the accession process. The 
division of the writers is clarified in Table 3.2.  
While looking at the representation of the categories of writers during 
different years, various trends can be seen. The quantity of the Political Elite 
decreased during the accession period, being 26.9% of the writers in 1997 and 
28.2% in 1998 but 21.3% in 2002 and 12.5% in 2003. The trend of Staff 
Journalists is rather similar: while in 1997 the amount of the articles produced 
by the paper’s journalists was 38.0% and 29.1% in 1998, by 2003 the 
proportion had decreased to 24.3%. The opposite trend takes place amongst 
the Cultural Elite, starting from 16.2% in 1997 and 1998 and reaching 24.3% 
in 2003. 
The trend amongst Readers did not follow the same pattern. The 
proportions for 1997 and 1998 (14.9 and 16.4 respectively) were smaller than 
the proportion for 2003 (23.7%). However, the smallest proportion occurred 
in 2002 - 11.5%. This anomaly might partly be due to the change by 2002 of 
adding titles and affiliations to the names of writers. Therefore, writers who 
were coded as Readers in 1997 and 1998 could have been coded on the basis of 
their affiliation in 2002 and 2003. However, presumably due to approaching 
referendum, the effect is not visible in 2003. Last but not least, the emergence 
and increase of sub-categories of businessmen, civil servants and 
representatives of the non-governmental organizations as part of category of 
‘Others’ during the accession process can be added.  
                                                          
33 In 1997 the EU decided to start negotiations with Estonia, which in 1998 were started and ended 
in 2002. In 2003, a binding referendum about EU membership was organized (for more detailed 
chronology of Estonian accession process see Chapter 1). 
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For interpreting the increase and decrease among the writers, various 
possibilities can be found. On the basis of analyzing the EU articles of 
Postimees from 1995 till 2000, Kristi Raik (2003) draws the conclusions that 
during these years, the shift from existential to pragmatic issues took place 
that also lead towards a more active debate between the pro- and anti-EU 
sides. Raik argues that, in the context of pragmatic discussions, the empty 
signifier of “national interests” (2003, 194; see Laclau 1996, 36-46) has been 
more open to debate and negotiation than the nodal point of national 
existence. Therefore, competing groups and positions have been more easily 
accepted and not seen as a threat to one’s own existence, which has left more 
scope for deliberation and listening to alternative views. This shift in the EU 
debate is characterized as part of “normalizing EU politics” (Raik 2003, 194). 
Even though the years 2002 and 2003 used in the empirical analysis of this 
study, were beyond the scope of Raik's study, an assumption about the 
continuity of the same process can be made. Thus, the decrease in the number 
of articles written by the Political Elite and Staff Journalists and the increase 
of those written by the Cultural Elite and Readers can be correlated to the 
greater variety of topics as well as moving from the existential topics to the 
more pragmatic issues). Consequently, increase in both topics and writers can 
be seen as part of the same trend.   
In 2003, the increases in the quantity of Readers’ letters to the editor and 
the articles by the Cultural Elite as well as the decrease in the articles by the 
Political Elite can also be equated to the approaching referendum as a concrete 
task for Estonian public. At the same time these results can be connected to 
the outcome of the referendum as being far from certain in advance (Raik 
2003, 47) and an assumption that who is talking matters more than the EU 
topic under discussion. On that basis one can ask if the unpopular political 
elite disappeared and the popular cultural elite filled the gap to familiarize the 
EU to the people in the name of raising the EU’s popularity beyond the 
threshold of the accession referendum. At the same time this process does not 
necessarily mark only a change of the persons but, taking into account the 
close link and interconnections between the cultural and the political elite, can 
also be based on a change of the titles of writers.  
Another possibility to interpret the developments in writership during the 
years can be found from the logic of building new communities as a process 
with various phases. For example, the Finnish scholar Pasi Saukkonen (1996) 
refers to the three phases of building new communities: the imagination, the 
naming34 and the recognition phase. In the first and the second phases, the 
                                                          
34 Naming is based on the nominalist view claiming that names are results of special deeds called 
naming, done by someone specific at a unique situation. The name is not discovered from the object (it 
is arbitrary, following the logic of Saussure) but has to be devised and be accepted by others (Palonen 
1997, 239 and Korhonen 1999, 124). General acceptance of the names depends on a certain political 
constellation and by changing that the names also often change (in Estonia at the end of 1980s). Since 
we are seldom able to locate the individuals who first uttered specific names, the names can usually be 
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ideas are created and presented in the media texts to get publicity and to 
activate discussion. The third phase aims at legitimizing this process: for 
making a community alive it has to be recognized (Saukkonen 1996, 9; see also 
Lehti 2003a, 120). As Ringmar (1996, 81) writes, only after being recognized 
can we conclusively establish a certain identity. 
Even though in the current study, the question is not about the construction 
of a new community in a classical sense (as a nation or a region), we can still 
talk about the construction of Estonia as EU candidate country. From this 
perspective, the shift from the Political Elite to the Cultural Elite and Readers 
as well as the aforementioned sub-categories of Others infers that since 
Estonia’s EU accession process was initiated in the sphere of country’s foreign 
policy, Estonia as a candidate country was first imagined at the political 
level. During the years, it spread from there to other groups in society. Here, 
the spreading to the other groups is interpreted as a wider recognition at the 
societal level. 
In this context, apart from the shift between the categories of writers, the 
developments inside the groups deserve attention. In order to analyze the 
trends in the categories, I divided the quantity of articles written by a certain 
group by the quantity of the writers, which enabled me to determine the 
number of articles each writer published. The results show that the variety of 
writers across all groups increased. In 1997, 143 Journalist articles per author 
equates to 13 distinct writers (11 per author), whereas the same statistics for 
1998 are 124 articles and 16 authors (7.75 per author). In 2003 the numbers 
were 145 articles and 26 authors (5.58 per author). Accordingly the numbers 
for Political Elite articles were 101 articles and 46 authors (2.20 per author) in 
1997 and 75 articles and 50 authors (1.5 per author) in 2003. The same trend 
of increasing variety of writers is visible also in the other categories.  
In addition to this quantitative division, I also analyzed the qualitative 
variety among the writers. The focus on different names not only ensures the 
result of the quantitative division but also shows that the process of moving 
from few to many writers is even more radical. For example, in 1997, of 11 
authors responsible for Staff Journalist articles 1 writer, Aivar Jarne had 
written 56 (of 143 articles) as almost 40% of the category’s total. In 2003, on 
the other hand, the most published single author of Staff Journalists, Erkki 
Bahovski, had only authored 10 articles, which equates, at best, to 7% of the 
category’s total35. Thus, apart from the general level (categories of writers) the 
increase from a few writers to a great many is also visible at the more specific 
level (inside each category). 
                                                          
studied as symbols of collective subjectivity (Korhonen 1999, 124). 
35 In 2003, almost 60% of Staff Journalists articles were editorials authored by “Postimees” (84 of 
145).  
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SUMMARY 
The aim of this part of the study was to operationalize the concept of discourse 
practice both in relation to the text as well as to the formative moment as a 
sociocultural practice. Especially in the latter case, a clear connection can be 
seen: Estonian media institutions have been strongly influenced by societal 
changes and vice versa.  
In order to map the relevant developments of discourse practice, I did not 
restrict the focus to just the EU accession process. The historical background 
and longer societal processes were also examined, as other potential formative 
moments relevant for interpreting the EU enlargement. In this context, 
depicting the Political Elite and the Cultural Elite as the two most represented 
groups of writers apart from Staff Journalists and the Readers is not a 
surprising phenomenon. Rather it can be connected to both the close-knit 
interrelations which the intelligentsia and the political leadership of Estonia 
have had at individual levels since the ‘new awakening’ as well as to the 
substantial importance of Estonian intelligentsia linked to political events.  
On the basis of analyzing the categories of writers present in Postimees, the 
spread of the ideas from the rather narrow circle of the political elite and 
journalists to the wider public can be depicted. For example, during the 
accession process the category of Staff Journalists expanded from being 
dominated by a single ’expert‘ (Aivar Jarne) to a broad variety of writers. This 
indicates that a new community, Estonia as EU candidate country, had been 
imagined and recognized. 
3.3 FORMATIVE MOMENT AS A SOCIOCULTURAL 
PRACTICE 
In this section, sociocultural practice, the third dimension of Fairclough’s 
discourse analysis, in a form of the formative moment is operationalized and 
applied to the current study. Fairclough (1995) maps sociocultural practice as 
economic, political and cultural practices occurring at situational, institutional 
and societal levels. These mean specific social events that the discourse is part 
of, i.e. the institutional frameworks that the discourse occurs within and the 
wider societal matrix of the discourse (Fairclough [1989]2001, 20-21 and 
Fairclough 1995, 16, 62). In the current study, the most relevant of these is the 
situational context of political and cultural practice that the discourses are part 
of, i.e. the formative moment as a social condition (Fairclough [1989]2001, 
21).  
The concept ‘formative moment’ refers to a period during which traditional 
identity stories are revised and challenged by new ones (Ringmar 1996, 83). A 
similar phenomenon has also been characterized by other scholars, who have 
used a range of terms. For example Anna Triandafyllidou (1998, 603) writes 
about the periods of instability and crisis when the boundaries of ingroup 
become unstable. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 909) refer to world historical 
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events (like major wars or depressions) that lead to a search for new ideas and 
norms for mapping the world (see also Browning 2008, 59). Alexander Wendt 
(1999) uses the moment of reflexivity for depicting cases when collectives 
become aware of the social kinds they constitute, and move to change them. 
As Wendt (1999, 76) claims, if a social kind can “know itself” then it may also 
be able to recall its human authorship and create new social kinds. In the 
context of Estonia, Kristi Raik (2003, 27) writes about the periods of change 
when competition between alternative meanings of social practices and 
institutions takes place and old conceptions are re-evaluated. In media 
studies, Ullamaija Kivikuru (1996b, 23) characterizes the checkpoints or 
intermediate spaces related to the Finnish accession to the EU as deviant from 
the ‘normal situation’ (see also Kivikuru 1996a, 401). 
At the same time, different origins and understandings for the term 
“formative moment” Jonsson (2006) suggests the Swedish political scientist 
Bo Rothstein (1992, 173-174) coined the term to explain the possibilities 
political actors have under certain periods to change institutional parameters 
or the nature of political systems.  
The key aspect is not, which definition is the original, but the difference 
between them. Ringmar (1996) sees identities as the main reasons for human 
action. Thus, he focuses on the formative moment while exploring the 
relationship between identity and foreign policy, more specifically on us and 
the Other in foreign policy (see also Neumann 1999, 222-225). By contrast, 
Rothstein (1992, 174) deals with the “the rules of the game” in domestic policy, 
and attempts to explain why Sweden's political system became highly 
corporatist. Nevertheless, Rothstein’s formative moment (in the early 1930s) 
is clearly shorter than Ringmar’s that lasts from 1520-1630 (see also Neumann 
1999, 224).  
Since from the perspective of the current study, Ringmar’s (1996) 
understanding of the formative moment is clearly more suitable, I will focus 
on this and deal next with its usage in a range of, mostly foreign policy related 
studies. I will then depict the relationship between the formative moment and 
the media. Finally, I will analyze how a certain time period becomes significant 
in the newspaper articles of Postimees in the context of the EU and how this 
special period is then used for arguing different issues (see Section 3.2). 
VARIOUS FLEXIBLE FORMATIVE MOMENTS 
Several studies have depicted alternative periods as formative moments. 
Concerning the more distant history, Anni Kangas (2008, 232) contends the 
somewhat surprising independence of Finland from the Russian Empire in 
1917, which was followed by a bloody civil war in spring 1918 can be 
constituted as a political crisis and an epoch of a formative moment in the 
Finnish political imaginary on Russia. In the context of more recent history, 
Sengueler (2009/2010, 39) suggests the post-WWII situation, often referred 
to, in German history, as a new beginning (Stunde Null), has been analyzed as 
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a formative moment that has led to a complete break with the German Nazi 
past and the reinterpretation of Germanness.  
From an even more recent period, several scholars analyze the decade of 
1990s as a formative moment in the Baltic Sea region. For example, Musial 
(2009, 293) claims that the 1990s constituted a formative moment for the 
Baltic Sea region, as a decade when the region was depicted as sharing a 
common historical experience. Similarly, Sami Moisio (2006, 442) argues the 
end of the Cold War may be regarded as a formative moment that not only 
opened up space for the reorganization of national narratives, but also 
challenged the prevailing assumptions and generated political struggles within 
the new independent states like Estonia and previously neutral states like 
Finland.  
At the same time, the period following EU and NATO accession in the first 
half of 2000s has been dealt with as a formative moment. Christopher 
Browning (2005, 1-2) writes that as a result of the unfolding formative 
moment, all those understandings, policies and orientations, which developed 
during the post-Cold War period are in need of revision (see also Browning 
and Joenniemi 2004, 229).  
Apart from the nations located around the Baltic Sea, similar processes are 
also depicted in the other regions during the same period. In the former 
Yugoslavia, Ferreira (2006, 148) deals with Kusturica’s movie “Underground” 
as an example of narrating the nation at a distinctive historical juncture, 
conceptualized as a formative moment that runs since Tito’s death to the 
1990s. Michel-André Horelt and Judith Renner (2008) depict a formative 
moment in Croatia in relation to analyzing identity constructions in 1990s 
from the perspective of foreign policy.  
In connection with international organizations, EU enlargement has been 
studied as a formative moment (Moisio 2009, 99-100) whereas the events of 
9/11 have been analyzed as a formative moment from the perspective of NATO 
which had to adjust to these changed circumstances (Bolcu 2012, 30-31). 
Unlike Ringmar (1996), who deals with defending an already established 
identity on the basis of going to war as a final action, Bolcu (2011, 17) 
scrutinizes how NATO acted in order to project (or even impose) a new kind 
of identity as an entire succession of events (see also Bolcu 2012). Thus, similar 
to the current study, Bolcu focuses on the process of identity construction, with 
a special emphasis on how this relationship is mutually constituted.  
However, since identity consists of various interpretations which compete 
and try to gain dominance (Horelt and Renner 2008, 11), formative moments 
are not only times of freedom and creativity, but also times of struggle where 
not all stories are recognized as equally important (Ringmar 1996, 151).  
In sum, since the concept has been applied to various time periods it is clear 
that instead of seeing Estonia’s EU accession period as the nation’s only 
formative moment, Estonia has experienced a range of such formative 
moments. Furthermore the accession processes to both the EU and NATO can 
be seen as part of the trend that started from the collapse of the old Soviet 
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Socialist societal system and created a necessity to develop a new kind of 
society and find new international position for the country (see also Lauristin 
and Vihalemm 2002). Therefore, instead of showing the characteristics of 
formative versus non-formative moments, the current study aims to show how 
a concrete formative moment works. Focusing on some other period, for 
example the ‘new awakening’ as a formative moment would have also meant 
that the us-versus-the Other relationship between Estonia and the EU would 
not have been the same, largely because any analysis of the construction of 
Estonia as an EU candidate country, or the EU as ‘the new official Other’ for 
Estonia was not possible.  
At the same time one can still ask about the beginning and the end, as well 
as the flexibility, of the chosen period. The issue is whether the formative 
moment, mapped here on the basis of the Estonian accession process, could 
have started already in 1995 while Estonia and the EU signed the Europe 
Agreement, instead of 1997 as indicated in this study. Although explicitly 
nothing related to a new identity emerged in 1997, the EU’s decision to start 
the accession negotiations with Estonia meant a clear change in the intensity 
of Estonia-EU relationship constructed in Postimees. While, for example in 
1993, 35 opinion articles were published in Postimees dealing with the 
relationship between Estonia and the EU, in 1994 the same number was 105 
and two years later 150. In 1997, the number of EU accession related articles 
was 376, and increased even more during the following years of accession 
process (see Table 3.2 for the exact numbers) (see also Raik 2003, 161-162). In 
terms of discourse analysis, this can be seen as an example of the close 
correlation between (foreign) political and media discourse in that deepening 
relations in the former are visible in the latter.    
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORMATIVE MOMENT 
Even though the increasing interest by Postimees towards Estonian-EU 
relations from 1997 onwards can be seen as an ‘objective’ basis for mapping 
the formative moment, I still understand formative moment as a social 
construction (see also Browning 2008, 59-60). Therefore, my decision to map 
the beginning of the formative moment on the basis of EU accession 
negotiations accompanied by the increase of EU related opinion articles in 
Postimees is an example of how a researcher frames a formative moment on 
the basis of certain societal developments.  
The exceptionality of the Estonian EU accession can be conceptualized 
from the temporal perspective in various ways. First, in relation to the EU 
accession process, one can depict the uniqueness of the time: the process takes 
place for the first (and the last) time ever. In the Estonian context this has been 
flavored by the argument that the ‘window of opportunity will be open for just 
a moment’. Second, the position of a candidate country is characterized by 
intense preparations and a need to make changes as soon as possible. For 
example Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 12-13) write that after the elections 
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held in 1999, Estonian society reached a “pre-accession situation” that is 
characterized by intense preparations to achieve EU accession and integration 
with NATO. Third, the position of a candidate country is a temporary one. 
Apart from massive internal reforms it is characterized by the lack of 
knowledge about if and when the move to the final destination takes place. 
From this perspective, Estonian accession to the EU can be interpreted as an 
end of this formative moment. As Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 15) suggest, 
by the time Estonia joined the EU, the break with the communist political and 
economic order and establishment of the new (capitalist) free-market 
economy seemed to have been completed.  
In the media analysis, societal crises have been analyzed as an example of 
special times. For instance Sabina Mihelj (2011, 5-6) writes about the national 
crisis-conflict situation where the media – politics relationship tightens, the 
media abandons temporarily professional routines of reporting and 
journalists adopt a patriotic stance. In the framework of the current study, the 
national crisis-conflict situation can be seen as one potential aspect of the 
formative moment. Simultaneously, as a time when new identity stories 
emerge, a formative moment can also be interpreted from the perspective of 
new possibilities or a mixture of both crisis and options. Since the study 
interprets the formative moment as a sociocultural practice, the various 
interpretations are related to the logic of the discourses and a range of 
understandings of actors.  
Approaching formative moment as a construction enables the study to 
focus on another part of the two-way process. While a certain period is 
depicted on the basis of the societal developments as a special time, one also 
starts to interpret other societal trends through the prism of this formative 
moment. Since time is neither dependent on people nor can it be controlled by 
human agency, a certain moment in time as an exceptional period can be used 
for legitimizing and naturalizing particular societal trends as natural 
processes.  
An example of how the specialty of time is used as a combination of political 
and ideological practices for naturalizing certain processes and producing 
‘facts’ can be taken from the article of Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009). The 
authors argue that the pre-accession atmosphere contributed to the 
marginalization of socially oriented political choices:  
The focus of the Maastricht criteria on market liberalization had much 
stronger effects on domestic policy than the comparatively weak and 
patchy ‘social dimension’ of the Copenhagen criteria. The high 
bureaucratic pressure supported technocratic elitism, and weakened 
even further the democratic mechanisms of social accountability. 
Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 12 
Thus, a ‘spiral of silence’ surrounded the opposition to the reforms, and as a 
result the majority of Estonian society accepted shock therapy as the only safe 
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way to get out of Russia’s sphere of economic influence (Lauristin and 
Vihalemm 2009, 11). From the perspective of agency, this means that the 
groups with the weaker social and economic positions were politically 
marginalized. By contrast the new, young entrepreneurial groups together 
with representatives of the middle-aged managerial class, formed the new 
capitalist elite (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 20). 
Since the current study focuses on the media, the role of the media in the 
process of forming, as well as using, the formative moment deserves further 
attention. For scrutinizing the media’s role, the opinion articles of Postimees 
written by journalists are analyzed as concrete examples of how special time is 
framed. Even though the paper does not use the term ‘formative moment’, 
time is given significance to being either special and/or a unique in the articles. 
Following the logic of the two-way process, I make a distinction between 
constructing special time in Postimees on the basis of societal developments 
and using it as an existing entity for legitimizing societal developments. In the 
first case, the dilemma between threat and opportunity, and in the second case 
the emergence of societal truths, are discussed. 
Analyzing the articles of Postimees as both text as well as sociocultural 
practice, is supported by the logic that despite conceptualizing text and 
sociocultural practice differently, as intertwined entities and example of 
intertextuality (Section 3.2), context36 is largely constructed in the same 
articles that are analyzed as empirical data for forming the discourses. Thus, 
focusing on contextuality does not mean jumping out of the text, since in the 
discourse analysis context does not exist outside the text (Rantanen 1997, 44).  
CONSTRUCTING SPECIAL TIME IN POSTIMEES 
Constructing the formative moment in Postimees means that a certain time 
period is mapped as a special one on the basis of the current societal trends as 
well as those that have taken place in the past. In the latter case, the 
importance of the current time is shown by drawing parallels between the 
present and historical events, both mapped as crucial ones. For example, a day 
after the EU referendum, Postimees wrote that yesterday Estonian people 
made history again, as they have done before (in 1869, 1918, 1920, 1988, and 
1991). The article related that the 14th of September 2003 goes down in 
Estonian history as the European self-definition of the Estonian state and 
nation, and urged readers to understand the greatness of the moment (PM, 
15.09.2003). In another example, the paper refers to the play “Tuulte 
pöörises” (Whirlwind) written in 1906 by August Kitzberg by claiming that on 
the basis of the EU referendum, stormy times are forecast again for Estonia 
(PM, 17.07.2003). Even though, in both examples, the past is used for making 
the significance of the current time clear, in the first case the greatness of time 
                                                          
36 Here the terms ‘sociocultural practice’ and ‘context’ are used as synonyms. 
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is seen as a merit of Estonian people whereas in the second case, the issue 
concerns the (natural) forces that occasionally make time special.  
Apart from drawing parallels between the remarkable times of past and 
present as in the previous cases, experiences of the past are also used as a 
background by Postimees to show the present time as truly exceptional. An 
example can be found in connection with starting the accession negotiations 
in 1998 when the paper claims: “But this time the sun should rise from the 
west.”37 (PM, 03.04.1998). This example, crystallized to one sentence only can 
be analyzed from both geographical as well as temporal aspects. The author 
uses the East-West division for referring to the symbolic act of moving from 
one to another. Nevertheless, the exceptionality of the case is communicated 
by claiming that the sun should rise from the west as an extraordinary event, 
breaking the laws of nature, and also being out of the scope of any human 
actors.  
In various examples, the singularity of time was emphasized by using the 
expression ‘(n)ever before’. As the paper claims in the beginning of 1997, the 
duty of Estonian foreign policy is clearer than ever before (PM, 07.01.1997). 
Another article stated that even though EU membership implies Estonia gave 
an illusorily part of its sovereignty to Europe, Estonia in fact became a more 
sovereign state than ever before in its history38 (PM, 14.12.1997). Other similar 
examples that emphasize ‘(n)ever before’ can be found in connection with 
organizing the EU referendum (PM, 03.11.1998) and referring to the year 1997 
as being more successful in the context of Estonian foreign policy than any 
other year (PM, 22.12.1997). Also, the five years of accession negotiations is 
seen by Postimees as an unprecedented sign in Estonian diplomacy that will 
remain unexcelled for a long time (PM, 14.12.2002). 
Mapping different events as historical and/or exceptional is very much in 
accordance with the claim of Finnish historian Marko Lehti (2003b, 131) that 
history as a collective memory of society is, similar to the memory of an 
individual, a selective narrative where something is emphasized, and 
something is forgotten when stories are told. Even though in the case of 
newspaper articles the issue is not about writing official history, the paper still 
follows similar practice by creating the stories of us as a daily chronology.  
In relation to national identity, the importance of the past is emphasized, 
for instance, by Göran Therborn (1995, 231) who argues that whatever there is 
to ethnicity or national belonging, it is inherited from the past. Emphasizing 
the historical viewpoint, has on the other hand, been criticized by Tim Edensor 
(2002, 10-11, 18-19) who stresses the present as crucial in connection with 
national identity. The articles of Postimees referred to above show a 
combination of both: the importance of the present is emphasized in 
Postimees by relating it to the past.  
                                                          
37 Seekord peaks päike aga tõusma läänest. 
38 A distinction between the illusory and real features is made in this example with a clear emphasis 
on the importance of the latter. 
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Using the logic of ‘never before’ in an opposite way, Postimees writes that 
the president, after looking as a statesman at past millennia, said that Estonia 
has always belonged to Europe and warned about the economic loss that would 
be caused by staying out of Europe (PM, 26.06.2003). In this case, the issue is 
not about the extraordinary possibility to join Europe, since Estonia has 
always been there. Thus, the formative moment, as a new condition, refers to 
the potential end of something that has always existed. The logic used is in 
accordance with the ideas of Finnish scholar Veikko Anttonen (1993, 52) who 
argues that the past does not only contain the achievements and the events 
that have brought honor, but also the worries and suffering. In the current 
case, however, the worries and the suffering are not seen coming from the past, 
which was a rather stable period (as the state had always belonged to Europe) 
but from the future outside Europe.  
Since the past and the future have been depicted as two equally important 
features in relation to national identity, the focus on the past and the future 
has been depicted as a sense of double time by scholars (Bhabha 1990, 295; 
see also Nairn 1977). In Postimees, the future was implicitly present in the 
examples that signified the current time period as an end of an era. Due to the 
EU’s decision to start the accession negotiations with Estonia in 1998, the time 
was interpreted as a breaking point in the independent Estonia’s status and 
fate (PM, 14.12.1997). The paper continues that Estonia starts the negotiations 
with the EU about the issues that will influence the life of all of us in the next 
millennium (PM, 14.12.1997; see also PM, 22.12.1997). In these examples, the 
future is indicated by referring to ‘breaking point’, ‘fate’ and ‘next millennium’. 
Interestingly, the same terms were used also five years later, at the time 
when the accession negotiations were finished and Estonia was invited to join 
the EU (and NATO). This time Postimees wrote that for Estonia, these 
decisions had an influence that reached beyond the horizon and celebrated the 
end of the transition period (PM, 31.12.2002). For emphasizing the long-
lasting character of the influence, the spatial expression about horizon as the 
most distant point one could possibly see, was used. Similarly, after the EU 
made the decision about finishing the accession negotiations in the 
Copenhagen Summit in 2002, Postimees wrote about the post-Copenhagen 
time (PM, 26.10.2002) and stated that the EU’s Copenhagen Summit surely 
meant an end of one era in Estonian foreign policy (PM, 14.12.2002). 
On the basis of the examples of Postimees, the formative moment can be 
seen as a great highlighted time that has been stopped for admiring its 
importance as an end result of a certain process. The references made both to 
the past and future were illustrative and aimed at emphasizing the greatness 
of the present moment. This also means that while the formative moment was 
mapped as a highlight, it is rather problematic to interpret formative moment 
as a threat or an opportunity. Both the past and the future form a background 
to the current moment that has to be accepted as a certain kind of truth.  
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USING SPECIAL TIME IN POSTIMEES 
While constructing the formative moment, an era is mapped as a special one, 
using the formative moment means that the importance of a particular time 
period is taken for granted, and used as an argument for reasoning and 
legitimizing certain actions and societal developments. Accordingly, ignoring 
the importance of time leads to the criticism of wrong timing and/or failure to 
understand ‘how things really are’. 
For emphasizing the importance of the present time and Estonian action 
that is not in accordance to that important time, the expression ‘especially not 
at the moment when’ was used by Postimees (for example PM, 10.05.1997; PM, 
09.06.1997 and PM, 05.05.1997). As the paper writes: “Especially at the time 
when Estonian accession to the EU is on a razor edge and every wrong step is 
erasing us from amongst the first candidates.”39 (PM, 14.04.1997; see also PM, 
03.01.2003). The expression ‘razor edge’ indicates that all the energy should 
be concentrated on keeping balanced. However, the issue is not only about 
falling down but also about getting hurt, since knives tend to be sharp. Thus, 
although one should focus on the most relevant thing, it is also better to do 
nothing than to do wrong things. 
Similarly, the Estonian governmental crisis at the time of EU’s Summit in 
December 1997 was interpreted as a possibility for Latvia and Lithuania to 
point a finger at Estonia as a country even more unstable than them (PM, 
21.11.1997). Again, the issue was not about the governmental crisis, which was 
quite typical for Estonia in the 1990s. Instead the issue is about the appalling 
timing of the governmental crisis and the fear that the others could take 
advantage of our misfortune. 
Apart from the accession process as such, several articles focused on the 
proper action before the accession referendum. Postimees writes that there is 
not much time left and even the smallest mistake can influence the whole 
process (PM, 04.07.2003; see also 18.06.2003). Thus, the time before the 
referendum presumes clear explanations and fair addressing from all 
politicians (PM, 04.07.2003). 
Similar to constructing the formative moment, the argument ‘(n)ever 
before’ was used in connection with using the formative moment for referring 
to the future developments. However, here the issue was not about admiring 
the moment, but taking it as a basis for further obligations, since the action 
should follow the logic of the moment. For example, after Estonia got to the 
first round of the accession negotiations together with five other EU candidate 
countries, Postimees wrote that this should mark the beginning of an 
absolutely new phase in the internal political EU debate (PM, 12.07.1997 and 
PM, 11.01.1997)40. Five years later, in connection with finishing the accession 
                                                          
39 Eriti veel ajal, kui Eesti liitumine Euroopa Liiduga on noateral ja iga valesamm kustutab meid 
esimeste kandidaatide seast. 
40 As a background, the EU’s decision to divide the candidate countries into two groups – those who 
started the negotiations in 1998 and those who did not even know when and if their negotiations would 
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negotiations, the paper claimed that at the moment, more than ever before, 
the importance of the decisions that stand in front of Estonia in the near future 
are manifest (PM, 19.11.2002). In 2003, Postimees stated that a very realistic, 
or at least a very much expected accession to the EU and NATO should finally 
turn a new page in history by liberating us from the label of being a former 
Soviet Socialist Republic, for the good times are ahead for Estonia (PM, 
31.03.2003). 
In sum, on the basis of using the formative moment, time becomes a crucial 
factor that enables the determination of the correct and condemnation of 
incorrect action. At the same time, the principal issues receive relativist 
treatment. For example, instead of condemning the governmental crisis in 
principle, it is considered to be improper in a certain situation. 
While in the context of constructing the formative moment, the actors did 
not have an important role, in using the formative moment the actors and their 
action were significant. This means that certain trends were seen and 
emphasized as something, for which actors should be responsible. Behind the 
openly normative examples, stating how things should be done and 
condemning the wrong ways of doing them, ‘the truth’ about the EU accession 
process as inevitable from the Estonian perspective can be found. 
SUMMARY 
In this part of the study, the formative moment was analyzed as a sociocultural 
practice. Even though the articles from four years were used, from the 
perspective of the formative moment, no remarkable differences can be 
depicted in the beginning and the end of the accession process. 
Connected to the logic of the three schools of IR theories, realism, 
liberalism or constructivism, the formative moment can be either seen as a 
restrictive or an enabling factor. In connection with the realist claim that small 
countries do not have any power at the international level, the formative 
moment can bring an unexpected and brief change to this situation. By 
contrast, in the context of constructivism, the opportunity for small states to 
participate in forming international anarchy can be limited to a certain period. 
Thus, as a temporal factor, the formative moment could bring discourses 
based on different perceptions of the world closer to each other. 
However, apart from that obligation can be used to characterize the 
formative moment. The time period is constitutive to the discourses and vice 
versa, since the decisions made at that special time are expected to be based 
on responsible and right actions as no corrections can be made later. The 
distinction made between constructing and using the formative moment, 
refers to the internal struggle of the discourses (what one is versus what one 
                                                          
start – created an atmosphere of competition. The competition was forced by the length of the whole 
process (1998-2002) and the EU’s failure to clarify the organization’s readiness to accept the new 
members during the initial years of the negotiations. 
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should be). Constructing the formative moment is shown to be a process that 
does not demand anything from the actors: they can just lie back and look at 
the fabulous moment. In the context of using the formative moment, the actors 
are supposed to take into account the moment as something taken for granted 
and thus determining their action (see also Browning 2008, 60).   
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4. PRINCIPLES OF SELECTING ARTICLES, 
FORMING AND ANALYZING 
DISCOURSES 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the three spheres that frame the empirical 
analysis. I explain first, the principles used for selecting the articles for 
analysis; second how the discourses were formed and last how the discourses 
were analyzed. 
In order to avoid unnecessary verbosity, articles written by representatives 
of one of the four categories of writers, Staff Journalist, Political Elite, Cultural 
Elite, Readers, will be referred to by the category plus the word ‘article’. Hence 
the quartet of Staff Journalist article, Political Elite article, Cultural Elite 
article, and Readers article. 
4.1 SELECTING THE ARTICLES FOR THE ANALYSIS 
The data for empirical analysis consisted of articles from the opinion pages of 
Postimees dealing with the relationship between Estonia and the European 
Union during four years, 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003. These four years were 
chosen for the analysis as certain highlights of the long accession process. 
More concretely, 1997 was the year the EU decided to start accession 
negotiations with Estonia, in 1998 the negotiations were started and finished 
in 2002 and in 2003 Estonia organized a binding referendum about EU 
membership (for more detailed chronology of Estonian accession process see 
Chapter 1).  
Since the decision to focus on the opinion pages was based on an 
assumption that each article reflected the views of the writer, some minor 
sections in Postimees that did not meet this criterion were excluded from the 
analysis. I left out the sections like Questionnaire (Küsitlus)41 and the Tough 
Word (Kõva sõna)42. Also the sections based either on the references to other 
Estonian papers (Teised lehed) or Russian Journalism (Venemaa 
ajakirjandus) were excluded from the analysis. Also omitted, from the data 
sets for 2002 and 2003 were anonymous internet commentaries, of which 
précis summaries were published in the section Letters to the Editor 
(Lugejakirjad). 
                                                          
41 Küsitlus is based on brief comments from readers referring to something that had appeared in 
Postimees or some other media. 
42 Maybe defined as strong topical opinions that catch the audience’s attention to the extent they re-
use the expression, phrase or wording. Popular re-tweeted hashtags on Twitter maybe viewed as the 
digital version of the Kõva sõna section in Postimees. 
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Even though selecting articles on the basis of the keywords might seem to 
be a mechanical task, the current study revealed something else. While John 
E. Richardson (2007, 18) writes about the possible obscurities and questions 
to be discussed in connection with interpreting articles, I was facing the same 
problems before the interpretation phase. Therefore, the starting points of 
naming, metonymy and neologisms, as Richardson (2007) suggests for 
interpreting the data were very useful during the selection process. At the same 
time these three can be seen as tools used in the discourse of Postimees for 
constructing social meanings and legitimizing group membership (Bishop and 
Jaworski 2003, 262).  
When gathering the empirical data, I looked through all the opinion articles 
published during these four years that are available in the digital archive of 
Postimees. In this selection process, four key words were used to get as broad 
sample as possible: European Union (Euroopa Liit), EU (EU), Brussels 
(Brüssel) and Euro (euro). The initial two lie in Richardson’s (2007) naming 
category, Brussels is metonymic and Euro is neologic.  
Since my aim is to analyze the relationship between Estonia and the 
European Union, I omitted articles that only mentioned Europe (Euroopa), 
Western Europe (Lääne-Euroopa) or West (Lääs) without any clear 
references to the EU. Especially in the beginning of the accession process, 
‘Europe’ was also used as a synonym of the Council of Europe instead or in 
addition to the EU. For example, in connection with discussing the need to 
abandon the death penalty in September 1997, both organizations were 
referred to. The term, ‘West’, on the other hand, was often related to the 
transatlantic element represented by the USA and NATO.  
However, the articles that included references to the European Union (EU) 
as well as ‘union’ or ‘Europe’ as synonyms of the EU were included. For 
instance, articles that spoke of ‘going to Europe’ after an initial discussion 
about the situation in the EU. Also articles to ‘Euro’+suffix, which clearly refer 
to the EU, were included. 
The articles where EU member states or candidate countries were 
mentioned without referring to the European Union as a whole were omitted 
as were articles where the only reference was ‘in all European countries’, ‘in 
Europe’ and ‘in the developed European countries’ that could refer to the wider 
Western Europe. On the other hand, if the wording concerned ‘European 
Union countries/nations/member states’, those articles were included. Also 
the claim that Estonians are becoming European citizens (PM, 18.03.1998) 
refers to the EU, since citizenship is connected specifically to the EU, not 
Europe in general. 
Richardson (2007, 18) suggests that it is as important to pay attention to 
metonymy and naming. Thus, the articles dealing with ‘Brussels’ and the EU 
institutions or their representatives as metonymical references to the EU were 
included. For example, the articles could refer to the President of the European 
Commission at the time, Romano Prodi, some other commissioners or 
Brussels in general. Also those articles that referred to certain EU programs 
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directed at Estonia as a candidate country were included (for example the 
Phare program).  
On the other hand, the articles referring to Brussels as a city, not the 
representative of the EU, were excluded from the analysis (for example PM, 
18.06.1998). Also the articles where a reference to the single currency Euro 
was made without any further reference to the European Union were left out 
of the analysis. The quantity of these articles was marginal and mostly related 
to discussions about the Estonian possibility to use Euro currency on the basis 
of Estonia’s decision only.  
The most common way of making neologisms in the paper was using the 
prefix ‘Euro’. Each example was evaluated separately on the basis of whether 
or not the reference was made to the European Union. Again, I did not include 
those articles where ‘Euro’ was referring to a certain quality, e.g. “Euro 
prisons” (eurovanglate), “Euro shelters” (euroturvakodudel) (PM, 
26.05.1998), “Euro renovation” (euroremonti) (PM, 31.07.1998) and “Euro 
skin” (eurokesta) (PM, 31.10.1997). 
At the same time those numerous neologisms where the term ‘Euro’ was 
replacing European Union were included, for example “Euro Commission” 
(eurokomisjoni) (PM, 28.06.1997) and “Euro Parliament” (Europarlament) 
(PM, 14.08.1997). The term “Euro race” (eurovõidujooksu) (PM, 24.07.1997b) 
referred to the stiff competition between the twelve candidate countries. Also 
the terms “Euro negotiations” (euroläbirääkimiste) (PM, 12.11.1997) instead 
of the negotiations with the EU, “Euro integration” (eurointegratsioonis) (PM, 
26.05.1997) instead of integrating to the European Union, “Euro Union” 
(Euroliit) (PM, 26.11.1997) instead of the European Union, as well as “Euro 
norms” (euronormidele) (PM, 28.07.1997), “Euro demand” (Euronõuet) (PM, 
17.11.1997) and “Euro policy” (europoliitika) (PM, 27.05.1997) in connection 
with the accession negotiations appeared. I also included “Euro optimism” 
(eurooptimism) (PM, 04.01.2003), “Euro process” (Europrotsess) (PM, 
09.02.1998), “Euro debate” (eurodebatt) (PM, 12.11.2003) and “Eurosceptics” 
(euroskeptikutele) (PM, 12.07.1997), “Euro support” (eurotoetus) and “Euro 
propaganda” (europropaganda) (PM, 02.06.1997) since all these were related 
to the European Union. Also for instance, “Euro corridors” (eurokoridoridest), 
“Euro minded people” (euromeelsel rahval), “Euro desire” (euroihaluse) (PM, 
12.07.1997), “Euro diagnosis” (Eurodiagnoos), “Euro road” (euroteelt) (PM, 
24.07.1997a), “Euro train” (eurorongi), “Euro autumn” (Eurosügise) (PM, 
05.09.1997), “Euro information” (euroinfo), “Euro discussion”  
(Eurodiskussioon) (PM, 11.09.1997), “Euro door” (euroust) (PM, 22.10.1997) 
and “Euro fog” (euroudu) (PM, 13.11.1997) were included. 
In the selected articles, aside from the EU, Estonia was always present in 
one way or another. I included those articles where the reference to ‘Estonian 
something/representative’ or ‘us’ as Estonia was made. On the other hand, I 
did not include the articles where Estonia was replaced by Baltic 
countries/nations, East European countries/nations or only candidate 
countries of the EU were mentioned. Also those few articles that focused on 
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the municipal or local level dealing with, for example, the development of a 
certain Estonian city, municipalities or local, not national us were excluded 
from the further analysis (see Section 2.4).    
Only those parts of the articles where both Estonia and the EU were present 
were selected for the analysis. In some cases this could mean the whole article 
whereas for other articles, one paragraph was selected on the basis of the above 
mentioned key words. At the same time it should be noted that even though 
visually it is easy to notice where one paragraph ends and the other one starts, 
this does not make paragraphs objective and neutral categories, neither are 
they necessarily logical entities. In some cases, a particular paragraph 
contained several topics of which only a small proportion concerned the EU. 
In other articles the same ideas and arguments continued across several 
paragraphs (even though the EU could have been mentioned in one of these 
only). Consequently, in order to understand the text, the preceding and 
following paragraphs were included in the analysis. This way mechanical 
categorization was replaced by distinct evaluations. 
In sum, on the basis of the above criteria, the aggregate of articles selected 
1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003 was 1780, of which 154343 of were analyzed (see 
Section 3.2). The more concrete division by years is shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Number of articles published and analyzed per year and in total. 
Year 1997 1998 2002 2003 Total 
Number of 
articles 
published by 
Postimees 
376 426 381 597 1780 
Number of 
analyzed 
articles 
361 383 292 507 1543 
4.2 FORMING DISCOURSES ON THE BASIS OF THE 
ARTICLES 
As a pre-analysis phase each article was transferred from Postimees’ archive 
to a separate digital file. The articles were gathered into Year Specific folders 
each containing files for the each of the categories of writers, Staff Journalists, 
Political Elite, Cultural Elite and Readers. After the filing process, I printed out 
each article and read through it twice underlining the relevant parts and 
commenting on them (using keywords such as irony, expressions etc.). Finally, 
                                                          
43 The difference in these figures was caused by the decision to discard the mixed group of ‘Others’ 
(see Section 3.2) from the process of analysis. 
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I translated the relevant parts into English and transferred them to a digital 
storage file.  
The analysis started from the linguistic properties extant in the process of 
forming discourses. For example, naming, metaphors, metonymy, 
presuppositions, usage of active and passive voice and nominalization were 
used in the initial categorization (see Richardson 2007, 51-63). During this 
phase, the articles were also divided into initial categories (such as Image, 
Estonia as Special etc.) that emerged from the data. The categories arising 
from the texts indicated the substantial means (the axes of 
friendliness/hostility and equality/inequality) that were dealt with in the 
Chapter 3 of this thesis (see also Fairclough [1992]2003, 2 and Raik 2003, 35). 
The process, however, was two dimensional, since the theoretical 
framework was developed hand-in hand with the empirical research (see also 
Raik 2003, 30-31). As a result, instead of ‘picking-up’ discourses they were 
formed by the researcher in the interaction process with both theoretical 
background and empirical data. The theoretical basis has also enabled me to 
depict the wider and more abstract systems of meanings and avoid ‘tennis 
discourses’ (Valtonen 1998, 98) formed on the basis of the topics dealt with in 
the articles (like ‘language discourse’ or ‘culture discourse’ while talking about 
language and culture accordingly). Forming the discourses did not void the 
texts from other analysis as other combinations of the properties of the text 
and of the interpreter (social positioning, knowledge, values) were equally 
valid (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 67). Thus, by choosing some other 
theoretical basis for the analysis, different discourses could be found within 
the same empirical data (see also Raik 2003, 30-31).  
In the second phase of the analysis, the usage of substantial and linguistic 
means started to diverge with an emphasis of substantial means over the 
linguistic ones. On the basis of the analysis grounded on the substantial means 
(friendliness/hostility and equality-inequality of Estonia-EU relationship), 
three discourses emerged rather clearly from the empirical data. The first of 
these discourses was European Estonia which sees the EU as an authority for 
Estonia, the second was Independent Estonia, which views Estonia and the 
EU as equal partners and the third was Humble Estonia, which sees the EU as 
an authoritarian actor and Estonia as a humble small country without any 
influence.  
However, even though the overall structure of the discourses is formed on 
the substantial basis, linguistic means have given a basis to the struggle inside 
each discourse as a cleavage between what Estonia is and what it is not/should 
be/become in relation to the EU. The cleavage could be found in the articles of 
all years and of all above mentioned categories of authors. In terms of 
discourses Fairclough (1995, 55) language use can be constitutive in 
conventional ways (reproducing and maintaining existing social identities, 
relations and systems of knowledge) as well as creative ways (help to transform 
them). The current analysis shows both usages.  
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In the context of forming the discourses, the issue about their beginning 
and end in the media text as a unit of analysis deserves an explanation. The 
logic of having one entire article displaying a discourse was to be less the rule 
and rather more the exception. A discourse limited to a paragraph was more 
common. In some cases, a discourse continued through several paragraphs 
(with a potential interruption in between), in others the discourses changed 
within a particular paragraph. An example of the last one can be found from 
the article of Postimees referring to the ideas of Mart Laar (Estonian Prime 
Minister at the time)44: 
Laar closes his article with a positive message: the whole of Europe 
should be changed into “new”. Here is Estonia’s real chance: to bear 
ethical values and knock continuously on the conscience of the big 
countries. Only of course when these things are in order at home.45  
PM, 20.02.2003  
The example starts with an assumption that Estonia as an independent actor 
can contribute to the EU. The discourse, however, ends before the last 
sentence where Estonia’s ability to be a role model for the whole EU is no more 
taken for granted.   
Another example of the movement of discourse to the formative moment, 
can be found in an editorial of Postimees published in the end of the accession 
process. A Staff journalist writes that the progress reports of the European 
Commission have created a fruitful ground for finishing the accession 
negotiations, and as the candidate countries have done their homework well, 
now it is left to wait for the answer from the member countries of the European 
Union. Postimees continues that time for the enlargement is more mature than 
ever before (PM, 10.10.2002). The first part of the text refers to the feedback 
given by the European Commission to the candidate countries as recognition 
given by the EU. The last sentence, however, moves to the formative moment 
as a special time. Instead of Estonia or the EU, here the time is seen to have 
the main agency: enlargement is taking place due to the proper time, not the 
action of the candidate countries or the EU.   
The finding that the same article, paragraph or even sentence could contain 
a variety of discourses also enabled me to ignore the question ‘what does the 
writer really mean’ usually asked when contradictory attitudes appear in the 
same text. If the notion of discourse analysis is employed contradictory 
attitudes can be analyzed as examples of separate discourses present in the 
same article.  
                                                          
44 Similar examples can be found also from Political Elite articles (PM, 28.08.1997 and PM, 
13.09.1997). 
45 Laar lõpetab artikli positiivse sõnumiga - kogu Euroopa tuleb «uueks» muuta. Siin peitubki 
tegelikult Eesti shanss - olla eetiliste väärtuste kandjaks ja koputada pidevalt suurriikide 
südametunnistusele. Seda muidugi eeldusel, et ka kodus on need asjad korras. 
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4.3 ANALYZING DISCOURSES 
In order to analyze the relationship between Estonia and the EU in the 
discourses, I focus on identification-recognition, internal action-interaction 
(practice-agency), image-substance and the current state of order-the status 
quo as different, though partly overlapping means used for making a 
distinction between us and the Other. 
In identification-recognition, identification refers to self-understanding as 
a basis of identity whereas recognition means others’ perception of this 
understanding. The importance of recognition in relation to (national) identity 
has been emphasized by variety of scholars (for instance Ringmar 1996, 81; 
Kivikuru 2004, 30; see also Therborn 1995, 231-232). Also, Eric Hobsbawm 
(1992, 8) argues that apart from regarding oneself as a member of a nation it 
is important to be treated as such.  
It has been argued that during the EU accession process applicant states 
strive for recognition as European states: on accepting a new member the 
other member states recognize the applicant’s Europeanness de facto (Moisio 
2002, 93, 97). Recognition given by the EU has been seen as important not 
only from the perspective of the accession negotiations but also in relation to 
the new national identity narratives of post-communist states (the story we 
tell of ourselves) (Moisio 2002, 93, 110; see also Section 3.1 and Robins and 
Morley 1993, 405-410).  
At the same time the characteristic feature of the media texts is internal 
recognition: apart from the EU, recognition can also come from internal 
actors. For instance, citizens’ support towards Estonia’s EU accession is an 
example of internal recognition during the accession process. As a mixture of 
external and internal recognition, internal actors mediate in the media texts 
(putative) recognition of the EU. In this study identification appears either in 
the form of who/what we are or what we should do/be/become (setting the 
norms explicitly) whereas recognition as evaluation often in a form of 
criticism, is a characteristic feature of becoming. At the same time, in the 
context of becoming, identification implicitly seeks recognition: by 
emphasizing what should be done, a possibility of further evaluation 
concerning success or failure is opened. However, no chronological linear 
process in the form of ‘being/doing something, should be/do something else, 
not having achieved the aim yet (as a recognition)’ with a clear beginning and 
an end can be depicted from the texts (see also Rantanen 1997, 55-56). Instead, 
recognition can be given both to the attempts to make changes and to the 
original situation, it can refer to the current trends or forecast the future. 
In agency-practice relations, agency refers to the EU, which is present in 
the media texts as an actor in the form of its representatives, institutions, 
legislative acts etc., indicating also interaction between Estonia and the EU. 
Even though practice refers to dealing with the EU, the focus is on how, on the 
basis of Estonian observations, things are arranged in the EU. At the same time 
Estonia is not interacting with the EU but is depicting the EU’s practice from 
 83 
 
the perspective of internal action. Thus, for instance a suggestion that Estonia 
should raise a certain tax to the level of the EU refers to the internal action and 
practice of the EU. At the same time the claim that the tax should be raised in 
Estonia due to the EU demands or directive is classified as an interaction 
between Estonia and the EU as an agency.  
Substance and image can be seen as complementary sides, that Light 
(2001, 1055) maps as who we are and how we want Others to see us (see also 
Section 3.1 and Young and Light 2001, 947). Substance (what is going on and 
how things are) provides a basis for the image targeted towards the Other 
(showing what is going on and how things are).  
At the same time, the complementarity of the relationship cannot be taken 
for granted, since the superiority of one side at the expense of the other can 
occur. In the context of valuing the substance as ‘a real thing’, the image is 
criticized as ‘just a picture’ that is not in accordance with reality. On the other 
hand, image can be seen as valuable. In such cases, despite the actual 
substance, it is still considered, at the least, to maintain the image. 
Last but not least, the relationship between us and the Other can be 
analyzed on the basis of mapping the status quo and the current condition. The 
latter concept refers to the situation that might be changed in the future 
whereas in connection with status quo both flexibility of processes as well as 
actors’ possibility to change things are abolished. Therefore, several issues that 
are actually considered to be problematic are treated as sealed for good. 
*** 
In sum, this brief chapter provides an overview of the principles for selecting 
the newspaper articles for the empirical analysis. The process involved 
substantial as well as linguistic means for forming and analyzing the 
discourses, which were presented. The substantial means formed a basis for 
making a distinction between the discourses whereas linguistic means had 
their role in finding out what was going on inside the discourses (the struggle 
between being and becoming). An overview of both is also given in the Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Scheme for forming and analyzing discourses. 
 Substantial means Linguistic means 
Forming discourses   
Background of analysis IR and Europeanisation 
theories 
Indicative/conditional; affirmative 
sentence/negation 
Question What discourses can be 
formed 
How are discourses formed 
Analyzing discourses   
Focus of analysis Construction of us- the Other 
relations 
Wording, expressions etc. 
Question What means are used for 
construction 
How are the means formed 
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5. REPRESENTATION: ESTONIAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES 
Using the means presented in the previous chapter, three discourses based on 
a trio of understandings about the relationships between Estonia and the EU 
were formed: European Estonia, Independent Estonia and Humble Estonia. 
Analysis of these is based on an assumption that at the textual level, language 
use constitutes to three aspects of society and culture: systems of knowledge 
as representation, social identities as well as social relations (Fairclough 1995, 
55). Accordingly, in each discourse all three constitutive aspects, 
representation, relations and identities of the text level are analyzed (see 
Section 3.1). This chapter analyzes representation whereas Chapter 6 focuses 
on relations and identities.  
The discourse European Estonia was formed in relation to the liberalist 
approach of IR theories, more precisely the importance of international 
organizations from the perspectives of nation states. I have combined this 
understanding with the equality axis that indicates the EU’s authority over 
Estonia. As a result, the EU is seen as a superior Other that Estonia either or 
both admires or should admire, follow and obey. The general admittance of 
EU authority in this discourse makes it rather similar to the official 
enlargement discourse (see Raik 2003, 114-115, 123-126, 128). 
The discourse of Independent Estonia was formed in relation to the 
constructivist approach of the IR theories. Here, the main idea is that actors, 
irrespective of size have certain roles in forming world anarchy. Since Estonia 
is seen to be a plenipotentiary actor, Estonia and the EU are either taken as 
equal partners or their equality is emphasized as a necessity. 
The discourse of Humble Estonia was formed in relation to the realist 
approach of the IR theories indicating that small states have rather poor 
opportunities in the hostile world anarchy. In this connection the EU as part 
of the same world is seen to be authoritarian (not necessarily hostile but 
ignorant towards Estonia) and Estonia is expected to realize this situation as 
well as its own opportunities. 
In every discourse, I analyze the two competing sides. The first refers to 
being and the second one challenges this by emphasizing what should be done 
to reach that goal. In the instance of being the actual situation accords to 
expectations and society is seen as rather homogenous without internal 
contradictions in the understanding of who we are. Becoming, on the other 
hand, is based on an assumption that reality and ideals are not in accordance 
to each other. Thus, the necessity to change the situation is indicated in the 
texts either implicitly by criticizing the current situation and pointing out its 
limitations or explicitly by claiming what has to be changed. In this process, 
internal cleavages of society also become visible.  
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Since my empirical data consists of opinion articles published over four 
years and written by four categories of writers (defined by authorship), in 
addition to the general overview, a distinction on the basis of the years and the 
writers can be made. First, the development of the discourses during the 
accession process will be analyzed. Second, a closer look and a comparison of 
the categories of articles in the discourses will be made. 
In order to locate the discourses in the wider societal context of Estonia, I 
will start in all three cases from the overview of the academic texts that 
communicate the understanding of either European Estonia, Independent 
Estonia or Humble Estonia. The reason is that as an example of intertextuality 
the discourses emerging from Postimees are also quite widely represented in 
academic texts. In discursive terms the academic texts referred to can be taken 
as an academic discourse (vis-à-vis media discourse of Postimees, see Section 
1.1).  
Before the actual analysis two aspects have to be noted. First, although the 
authors of the academic texts communicate the understanding of Estonia-EU 
relationship in the framework of a particular discourse, this does not mean 
that the authors could not position themselves differently. For instance, 
scolars can refer to the political discussion that Estonia has always belonged 
to Europe as an example of how the idea of European Estonia is spread in 
Estonian society. As an alternative option, the same author could conclude 
that this discussion proves that Estonia ‘truly’ is a European country. The first 
case is an example of distinct categories of analysis and practice, in the second 
case the category of practice is reproduced in category of analysis (see Section 
1.1). 
Second, even though academic texts are placed at the beginning of each 
discourse, the sequence of analysis was different because the comparison 
between media and the academic texts was made after the discourses of 
Postimees had been formed. Thus, the academic texts were not used as a 
ready-made basis for finding the same discourses in the paper. 
5.1 DISCOURSE OF EUROPEAN ESTONIA  
In various academic texts published during the accession process, the 
relationship between Europe46 and Estonia is based on the understanding that 
Estonia is a European country (see section 3.1). For example, Aksel Kirch and 
Marika Kirch (2001, 129) write that Estonia can be seen as a part of the West 
due to the common cultural values and background that contains Western 
ideas like individualism, liberalism, the rule of law, constitutionalism, free 
markets as well as separation of church and the state (see also Kirch 2002, 91 
and Kuus 2002c, 307). Being part of European civilization has also been 
                                                          
46 Especially in these texts, European Union is widely equated with Europe. In some examples the 
terms West and Western Europe are used for the same reference.  
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depicted as one of the main features of Estonian national identity (Jaanson 
1999, 17). 
Berg and Oras (2002, 30) write that Estonia belongs to Europe 
geographically, culturally, economically and politically, which points of view 
support the assertion: 
On the Estonian side there is an historic fortress [ Narva - SKK] built 
by the Swedes, Danes and Germans in full accordance with the cultural 
traditions of the Western Europe, on the other side there is a historical 
fortress [Ivangorod – SKK] representing Slavic-Orthodox cultural 
traditions. The distance between these two fortresses is approximately 
1000 meters, but the cultural differences are greater. 
Kirch and Kirch 2001, 129  
In addition to the aspects like culture, geography etc. also the wide 
identification with Europe among the groups of the society was brought out in 
the academic texts. For example Marika Kirch (2002, 94, 95) refers to the 
results of an opinion poll from the beginning of 1993, which indicates the 
majority of Estonians see themselves in a more or less equal amount the 
carriers of Estonian as well as European identity. Kirch (2002, 95) draws the 
conclusions that for Estonians European identity is not just a political rhetoric 
but the self-understanding of the nation and a creation of a conscious 
connection with the wider cultural context that is closest to Estonia47. As Kirch 
and Kirch (2001, 130) state: ”No distinguished Estonian researchers, writers 
or politicians have doubted that Estonia belongs to the Western world” (see 
also Vihalemm 1997, 132 and Kirch 2002, 91). 
One argument common to some texts was the reference to the temporal 
aspect, either in a form of distant history or timeless eternity. An example of 
the first is the claim that Estonia has been an integral part of the Western 
Europe's economic, political and cultural life since, at least, the Middle Ages 
(Hanseatic League, own language, administrative system, religion) (Kuus 
2002a, 97). Similarly, the slogan ‘Let's be Estonians, but let's also become 
Europeans!’ of the literary movement ”Young Estonians” from the beginning 
of the 20th century was referred to in the beginning of 1990s as a historical 
proof of being European (see Kirch and Kirch 2001, 130). 
An example of the timeless relationship can be found from the book 
“Return to the Western World” (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b). The authors 
write that Estonia has always belonged to Western civilization (as opposed to 
Russian orthodox Byzantine culture). Thus, Estonian Westernness did not 
disappear during the Soviet time but made Estonia at that time a part of the so 
called Soviet West until the country’s historical position as a part of the 
Western world was re-established (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997b).  
                                                          
47 At the same time the opinion polls showed that the attitude towards Estonian EU membership 
was rather critical (see Chapter 1). 
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From the EU perspective an attempt to emphasize Estonian Europeanness 
during the accession process could be seen as an aim to seek for the recognition 
of Estonian Europeanness in a form of EU accession (Lagerspetz 1999, 388). 
As Marju Lauristin (1997) writes about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania:  
Their wish to be accepted again by the West and to be recognized as an 
integral part of the Western cultural realm is a more substantial 
driving force in their development than mere economic or political 
motivation could ever be. 
 Lauristin 1997, 29  
One example of this process was an attempt to make Estonia look like one of 
the Nordic countries48, since being Nordic was seen to be complementary with 
being European (for example Vihalemm 1999). Since the EU did not decide 
until the late 2000, either which of the candidate countries was going to be 
invited to join in the first round or when the enlargement would take place, 
Estonia’s statecraft considered it important to make a distinction between 
Estonia as a ‘real Nordic country’ and the ‘former Soviet republics of Latvia 
and Lithuania’. As a part of this process, the Estonia’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at the time Toomas Hendrik Ilves invented the concept of Christmas 
lands in his speech “Estonia as a Nordic Country” held at the Institute of 
Foreign Policy in Stockholm. Ilves claimed that Estonia belonged to the 
Northern European Region of “Jõulumaa” (Yule-land - Christmas Land). 
Members of this region (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Great 
Britain and Estonia) share linguistically similar kinds of term for Christmas 
(Jul, Joulu, Yule). In addition to linguistic and traditional similarities, the 
countries have in common a low level of corruption, trade amongst themselves 
and a large number of mobile phone and internet users (Välisministeeriumi 
Pressitalitus 1999). Similar ideas were also presented by other societal figures 
(for example Eerik-Niiles Kross 2001 and Tarand 2001) in Estonian media as 
well as reflected in academic texts (for example Vihalemm 1999). 
In the current study, the discourse of European Estonia is formed of Being 
and Becoming European. Being European is based on the idea that Estonian 
membership in the EU is rather clear: questions of the category similar to 
whether either or both Estonia wants to become a member of the EU and the 
EU wants to accept Estonian accession are seen as irrelevant, since this issue 
                                                          
48 The idea that Estonia could be one of the Nordic countries was invented during the interwar period 
for securing the country’s international position and finding allies in international relations. The project 
of the Baltic League was presented in 1918 and at the end of the 1920s the concept of Baltoscandia that 
was based on the geopolitical logic was created (Lehti 1998). According to these views Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Scandinavia formed the same entity whereas Russia was seen as the Other (Lehti 1998). 
In practice, Baltoscandia failed to get support in the Scandinavian states (Lehti 1998 and Lehti 1999, 
434). 
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has been decided upon already. Also the similarity between Estonia and the 
EU is taken for granted. 
Even though having a similar basis, Becoming European challenges Being 
European either by criticizing what Estonia is not, or emphasizing what it 
should be as a cleavage between the ideal and Estonian reality. Since the EU is 
in a position of authority, Estonia has to follow the duties, tasks or an example 
set by Brussels. Instead of an active Estonia, a reactive Estonia that has to work 
hard to become suitable for the EU membership can be depicted. 
On the basis of whether the main emphasis is on the agency or practice both 
being and becoming are divided into two sub-discourses. In the case of 
emphasizing the EU as an agency, the focus is on the rhetoric/discursive level 
and Estonia is either following or is supposed to follow EU’s laws, statements 
orders etc. The EU’s practice does not tell what should or should not be done 
in Estonia in connection with the accession process but the issue concerns the 
observations made while comparing Estonian practice to the superior one of 
the EU. 
The relations depicted in the previous chapter (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3) 
are analyzed against each sub-discourse. This way, the internal logic of the 
data is mapped by taking into account the above mentioned 
recognition/identification (in the case of becoming). Apart from that the 
attention is paid to the EU norms/internalized norms (in the case of being and 
becoming). 
In this discourse, identification means tasks set either by the writers (of the 
articles) or the EU whereas the recognition is feedback, evaluation and 
estimations as a stick or a carrot given in relation to becoming. EU norms refer 
to the EU as an expert/authority or the good practices valid in the EU as an 
ideal for Estonia whereas the internalized norms means that even though the 
norms are still coming from the EU, these are not taken as orders coming from 
outside but followed as part of own aims and promises. Thus, the EU norms 
are no more external but understood as part of Estonia’s goals49. 
The interplay between the identification/recognition and the EU 
norms/internalized norms can be depicted in two ways for being and four ways 
for becoming. The division is capsulized in Table 5.1 and the hierarchy of the 
discourse is clarified in Figure 5.1. The elements in Figure 5.1, which this 
chapter deals with are Being European and Becoming European, whereas 
Chapter 6 analyzes Being Informed and Becoming informed.  
                                                          
49 EU norms are thus an example of what Trine Flockhart (2008, 6) has called “thin” 
Europeanisation and internalized norms (own aims) as “thick” Europeanisation. Here, however, the 
focus is on how the process has been interpreted, not on the actual situation in taking over the acquis 
communautaire.   
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Table 5.1. Sub-discourses of Being and Becoming European. 
Being European Becoming European 
Follow EU practice Should follow EU practice 
 Failure to follow EU practice 
Accept EU authority Should accept EU authority 
 Failure to accept EU authority 
 
Figure 5.1. Sub-discourses of European Estonia.  
BEING EUROPEAN 
Being European is split into two sub-discourses, Follow EU practice and 
Accept EU authority. Follow EU practice emphasizes the uniformity of 
Estonian and European/EU practice without paying attention to the agency of 
the EU. A Cultural Elite article suggests, Estonia just belongs to Europe: “We 
just belong here and that is why it is important to settle down here as well and 
practically as possible. EU is by far the best opportunity to do that.”50 (PM, 
13.09.2003c). 
                                                          
50 Me lihtsalt kuulume siia ja sellepärast on oluline ennast siin nii hästi ja otstarbekalt sisse seada 
kui vähegi võimalik. EL on kaugelt parim võimalus seda teha. 
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Accept EU authority deals with the EU as an agency that helps, guides and 
supports Estonia or at least creates a good framework for the development.  As 
a Cultural Elite article writes about help got from Brussels: 
The development of Estonian society is supported already now from 
several international foundations and sources. /…/ When Estonia one 
day becomes a member of the European Union, the sources and 
amounts of the support will increase several times.51  
PM, 25.01.1997  
Follow EU practice 
Follow EU practice means that the accession process in general and the 
preparations made for the membership are seen as Estonian internal tasks not 
a result of the interaction between Estonia and Brussels. The basic idea is 
similar to the one that Estonia has always belonged to Europe (see above). 
However, while academic texts concentrate more widely on Europe and the 
‘timeless values’ like language, culture etc., the discourse of Postimees focuses 
on Estonian developments during the integration process. Depending on the 
articles it is either claimed that Estonia has already reached its destination and 
is European, since it follows EU practice, or at least a linear way towards the 
EU has been developed during the accession process.  
The main idea of the EU as an already reached destination is 
expressed in a Readers article three months before the accession referendum, 
which created the analogy of a residential neighborhood for the EU: Estonia 
has a choice either to buy the best house in the worst district or the other way 
round. The writer continues that we are already the fruitful habitants (viljakad 
elanikud) of the neighborhood called Europe (PM, 20.06.2003c; see also 
Political Elite article, PM, 20.06.2003a). Also several Cultural Elite articles 
express the same idea by writing that we are Europeans and experience all 
Europe’s developments and crisis together with Europe (PM, 11.12.1998a), 
referring to Martin Luther’s famous statement that here we stand on this side 
of European border and we can do no other (PM, 08.08.2003a), claiming that 
Estonia is rooted to Europe (PM, 13.09.2003c) and seeing Estonia as a 
potential weak link in EU and NATO that could be threatened by international 
terrorism (PM, 27.10.2003).   
The most common way of constructing the EU as a destination that Estonia 
has already reached is by pointing out the spheres of life where Estonian 
practice resembles the admired European one. At the most abstract level - 
common values, opinions and ideas are pointed out mostly by Cultural Elite 
articles (see also Journalist article, PM 20.09.2003).  The articles argue that 
                                                          
51 Eesti ühiskonna arengut toetatakse juba nüüd mitmetest rahvusvahelistest fondidest ja allikatest. 
/…/ Kui Eesti saab kunagi Euroopa Liidu liikmeks, kasvavad allikad ja toetuste määrad mitmekordseks. 
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the main themes of Estonia to aim to join the EU and NATO have been the 
common values and way of life that connect us to the Western world (PM, 
06.02.2003). Similarly, on the basis of the distance to power (võimukaugus) 
and individualism, Estonia is seen as having been in Europe for a long time 
already (PM, 06.09.2003a). Also on the basis of Euroscepticism as a European 
phenomenon, Estonia is considered to belong to Europe (PM, 17.07.1998). 
Concerning Estonian habitants, it is asked if politicians have shifted their 
party-centered thinking to being state centered as a characteristic of the EU 
(PM, 02.10.2003b) and similarly to the majority of the citizens in all EU 
countries, opinion polls show that in Estonia most of the people were against 
the Iraqi war (PM, 04.02.2003).  
At a more concrete level, the articles of the Journalists, the Political Elite 
and the Cultural Elite refer mostly to the economic sphere, legislation of the 
society or a combination of both for showing Estonia as European. At the same 
time the opportunity to skip the Estonian accession referendum on the basis 
of the example of several EU member countries (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
19.03.1998) can be seen as an exceptional issue.  
Concerning the economy and regulation of the society Political Elite articles 
write that Estonia is already part of EU’s legal and economic space (PM, 
04.07.2003b; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 22.06.1998 and PM, 
06.09.2002) and Estonian economic development after the independence is 
directly connected to the economic environment of the European common 
market (PM, 21.07.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article argues that within a 
year the prices of goods and services have risen only 2.4 per cent, the same rate 
of inflation as the Euro zone countries. Therefore, thanks to the competition 
of the free market, the prices of most goods and services are already at the EU 
level, thus one does not have to be afraid of special price jumps in the future 
(PM, 08.04.2003b). Even though high prices are seldom considered as 
positive, these are taken as a sign of the similarity between Estonia and the EU 
and therefore used as a proof that Estonia already has a stable economic sector 
like the EU member countries. 
Regulation of the society is mostly related to EU legislative acts 
implemented in various spheres, including the economy. Most of the articles 
are dated towards the end of the accession process (with the exceptions of a 
Political Elite articles, PM, 18.07.1997b and PM, 09.07.1998 as well as Cultural 
Elite articles, PM, 21.11.1997 and PM, 22.12.1997). A Political Elite article 
contends that Estonia has adopted all current EU laws with several transition 
periods whereas new basic treaty of the EU will be accepted by Estonia, which 
by then will already be an EU member (PM, 27.01.2003). In a similar example, 
a Political Elite article claims that Estonian conservation systems are already 
in accordance to EU’s Natura-principles (PM, 01.04.2002; see also Journalist 
article, PM, 21.04.2003). 
Similar arguments can be found in Cultural Elite articles. The articles claim 
that Estonia has European governmental rule (valitsuslahend) (PM, 
20.03.2003; see also PM, 12.09.2002b). In Estonia, as in the EU member 
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countries the population is representative of a sovereign state (PM, 
02.05.2003b). Estonia has developed a democratic society and harmonized 
legal space, standards etc. (PM, 27.06.2003), the principles known and 
recognized in Europe for a longer time have now found their way also to 
become valid laws of Estonia (PM, 19.03.2002) and Estonian laws regulating 
language issues are already now in accordance to the EU (PM, 02.09.2003a; 
see also PM, 30.03.2002a and Readers article, PM, 14.07.2003b). The articles 
also suggest the same corn species are allowed on the basis of Estonian and 
the EU regulations (PM, 16.09.2003b), as an EU member, the principle of 
superiority of the EU law would be valid for Estonia as with all other member 
states (PM, 13.05.2002a; see also PM, 15.01.2003b) and Estonia has already 
used the rights of a future member state (PM, 13.09.2003c). 
Apart from the above mentioned regulations, the Cultural Elite articles 
emphasize education, research and science as spheres confirming Estonian 
Europeanness (PM, 28.10.1997 and PM, 12.01.1998). In the beginning of the 
accession process, articles appeared concerning the organization of science 
(PM, 06.02.1997), mutual scientific priorities valid in Estonia and the EU (PM, 
16.05.1997) and new study programs similar to the EU ones (PM, 19.02.1998). 
At the end of the accession process, writers say that training, culture and 
consolidating people as Estonian priorities are considered to be in accordance 
with the priorities of the EU (PM, 13.09.2003e), Estonian principles of 
financing science are in accordance to the main principles of the EU and the 
centres of excellence have been selected on the basis of the EU science policy 
for ensuring and valuing the high level of the research (PM, 08.02.2003a). 
Last but not least, the Bologna declaration is guiding the action of Estonian 
universities and Estonia is participating in the EU Socrates program (PM, 
06.08.2003a). 
In sum, by pointing out the similarities between Estonia and the EU, 
writers claim that Estonian practice is already the same as that in the EU. As a 
Political Elite article explains, one has to get used to the idea that the EU’s 
policy and the decisions at this level are part of Estonian internal policy (PM, 
20.06.2003a). Even though not all issues pointed out by articles can be seen 
as positive ones, e.g. high prices and distance to power, in general Estonian 
similarity to the EU is seen as positive. 
Another part of Follow EU practice is based on the idea that even though 
the destination has not been reached yet, the linear way towards the EU 
has been built (Political Elite article 07.08.1997 and Journalist articles, PM, 
01.12.1997b and PM, 23.02.2002) and Estonia is seen as a probable future 
member country (Political Elite articles, PM, 10.07.1997b and PM, 
18.03.1998b; see also Journalist article, PM, 14.12.1998b and Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 28.08.2003). Amongst Political Elite articles, are depictions of the 
correlation between starting the accession negotiations in 1998 and future 
membership in the EU (PM, 23.10.1997 and PM, 21.10.1998; see also 
Journalist article, PM, 06.12.1998).  
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Similarly, a Cultural Elite article says that Estonia has got into the process 
of the EU accession negotiations and consequently the main political decision 
about us in the European direction has been made (PM, 31.01.1998). The same 
kind of ideas are also presented in other Cultural Elite articles, which argue 
that: Estonian accession to the EU has become much more real (PM, 
20.06.1998b), Estonia is closer to joining the EU than ever before (PM, 
23.12.1997), Estonia, on its way to membership, stands on the threshold of 
accession negotiations (PM, 06.11.1997), Estonia has all preconditions to join 
the EU soon (PM, 11.11.1997b) and most probably Estonia gets in whereas 
Latvia and Lithuania will at initially remain aside (PM, 01.08.1997a; see also 
Political Elite article, PM, 18.07.1997b). Substantially the Estonian-Russian 
(similarly to Latvian-Russian) border is about to become a contact line 
between the EU and Commonwealth of Independent States (PM, 04.02.1998) 
and the EU as well as the free movement of labour are waiting ahead of us (PM, 
06.03.1998d). Even though all these indicate Estonia’s success, the country is 
in a rather passive position guided by political decisions made about the 
country that create good preconditions for Estonia’s linear way to the EU. 
The same line of argument is continued towards the end of the accession 
process. Journalist article suggests after the end of the accession negotiations 
that in the following year Estonia faces the very real, or at least very much 
hoped for, possibility of joining the EU and NATO (PM, 31.03.2003) and a 
Political Elite article claims that it is rather sure that the country will quite 
soon be a member of the EU (PM, 30.01.2003). Also the act of the Estonia’s 
President in signing the accession treaty is interpreted as more symbolic than 
being a substantial step but still brings us closer to the EU (PM, 16.04.2003a).  
The linear way to the EU was the most represented in Cultural Elite articles. 
The articles argue about the looming (terendumine) of the EU (PM, 
11.10.2002), Estonia as almost a member of the EU already (PM, 23.12.2002a; 
see also PM, 15.06.2002a), as soon as the candidate countries like Estonia will 
be accepted as full members (PM, 19.04.2003), forthcoming accession to the 
EU (PM, 18.01.2003a), Estonia having an opportunity to join the EU (PM, 
27.07.2002b), Estonia moving towards the EU (PM, 06.08.2003a) and 
Estonia’s future among the states of the enlarged EU (PM,13.09.2003c). 
Conclusively, as one Cultural Elite article suggests, we started twelve years ago 
from a mature post-World War II Europe, and the way chosen by us has been 
European all these years – it is a way of peace and creative reconstruction (PM, 
02.09.2003b; see also PM, 15.09.2003). Another article says that presumably 
Estonia’s progress (kulgemine) to the EU has been determined both by our 
own former decisions and the preceding Yes-decisions of the other states (PM, 
10.09.2003b). 
In a Readers article, the EU accession is connected to the question of 
expenses, thus making the No-direction visible, even though not reasonable. 
The article suggests that if Estonian laws have been harmonized with those of 
the EU, can we vote against the accession, although a lot of our money has 
already been spent on the accession, hiring four to five people for the EU 
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integration bureau? The article continues that if one really wants to know 
people’s opinion it should have been asked before spending the money (PM, 
02.06.1997). 
In sum, in the examples that depict Estonia’s linear way to joining the EU, 
the country is given a rather passive position. Since the conclusions about the 
linear way are drawn on the basis of events during the accession process, the 
role left to the accession referendum is rather formal. Instead of seeing the 
referendum as a forum where the actual decision is made and practice formed, 
it is rather depicted as a forum that either follows the existing practice (in the 
case of Yes) or questions it in the discursive level (No to the EU). The latter, 
however, indicates quite illogical behavior from the perspective of the linear 
way.  
Accept EU authority 
The second sub-discourse of Being European, Accept EU authority, is based 
on the EU agency and interaction between Estonia and the EU. The EU is no 
more seen as a destination raised to the pedestal but an agency that has a 
positive impact on the development of Estonia. This impact is depicted either 
as an interplay between Estonia (the needy) and the EU (the carer) or by 
pointing out the beneficial framework the EU offers to Estonia. In both cases 
help and care gained from the EU are seen as additional value for Estonia, 
unrelated to the necessity to solve problems or to become something else. 
EU taking care is based on the EU as an active agency who helps Estonia 
(Political Elite articles, PM, 18.07.1997b and PM, 05.01.1998a and Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 02.10.2003c). In the beginning of the accession process, this 
relationship is characterized by using family terms, hierarchical face-to face 
relations based on deep emotional bonds. For instance the European 
Commission's general attitude towards Estonia is fatherly strict (isalikult 
karm) (Cultural Elite article PM, 26.06.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article 
claims that Nordic countries have taken the inclusion of the Baltic countries to 
the EU to their heart (PM 24.03.1997). As a representative of this ‘Nordic care’ 
the paper refers to Finland’s president at the time, Tarja Halonen: “As an older 
sister she guides younger brother in the winding road of the EU, she teaches 
and warns at the same time.”52 (PM, 22.10.1997a). By mapping Finland as an 
older sister and Estonia as a younger brother article also seals the role of both 
actors for good.  
In most examples, however, care and support are not based on love and 
warm feelings but calculations of how to maximize the benefits. A Journalist 
article writes, by helping them we also help ourselves has been motto of 
Europe (PM, 31.03.1998b). On a more concrete level, the same idea is 
expressed by a Political Elite article: since the EU accession means that 
                                                          
52 Justkui vanem õde juhatab ta nooremat venda euroliidu käänulisel teel, ta õpetab ja hoiatab samal 
ajal. 
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Estonia has to unavoidably sign both the Maastricht and Schengen treaties, 
the good work of the Estonian police and border guards is in the interest of all 
EU member states as even a question of life and death (PM, 17.07.1997). 
Towards the end of the accession process, the sphere, in which the EU’s 
help was widely noticed and authority was recognized, was the financial 
support offered to Estonia (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.08.2003a). As 
another Cultural Elite article states, the support Estonia already gets from the 
EU is increasing in connection with the proposed membership (PM, 
25.01.1997).  
In more concrete examples, Political Elite articles revealed Estonian 
programs and targets for EU financing (PM, 05.01.1998a; PM, 28.08.1998; 
PM, 24.10.2002 and PM, 04.07.2003b). Concerning more concrete specifics, 
a Journalist article suggests that Estonia has a reason to be thankful to the EU 
for the Phare money (PM, 06.11.2003a). Similarly, Cultural Elite articles point 
out that as part of the Phare program, EU supports language training and 
teaching Estonian language to Russian-speakers (PM, 22.12.1997; 
02.09.2003a; see also PM, 08.08.2003a) as well as EU finances targeted to 
the educational sector of Estonia (PM, 15.10.2002a).  
Apart from that Journalist articles discussed the opportunities to use EU 
aid to improve Estonian railways (15.04.2003a; PM, 24.04.2003 and PM, 
05.11.2003) and Political Elite articles discussed agriculture (PM, 01.02.2002 
and PM, 13.02.2002) and environmental protection (PM, 01.04.2002). 
Compared to the other three categories of articles, only a few Readers articles 
emphasized the EU’s aid to Estonia (PM, 14.07.2003b and PM, 21.08.1997a). 
In addition to the help Estonia is getting or going to get from the EU, the 
articles depict the EU as a good framework for Estonia. Here, instead of 
offering help, the EU creates a safe and secure framework for Estonia (Political 
Elite article, PM, 19.03.1997). As a Cultural Elite article writes, until now our 
attitude towards the EU has been first and foremost consumer-like but in 
reality the EU is an opportunity for us to develop ourselves more efficiently 
(PM, 12.07.1997a). Another Cultural Elite article claims that in the new reality 
of Europe, small countries have also been given the opportunity to define their 
fate with deeds (PM, 04.02.1998; see also PM, 02.07.1998). 
Similar to these, in most cases the idea of good framework is explicitly 
related to the future whereas the past or the present are referred to implicitly. 
More concretely, the focus is on predicting what opportunities would EU 
membership bring to Estonia. A Cultural Elite article states the EU will 
increase remarkably Estonia’s administrative capacity and restrict not only 
corruption and the uncontrollable movement of money but also other social 
vices (PM, 13.09.2003c). 
The benefits depicted by the articles both in the beginning as well as the 
end of the accession process are rather similar. The Cultural Elite articles tell 
of choosing peace that the EU together with the United States of America has 
guaranteed to me for the past 56 years (PM, 02.09.2003b), see the EU as one 
of the great guarantees (garant) of our national existence (PM, 13.02.1998) 
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that ensures Estonian statehood (PM, 08.08.2003a) and prevents potential 
military aggression against Estonia (PM, 27.10.2003). Therefore, compared to 
the accession of Nordic countries which felt secure and could bargain with the 
EU as equals, “[w]e have much more to win from the [European –SKK] Union 
and little or nothing to lose.”53 (Journalist article, PM, 11.09.1997a). 
Apart from the EU as a framework where existence of Estonian statehood 
is guaranteed, the articles refer to the improvement of Estonia’s international 
position in relation to the EU. Membership is expected to strengthen the 
existence Estonia (Cultural Elite article, PM, 02.10.2003a). In an allegoric 
example where the attributes of ‘Russia’ and ‘Estonia’ are used in an opposite 
way, a Cultural Elite article writes about the increasing importance of the 
“small Russia” (väike Venemaa) in connection with that country’s EU 
accession (PM, 08.12.2003). Since the EU is seen to give Estonia a good 
foreign political reference group (Political Elite article, 05.05.2003), a Political 
Elite article claims that as an EU member, Estonia can more easily negotiate 
with Third Countries (PM, 21.10.1998).  
At a more concrete level, the influence of the EU on Estonian relations with 
single countries is dealt with. A Cultural Elite article writes that after Estonia 
and Poland belong together to the EU, Polish border guard no longer consider 
it necessary to show its importance and thoroughness at the border crossing 
points (PM, 04.07.2003c). In a common article of Estonian and Finnish 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the time the writers emphasize the cooperation 
opportunities opening up from Estonian EU membership (PM, 09.10.2002a).  
Concerning the relations between Estonia and Russia, a Cultural Elite 
article argues that after the EU called Estonia to begin the accession 
negotiations, Russia tried to show the world that it wished to improve its 
relations with Estonia (PM, 06.01.1998a). The articles also claim that EU 
accession finally offers a new opportunity to deal with the large neighboring 
state (naabrist suurriigiga) with dignity (väärikalt asju ajda) (PM, 
11.11.1997b) and when Brussels says yes to Estonia’s accession(and why not 
Latvia’s and Lithuania’s) to the EU, Russia will also sign the border agreement 
with us and Latvia without further dawdling (venitamine) (PM, 29.11.1997a). 
At the end of the accession process the same line of argument is continued. 
Cultural Elite article argues that Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s full 
membership in the EU and NATO will make Moscow treat the Baltic provinces 
completely different from previous centuries (PM, 26.11.2002; see also PM, 
07.11.2002). 
Apart from Estonia’s international relations, the influence of the EU is 
mapped also in the other spheres of life. In the Cultural Elite articles, language, 
culture, identity but also science and education are emphasized at the end of 
the accession process. The articles claim that membership enables the EU to 
protect the identity of a small country (PM, 27.06.2003), that cultures are 
protected, not destroyed in the EU where the Estonian language will be one of 
                                                          
53 [m]eil on liidust võrratult rohkem võita ning kaotada pole suurt midagi. 
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the official languages of our civilization and Estonia will have a say with full 
rights (täieõiguslikuks kaasarääkijaks) in all main questions of our 
civilization (PM, 08.08.2003a; see also PM, 16.09.1998 and PM, 
02.09.2003a). Another article states that Estonian participation in the EU 
common scientific space has been very fruitful (kandnud head vilja) already 
and EU membership is considered to be a necessary condition for creating a 
knowledge based Estonia (PM, 03.09.2003b; see also Political Elite article, 
PM, 04.01.2002). 
Also most of the economy related arguments in the paper are presented by 
the Political and Cultural Elite articles. A Political Elite article claims that the 
Free Trade Agreement with the EU has helped to bring investments to Estonia 
and enabled us to become a part of the steadily developing economic region 
(PM, 21.07.1998). On the basis of a similar logic, other writers say that a formal 
EU accession occurring as soon as possible presumably offers new 
opportunities to Estonian economy (Political Elite article PM, 03.11.1998; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.08.2002 and Readers article, PM, 
27.04.1998). The decision to put Estonia into the first group in the accession 
negotiations was seen to raise trust towards the country and reduce the 
outward flow of money from the economy (Cultural Elite article PM, 
09.10.1998; see also Political Elite article PM, 17.07.1997). EU membership is 
expected to increase Estonia’s trustworthiness and economic interests of the 
other countries towards Estonia even further (Political Elite article, PM, 
22.05.1998 and Cultural Elite articles PM, 16.11.2002 and PM, 12.08.2003a).  
At a more concrete level articles state that as an EU member, Estonia will 
have easier access to the Eastern market (Political Elite article, PM, 
25.07.1997a; PM, 21.07.1998 and PM, 26.08.2003b), Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) will be a tangible benefit for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 
04.07.2003b) and EU offers a good framework for a knowledge based 
economy (Cultural Elite article PM, 27.06.2003). Conclusively, a Cultural Elite 
article writes, on the basis of the experiences of Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
one can, without much hesitation, hope for an increase of welfare in Estonia 
(PM, 24.12.1997c).  
The sphere that was present in the Readers articles and in the Cultural Elite 
articles were the new opportunities from the human perspective. As a Cultural 
Elite article writes, I have no doubt that joining the EU would help to make 
Estonia a more human friendly (inimsõbarlikumaks) place (PM, 14.11.1998). 
Also the power of the people as the highest power holder (võimukandja) is 
seen to increase, since apart from the national bodies people practice their 
power through EU institutions (PM, 02.05.2003b). 
Similarly, a Readers article says that in the EU, future generations will have 
more opportunities (PM, 01.09.2003). In the economic sphere, one expects 
the EU to help to save money in everyday life (Readers article, PM, 
18.02.2003) and the free movement of labor is seen to enable our people to 
enter themselves into the EU wide labor market for a better remuneration 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c; see also PM, 11.07.2003c). 
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Membership of the EU is also related to the new opportunities for the students 
(Cultural Elite article PM, 06.08.2003a). In another example of the Cultural 
Elite article however, the idea of various opportunities is expressed more 
ironically: if Estonia joins the EU for good, the slaves will run away and the 
world of Estonian libertarians and new capitalists tends to break down, 
logically and rightfully (PM, 05.12.2003).    
In sum, in Follow EU practice, the aim is to show that either Estonia has 
reached its destination already or has at least direct access to the EU. Accept 
EU authority, on the other hand, emphasizes either the EU as an actor that 
cares for Estonia (EU helping us) or concentrates on the beneficial framework 
created for Estonia by EU membership. The latter is largely based on the 
anticipated developments inside the EU. Both sub-discourses, however, can 
be characterized by a comparison in which ‘normality’ is ascribed to one side 
only whereas the other side measures itself against evaluation (Hörschelmann 
2001, 986; see also Section 3.1). 
The position of Estonia in Follow EU practice is either static or reactive. In 
static cases the similarity between Estonia and the EU is depicted as a concept 
that just exists (for instance, like the EU, we are also Eurosceptical and 
individualistic). Reactivity, on the other hand, is based on the idea that the 
country has already successfully internalized the practice of the EU.  
In Accept EU authority, Estonia is rather passively looking forward to the 
EU's help. Also in the case of the EU as a beneficial framework, the focus is 
more on the opportunities created by the EU than by Estonian agency. This 
way the new opportunities also do not refer to the urgent need to change 
Estonia but possibilities that the nation can take advantage of.  
In both sub-discourses, the Cultural Elite articles as well as the Political 
Elite articles are dominant, whereas the Readers articles and the Journalist 
articles are more modestly represented. Since Accept EU authority is based on 
the arguments for joining the EU, the relative absence of Journalist articles 
can be seen as an outcome of a mixture of the ideal of objectivity and the pro-
EU attitude. Instead of directly arguing for the EU membership, Postimees 
offers a platform to the representatives of society for praising the EU. This way 
the newspaper can simultaneously take a particular stand as well as remain 
objective54. In the case of Readers articles, their weak representation can be 
connected to their rather critical attitude towards Estonia’s EU accession.  
BECOMING EUROPEAN 
The scheme of Becoming European follows the logic of Being European: the 
sub-discourses Follow EU practice and Accept EU authority are accordingly 
challenged by the sub-discourses Should follow EU practice and Should 
accept EU authority. Should follow EU practice is based on the difference of 
                                                          
54 However, in the third discourse, Humble Estonia, PM was taking stand by giving a negative 
forecast about Estonian development outside the EU (threats instead of the promises). 
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Estonian practice from the one of the EU as an ideal that should be achieved. 
For example, a Political Elite article emphasizes the necessity to follow 
European norms in connection with prisons: ”On the basis of the European 
norms we have approximately 3000 prison places and we keep 5000 inmates 
in these. Sooner or later we have to build more prisons.55” (PM, 10.12.2002). 
Similar to Accept EU authority, Should accept EU authority deals with EU 
agency. Here, instead of help or benefits offered by the EU, the focus is on the 
EU’s orders Estonia should fulfill.  
The cleavage between ideal and reality means that apart from the 
identification, recognition can also be analyzed. Thus, both sub-discourses 
consist of two parts: one refers to what should be done as identification and 
the other recognizes the situation either as a starting point or a result of the 
changes. Recognition in a form of Failure to follow EU practice is presented 
in relation to the small financial support given to the No side of the Yes/No 
debate before the accession referendum:  
By comparing these numbers but, above all, the attitudes one can 
conclude that in our EU process the principles of democracy are 
ignored and even the Copenhagen democracy-criteria set for 
[evaluating - SKK] the compliance of Estonia to the EU accession are 
called in question.56 
Cultural Elite article PM, 15.01.2003b  
Failure to accept EU authority deals with the EU as an actor who gives 
feedback to Estonia. A Political Elite article states:  
Cheap public sector does not guarantee sufficient institutional 
development of the state that, however, is our weakest point on the 
basis of the evaluation of the European Union specialists. The laws do 
not function and officials do not fulfill their duty. 57 
PM, 22.11.1997  
Should follow EU practice 
Similar to Follow EU practice, Should follow EU practice deals with the EU 
accession as an internal process. The emphasis is either on the process (linear 
                                                          
55 Euroopa normide järgi on meil umbes 3000 vanglakohta ja me peame nendes 5000 vangi. Varem 
või hiljem peame vanglaid juurde ehitama.  
56 Neid arve, eelkõige aga suhtumisi võrreldes saab järeldada, et meie ELi-protsessis eiratakse 
demokraatia printsiipe, seades kahtluse alla isegi Eesti vastavuse ELi ühinemiseks kehtestatud 
Kopenhaageni demokraatia-kriteeriumidele. 
57 Odav avalik sektor ei taga piisavalt riigi institutsionaalset arengut, mis aga Euroopa Liidu 
spetsialistide hinnangul on meie nõrgim koht. Seadused ei toimi ja ametnikkond ei täida oma rolli. 
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towards the EU) or a destination (reached destination). However, both process 
and destination are challenged by what one should be/do as identification and 
failing to be/do that as recognition. In connection with linearity, Estonia is 
supposed to follow the EU practice as a norm (or admit a failure to do so). 
Thus, the EU’s practice is seen as an ideal to be achieved for Estonia’s own 
sake. The reached destination, on the other hand, is challenged by the 
necessity to follow EU practice as an own aim (or failure to do so). In this case 
the focus is on the cleavage between the rhetoric (goals of Estonia) and the 
actual practice of the country (that in ideal should be complementary to the 
rhetoric).   
The emphasis on the internal relations means that even though following 
the EU practice, the process is based on the observations made by the Estonian 
side (should be/do, since consider EU practice is valuable for us), not the 
orders given by the EU to Estonia as a candidate country. Also the EU-related 
goals are set by Estonia itself. The same is also valid in connection with the 
recognition to both the EU practice as a norm and as own aims. 
In relation to the first half of this sub-discourse, understanding that 
Estonia should follow EU practice as a norm, the superiority of the EU 
practice over Estonia’s is depicted from three perspectives: image, substance 
and development. In the case of image, the EU is seen as a quality label 
whereas the substance is based on the practical value gained by following the 
example of the EU. The third case, development, can be seen as a mixture of 
both image and substance. 
According to the EU, as a quality label, the notion that things are organized 
differently in the EU is sufficient reason to do the same in Estonia. This way 
the label ‘made in/by the EU’ is sufficient to legitimize the value of certain 
practices for Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 25.05.1998a).  
The categories of writers which most actively depict the EU as a quality 
label are the Political and especially the Cultural Elite whereas the Journalist 
articles and the Readers articles are less represented. The topics by categories 
are rather heterogeneous, from value added tax for books (Political Elite 
article, PM 17.04.1998) and EU market regulation as being very instructive for 
Estonia (Political Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998b) to the labor force strike as a 
common practice in the EU (Readers, PM, 18.04.2002c). In between these 
themes, the Cultural Elite articles portray the necessity to increase welfare 
(PM, 02.09.2002) and the need to get used to commuting from 50 to 100 
kilometers for finding a job as per the average European practice (PM, 
12.08.2003a). 
The spheres represented in the Journalist articles are EU practice in 
agriculture (PM, 15.03.2003) and financing of medical services (PM, 
19.05.2003). Readers article approaches the latter topic from the grass root 
perspective. In relation to the case of mother of the small children who had 
leukemia and was fighting publicly to get her medicines compensated from 
Estonia’s health insurance fund, a Readers article explains: since this 
expensive medicine is compensated even in Latvia and of course in all EU 
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countries one can clearly see where also we should be heading (PM, 
27.11.2002b). The argument that in the EU countries, the medicine is ‘of 
course compensated’, is strengthened by the claim that even in Latvia the same 
practice is followed. 
The most numerous articles are the Cultural Elite, which deal largely with 
education and research. For example, Finland is seen as an example of 
qualitative vocational training in the EU and Estonia’s development is 
expected to be guided in this direction (PM, 31.01.2002). Similarly, another 
article claims that the common EU criteria for education and training could be 
used also for evaluating our educational policy program (PM, 27.02.2003). 
Other articles state that in EU countries, higher education is developed on a 
quality basis that is the only possible route for Estonia’s higher education (PM, 
06.08.2003a), one should follow the example of the EU countries in 
diversifying basic education (PM, 06.04.1998a) and the EU is seen as a role 
model in connection with the percentage of the GDP used for research (PM, 
14.02.1997). 
While in connection with the quality label, EU practice is seen as valuable 
and worth following, substance deals with the genuine benefits Estonia would 
gain by following the EU practice. At the same time, the current practice of 
Estonia is seen as insufficient. Therefore the EU practice is presented as a 
necessity not an added value. For example, a Journalist article writes that by 
approaching the EU, the Estonia-Russia relationship will be improved, since 
Estonia has to make the decisions that please Russia (PM, 28.11.1997). A 
Political Elite article writes about the possibility to save our agriculture by 
implementing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) whereas any other 
option would be a dead end (PM, 02.04.2003a). The claim emerges from the 
liberal principle of adopting ‘as much of the state as necessary and as little as 
possible’ as a leading idea for reforming Estonia’s economic sector. In 
agriculture, this meant opening up borders and decreasing subventions. 
Among the farmers this was widely seen as a destructive decision that had put 
Estonian farmers into a poorer position and made the competition unequal. 
Several of the Political Elite articles and Journalist articles argue that EU 
practice is elaborated from the perspective of making Estonian life safer and 
protecting the people. As a Journalist article says, the norms of the EU are not 
made from whole cloth (laest võetud) but are necessary for guaranteeing 
consumers good and wholesome food products (PM 24.12.1997a; see also 
Political Elite article, PM, 07.09.1998a). Other examples focus on the EU 
practice concerning the safety of play and sport grounds that is necessary to 
protect children’s health (Journalist article, PM, 07.06.2002) and substantial 
basis of following the environmental norms (Journalist article, PM, 
29.08.2002 and Political Elite articles PM, 19.03.1997 and PM, 01.04.2002). 
In addition to substantial superiority of EU practice depicted above, in 
some examples the main focus is on the urgent need to change Estonian 
practice. A Readers article writes in relation to the unhygienic situation in 
Kuusalu children camp that for Estonian people the elementary behaviour 
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norms (including basic sanitary norms) have to be pressed upon (pähe 
taguda) even from outside under the name of EU norms (PM, 15.06.2002b). 
The expression ‘press upon’ refers to the way children are taught: endless 
repetition of activities until they remember, adopt and start to behave on the 
basis of these repetitions. Thus, EU practice is necessary for the development 
of Estonian people. Similarly, a Cultural Elite article writes that even with the 
most stupid EU standard it could be possible to eliminate several colonies of 
chaos and irresponsible incompetency in Estonian life (PM, 14.11.1998; see 
also Readers article, PM, 02.09.2003c). 
The previous two parts above focus on the EU as a quality label and the 
substance of the EU practice whereas in the last part, development can be seen 
as a mixture of both concepts. Simultaneously, the EU is used as a quality 
control tool and the practice of the EU is depicted as being necessary for 
improving Estonia. As a Political Elite article writes: 
If the European Union that is much wealthier than Estonia, has 
considered the regional policy that important, also we should not 
proceed from the simplified ideological understanding and hope under 
the label of right-wingness that the free market economy as such 
develops the life in South Eastern or North Western Estonia.58  
PM, 03.06.1998b  
The value of the EU experience is legitimized by referring to the EU as a much 
wealthier entity in comparison with the rather poor and naïve Estonia. 
In some cases the superiority of the EU practice is created by locating the 
EU metaphorically more superior than Estonia and using the adjectives like 
‘wider’, ‘higher’, ‘more real’ etc. to refer to the necessary progress. In the 
Political Elite articles and Cultural Elite articles as well as in those of the 
Readers, the references to ‘EU/Euro level/standards/quality’ are made as a 
sign of quality and inevitability (Cultural Elite article PM, 12.01.1998 and 
Readers article, PM, 30.08.2002). In the articles of the Political Elite articles, 
the EU level is connected to the development of the political culture (PM 
05.03.2003a) and the quality of education (PM, 21.07.2003b).   
Other adjectives used for showing the superiority of the EU practice are 
‘truthful’, ‘real’, ‘equal’ and ‘covering’. A Readers article states that the EU 
salary and taxation system is quite close to the truth (PM, 08.10.1998a) and a 
Journalist article depicts cooperation among the EU countries as the real one 
based on flesh and blood (vis-à-vis the one between Baltic countries) (PM, 
12.05.1998a). Another Journalist article writes about the necessity for treating 
                                                          
58 Kui Eestist tunduvalt jõukam Euroopa Liit on regionaalpoliitikat nii oluliseks pidanud, siis ei tohi 
meie kindlasti lähtuda lihtsustatud ideoloogilisest käsitlusest ja parempoolsuse sildi all loota, et 
vabaturumajandus arendab iseenesest Kagu- või Kirde-Eesti elu. 
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Estonian and EU students equally in Estonia, since the EU leans on the 
principle of equality (PM, 12.11.2003a). 
In some cases, the value gained from following the EU practice in a variety 
of spheres is characterized as simply ‘becoming European’. A Journalist article 
urges that Estonia’s legislators should follow European traditions and enable 
the children of inhabitants without any citizenship59 to gain Estonian 
citizenship (PM, 22.10.1998b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.08.1997). 
As a Journalist article writes: 
 
Let’s still see things more broadly than the soil of Saint Mary’s Land 
we are accustomed to, the one that we are still willing to consider a 
measure of everything else in the world. Let’s look at the things in a 
European way.60 
PM, 02.06.2003b 
The term Saint Mary’s Land refers to the name given to the current Estonian 
territory in the 13th century by Bishop Albert. The term is usually used in the 
ceremonial contexts to emphasize Estonia’s specialty one is proud of. Also the 
soil or ‘homeland’s dust’ is an expression that usually refers to the land as holy 
and valuable, represented for example in a ”homeland narrative” (Feldman 
2001, 13-15; see also Berg 2002, 111). In this example, however, the meaning 
of both terms is turned around to signify a confined and uncivilized world view 
based on an imagination that Estonia is at the center of everything (see also 
Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.11.2003).    
The second part of Estonia Should follow EU practice, is based on the 
understanding that Estonia should follow EU practice as own aim, as a 
destination to be achieved. While the former part was based on a cleavage 
between Estonian and EU practice of which the latter was seen as an ideal, 
here a cleavage between Estonian goals as an ideal (rhetoric) and practice of 
fulfilling these goals is depicted.  
The major goal referred to in the articles is EU membership. As Journalist 
articles suggest, Estonia has to work hard and put in an effort to achieve that 
goal (PM, 11.11.1997a and PM 05.12.1997b). At a more concrete level several 
examples can be found in the articles of all four categories from both the 
beginning as well as the end of the accession process. The least represented 
are the Political Elite articles. 
Readers articles claim that since the Estonian government heads towards 
the EU, for making the aim real, this should be visible also in the other spheres 
of life. One Readers article writes that since our government pushes Estonia 
towards the EU and NATO with full force (täiel rinnal) our fathers of the 
                                                          
59 Article refers to those Russian speakers who are neither Estonian nor Russian citizens. 
60 Nähkem siiski asju avaramalt kui harjumuspärane Maarjamaa mullakamar, mida kipume ikka 
veel kõikide maailma asjade mõõduks pidama. Vaadakem asjadele euroopalikult. 
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people (riigiisad) should seriously consider a transition to progressive income 
tax (PM, 22.02.1997). Other examples of Readers articles show concern for the 
necessity to increase the state budget (PM, 14.08.2003b), cease using the term 
KAPO as an abbreviation of the Estonian Security Police (Kaitsepolitsei) due 
to its analogy with the history of Nazi-Germany (PM, 26.08.1997c) and stop 
using bears in circuses, since it’s a torment to the animals (PM, 02.11.2002). 
Also a Journalist article writes that the changes that should be made are 
logically connected to or inevitable for achieving the membership. Even 
though concrete single tasks may originally come from the EU, these are 
internalized by referring to the EU accession as Estonian aim. Thus, the paper 
writes that it is difficult to imagine Estonian EU membership without 
establishing a market regulation system (PM, 12.09.2002a), Estonia has a 
discussion concerning future foreign labor and migration policies due to 
joining the EU (PM, 01.02.2003), and in connection with keeping Estonia’s 
leading position in the EU direction ahead of Latvia, Estonia should liberalize 
its citizenship policy since this has been done in Latvia (PM, 22.10.1998b; see 
also PM, 08.04.1997).  
Similar claims can be found in the Cultural Elite articles and Political Elite 
articles. A Cultural Elite article refers to the conclusions of the Commission of 
Juridical Expertise that the constitution has to be changed for joining the EU 
(PM, 11.06.2002b). Another article writes that one has to rethink how our 
current citizenship policy serves the objectives that are relevant in connection 
with the EU accession (PM, 06.11.1997; see also PM, 18.11.1997; PM, 
19.02.1998; PM, 12.11.1998a and PM, 11.01.2002). The Political Elite articles 
write that the wish to join the EU gives us another obligation: to harmonize 
Estonian laws with those of the EU (PM, 15.04.1997c), for normal economic 
interaction with the EU countries Estonia has to reorganize the state 
organization, create new institutions, accept the laws, train officials etc. (PM, 
13.10.1998) and to consider quick implementation of progressive income tax 
since in the EU we can hardly avoid that (PM, 29.07.2003; see also PM, 
04.07.2003b).  
In sum, in the examples above the relationship between Estonia’s goal and 
its duties is communicated by emphasizing the necessity to fulfill the tasks 
whereas in the following examples the focus is on the necessity to fulfill the 
tasks completely and properly. For instance, a Journalist article writes in 
relation to the law that regulates gender equality that hopefully this legislative 
proposal will not remain only a declarative act but will really engage new 
mechanisms for avoiding any kind of discrimination, and will give Estonia an 
opportunity to shadow Europe in the sphere of societal developments (PM, 
13.11.2003a). Similarly, a Readers article asks rhetorically that even though 
externally (formally) everything is in order and norms harmonized the 
question remains what is the internal situation? (PM, 06.01.2003a). 
The willingness to change Estonian practice is also connected to the 
question of whether joining the EU really is the goal for Estonia. For example, 
a Political Elite article writes that if we in the first place want to become 
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members of the EU, taking over EU’s tariff policy demands of us a quick 
change of our constitution (PM, 15.08.1998). Another article claims that if we 
want to join the EU, sooner or later we also have to abandon the death penalty 
(Political Elite article, PM, 09.06.1997). A Cultural Elite article writes that if 
one declares joining the EU, our first big duty is to stop the cowboy capitalism 
and Friedmanship (friedmanlus) that has lasted for more than ten years and 
to head together with the European core states towards a proper social and 
balanced society (PM, 11.07.2003a). 
Like in the last example, several Cultural Elite articles point out the 
consequences in the economic sector. For example, one has to deal more with 
social guarantees, to improve working conditions, welfare of the workers and 
labour policy. The article continues that if one belongs to the club of rich states, 
many major truths that have been thrown aside in the current cowboy 
capitalism have to be accepted (PM, 12.08.2003a). Another article states that 
since the accession to the EU causes a significant change in the movement of 
goods, money and people in the Baltic Sea region, one cannot escape from 
creating an enormous logistical service region in the area of Narva-Vaivara-
Sillamäe (PM, 02.04.2003b, see also PM, 25.08.2003a). A Cultural Elite 
article writes that, as a member state, Estonia has to start following stricter 
rules of national support. Thus, it would not be bad at all if one started to fulfill 
these criteria now (PM, 09.11.1998a, see also PM, 18.11.1997 and PM, 
11.08.1997). 
One topic dealt with both by Journalist articles as well as Cultural Elite 
articles is the demand for additions to the labor force due to the EU accession. 
A Journalist article writes that in the process of joining the EU, the Ministry 
of Agriculture needs a complementary work force, since the agricultural policy 
is simply the most laborious sphere (PM, 31.05.2003). Estonia’s membership 
is also connected to the need to benefit from an increasing bureaucracy 
(18.06.2003b; see also Journalist article, PM, 17.07.2003a) and the necessity 
to have professionals of different spheres (Cultural Elite article PM, 
13.01.2003; see also PM, 12.06.2002a and PM, 26.02.2003). From the 
substantial perspective, the new tasks for the farmers are pointed out by a 
Cultural Elite article: the farmers have to be competitive, prefer quality over 
quantity and discover the necessary specialty for adapting to the market that 
has been formed on the basis of new principles (PM, 15.08.2002).  
As in the case of Follow EU practice, the sphere dealt with by the Cultural 
Elite article is education. Thus, in connection with Estonia’s accession to the 
EU and the promotion of the Tartu University as the national university, our 
country, people and culture need to be introduced in the international arena 
more intensively (PM, 03.05.2003b; see also PM, 06.08.2003a). Another 
article states that since Europe’s objective is a knowledge based society, 
everybody separately should try hard to create and deliver knowledge and 
resources and agree upon common rules (PM, 03.09.2003b). 
In sum, while should follow EU practice as a norm was targeted towards 
‘becoming European’ in a wider sense, the focus of should follow EU practice 
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as own aim was on achieving Estonia’s EU membership or acting as a member 
country. The frequency of both arguments was increasing by the end of the 
accession process. All four categories of articles participated with the least 
represented being Readers articles. 
Substantially, Readers articles differ from the other categories in two ways. 
First, in the case of the good EU practice one should follow, the attention of 
the other three categories was on the official sphere whereas Readers articles 
focus on all the spheres of (everyday) life more than any other category. At the 
same time Readers articles do not contribute to the idea that the official EU 
practice should be followed for one’s own sake.  
Second, in relation to the EU membership as Estonian goal, Readers 
articles emphasize the duties of the other societal actors (mostly politicians) 
whereas the emphasis in the other three categories is on ‘us/Estonia’ and ‘our 
duties’ for joining the EU. This way, Readers articles distance themselves from 
the idea that EU accession is a common goal and use the EU for ‘blackmailing’ 
the political elite (you have to show that you really want to go there). On the 
other hand, talking in the name of us enables the articles of the Journalists, 
Political Elite and Cultural Elite to ignore potential criticism towards the 
changes made in the name of the EU as a common goal of the whole society. 
Logically, the ones who are against making these changes can also be excluded 
from us on the basis of not sharing this goal. 
Failure to follow EU practice 
In the previous section, the need to follow EU practice as a norm or own aims 
was dealt with as identification whereas this section is based on the 
recognition given to Estonia in the same process. Accordingly, recognition is 
divided into failure to follow EU practice as a norm and failure to follow EU 
practice as own aim. On the basis of comparing Estonian practice to the one 
of the EU, conclusions are drawn about the cleavage between them. Similarly, 
a cleavage between Estonian goals and practice is depicted in the other, clearly 
shorter half of this section. Both parts are based on internal recognition, not 
EU evaluation.   
In the articles of the first half of this sub-discourse, failure to follow EU 
practice as a norm, conclusions are drawn on the basis of societal spheres, 
processes and statistical means, about the failure of Estonian practice in 
relation to the EU practice as a norm. Furthermore, in some 
articles, conclusions about Estonian failure are drawn on the basis of Estonian 
people whose behavior does not conform to EU standards.  
The sphere Cultural Elite articles mostly emphasize is legislation. The 
articles argue that Estonian laws are not at the level of the EU countries (PM, 
28.05.1998), democratic principles are ignored in our EU process questioning 
even Estonian accordance with the Copenhagen democracy criteria set for the 
EU accession (PM, 15.01.2003b) and Estonia’s uneven legislation concerning 
gender equality is a potential restriction in connection with introducing EU 
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support and this in turn slows down Estonian development and decreases 
competitiveness (PM, 02.06.2003a; see also PM, 30.08.2003).  
In the examples above Estonian backwardness is stated in a rather status 
quo manner whereas in the following cases it is seen as a current condition and 
thus naturally changing. Here failures are pointed out as implicit 
encouragement to solve the problems. One article writes that it still takes time 
before European laws will match Estonian life (Cultural Elite article PM, 
28.03.2002). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that it takes time until 
Estonia reaches the EU’s legal space in practice (PM, 21.12.1998) and a 
Cultural Elite article states that normalization of politics as well as our real 
going to Europe becomes true after the end of the ongoing process that 
alienates people from politics (PM, 28.02.1998b).   
In addition to legislation, the Political Elite articles and Cultural Elite 
articles depict Estonian failure on the basis of the societal practices and 
institutions. The articles argue that Estonia and the EU differ in their views on 
the  curriculum of teaching (Political Elite article, PM, 22.10.1997b) and the 
term ‘integration’ is interpreted differently (Political Elite article, PM, 
27.07.1998). Similarly, the Cultural Elite articles write that science is gaining 
a profit in the EU (PM, 17.05.2002), information policies of most EU 
countries, where libraries are treated as institutions that produce content of 
information and provide public services, differ from Estonia’s (PM, 
30.10.2002), in the EU countries, unlike Estonia, milk industries belong to the 
farmers (PM, 25.10.2002a), non-working Estonian public transportation does 
not enable Estonia to follow the EU model in the labor market (PM, 
12.08.2003a) and the Eastern European banana economies are not suitable in 
the EU context (PM, 11.07.2003a;  see also Journalist article, PM, 09.01.1997). 
Similarly, Readers article claims that with the current social policy, Estonia 
has nothing to do in the EU (PM, 14.12.1998a; see also PM, 23.03.2002). 
Concerning gender equality, a Political Elite article writes that the 
developed Europe where Estonia aims at has paid great attention to the 
equality question whereas, in this context, Estonian society is as blind as a 
kitten (PM, 25.03.1998). Characterizing Estonia as a new born kitten refers to 
a totally helpless creature that can survive only if somebody is taking care of 
it. However, the kitten-phase can also be seen as a temporary one: after for a 
while kitten’s eyes open and it is able to see. Thus, here the question is about 
the current condition: Estonia has to go through certain phases before 
reaching the EU level. 
In some articles, the same understanding is communicated by the 
expression ‘lagging behind’. A Political Elite article writes the Estonian living 
standard is still lagging much behind from the developed Europe and also that 
understanding about European values and management of democracy lag 
behind (PM, 03.06.1998a).  
The examples of ‘lagging behind’ refer to the linear development where the 
one who lags behind has at least a theoretical possibility to catch the leader 
whereas some Political Elite articles distinguish between Estonia and the EU 
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on the basis of spatial grounds. Here, a cleavage is seen again as a rather 
permanent characteristic. As one article asks rhetorically, for which union is 
Estonia actually suitable (PM, 30.07.1997). In another Political Elite article, 
answer is given to this question. For example, due to being politicized Estonia 
is considered to move towards the East (PM, 01.10.1998). In the context of 
Estonian nepotism, a Readers article suggests the African Union as a proper 
alternative, since unfortunately in Europe that kind of action is not acceptable:  
In this connection I make a proposal to finish the accession 
negotiations with the European Union and join the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU). Despite our different skin color the behavior is 
the same.61 
PM, 11.03.2002a 
Apart from the societal practices and developments, various articles express 
Estonia’s failure to follow EU practice on the basis of statistical indicators. 
Readers articles are particularly concerned by the numbers of policemen and 
murders per capita (PM, 06.11.1998b) and different understandings of 
economic indicators (PM, 22.05.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes 
that Estonian GDP is less than a quarter of the EU’s average (PM, 02.08.1997; 
see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 24.12.1997c). 
Here, the most represented category is the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 
12.06.1997; PM, 20.05.1997 and PM, 08.04.1998). Amongst the articles, 
statistical indicators and percentages of various spheres are dealt with. For 
instance renewable energy in Estonia and the EU in 2010 (PM, 02.08.2002), 
EU average salary compared to Estonian one (PM, 03.12.2003), relationship 
between the domestic loan portfolio and the GDP (PM, 25.09.2002), small 
enterprises per 100 000 inhabitants (PM, 12.08.2003a) and the percentage of 
the adults who participate in lifelong learning in Estonia and the EU (PM, 
06.12.2003 and PM, 27.02.2003) are some of the examples. Apart from that, 
the amount of long term unemployed who return to the labor market in 
Estonia is estimated to be a half the EU average (PM, 23.05.2003b), the level 
of social stratification is seen to differ (PM, 21.11.2003), the average life 
expectation of men is clearly shorter in Estonia than in the EU (PM, 
13.11.2003b) and the proportion of the population that supports the death 
penalty is higher in Estonia than in the EU (PM, 06.09.2003a). 
In several cases the comparison is based on the money available in different 
spheres. Here, the articles of the Cultural Elite and the Political Elite are 
represented. For instance, Political Elite articles write that the price of land 
has collapsed and is tens times lower than the price level of the EU countries 
                                                          
61 Seoses sellega teen ettepaneku lõpetada liitumisläbirääkimised Euroopa Liiduga ja astuda hoopis 
Aafrika Ühtsuse Organisatsiooni (AÜO) liikmeks. Nahavärv on meil küll teine, kuid kombed samad. 
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(PM, 19.07.2002b) and Estonian public spending on employment is almost 
ten times below the EU’s average (PM, 15.01.2003a). Other Political Elite 
articles draw conclusions on the basis of the differences in national subsidies 
for agriculture (PM, 08.01.1998) and spending on higher education in Estonia 
and the EU (PM, 30.09.3002).  
Financing higher education and science are the topics present in the 
Cultural Elite articles. The articles argue that the salaries in the academic 
sector are not competitive (PM, 15.10.2002a) and in the EU the financing of 
research and development has increased to 3% of the GDP whereas the current 
level of Estonia, 0.6% of the GDP, sets us in a long perspective to the periphery 
of the world (PM, 06.08.2003a; see also PM, 14.02.1997; PM, 01.11.2002; PM, 
12.11.2002 and PM, 29.01.2003). Apart from that, the difference of spending 
on the labor policy is dealt with by the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 02.12.1998 
and PM, 19.12.2002a).  
Sometimes Estonia’s failure is depicted also in the cases when Estonia 
seems at first glance to do better than the EU. For example, even though the 
statistics shows that Estonia has six times less accidents at work than the EU, 
a Journalist article continues: However, the working inspection knows the 
reason for this ‘small’ variable - most of the occupational accidents are not 
officially registered and only the really difficult cases are reflected in the 
statistics (PM, 31.08.2002). Similar points are also written by the Cultural 
Elite articles concerning higher education in Estonia (PM, 18.04.2002a) and 
the future developments in the secondary education (PM, 27.02.2003).  
The latter examples can also be characterized as the ‘half EU level’ (Political 
Elite article, PM, 15.08.1998). The characteristic feature of Readers articles 
that refer the most to the half EU level is an ironical attitude targeted towards 
aiming at the EU practice in some but not in all spheres. For example, prices 
and taxes are already similar to the EU’s but with the quality of Estonian roads 
it is embarrassing to knock on the EU’s door (PM, 31.10.1997b), Estonian 
prices are at the EU level, salaries are not (PM, 19.12.1997a), prisons and 
courtrooms are at the EU level whereas schools and hospitals are not (PM, 
14.09.2002), excise of gasoline is raised whereas the social benefits (PM, 
15.04.1997b), salaries and pensions are not (PM, 16.04.1997b and PM, 
29.04.1997). In one Readers article, the same idea is communicated by talking 
about the EU accession in terms of entering the house:  “Estonia has already 
got one foot in the door but we still have to look how the elderly, mentally and 
physically disabled, by compulsion, clean the sidewalks of the city with 
brooms.”62(PM, 28.01.2002). 
Conclusively, in the examples above Estonian practice is criticized in a 
rather general level whereas the following criticism focuses on those Estonians 
who don’t conform to EU standards. A distinction can be made between these 
Estonians as not being European (used mostly by Journalist articles to refer to 
                                                          
62 Eestil on juba jalg ELi ukse vahel, aga ikka peame veel vaatama, kuidas vanurid, vigased ja sandid 
luuakontsuga sunniviisiliselt linna kõnniteid puhastavad. 
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the political elite) and mapping certain Estonians (citizens) who are 
responsible for Estonia not reaching the EU norms.  
The inability of Estonian politicians to perform in European way is depicted 
by Journalist articles either as a single failure or a more permanent 
shortcoming. An example of the former, is an article that suggests that Lennart 
Meri (Estonia’s President at the time) had, by meeting Belorussian leader 
Aleksandr Lukashenko, abandoned good European traditions (PM, 
30.08.1997). Another example concerns the meeting of Toomas Hendrik Ilves 
(Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) with the head of Latvia’s 
main opposition party: “For a European Union member states’ Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to flirt with the neighbouring country’s opposition over such a 
delicate question as a border would have certainly cost [him - SKK] his post.”63 
(PM, 25.08.1998). Referring to the meeting as a flirt makes the Minister look 
like a gigolo having fun, which brings the flirting and its consequences down 
to the everyday level: flirting with somebody in the wrong situation could, for 
example, cause marital trouble (or cost someone their post, like in the current 
case).  
In general, however, the tone of Journalist articles while condemning the 
single violations of Estonian political elite is rather friendly (PM, 03.07.1998). 
Sometimes the newspaper acts as a parent reproving their child. For example, 
when reminding Ene Ergma (Speaker of Estonia’s Parliament at the time) 
Estonia’s responsibilities as a future EU and NATO member, the Journalist 
article represents the reproving attitude of a caring parent: it reminds the child 
about its improper behaviour but tries not to shame her in front of the other 
people. More concretely, the article claims that Ergma has given too much 
hope for Ukrainians concerning their future membership in the EU and 
continues that it would not like to displease Ene Ergma but would like to 
remind her quietly that from now on the words of Estonian politicians carry 
much more gravitas (PM, 03.10.2003). 
Unlike the delicacy prevalent in the articles covering cases of single failure, 
the tone of the articles concerning permanent shortcomings are cynical. For 
instance, a Journalist article refers to the shameful fact that some deputies of 
Estonian parliament are unable to interact in one foreign language, let alone 
two or three. The article continues by asking how does this kind of politician 
plan to protect our interests at the international level - how do they for 
example persuade the representatives of the European Commission that an 
Estonian farmer wants to produce 900 000 tons of milk per year, do they 
expect an interpreter to be hired with the tax payers’ money? The article also 
asks if they presume that their discussion partner, a Member of the European 
Parliament or a minister of a foreign country, has sufficient time and 
politeness to wait, until the valuable thoughts of the Estonian politician are 
translated into another language (PM, 26.09.2002). 
                                                          
63 Ühele Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigi välisministrile oleks flirt naaberriigi opositsiooniga nii 
peenetundelises küsimuses kui piir läinud kindlasti maksma ametikoha. 
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The fact that the Journalist article creates a link between the Estonian 
deputies who do not speak foreign languages and the topic of agricultural 
quotas can be reasoned by Postimees’ generally critical attitude towards 
Estonia’s ‘rural politicians’ during the accession process. The sarcastic claim 
about the ‘valuable thoughts’ infers an assumption that the thoughts have no 
value at all. At the same time, one can ask if the language skills really affect 
this situation: would those thoughts get additional value if the person had 
voiced them in English or some other foreign language? 
Apart from Journalist articles, other categories of articles express similar 
criticism. A Political Elite article criticizes Estonian officials by saying that 
their first worry is not to obey the law but to fight for changing it (PM, 
15.04.1997c). A Readers article states that not all the politicians are good 
enough to represent Estonia at the Convention on the Future of Europe (PM, 
22.02.2002). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that the tendency of 
Estonian politicians to see a representative democracy as the only instrument 
of democracy does not suit the open society principles accepted in the EU (PM, 
25.08.2003a). Another Cultural Elite article comments on the proposal that 
was made by Ken Martti Vaher (Estonia’s Minister of Justice at the time) to 
have a life sentence for drug crimes:  
But I feel hollow if the Minister of the country soon [gaining - SKK] 
access to the EU tells a story about the life sentence. Will we become 
something like a European Thailand, where the prisons are full of 
suffering people?64  
PM, 24.05.2003  
The expression ‘tell a story about’ refers more to the fairy tale than the official 
policy and thus, makes the Minister’s statement sound like entertainment. The 
rhetorical question about Estonia as a European Thailand makes the 
Minister’s proposal sound even more absurd, since a country with Thailand-
type prisons would never gain acceptance by the EU. 
In addition to the aforementioned criticism expressed towards the 
Estonian politicians as not being European, criticism is also leveled at 
Estonian citizens (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.07.2003c). For example a 
Journalist article refers to active EU citizens in comparison with the passive 
citizens of Estonia who complain about things but do nothing to change them 
(PM, 26.03.1998). 
Similar to the sarcastic tone used to criticize the political elite, the articles 
use the same tone for citizens. However, instead of distancing itself from the 
inappropriate citizens, the articles refer to the citizens as us. Thus, our 
poorness in relation to the EU is admitted and the citizens are seen as the ones 
                                                          
64 Aga mul on kõhe, kui sellist eluaegse-juttu ajab varsti ELi astuva riigi justiitsminister. Kas meist 
saab midagi Euroopa Taimaa-laadset, kus vanglad on täis piinlevaid inimesi? 
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who are responsible. For example, a Journalist article comments on the usage 
of services offered by local entrepreneurs:  
In the developed countries the local entrepreneurs are preferred under 
similar conditions /…/ but obviously we are too poor or stupid to think 
about these kinds of things. While looking from Narva, the Soviet 
Union might also be closer to Estonia than the European Union and 
not the solid building firms who pay taxes but the experts behind the 
store are asked to build a shed for a bottle.65  
PM, 05.07.2002b 
In this example, the article makes a distinction between the developed 
countries and Estonia as us. After that, however, more specific reference is 
made to Narva, the Estonian city, situated at the Russian border, of which 
more than 90% of its population is Russian speaking. Even though the article 
was published in 2002, eleven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
city still dwells in a different era. At the same time, the way things are done in 
Narva are seen to map Estonia as a whole. On the basis of the title of the article, 
“Prefer Estonian” (Eelista eestimast!), one might assume that only the solid 
firms, and not the ones (most probably Russian speakers) who provide their 
service ‘behind the store’, are seen as ‘Estonian’. Therefore, the Russian 
speakers are excluded despite the fact they are probably as ‘local’ as one could 
be. 
Since the citizens are seen as the only ones who could change the situation 
by changing themselves, a Journalist article accepts the current situation with 
regrets. The paper writes that it is very difficult to say what would make the 
people follow the laws in a European way and continues that it can be claimed 
for sure that one is not going to do it for getting into the EU (PM, 20.03.1997a). 
Another Journalist article refers to our self-pity as an attribute, with which one 
cannot reach to Europe with (PM, 02.06.2003b). 
In comparison to the failure to follow EU practice as a norm depicted so 
far, another part of this sub-discourse, failure to follow EU practice as 
own aim, is clearly less represented in the articles. In this part the main 
distinction is made between criticizing the situation either as a current 
condition or a status quo.  
Even though in the case of current condition the cleavage between Estonian 
goals and its practice is admitted, one does not question EU membership as a 
goal but condemns the current practice instead. For example a Political Elite 
article writes that it is weird that in Estonia that aims at the EU it is still 
                                                          
65 Arenenud riikides eelistatakse sarnastel tingimustel ikka kohalikke ettevõtjaid /…/ kuid ju me siis 
oleme nii vaesed või rumalad, et selliste asjade peale mõelda. Narvast vaadates võib ka Nõukogude Liit 
olla Eestile Euroopa Liidust lähemal ning kuuri kutsutakse pudeli eest ehitama oskajaid poe tagant, mitte 
riigimakse tasuvaid soliidseid ehitusfirmasid. 
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presumed that a Minister has to get involved with the problems of enterprise 
at the level of operative management (PM, 20.06.1998a; see also Journalist 
articles, PM, 03.04.1997 and PM, 10.11.2003b and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 
30.05.2002 and PM, 22.08.2002). 
The most represented articles in the examples of the current condition are 
Readers. For example, a Readers article comments on the decision to close the 
national library for the whole of July saying this kind of action is inappropriate 
but even unheard of in a state that aims at the EU with all one's might (kõigest 
väest) (PM, 05.07.1997b). Other similar Readers articles show a paradox 
between Estonia’s goal to join the EU and an attempt to avoid the 
implementation of the 21st century railway development program (PM, 
30.07.2002), consider it impossible to live, as an honest man, in Estonia that 
aims at the EU (PM 05.06.2003) and claims that in Estonia that officially aims 
at the EU membership, there still sprawls a deep double moral of stagnation 
(PM, 16.05.2003; see also Readers article PM, 21.02.1998 and Political Elite 
article, PM, 13.11.2002). In the last example, reference to the (Soviet) 
stagnation period as a temporal argument is used to show a cleavage between 
the EU as an Estonian goal and the current reality. Another Readers article 
writes that Estonia tries, no matter what, to join the EU by forgetting that for 
administrating property in the cities, we still use the law of slavery (teoorjuse 
seadus) from the 15th century (PM, 28.01.2002). 
Towards the end of the accession process, criticism is also targeted at the 
failure to act in the EU in a proper way. A Cultural Elite article writes that 
taking into account the necessity to organize the usage of billions of kroons 
that came from the European structural foundations, the decision to abandon 
regional structures was even more critical (PM, 28.03.2003). Other articles 
write that at the threshold of joining the EU no means has been planned to the 
budget that would enable to include the financial means of the EU foundations 
and programs for developing our culture (PM, 16.10.2002) and after two years 
one needs 300-400 (!) top level translators who just do not exist (PM, 
13.01.2003). Several Journalist articles see weak administrative capacity as 
something Estonia suffers from already and will become even more critical in 
the EU (for example PM, 17.06.2002a; PM, 18.06.2003b and PM, 
05.08.2003b).  
In contrast to the current condition, in the case of seeing Estonian practice 
as a status quo, articles  follow the logic that it is easier to change the goal as 
‘words only’ rather than the existing practice that determines what is ‘really 
going on’. Therefore, if these two are not in accordance with each other, the 
goal loses its credibility. A Political Elite article writes, it is fairer if the People’s 
Union (Rahvaliit) stated clearly that they no longer support EU accession (PM, 
05.08.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article asks rhetorically if Estonian 
authorities also really aim at the EU or just keep talking about this (PM, 
16.08.1997) and a Political Elite article claims that at least rhetorically also the 
current coalition has supported Estonia’s EU accession (PM, 23.04.1997; see 
also Cultural Elite article PM, 14.02.1997 and Readers article PM, 
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23.08.2003b). A Journalist article writes that even though one talks about the 
integration to the EU in a loud voice, on the basis of money delivered to 
governmental institutions, the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture has 
increased the most (PM, 07.01.1998b). Therefore, agriculture is not seen as an 
important part of, but an alternative to, the EU integration.  
The category of articles most concerned at the beginning of the accession 
process about the sincerity of the claims that the EU accession is Estonian 
priority were Readers. For example an article argues that may be the 
politicians and officials leading our country are not actually really interested 
in joining the EU (PM, 06.03.1998a). Another article criticizes Andres Varik 
(Estonia’s Minister of Agriculture at the time) for gambling (maha mängida) 
the liberal tariff policy that has been Estonia’s advantage, and continues: one 
cannot avoid the ideas coming to one’s mind that Varik and other Ministers do 
not lean towards the EU but peep over the shoulder towards the East (PM, 
15.04.1997a). The article’s reference to gambling makes the Minister’s action 
clearly irresponsible and irrational. The verb ‘peep’ creates an impression that 
the Minister also tries to keep his real motives in secret. 
In sum, Failure to follow EU practice is stronger in the articles than the 
necessity to follow EU practice. At the same time the first part of the sub-
discourse, failure to follow EU practice as a norm is clearly more represented 
in the opinion articles than the second part, failure to follow EU practice as 
own aim. 
The Cultural Elite articles criticize Estonian practice in relation to the EU 
practice the most, whereas Journalist articles are the least represented. The 
situation is rather the opposite in the context of criticizing the representatives 
of Estonia where the majority of the articles are Journalist articles. At the same 
time a contrasting development can be seen in the authorship of Political Elite 
and Cultural Elite articles. At the beginning of the accession process the 
Political Elite articles criticizing Estonia’s practices are more numerous than 
their Cultural Elite counterparts whereas towards the end of the accession 
process the Cultural Elite articles are infinitely more numerous than their 
Political Elite counterparts. The development accords to the general changes 
amongst the articles: the Political Elite became less actively vociferous during 
the accession process, whereas the Cultural Elite became more actively 
vociferous (see Table 3.2).   
Both sub-categories of recognition show the problems and weaknesses as 
well as heterogeneity of Estonian society. In the current case, both citizens and 
the political elite are depicted as being either not European by themselves or 
responsible for Estonia’s problems. In the context of the low public trust 
towards the political institutions and the correlation between the low EU 
support due to the suspicious attitude towards Estonian political elite (see 
Chapter 1), it is interesting that Journalist articles are more eager to depict 
Estonian politicians as not European than the Readers articles. On the other 
hand, it is in accordance to the claims that at the time the media were critical 
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towards the politicians as actors but did not offer substantial criticism (see 
Section 3.2). 
However, in recognizing a cleavage between Estonian practice and the goal 
to join the EU, either the practice as a current condition or the goal as ‘talk 
only’ is criticized. In both cases, Readers articles are most represented and 
politicians are held responsible for the situation. References to Estonian goals 
instead of EU practice as an ideal enables Readers articles to criticize the 
current situation and the politicians without idealizing the EU or identifying 
oneself with the EU. At the same time the politicians are reminded their 
commitment to the EU accession should guide their action in all spheres. 
Should accept EU authority 
Should accept EU authority (as becoming) challenges Accept EU authority (as 
being) by what one should be/do (as identification) and failing to be/do (as 
recognition). While Accept EU authority is based on the aid and beneficial 
framework got from the EU, in connection with becoming, Estonia is expected 
to be the active side, the one who gets the rod instead of fish. Thus, one should 
follow the EU guidance (in a form of demands, regulations, statements etc.) 
now (getting a rod) for being capable to take care of oneself in a long run (as a 
member of the EU). The EU is present in the articles as an actor who is obeyed 
and to whom the promises are given. This way the focus is on interaction 
between Estonia and the EU.  
More concretely, the should part of EU taking care is titled as should listen 
to the EU. Here, the EU guidance for Estonia is seen as an ideal. EU as a good 
framework, on the other hand, is challenged by should keep own promises. In 
this section the focus is on internalized goals, however, in a form of promises 
given to the EU. As a necessity, keeping these promises is emphasized.  
In should listen to the EU, the EU’s authority is taken for granted and 
its orders or advice in one form or another are used for reasoning why certain 
changes are considered necessary. One example of the orders is ‘Euro norms’ 
(euronormid) and ‘Euro demands’ (euronõuded). For instance a Political Elite 
article points out the necessity to adjust the school canteens in accordance to 
the EU demands (PM, 06.11.2002), in the other articles the same need is 
communicated in relation to Estonian veterinary education and inspection 
(PM, 18.03.2002) and environment (PM, 19.03.1997). Similarly, a Journalist 
article refers to the ‘Euro demands’ Estonia should fulfill in connection with 
pensions (PM, 31.10.2003). In some articles also ‘EU suggestions’ are referred 
to, for instance concerning the progressive income tax (Political Elite articles, 
PM, 27.06.1998b and PM, 24.09.1998).  
While in the case of taking over the EU practice, a distinction could be made 
between the EU as a quality label and the substantial benefits achievable by 
following the EU practice, here a distinction between following EU guidance 
(substance) and giving an impression of doing that (as image) can be made. In 
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the last case the focus is not on the substantial changes but on impressing and 
pleasing the EU. 
As an example of substance, a Cultural Elite article uses a comparison with 
the housing company: just like becoming a member of the club or joining the 
housing company, one takes over the rules and regulations valid therein (PM, 
17.12.1997a; see also PM, 24.12.1997c; PM, 10.11.1997 and PM, 13.05.2002a). 
Thus, Estonia should not have too high expectations for the negotiations, 
since, like a Political Elite article writes, EU expects Estonia to do its 
homework (PM, 04.03.1997). More concretely, a Journalist article points out 
that the candidate countries should adopt all EU legislation, 80 000 pages, 
and it is not possible to bargain that we accept only 67 000 pages (PM 
11.12.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.02.2003). As Political Elite 
article writes, Estonia cannot get a positive answer to all its wishes in the 
accession negotiations and for sure the government has to make choices and 
decisions (PM, 08.03.2002b).  
Apart from the EU as a whole, mostly at the beginning of the accession 
process, representatives of the EU were referred to as authorities. In some 
articles, the reference is made on a rather general level whereas other 
examples dealt with suggestions of concrete persons. As an example of the 
general level, a Journalist article writes about the necessity to listen to the 
criticism and suggestions of the EU representatives (PM, 20.03.1997a). In a 
more concrete case, the focus is on a single country as a representative of the 
EU. A Journalist article refers to Austria as the country that was holding the 
EU presidency at the time and writes that Austria is the one which has set the 
schedule whereas Estonia has to work hard to stay in it (PM, 04.07.1998). 
Similarly, the Political Elite article writes about European Commission’s 
suggestions to Estonia not to increase country’s budgetary deficit (PM, 
07.01.2003). 
At the most concrete level, authors refer to single Commissioners as an 
authority. For example, Political Elite article quotes Franz Fischler, 
Commissioner of the Agricultural Affairs at the time that Estonia has to 
increase the competitiveness of the farms but should not also forget about the 
environmental aspects and other differences of conditions (PM, 10.03.1998). 
Another article refers to Fischler’s suggestions concerning agricultural 
production (PM, 12.08.1997a). Also the claim of Hans van den Broek, 
European Commissioner of External Relations at the time that harmonized 
laws are a decisive factor in getting accepted to the EU is emphasized (Political 
Elite article, PM, 19.04.1997).  
In addition to the statements of the EU institutions and representatives, 
the Political Elite articles use the EU documents and legislative acts as a basis 
for emphasizing the authority of the EU (PM, 18.07.1997b). The articles state 
that according to the EU treaty we have to harmonize our economy with the 
demands valid in the EU (PM, 19.04.1997) and the necessity to decrease the 
amount of the persons without citizenship is skillfully written also to the 
Agenda 2000, document, that is our entrance ticket to the EU (PM, 
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13.03.1998). As an example, water policy is one sector where Estonia has to 
transform itself on the basis of the EU directives (PM, 22.10.1998a). In several 
Political Elite articles the focus is on EU’s agricultural principles (PM, 
31.03.1998a), mostly based on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The 
articles argue that already today we should keep in mind the CAP of Europe 
for being able to implement it while joining the EU at latest (PM, 06.11.1998a; 
see also PM, 18.11.1998). 
The examples above have emphasized the necessity to follow EU’s guidance 
whereas in the following cases the focus is on impressing and pleasing the EU 
as the main goal. In some articles it is though done by improving substance. A 
Political Elite article writes about the atmosphere of unawareness concerning 
Estonia’s position in the EU ranking list and the opportunity to start the 
accession negotiations among the first countries. Article continues that the 
developments concerning democracy are, of course, followed attentively in the 
case of Estonia as the newcomer in the EU integration. Thus, the article 
continues, it is especially important that the democratic control over the 
authorities and responsibility of the authorities (võimuvastutus) in Estonia 
worked immaculately (PM, 03.02.1997a; see also PM, 02.10.1998b). Since the 
EU neither knows nor trusts Estonia (yet), Estonia should prove itself. 
According to a Political Elite article the tariffs, implemented as a tool for 
immediate reaction (kiirreageerimisvahendina), is exactly the thing that 
would prove Estonia’s capability to administrate the tariffs in front of the EU 
(PM, 11.09.1997b). 
Unlike the former examples, image and substance are also dealt with as two 
aspects unrelated to each other (Political Elite article, PM, 28.03.1998a). For 
example a Journalist article writes that in issuing visas, cosmetic 
improvements that give a more European impression of Estonia are welcome 
by all odds (PM, 29.12.1997c). The expression ‘cosmetic improvements’ refers 
to using make up and thus, the importance of improving the image is 
emphasized instead of the need to make Estonian society substantially more 
European. 
Similarly, in connection with Poland’s decision to state in its constitution 
the civilian control over the army and the possibility to delegate part of the 
state power to the international organizations, a Journalist article writes: “For 
pleasing Brussels we should probably set these so called Euro clauses.”66 (PM, 
28.05.1997). The term ‘Euroclause’ indicates that the clause is necessary for 
improving Estonian image and making Brussels happy, not for contributing to 
Estonian development.  
In another similar example, a Journalist article writes that for getting into 
the EU, Estonia has to create structures for influencing the vegetable market 
with active support purchases as well as the temporary protection tariffs that 
have not been implemented yet in Estonia. The article continues that the 
question still remains, if one can learn to swim while practicing in an empty 
                                                          
66 Need nn eurosätted peaksime ilmselt ka meie Brüsselile meeldimiseks sisse viima. 
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pool (PM, 16.07.2002). The metaphor of ‘swimming in the empty pool’ maps 
EU demands as artificial measurements necessary for pleasing the EU but 
without any substantial value. 
Another part of Should accept EU authority is based on the idea Estonia 
should keep own promises given to the EU. More concretely, in the former 
part, Estonia was supposed to fulfill the EU norms because the EU had told it 
to do so, whereas here the EU authority has been internalized by the 
engagement Estonia has taken in relation to its aim to join the EU. Therefore, 
the logic is the same as in the case of should follow EU practice as own aim 
but instead of own aims, the focus is on the promises given to the EU or its 
justified expectations towards Estonia. This way the willingness to become a 
member of the EU is no more an internal issue but is dealt with as an 
interaction with the EU. As a Journalist article writes, Estonia has to confirm 
the EU that we could fulfill the accession conditions in reasonable time (PM, 
06.03.1998c). Similarly, articles deal with Estonia’s Eastern border, the future 
EU’s external border as something Estonia should take the responsibility for 
(Political Elite article, PM, 11.09.1997b and Journalist article, PM, 
13.05.2002b). Concerning the everyday working conditions of the border 
guards, a Journalist article writes:  
If the Estonian state wishes to take its priorities seriously, be this 
raising national security and seriously fighting crime or keeping the 
promises that have been given for getting into the EU, then it should 
not allow the people who do this work daily to be pushed into 
rotting behind-the-corners.67 
PM, 19.07.2002a 
In comparison with the beginning of the accession process, the scale of the 
spheres where Estonia was urged to take responsibility had increased in the 
articles by the end of the negotiations. The articles suggest that since the 
Estonian language was about to get the status of being one of the EU’s official 
languages, it sets out the duties of the Estonian state, and not just to the EU 
(Journalist article, PM, 16.07.2003b). Another article states that Estonia does 
not apply at the transition period for the medicines, and thus, from 2004 all 
medicines sold in Estonia should be in accordance to the EU’s demands (PM, 
18.04.2002b).  
Apart from Estonia’s promises to the EU, in some examples the emphasis 
is on the expectations EU has in relation to Estonia’s accession. For instance a 
Journalist article writes that just like we ourselves also the EU is expecting 
Estonia to increase its administrative capacity (PM, 17.07.2003b). Another 
article claims that Estonia has an opportunity to show if the praising 
                                                          
67 Kui Eesti riik soovib tõsiselt täita oma eeliseesmärke - olgu selleks siis turvalisuse tõstmine ja 
tõsine võitlus kuritegevusega või Euroopa Liitu pääsemiseks antud lubaduste täitmine -, siis ei tohiks ta 
sallida, et inimesed, kes seda tööd igapäevaselt teevad, on surutud kõdunevatesse nurgatagustesse. 
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evaluations concerning its economic and political readiness to join the EU are 
being true (PM, 04.07.1998). One article states that most of the foreign real 
estate investors are sure that Estonia says Yes in the EU referendum and one 
is not afraid to invest hundreds of millions of kroons to Estonia only because 
in the mutual “Europot” (euroanumas) prices should get harmonized like it 
used to be in the other parts of Europe (Journalist article, PM, 14.08.2003a). 
In both cases Estonia has already been praised. This, however, means, that the 
other side has reasoned expectations towards Estonia which now has to fulfill 
its obligations as a part of the contract. 
Towards the end of the accession process, the Cultural Elite articles refer 
to the EU foreign policy related expectations towards Estonia in connection 
with the Iraq crisis (PM, 21.02.2003; PM, 15.04.2003b and PM, 25.07.2003a). 
Another article claims that normal Estonian-Russian relations will soon 
become an absolute necessity for the third partners – Nordic countries, Baltic 
Sea region and the EU (PM, 02.04.2003b). 
Both in the beginning and towards the end of the accession process, some 
articles argue that since the EU is ready for a great financial contribution, 
Estonia should contribute at least a little from its side. For example, a 
Journalist article writes about investments to agriculture (PM, 01.08.1998a) 
and a Political Elite article about regional development (PM, 03.06.1998b). In 
sum, as the articles state, if Estonia next year gives to the EU’s budget less than 
billion kroons but receives more than two billions, then simple arithmetic 
shows that to achieve this difference it is worth to take an effort and put 
something into the game as well (Journalist article, PM, 18.06.2003b). The 
latter example is empowered by talking about the game, since it is common 
knowledge that to take part of any game as a freeloader is unacceptable. The 
reference to simple arithmetic makes the argument stronger, since the 
question is no more about the options and choices but a truth that can be 
shown by counting. 
On the other hand, apart from the articles indicating that in addition to the 
EU, Estonia should contribute to certain spheres of life, in some cases Estonia 
is seen as the only one responsible for certain issues and not entitled to any 
support from the EU. These examples are based on the background logic that 
even though the EU takes care of most of the things, not everything can be 
externalized to the EU. A Cultural Elite article writes that one example where 
Estonia should manage by itself is protection and development of the Estonian 
language, since this is a sphere in which we should cope without Brussels' 
guidance (PM, 16.03.2002). Other articles make the same claim about higher 
education (PM, 06.04.1998b and PM, 11.12.2002b). 
In addition to Estonia in general, some articles emphasize the 
responsibility of Estonia’s political elite. For instance, a Cultural Elite article 
writes that strong institutions are needed for international cooperation and 
continues that for understanding this we do not need EU’s pointing finger 
(näpuganäitamist) but our politicians should deal with this (PM, 
29.12.1998b). Similarly, an article comments on the promise of Estonia’s 
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Prime Minister that life in Estonia will get better: for keeping this promise one 
should not look at the EU direction – also inside the EU, our politicians 
themselves have to solve the problems of Estonia (Cultural elite articles, PM, 
15.09.2003 and PM, 14.11.1998; see also PM, 06.05.2002). 
In sum, should keep own promises is rather weakly represented both in 
the beginning as well as in the end of the accession process whereas should 
listen to the EU is dated more to the beginning. Since should follow EU 
practice increases during the accession process, the shift from following the 
EU’s orders and norms towards following the EU’s practice can be depicted. 
Towards the end of the accession process more observations about EU practice 
as something valuable is made whereas the EU’s orders and statements are 
less used as a basis of the EU’s authority. In the context where the EU’s low 
popularity in Estonia is related to the orders and ‘to do lists’ given in the name 
of the EU (for example Raik 2003, 106, 233-235), the shift from EU’s orders 
to its practices in the articles can also be seen as tactical means with an aim to 
rise EU’s popularity. 
Among the categories of articles, the most represented is Political Elite as 
a group who emphasized the need to listen to the EU. This supports the results 
of the former studies that by referring to the EU authority, Estonia’s political 
elite had tried to legitimize their own positions during the accession process 
(see also Raik 2003, 233-235). At the same time Readers articles are missing 
from should listen to the EU. This is in accordance to the previous sub-
discourse Should follow EU practice, where the Readers, unlike the other 
groups, did not contribute to the idea that the official EU practice is worth 
following. 
The Readers also miss as contributors from should keep own promises 
whereas the most represented here are Journalist articles and Cultural Elite 
articles. Both remind the political elite of their duty in front of the EU and 
society, what the EU is doing/has done already for Estonia and what should 
be the Estonian contribution to the same process. Lack of Readers articles in 
should keep own promises is rather compatible to the conclusions drawn 
about should follow EU practice as own aim. There, instead of identifying 
oneself with Estonian goals, Readers articles claim the country’s political elite 
who have set the goals, should also work for achieving them. At the same time, 
Readers articles rather weakly identify themselves with those who have set the 
goals and given promises to the EU.   
Failure to accept EU authority  
While in the previous section, the necessity to accept EU authority by listening 
to the EU or keeping one’s promises was dealt with as identification, this part 
is based on the recognition given to Estonia in the same process as failure to 
listen to the EU or failure to keep own promises. 
Compared to the recognition of Failure to follow EU practice, two 
differences can be depicted. First, no positive recognition was expressed in the 
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former case whereas here both stick and carrot are offered. Second, the 
recognition in relation to comparing Estonian practice with the one of the EU 
or Estonian goals with country’s practice was based on the observation of 
Estonian actors. Here, on the other hand, the EU feedback in various forms is 
used as a source of authority. In most of the cases, however, it is mediated by 
Estonian actors68. 
In failure to listen to the EU, a distinction between current condition 
and status quo situation can be made. In the beginning of the accession 
process, the Political Elite articles, especially, point out the Estonian failure to 
listen to the EU as a current condition that deserves criticism. The articles 
argue that EU experts have notified of the problems of Estonian land reform 
(PM, 07.10.1998), the specialists of the EU consider the state’s institutional 
development as our weakest point (PM, 22.11.1997), the EU has blamed 
Estonia for the low prices of our agricultural products that prevents Estonian 
accession to the EU (PM, 20.10.1998) and EU’s high representatives’ have 
continuously notified Estonia’s irresponsibility in connection with the external 
trade deficit and current account deficit (PM, 13.04.1998a; see also Cultural 
Elite article PM, 06.08.1997).  
In addition to ‘high representatives’ and ‘specialists’, the EU’s authority is 
also communicated on the basis of its institutions, documents and regulations 
(Cultural Elite articles PM, 17.12.1997a and PM, 21.11.1997). For example a 
Cultural Elite article writes that the main problem, the  European Commission 
marked this year (as well as last year) is the continuous deficit in both trade 
and the current account (PM, 09.11.1998a; see also Journalist article, PM, 
05.05.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that weak regional policy 
is criticized in the avis (PM, 03.06.1998b) and on the basis of Agenda 2000, 
the law for insuring the bank deposits was supposed to be accepted in October 
1997 but Parliament’s Monetary Commission has not even started to proceed 
with this issue (PM, 12.11.1997).  
Similar to the last example, negative feedback from the EU is used for 
communicating heterogeneity of society also in other articles. By expressing 
an ironic attitude and schadenfreude in the form of ‘I told you so’, the articles 
distance themselves from ‘Estonia’ to which the feedback is given. For example 
a Journalist article writes at the time when the decisions about the accession 
negotiations had not yet been made: It has become clear that no unanimity 
dominates in the EU concerning our great readiness to start the accession 
negotiations (PM, 24.07.1997). Also a Readers article depicts the unrealistic 
imaginations of Estonian greatness and writes that those on whom our 
acceptance depends do not operate only with the positive information given 
by us (PM, 06.05.1997). Another Readers article refers to the free movement 
                                                          
68 Apart from the articles written by Estonian authors, also some EU representatives are among the 
authors who evaluate Estonia. The article of Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Per Stig 
Muller (PM, 01.07.2002) and another one by British Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Robin Cook 
(PM, 28.08.1998) can be taken as examples. 
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of people in the EU by commenting on the fear that EU citizens would crowd 
into Estonia after the accession: Estonia might be proud of its economic 
achievements but the queue of the ones moving from the EU to Estonia is in 
no case a very long one (PM, 02.09.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 
12.08.1997b).  
Negative feedback creates a basis for the current condition whereas positive 
feedback from the EU is used for creating a status quo situation. Here, failure 
does not mean shortcomings of society but shortcomings of interpreting 
issues. At the same time no further discussion is expected, since the EU as an 
authority has said its final (praising) word (Political Elite article, PM, 
13.02.2002). For example a Political Elite article writes that no changes 
concerning Eastern border are necessary, since the EU is completely satisfied 
with our control line (PM, 14.08.1998  and PM, 20.02.1997; see also Readers 
article, PM, 13.02.1997).  
In another example a Political Elite article calms down the ones who are 
worried about the deficit of the current account of the balance of payments 
(maksebilansi jooksevkonto) by writing that we should not have any particular 
problems, since Estonia was let into the first round of the EU accession 
negotiations and we are continuously set as a role model to a few in the world 
(PM, 01.04.1998). Apart from that a Political Elite article admits that Estonia’s 
economic policy with limited resources and reforms has not been pleasant for 
everybody but this economic policy is also one reason why Estonia stands at 
the threshold of the EU negotiations (PM, 25.11.1997; see also PM, 
18.07.1997b). Thus, on the basis of the most important indicator — EU 
recognition —the right choices have been made.  
At the same time articles, directly or indirectly condemn the ones who are 
critical towards Estonia’s development by indicating their failure to accept EU 
authority (in these cases, failure to believe and admit that Estonia is doing 
well). On the basis of the European Commission’s reports and a decision to 
take Estonia into the first round of the accession negotiations the articles 
communicate an understanding of Estonia’s success by writing that the 
country was considered to be ‘Euro proper’ (eurokõlblik) (Readers articles, 
PM, 18.12.1997b and PM, 19.11.1997), Estonia deserves a place behind the 
negotiations' table (Cultural Elite article PM, 09.11.1998a) and the decision to 
start negotiations is an acknowledgement of the development of Estonian 
economy and democracy as a whole (Political Elite articles, PM, 25.07.1997b 
and PM, 18.07.1997b; see also Journalist article, PM, 28.11.1998). As a 
Political Elite article writes, from European Commission's analysis published 
on the 12th of October it becomes clear that on the basis of the GDP growth 
since 1997 we have been the ultimate best among the ten EU candidate 
countries (PM, 07.12.1998; see also Journalist article, PM, 10.10.2002a). A 
Readers article emphasizes the importance of the fact that only Estonia, but 
neither Latvia nor Lithuania are ready for accession negotiations (PM, 
18.07.1997a). 
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One option for creating the status quo situation is by referring to the finality 
of the EU's evaluation. On the basis of the EU statements a Journalist article 
writes that Estonia is no more a “[f]ormer republic of the [Soviet Socialist - 
SKK] union but the country that holds official accession negotiations with the 
Euro Union (euroliit)”69 (PM, 20.04.1998; see also PM, 04.11.1997 and  PM, 
28.12.1998 and Political Elite articles, PM, 17.07.1997; PM, 22.05.1998 and 
PM 05.01.1998a). In connection with the visa freedom between Estonia and 
Schengen countries, a Journalist article writes:  
When the demand for visa will be abandoned in the 1st of March next 
year, this means that Estonians will no more be in the position of 
schoolboys in Europe and Estonia is considered to belong to Europe so 
that we are no longer directly connected to political and economic 
mess in Moscow or Russian mafia.70 
PM, 20.12.1998 
Towards the end of the accession process, positive recognition is 
communicated as a sign that it is not necessary for Estonia to prove itself any 
more. For example a Journalist article writes that the number of closed 
chapters does not matter anymore since the EU has decided that at the end of 
this year the accession negotiations will be finished (PM, 17.01.2002). On the 
basis of the European Commission’s progress report, another Journalist 
article claims that this increases Estonia’s and other candidate countries’ 
courage to assume that the EU enlargement to ten countries will become true 
in 2004 (PM, 10.10.2002a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 25.02.2003a). 
Another part of Failure to accept EU authority, failure to keep own 
promises is based on the negative recognition got from the EU with the focus 
on the further consequences of these shortcomings (Journalist article, PM, 
12.09.2002a). The criticism is targeted either towards the whole society or 
towards certain representatives of Estonia whereas the consequences faced are 
either real or potential ones. 
As real consequences for the whole society, the Political Elite articles write 
at the beginning of the accession negotiations that a collapse of Estonia’s 
image is very harmful to our negotiations with the EU (PM, 25.05.1998b) and 
if Estonia does not change its attitude we might face unpleasant surprises in 
1997 (PM, 04.01.1997). The same attitude is expressed in a Readers article 
arguing ironically that our achievements are supposed to be so good that our 
neighbors are claimed to explode of jealousy (lähevad kadedusest lõhki) but is 
not this self-praising one of the reasons why one would not rather like to see 
us as a member of the EU or NATO (PM, 06.05.1997). 
                                                          
69 [e]ndise liiduvabariigiga, vaid euroliiduga ametlikke liitumisläbirääkimisi pidava maaga. 
70 Kui viisanõue tuleva aasta 1. märtsiks kaotatakse, tähendab see, et eestlased pole Euroopas enam 
koolipoisi seisuses ning Eestit peetakse niivõrd Euroopasse kuuluvaks, et meid ei seostata enam otseselt 
poliitilise ja majandusliku segadusega Moskvas või vene maffiaga. 
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The same consequence – not getting into the EU – due to broken promises 
is indicated by the Cultural Elite articles, which argue that with hundreds of 
thousands of non-citizens Estonia will not be accepted into the EU (PM, 
28.08.1997), Estonia just does not get to the EU, if its laws are not in 
accordance with the democratic traditions valid in the EU (PM, 21.11.1998) 
and if Estonia does not succeed in accomplishing the accession requirements 
in reasonable time, the negotiations will be put on hold (Journalist article, PM, 
06.03.1998c). 
Some articles view the representatives of Estonia who have given and 
broken promises as responsible for the consequences. The criticism is mostly 
targeted towards Estonia’s political elite whereas the entire society will face 
the consequence. For example, Readers article states that if Estonia’s 
parliament had amongst the laws to be accepted, adopted the law against 
corruption, the state’s wallet would be much bigger and what is more 
important our image in the eyes of those who decide upon EU and NATO 
members would be more positive (PM, 06.05.1997). 
In connection with the governmental crisis in 1997, several articles deal 
with the consequences of instability. The Political Elite articles write that the 
door to the EU enlargement’s first round will be closed if Estonia’s next 
government remains in power for less than half a year (PM, 02.04.1997) and 
that if one is not going to replace the tired leader of the ruling party, there is a 
danger that Estonia will lose for good the possibility to be taken seriously in 
Europe (PM, 07.02.1997; see also PM, 04.03.1997). Also a Readers article 
writes that the EU cannot take us seriously at the negotiations’ table if it hears 
that a continuous power struggle takes place in Estonia (PM, 05.01.1998b). 
Apart from the society-wide consequences, in some articles, the 
wrongdoings of the political elite are seen to lead towards the unpleasant 
consequences for themselves. For example, a Journalist article refers to an 
unpleasant situation where the Prime Minister personally had had to admit a 
serious lagging behind in addressing the laws necessary for joining the EU 
(PM, 28.05.2002a). Another article points out the shame as a consequence:  
Estonian authorities are ashamed above all because at the same time 
when the government emphasizes the necessity to decrease the state 
bureaucracy, [Hans – SKK] van den Broek comes from Brussels and 
practically demands opposite decision.71 
PM, 16.04.1997a 
Another article depicts Lennart Meri (Estonia’s President at the time) as a 
schoolboy standing in front of an EU representative, not daring to look at him 
but keeping his eyes down. The article writes that Lennart Meri had to cast 
down his eyes in front of Commissioner Hans van den Broek, when out of 
                                                          
71 Piinlik on Eesti võimudel eeskätt seetõttu, et samal ajal, kui valitsus rõhutab riigi bürokraatia 
vähendamise vajalikkust, tuleb van den Broek Brüsselist ning sisuliselt nõuab vastupidist otsust. 
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almost half thousand necessary EU directives and laws Estonia had 
harmonized only seventy (Journalist article, PM, 15.05.1997).  
In the examples above, real consequences are pointed out whereas the 
following ones focus on the potential consequences for Estonia, as wishful 
thinking. In the case of Estonia’s political elite breaking their promises, a 
Journalist article calls for the EU as the one Estonian politicians should or 
could listen to. For instance:  
We are talking again about the hypocrisy that should bring some 
Estonian swear word to the lips of the EU Commissioner Hans van 
der Broek. 
Government had promised Broek in April [1997 - SKK] with their 
hands on their hearts that in Toompea everything they can do is made 
for harmonizing Estonian and Brussels’ laws.72  
PM, 16.08.1997  
In another similar example, a Journalist article states that if Estonia’s 
government thinks that promises are given for not keeping, the EU probably 
does not think this way (PM, 30.03.2002b). 
Examples found in Readers articles address the EU as a hope of the last 
instance, whose potential interruption as a consequence is expected to 
improve the situation in Estonia. The arguments are formed as rhetorical 
questions to the decision-makers based on an assumption that the EU would 
be on the side of the ordinary people. For example, Estonia’s ethical situation 
is criticized by claims that Europe is said to be surprised at the goings-on in 
Estonia (PM, 12.02.1997). Another article refers to the necessity to have 
everything as in Europe and argues that it is embarrassing to start knocking 
on EU’s door with the kind of roads Estonia has. What could they think about 
us? (PM, 31.10.1997b). Towards the end of the accession process, the rise of 
food prices in connection with the EU membership that makes the life of the 
poor people even more difficult is depicted. The  Readers article asks if the EU 
into what we are trying to get, approves, that associated country takes this kind 
of attitude towards its population (since, as article claims, ca 2/3 of Estonian 
population is poor) (PM, 06.08.2002). 
Usage of the rhetorical questions in these examples can be interpreted in 
two ways. Even though the EU has not made the statements in these issues, 
Readers articles look for EU recognition to legitimize their own criticism. More 
concretely, EU statements are seen as the consequences that might have 
                                                          
72 Tegemist on jälle silmakirjalikkusega, mis eurovolinik Hans van der Broekil huulile peaks tooma 
küll mõne eestikeelse vandesõna. 
Kätt südamele pannes lubas ju valitsus Broekile alles aprillis, et Toompeal tehakse kõik endast 
olenev Eesti ja Brüsseli seaduste ühtlustamiseks.  
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impact on Estonia’s political elite. On the other hand, the rhetorical question 
- ‘whether Estonia is good enough for the EU’ - can also be seen as ironical 
reference to the continuous worry of the Estonian political elite at the time.  
In sum, compared to Failure to follow EU practice as recognition, the 
characteristic features of Failure to accept EU authority are presence of both 
sticks and carrots as well as real and potential recognition. In the case of sticks, 
a change is indicated on the basis of the EU feedback, whereas the carrots are 
used by the articles to set up a status quo situation that cannot be undermined 
by individual’s or some other groups’ criticism. Therefore, implicitly or 
explicitly a change of attitude is aimed at, since the actual situation is sealed 
with positive feedback from the EU. An analogy can be taken from the play 
“Pisuhänd” (Vihtahousu/Devil) of Estonian writer Eduard Vilde, where the 
novel published under the name of a wannabe writer is criticized by his sister-
in-law. Offended, the wannabe writer states that ‘as you see from the reviews, 
everything is fine’.  
The second characteristic feature, potential recognition, shows the EU’s 
interference as the only hope to make Estonian political decision makers to 
keep their promises and/or to improve the living conditions of Estonian 
people. At the same time citizens’ claims for the EU’s opinion can be taken as 
a parody of the general atmosphere where EU’s opinion is highly evaluated.  
The Political Elite articles and the Journalist articles are the dominant 
categories writing about the Failure to accept EU authority whereas the least 
represented are the Cultural Elite articles. Timely, this sub-discourse is clearly 
more restricted to the beginning of the accession process. This is in line with 
previous parts of the discourse indicating that towards the end of the accession 
process the focus is more on the EU practice, not the EU as an agency which 
puts some pressure on Estonia. Logically, also the claims for potential 
consequences get weaker towards the end of the accession process.  
CONCLUSIONS OF EUROPEAN ESTONIA  
Internal development of the European Estonia discourse leads from the EU as 
an authority to following EU practice. The necessity to follow the EU's orders 
and impress it as an authority is dated more to the beginning than to the end 
of the accession process whereas during the accession process, a shift from 
following EU’s orders and norms (interaction with the EU) towards following 
EU’s practice (internal considerations) is visible. The idea of becoming 
European was thus internalized during the accession process: instead of 
following the orders of the EU, observations about the EU practice as 
something valuable are made in the end. This resembles the conclusions 
drawn about Estonian EU debate by Kristi Raik (2003) that during the 
accession years a shift from an existential to a pragmatic approach occurred in 
the form of working out domestic solutions instead of doing what is inevitable 
for membership (see Section 3.2).  
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Concerning the general tone of the articles, a shift from the EU orders to 
own observations could be discerned on the basis of the language used. 
Especially in the Journalist articles a certain ‘calming down’ took place during 
the accession negotiations. While at the beginning of the negotiations, a 
critical situation was created by terms like ‘strict orders’, ‘things in order’, ‘take 
efforts’ etc., towards the end of the accession process, the accession issues were 
more about the normal routines. 
This ‘calming down’ is in accordance to the results of previous studies that 
deal with developments in Estonian society. For example, Finnish scholar 
Henri Vogt (2005) writes how at some point the style of policy making where 
the political elite spoke with the voice of international authorities started to 
have a negative impact on the credibility and legitimacy of the government. 
Also Lauristin and Vihalemm (2009, 12) point out that the pre-accession 
period 1999 onwards was characterized by the strengthening influence of 
domestic agencies.  
On the basis of the European Estonia discourse it can be said that the 
changes in society and in Postimees are interlinked. On one hand it can be 
assumed that the paper reflects general societal developments. On the other 
hand the focus on EU practice instead of orders given by the EU can also be 
based on conscious policy to decrease the amount of ‘orders’ given by the EU, 
since according to the opinion polls these ‘orders’ were one reason for low 
public support towards the EU. Also the decrease of the (unpopular) Political 
Elite articles and increase of the (trustworthy) Cultural Elite articles during 
the accession process can be interpreted as part of the same process, especially 
while the Cultural Elite articles dominated in communicating the necessity 
and failure to follow EU practice whereas the focus of the Political Elite articles 
was on the need and failure to follow EU authority.  
However, the decrease of EU agency does not change the fact that of two 
sides of the discourse, Becoming European is clearly stronger than Being 
European, which was the prevalent side in the Cultural Elite articles. This also 
means that change is indicated in this discourse in the form of becoming, the 
most as critical recognition in Failure to follow EU practice. Thus, the idea 
that one is not good enough is strongly communicated in the discourse of 
European Estonia.  
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5.2 DISCOURSE OF INDEPENDENT ESTONIA 
In the academic texts Estonia as a sovereign actor in the world context is 
mapped on the basis of its position between East and West as a cultural 
meeting point, economic gateway and a political mediator (for example Berg 
and Oras 2002, 46, 54). Estonian territory is seen as an important geopolitical 
region in the world (Berg and Oras 2002, 29, 30), location on the board of the 
Baltic Sea is considered to be important place where the rest of the world has 
been trying to get their interests through (Berg and Oras 2002, 44-45, see also 
Vihalemm 1997, 132). 
Mapping Estonia’s unique position as a bridge between Russia and 
Western Europe has also been depicted as the most dominant vision in 
Estonian foreign policy (for example Berg and Oras 2002, 46, 54; Berg 2007, 
50). On one hand Estonia is seen to share similar identity and cultural 
experiences with Europe, but also ‘knows Russia’ and can work as a translator 
between Russia and the rest of the world (Berg and Oras 2002, 45; Berg 2002, 
115-116). At the same time, Merje Kuus (2002c, 308) writes that the scenarios 
of Estonia as a neutral meeting point and a gateway between the West and 
Russia had considerable currency in the first half of the 1990s while later such 
visions have been gradually supplanted by the exclusive civilizational narrative 
(from bridge-state to bridgehead-state) (see also Miniotaite 2003, 214-215, 
220). 
In various cases the strength of Estonian agency is seen to be based on its 
language and culture as crucial in self-understanding. During the Soviet 
period, the role of culture and language was remarkable also from the political 
perspective (for example Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997a, 74; Vihalemm, Lauk 
and Lauristin 1997, 230 and Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 20). As Mikko 
Lagerspetz (1996, 55) writes, disguised political opposition could be expressed 
through national culture even though explicitly political themes were avoided. 
Even though from the IR perspective at that time, Estonia was not an 
independent actor in the world context but part of the Soviet Union, references 
to culture enable to show its agency at some level. In the same spirit the 
quotation of the initiator of the huge Estonian folklore archive Jakob Hurt 
from the 19th century, if Estonians cannot become a big nation due to size of 
population, it can become big through its spirit and intellectuality, is 
considered relevant also nowadays (Kirch and Kirch 2001, 130).  
From the end of the 1990s, flexibility as a characteristic feature has been 
referred to in connection with Estonian agency. For example, Berg and Oras 
(2002) write that Estonia is a small country that is mobile and flexible to being 
changed, and that it is smallest state in Europe which has a modern culture in 
its own language. At the same time the smallness of the territory and the small 
population are seen as reasons for the country’s success in the international 
arena as well as for its ability to complete the internal changes in short order 
(Berg and Oras 2002, 27). According to Lauristin and Vihalemmm (1997a, 
106), young politicians and businessmen created a new vision of Estonia and 
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its people as a nation capable of successful integration with the West. An 
attempt to show Estonia as an innovative information technology country 
ahead of the ‘old EU’ during the accession process is part of the same 
understanding (for example Lehti 2006, 82-84). 
In Postimees, the discourse of Independent Estonia is based on the struggle 
between Being independent and Becoming independent. In Being 
independent the country is free to choose, follow its interests and act on the 
basis of own specialties. Estonia is depicted in Postimees as an independent 
country that is able to make up its mind on the basis of own calculations. A 
Political Elite article writes that even though the EU supports us, the 
responsibility how to use this support is left to us, the citizens of the Republic 
of Estonia (PM, 24.07.2003b).  
Being independent contains two sub-discourses. Form own practice is 
based on internal relations and characterize the EU either as a framework 
Estonia could make use of or see EU’s agency insignificant from the Estonian 
perspective. Deny EU authority, on the other hand takes shape in interaction 
between Estonia and the EU. Since in connection with being no change is 
intended, nor is separate recognition given. 
Becoming independent, on the other hand, indicates that Estonia’s current 
performance is not in accordance to that of an independent country. As 
Political Elite article asks, why do we want to invade somewhere where we are 
not really wanted to (PM, 10.07.2003), especially while No in the referendum 
makes the EU officials take us far more seriously (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
09.07.2003). At the same time, it has to be noted that in most of the articles 
‘independent’ does not refer to a need to stay outside the EU but to act as an 
independent country in relation to the EU both during the accession process 
as well as afterwards. As an equal agency, not an authority, the EU is mapped 
as one possible partner for Estonia, but not the only option for the country. 
Therefore, membership is seen to be justified only if it is beneficial from an 
Estonian perspective.  
On the basis of internal relations/interaction, rhetoric (discourse)/practice 
and identification/recognition, Becoming independent can be divided into 
four parts. Should form own practice focuses on internal relations, Should 
deny EU authority is based on interaction and EU agency. Inside these, the 
axis of rhetoric consists of defining and letting the EU know Estonia’s interests 
as identification but also a failure to do the same things as recognition. Practice 
is based on action: either acting on the basis of own interests or protecting 
these (identification). As recognition, a failure to do both can be depicted. In 
all cases, recognition is based on Estonia’s own evaluation. 
The interplay between the identification/recognition and the EU 
agency/practice enables to depict two ways of being and four ways of 
becoming. The division is capsulized in Table 5.2 and the hierarchy of the 
discourse clarified in Figure 5.2. In the following part, Being and Becoming 
independent (representation) are dealt with whereas Chapter 6 analyzes Being 
and Becoming rational (relations and identities).  
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Table 5.2. Sub-discourses of Being and Becoming independent. 
Being independent Becoming independent 
Form own practice Should form own practice 
 Failure to form own practice 
Deny EU authority Should deny EU authority 
 Failure to deny EU authority 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Sub-discourses of Independent Estonia. 
BEING INDEPENDENT 
Form own practice emphasizes Estonia as independent of the EU, without, 
however paying attention to the agency of the EU. As Political Elite article 
writes: “[w]e are an independent state. We do not have to do anything we do 
not want to do.”73(PM, 10.07.2003). 
Deny EU authority focuses on the EU as an agency whereas the EU’s 
authority over Estonia is denied, which is done by seeing Estonia and the EU 
as equal actors or claiming that the EU cannot be taken seriously. An example 
of the equal actors is given by a Cultural Elite article:  
                                                          
73 Me oleme iseseisev riik. Me ei pea tegema midagi, mida me ei taha teha. 
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If we during the Soviet order were able to maintain Estonian language 
and culture then in the EU it is a piece of cake. Europe has prides with 
its cultural heterogeneity and the creativity emerging from that. Thus, 
there is no need to worry.74 
PM, 13.09.2003c  
Form own practice 
Form own practice deals with Estonian practices, possibilities or agency as an 
independent country that is not necessarily tied to the EU. This can also be 
seen as a difference in comparison with the academic texts above where 
independence is complemented by (wider) Europeanness. Nevertheless, the 
focus of the academic texts is on wider issues as Estonia as a mediator between 
East and West whereas the discourse of Postimees concentrates on Estonia’s 
agency in relation to country’s accession process.  
The first section of this sub-discourse, own practices and possibilities 
either shows Estonia and the EU as separate entities, build a hierarchy where 
Estonia beats the EU on the basis of variety of indicators or is based on a 
mixture of these two. The conclusions about the country are drawn on the basis 
of Estonian possibilities and characteristic features of the country.  
The idea that Estonia and the EU are different entities is communicated by 
a Cultural Elite article which writes that EU membership is only one possible 
future vision, just not the only one (PM, 26.08.1997b; see also Readers article, 
PM, 27.08.2003). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that on the basis of the 
former experiences, tearing oneself apart from the Soviet structure and 
building an economic system from scratch, we can for sure manage also in case 
of a No-scenario in the accession referendum (PM, 17.07.2003a). In some 
articles the EU is dealt with in relation to the other spatial entities. A Readers 
article writes that the Russian market is more important for Estonia than the 
European Union (PM, 29.07.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article emphasizes 
the importance of the USA in the world context (PM, 02.04.1998a).  
Apart from pointing out spatial alternatives, the difference between the EU 
and Estonia is made on the substantial basis. An example can be taken from a 
Readers article which claims that the logic established in the West for making 
a division between the supporters and opponents of the EU does not work in 
Estonia where the farmers and the others who need support do not get any 
help from the state (PM, 22.07.1997). Another example concerns the differing 
habits of Estonia and the EU in using rye in the bread industry. A Journalist 
article writes that rye, the bread grain loved in Estonia, is burnt in the EU, 
since black bread and also kama are just not known in many regions (PM, 
                                                          
74 Kui me nõukogude korra ajal suutsime säilitada eesti keele ja kultuuri, siis ELis on see naljaasi. 
Euroopa uhkustab oma kultuurilise mitmekesisuse ja sellest tuleneva loovusega. Nii et pole põhjust 
muretseda. 
 
 133 
 
05.08.2002a). Even though eating habits can be based on preferences, here 
instead of the taste, the focus is on knowledge as remarkable from the 
perspective of forming Estonian and EU practice (see also Journalist article, 
PM, 17.11.1998d).  
Various practices of Estonia and the EU are also mapped by the Cultural 
Elite articles. An article writes that security questions are solved differently 
throughout the EU, and Estonia does not have much in common with the 
solutions of the other countries (PM, 12.09.2003; see also PM, 15.08.2003). 
In the sphere of immigration, the Estonian situation is seen to be more 
complicated than that of the European Union (PM, 30.03.2002a). Also the 
distinction to Euro optimists and pessimists has a different historical basis in 
Estonia than in the EU member countries (PM, 04.08.1997a) and Estonia is 
seen as one of the protectors of the Western culture and its basic values from 
departmental nihilism and leveling as characteristic features of the EU (PM, 
09.07.2003).  
In some articles, borderline cases can be found that at the same time depict 
parallel practices of Estonia and the EU as well as refer to the common 
trajectory. For instance, a Political Elite article writes that it is also a fact that 
Estonian society is by far more human, free and democratic than any EU 
institution (PM, 23.08.1997) and a Cultural Elite article claims that the 
Estonian constitution is one of the most ‘sovereign’ in Europe (PM, 
13.05.2002a). Usage of the term ‘by far’ (võrreldamatult) whose direct 
translation would be ‘incomparably’ in the first example creates a friction 
between the claims and the practice depicted by the article: even though things 
are characterized as non-comparable, article still makes a comparison and 
claims Estonian superiority on that basis. 
Also a Journalist article writes that compared to the EU, in several 
accession countries, including Estonia, fortunately more environment has 
been preserved. The article continues that this is why we, unlike the EU, have 
practiced regulated hunting and as many environmental specialists claim, 
without this the natural balance of environment would be entirely unbalanced 
(PM, 29.08.2002). On one hand the article refers to two practices, on the other 
hand at the more abstract level, a common scale is used for mapping how much 
environment has been preserved. In this scale, Estonia is in the leading 
position with ‘fortunately’ more environment. 
In another similar example, a Journalist article refers to the dispute 
concerning the Iraq war between Mart Laar (Estonia’s Prime Minister at the 
time) and French President at the time Jacques Chirac. Since the EU and USA 
took different stands towards the war in Iraq, the EU candidate countries, 
including Estonia, started to support the position of the USA. Chirac claimed 
that the candidate countries had ‘missed a good chance to shut up/take a 
chance to be silent’. A Journalist article writes that Laar was right when he said 
that unlike Western Europe, the countries that have suffered under the 
communist occupation had a more value-based foreign policy (PM, 
19.02.2003; see also Political Elite article, PM, 11.02.2002). At the ontological 
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level, the EU and Estonia (as a candidate country) are seen to have 
backgrounds that are entirely different and thus not comparable. However, 
despite this difference, a comparison is made with the conclusions of Estonian 
superiority. 
As the borderline cases above indicate, the third version, locating Estonia 
and the EU to the same trajectory is based on the comparison that enables to 
show Estonian superiority. For example, a Journalist article writes about the 
potential situation where we are ready for the enlargement but the EU itself is 
not (PM, 11.06.2002a) and a Cultural Elite article claims that it is possible for 
Estonia to reach a secure, sustainable and fair society in a briefer way than the 
current Europe (PM, 03.11.2003b). Variety of articles also point out Estonia’s 
superiority in connection with foreign policy and the country’s international 
position (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 11.01.2003 and PM, 13.09.2003d; see also 
Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.2003a). As Journalist article writes Estonia 
has a real chance to bear ethical values in the EU (PM, 19.02.2003).  
Apart from the foreign political issues, in most cases a comparison between 
Estonia and the EU is made on the basis of the economic indicators that prove 
the ‘objective’ superiority of Estonia. For example the  Cultural Elite article 
writes that Estonia, as other quickly moving Eastern European countries has 
developed much faster than the EU countries (PM, 13.09.2003c; see also PM, 
11.11.2003 and PM, 09.10.2002b). At a more concrete level, the  Political Elite 
article claims that Estonian development depends largely on the investments 
whose level is considerably higher than in the other transition countries or the 
European Union average (PM, 27.10.1998b) and that the lower tax level has 
created certain advantages to our economy in comparison to the other 
countries (PM, 12.06.2002b). Also a Journalist article writes that the so called 
stability pact of the European Union enables a budgetary deficit even up to 3% 
of GDP and several countries that are notably bigger and have stronger 
economy than Estonia, have trouble with this indicator (PM, 18.09.2002).  
In some examples statistical indicators are referred to. For example  a 
Journalist article writes about Estonia’s high ownership of cars per capita (PM, 
18.04.1998) and a Cultural Elite article mentions that more Estonian people 
have at least secondary education compared to the EU average (PM, 
27.02.2003). Estonia has also a possibility to be the first and a pioneer in 
financing higher education (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.02.2002). 
The examples above focused on Estonian practices and possibilities 
whereas the following part, own agency is based on Estonian interests, 
achievements and influence both at present and in the future perspective. As 
a Cultural Elite article writes, the question what is the EU by 2020 depends to 
certain extent also on us (Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.08.2003d; see also PM, 
14.06.2003b and PM, 13.09.2003c). Substantially, the current achievements, 
interests and influence are connected to Estonian accession process and the 
future ones to Estonian goals in the EU. Since the focus is on internal relations, 
no interaction between Estonia and the EU is depicted.  
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Estonian interests that form a basis for action are mapped in connection 
with the accession process. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that the 
country’s foreign political strategy is based on Estonian membership in the 
Western world and that the Estonian state now finally tries to formulate a 
plenipotentiary political membership of the EU and NATO (PM, 27.11.2002a). 
Another article claims, in relation to the accession negotiations, that Estonia 
has quite a lot of possibilities to perform as a sovereign state (PM, 24.12.1997c) 
and put forth realistic policy (Journalist article, PM, 29.10.2002). Similarly, 
the  Political Elite article write that Estonian negotiations go with exactly the 
speed we ourselves have wished and decided upon (PM, 08.03.2002b; see also 
Cultural Elite article PM, 01.06.1998) and it is up to us to decide what regime 
is implemented to the protected areas we are going to form (PM, 01.04.2002).  
The same idea is indicated in the articles that deal with Estonian EU 
membership. For example a Cultural Elite article writes that as an EU member 
Estonia and Poland will intensively demand the inclusion of Lithuania and 
Latvia, since it is geopolitically useful for them75 (PM, 01.09.1998; see also PM, 
14.03.1998). Another article claims that the first security interest of Estonia is 
to ensure that the super structures (EU and NATO) would neither crush nor 
break up (PM, 27.10.2003). Similarly, the Political Elite articles write that the 
aim of Estonia is to have the European Union as a union of sovereign states 
(PM, 25.02.2003b and PM, 08.02.2003b) whereas the EU as a federal state is 
not suitable for the small countries like us (PM, 13.12.2002). Conclusively, 
until the EU remains an organ that organizes mostly economic issues, it can 
be only beneficial for us as also for all the others, including well-off larger 
countries (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998a).  
At the same time, Estonian interests are not necessarily mapped as 
unchangeable, but if needed, corrections can be made.  A Journalist article 
writes about increasing Baltic unity after Russian aggression towards Latvia 
and the fact that the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had basically 
distanced itself from its report to the European Commission where Lithuanian 
privatization policy was criticized. The paper continues that “[t]his could 
though be called a withdrawal but there are situations when withdrawal is 
justified.”76 (PM, 16.03.1998).  
Apart from Estonian interests mapped in the examples above as guidelines 
for action, Estonian achievements as positive self-evaluation in connection 
with the accession process are depicted (Political Elite article, PM, 
16.04.2003a). In relation to EU's decision to start the accession negotiations 
with Estonia,  a Journalist article calls Estonian foreign political efforts as very 
successful ones (PM, 10.07.1997a). Thus, another article writes, despite the 
growing suspicion towards the EU inside the country, Estonia can still remain 
the EU’s darling (pailaps) at the time when the accession negotiations are 
                                                          
75 At the time nobody knew when the accession negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania would be 
started. 
76 Seda võiks ju nimetada taganemiseks, kuid on olukordi, kus taganemine on õigustatud.  
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started (PM, 01.11.1998)77. Since Estonia has been active with good reason in 
the EU and NATO direction as unarguable priorities (Cultural Elite article, 
PM, 16.01.2002) after the Copenhagen Summit the country has achieved its 
second great foreign political goal: finished the negotiations with the 
European Union with good results (Journalist articles, PM, 14.12.2002 and 
PM, 11.12.2002a). The same idea is expressed also by a Cultural Elite article 
which writes that the experience with the European Union and NATO shows 
that we are capable of agreeing upon priorities and also keeping these up 
during a longer period (PM, 09.12.2002a; similar Journalist article, PM, 
19.02.2003).  
In addition to the agency of Estonia as a whole based on the interests and 
achievements, agency of the social groups is depicted on the basis of their 
influence. Concerning the influence of Estonian citizens, a Cultural Elite 
article claims that by accepting the so called third act of the constitution, 
Estonian people would give a necessary mandate for joining the EU (PM, 
13.05.2002a) and the more actively people participate in the referendum, the 
stronger is the position of Estonian sovereignty in the EU (PM, 02.05.2003b). 
In relation to the role of the people inside the EU, an article asks rhetorically 
who are those who take care of everything in Estonian society, work hard, 
protect the state etc. and “stand for Estonian issues” (ajavad Eesti asja) in the 
EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.01.2003; see also PM, 18.01.2003b). 
Apart from the influence of the citizens pointed out by the Cultural Elite 
articles, some Political Elite articles focus on their own influence as actors. In 
the beginning of the accession process article aligned to Pro Patria Union 
(Isamaaliit) writes that the image of Estonia as a successful reform country 
was kept up in the international arena and on the basis of the reforms 
conducted by Pro Patria Union, Estonia is taken to the EU negotiations (PM, 
04.12.1997b). Towards the end of the same process also other political actors 
expressed similar positions (PM, 20.06.2003a and PM, 08.02.2003b).  
In sum, the sub-discourse Form own practice is clearly stronger in the 
end of the accession process. This concerns both own practices and 
possibilities as well as own agency as rather equal parts of the sub-discourse. 
In most of the articles, Estonian possibilities and influence are visualized in 
relation to country’s EU membership, not the position outside the EU. The 
latter is depicted in few cases on the basis of the spatial alternatives that are, 
however, not necessarily seen as the best choices for Estonia.  
In this sub-discourse, the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented, 
especially towards the end of the accession process, when the majority of the 
categories’ articles appeared. Journalist articles and the Political Elite articles 
share a second position and the category lacking almost any representation are 
Readers articles.  
                                                          
77 In this case, despite the positive evaluation, internal and external developments are confronted 
whereas the external goals are seen as the major ones. 
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Deny EU authority 
The sub-discourse Deny EU authority focuses on interaction between Estonia 
and the EU either in a form of equal partnership with the EU or not being able 
to take the EU seriously. In both cases the relationship is based on the EU 
agency. However, unlike the European Estonia discourse, here the question is 
not about accepting but questioning the EU agency as an authority. A Cultural 
Elite article writes, European worldliness (maisus) and pragmatism has 
become touchable by today and in the 14th of September idealism of going is 
turning to the routine of being (PM, 25.08.2003a). 
As the heading says, equal partnership with the EU depicts Estonia-
EU relationship as the one between equal parties. As a Readers article claims, 
the member states have partly common demands and the other part has been 
negotiated and agreed upon on the basis of the specialty of the state (PM, 
19.07.1997b).  
In the articles, partnership is characterized both on the basis of 
collaboration as well as conflicts. In case of collaboration the articles deal with 
the EU as a safe partner which does not cause any harm from an Estonian 
perspective. Most of the examples can be found from the end of the accession 
process and one of the main issues dealt with is Estonian sovereignty (Political 
Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.09.2003b). 
As the Cultural Elite articles write, Estonia remains independent in the EU 
(PM, 04.07.2003c) since the EU accession does not concern the existence of 
people’s sovereignty (PM, 02.05.2003b). At the same time, if the European 
Union really turns into an organization whose demands start to confront 
survival instinct of Estonians, they can vote in the forthcoming EU referendum 
against the EU (PM, 19.03.1998). At a more concrete level the Cultural Elite 
articles write that also after accession, the language relations inside the 
country remain largely to be organized by each state and its citizens (PM, 
02.09.2003a) and EU’s rules of law and the main values of the Estonian 
Republic’s constitution do not have to be wholly identical (PM, 13.05.2002a; 
see also Journalist article, PM, 05.08.2002b). 
One way of showing the EU as harmless for Estonia is by making a 
comparison between the EU and the Soviet Union (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
02.05.2003b). As Cultural Elite articles write, unlike in the Soviet Union, the 
composition of our parliament is not set or our government is not named from 
Brussels (PM, 12.08.2003c). Another similar example depicts the Soviet 
Union as an empire whose colony Estonia was, and continues that since 
history does not know the cases when four or five big countries had a common 
colony things are different in the European Union (PM, 18.01.2003b; see also 
PM, 13.09.2003c).  
In addition to the differences between the Soviet Union and the EU, some 
articles focus on their similarities for showing Estonia as the EU’s equal 
partner. In these cases, however, the question is about conflicting, not 
collaborative partnership. For example, in relation to continuance of Estonian 
culture, a Readers article writes that if Estonianness (eestlus) lasted in the 
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Soviet Union, we should remain ourselves in the EU as well (PM, 14.03.2003; 
see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 13.09.2003c).  
In most cases the conflicting partnership between Estonia and the EU is 
based on country’s refusal to follow EU’s guidelines. At the same time unlike 
not being able to take the EU seriously the EU as an entity is not questioned. 
For example a Cultural Elite article questions the EU’s pressure on Estonia to 
adapt the legislation of gender equality, reasoning its arguments with the claim 
that in Estonia, no injustice similar to that of Western Europe has existed (PM, 
20.11.2003). Another Journalist article writes about the EU’s inefficient 
pressure on Latvia in relation to the acceptance of the citizenship law. 
However, instead of learning from this failure, the EU tries similar “soft 
pressure policy” (pehmet survepoliitikat) based on expressions as “we hope” 
(loodame) in Estonian case. On the ground of that the article claims that 
hopefully those memorable times, when the laws were changed only due to 
“Stoel's finger-waving” (Stoeli näpuviibutuse peale), are over in Estonia for 
good (PM, 29.08.1998). For showing the unacceptable manner of the EU's 
behavior, the article writes about ‘Stoel’s finger-waving’, a gesture with an aim 
to make the other side to obey. At the same time this gesture refers to the adult-
child relationship and cannot be considered as a proper behavior among 
grown-ups. Also the hope that ‘these times are over for good’ can refer to the 
adult-child interaction: even though Estonia used to be the one obeying the 
EU, these days are now gone, since the child has grown up. The whole process 
is based on an unavoidable development: children grow up, time passes by and 
neither the EU nor other actors are capable of changing that process. 
In some articles, the reason for not following the EU’s guidance is an 
unwished consequence. A  Cultural Elite article writes that too much 
compliance with the demands of the European Union and OSCE might have a 
catastrophic impact on European Union's prestige among Estonians. The 
article continues that in any case, it already is on a knife-edge (noateral) (PM, 
26.06.1998). The terms ‘catastrophic’ and ‘on a knife-edge’ make the situation 
look very inflammable and following the EU’s guidelines could thus, cause a 
disaster. Ironically, here ‘disaster’ means a decrease of the popularity of the 
same EU among Estonians. Therefore, Estonia actually protects the EU from 
itself.  
Similarly, a Journalist article characterizes the potential EU penalties to 
the candidate countries as illogical: “In relation to an attempt to set the 
penalties Euro support in the candidate countries would definitely decrease 
and thus the result of the Euro referendum would become totally 
unexpected.”78 (PM, 27.07.2002a). Another article writes about the European 
Commission’s program concerning agricultural support to the future member 
countries and claims that also without this program there had been enough to 
do, since the agricultural chapter forms more than 40% of the legislation (PM, 
                                                          
78 Trahvikavatsuse korral väheneks kahtlemata kandidaatmaade eurotoetus ja seega muutuks 
eurorefendumi tulemus täiesti ennustamatuks. 
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30.01.2002). On the basis of the criticism, the European Commission’s 
behavior can be seen as an irresponsible one that threatens to slow down 
negotiations.   
Another part of this sub-discourse, not being able to take the EU 
seriously focuses either on the EU as a whole or some representatives of the 
EU. In both cases the EU's entity is questioned and its action is mapped as 
absurd, hypocritical or unacceptable on the basis of its substance. For instance 
a Cultural Elite article refers to the EU as an absurd administrative monster 
similar to the structure lead by rabbits in Estonian satirical animation “Night 
of the Carrots” (Porgandite öö) (PM, 18.12.1998b).  
At a more concrete level a Readers article finds it senseless that on the basis 
of the EU laws, prisoners who suffer from Aids share cells with the rest of the 
inmates (PM, 09.03.2002b). Another article writes that the chapters of the 
European Union Accession Treaty set the size of potato and carrot but there is 
no single chapter about restricting the alcohol usage in connection with rising 
youth (PM, 28.05.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that instead of 
demanding the school canteens and tourist farms to have five to six lavatories, 
the EU officials could stand for the human standard (inimliku taseme) and the 
security of the buses (PM, 19.07.2003b). In these examples, the EU norms are 
seen at the same time as excessive and insufficient. The EU is blamed for 
regulating the minor details (the optimal amount of lavatories or size of 
potatoes and carrots) whereas larger and substantially important issues are 
left unnoticed.  
Concerning EU’s hypocrisy one Cultural Elite article characterizes the EU 
by calling for the human rights as hypocrisy and administrative capability and 
restrictions as reality (PM, 30.03.2002a). In another example, EU 
bureaucracy is commented on: as in the army (kroonu värk!). First to the louse 
sauna (täisaun) only after that a new uniform with gold stars is given. First 
cleanliness and after that administrative capacity (PM, 09.11.2002). 
In addition to the EU as a whole, articles question the authority of some EU 
institutions and representatives. For instance a Journalist article writes that 
even though the European Parliament wants to say something about the 
enlargement it suffers from the lack of authority and substantial power (PM, 
14.08.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 23.12.2002a). One article writes 
about the EU officials who suffer from dullness and as a result, start to deal 
with stupidities:  
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It seems that only the official who has got bored and has nothing 
reasonable to do starts to figure out the shape of ideal swede, acorn or 
banana. Also the complicated system created in the European Union 
for agricultural support that every farmer is in need of the book-keeper 
skills for implementing that has made Estonians smirk.79  
PM, 12.12.1998a 
Similarly, a Readers article comments on the visit of the EU Enlargement 
Commissioner by writing that life in Estonia would be better and safer if these 
kinds of emissaries kept their nose at home (PM, 03.09.2003a). In the current 
case, the abstract is used even though article writes about a concrete 
recognizable person. Also the title of the Commissioner is distorted in purpose: 
the usage of the term ‘emissaries’ instead of Commissioner refers to the Soviet 
bureaucracy and indicates that the world is full of these kinds of insignificant 
useless actors. 
At the beginning of the accession process a Journalist article addresses the 
‘personal question’ of Jörn Donner (a Finnish Member of European 
Parliament at the time). Donner's ‘popularity’ is caused by his suggestions 
concerning Estonian citizenship policy.  The article depicts the suggestions as 
absurd and unbelievable, not even worth discussing and expresses its 
resentment by claiming “Donner wetter!” -  a German expression that sounds 
as a curse and also includes Donner's name. The article asks:  
Did we tear [ourselves - SKK] away from one union to now follow the 
guidance of one Finnish bohemian socialist and start to do the things 
that even Moscow did not want to say straight. After all [the guidance 
of - SKK] this kind of man who only lately changed the right wing 
Swedish People's Party into social democrats.80 
PM, 08.08.1997b 
The example clearly indicates that apart from being extremely rude (even 
Moscow did not dare to say something like that), one good reason for not 
taking these suggestions seriously is the personality of Jörn Donner. 
Characterizing Donner as ‘a Finnish bohemian socialist’ makes him one of the 
many bohemians who are rarely treated as an authority in serious issues. Apart 
from that the fact that he has changed the right wing party to being social 
                                                          
79 Tundub, et vaid igavlev ametnik, kel pole mõistlikku tegevust, hakkab välja mõtlema ideaalse 
kaalika, tammetõru või banaani kuju. Samamoodi on eestlasi muigama ajanud Euroopa Liidus 
põllumajanduse toetuseks loodud keeruline süsteem, mille rakendamiseks iga farmer vajab 
raamatupidaja oskusi. 
80 Kas me selle pärast endisest liidust lahti rebisime, et nüüd ühe Soome boheemlasest sotsialisti 
juhtnööride järgi hakata tegema seda, mida isegi Moskva otsesõnu ei tahtnud välja öelda. Pealegi veel 
niisuguse mehe, kes alles hiljuti parempoolse Rootsi Rahvapartei sotsiaaldemokraatide partei vastu 
vahetas. 
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democrat is presented as an unbelievable act. The latter issue is 
understandable in the Estonian context where the Social Democratic Party 
(Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond), used to be until 2004, the People's Party 
Moderates (Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad) for not being related to the former 
socialist times and actors. 
In sum, the sub-discourse Deny EU authority is based on equal 
partnership with or criticism targeted towards the EU. The comparison of two 
parts shows a dominance of the first one, equal partnership with the EU. The 
Cultural Elite articles are the most represented.  
From the two sub-discourses, Form own practice is clearly stronger than 
Deny EU authority. Thus, the idea of Being independent is largely based on 
Estonian possibilities and achievements. Since these possibilities and 
achievements are mostly dealt with inside the EU, Being independent goes 
hand in hand with Estonian EU membership. Also these articles that criticize 
the EU hardly question the necessity of Estonian accession. Therefore, the 
criticism targeted towards the EU even though Estonian membership is 
supported, can be seen as an example of ‘objective journalism’.  
Since the overall amount of the examples is rather limited, no remarkable 
differences or developments have taken place during the accession process. 
Similarly to Being European, also Being independent is the most emphasized 
by the Cultural Elite articles. The least represented are the Political Elite 
articles.  
BECOMING INDEPENDENT 
In the Becoming independent sub-discourses Form own practice and Deny 
EU authority are accordingly challenged by the sub-discourses Should form 
own practice and Should deny EU authority. Prioritizing Estonian interests 
and denying EU authority are seen as ideals Estonia is encouraged to achieve. 
Accordingly, country’s incapability to perform this way is seen as a failure. 
Thus, the focus is either on what is necessary for achieving this ideal (what 
should be done to ‘become independent’) or what Estonia is not (criticizing 
reality of not being independent). 
As an example of Should form own practice a Journalist article writes in 
relation to signing the accession treaty with the EU:  
Thus, one should not immediately rise one’s voice or throw the gun to 
the bush if at first something goes wrong or remains incomprehensible 
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in relation to Brussels. One learns from the mistakes and by May 1, 
2004 we should be as ready as possible to start serious work.81  
PM, 16.04.2003b  
Similar to Deny EU authority, Should deny EU authority deals with the EU 
agency in relation to Estonia. A Political Elite article writes:  
At the moment two first co-operations should be to protect Estonian 
national interests in the final phase of the Euro negotiations and 
guarantee the future of the nation by supporting the children and 
families.82  
PM, 21.06.2002  
As in all discourses, cleavage between ideal and current reality means that 
apart from identification, recognition can be analyzed. Recognition as Failure 
to form own practice is presented in a following example of a Cultural Elite 
article:  
More than a decade have our top politicians and media tried to lead 
the people keeping a piece of grass put on the rod under his nose as if 
he were a donkey /…./. It started from the IME-program whereas the 
current magic rods are joining the European Union and NATO.83 
PM, 14.03.2002 
Failure to deny EU authority deals with the wrong decisions as ‘lost cases’. A 
Cultural Elite article writes: “The signatures of the President and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs on the Accession Treaty with the EU are illegal.”84 (PM, 
13.08.2003a). 
Should form own practice 
In Should form own practice identification is based on should define own 
interests and should act on the basis of own interests. Should define own 
                                                          
81 Ning seega ei maksaks kohe häält tõsta või püssi põõsasse visata, kui midagi alguses suhetes 
Brüsseliga vussi läheb või arusaamatuks jääb. Vigadest õpitakse ja 1. maiks 2004 peame olema 
maksimaalselt valmis alustama tõsist tööd. 
82 Praegu peaks kaks esmast koostehet olema Eesti rahvuslike huvide kaitse euroläbirääkimiste 
lõppfaasis ning rahvuse tuleviku tagamine laste ja perede toetamise kaudu.  
83Rohkem kui aastakümme on meie tipp-poliitikud ja meedia püüdnud rahvast talutada, hoides tal 
kui eeslil nina ees ridva otsas heinatuusti /…/. Algas see IME-programmist, tänasteks võluvitsadeks on 
Euroopa Liitu ja NATOsse astumine. 
84 Presidendi ja välisministri allkirjad ühinemislepingul ELiga on seadusvastased.  
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interests challenges Estonian practices and possibilities and should act of the 
basis of own interests accordingly Estonian agency. In both cases the focus is 
on the internal relations: even though the interests are related to the EU, 
Estonia is the one whose practice and action are followed. 
The idea of should define own interests is emphasized either due to or 
despite Estonian EU accession process. The necessity to define Estonian 
interests despite the accession process considers the latter as rather 
insignificant from the perspective of national interests and stresses that the 
interests should be defined on the substantial basis. For example, a Readers 
article writes in connection with rising the youth that it is easy to punish, 
difficult to rise but if one does not start from that, we do not have any hope 
neither inside the EU nor outside of it (PM, 11.08.2003b). Similarly, a Political 
Elite article claims that development of Estonia cannot be restricted to aiming 
at the European Union only (PM, 22.08.1998).  
In connection with Estonian EU-related interests, the necessity to define 
country’s positions is emphasized as a first step for being able to protect these 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.11.1997). As a Political Elite article writes, we 
have to know in which spheres we want to have longer transition periods, in 
which spheres we do consider impossible to integrate at first and in which 
sectors we are ready to have the negotiations with certain reservations (PM, 
25.07.1997a). Another article states that it has to be clarified and agreed upon 
what we want (Political Elite article, PM, 22.12.1998). Similarly, a Political 
Elite article writes that in connection with the huge work load the Estonian 
parliament has ahead, first and foremost one has to come to terms with 
Estonian own national interests (PM, 30.12.1997a). 
The necessity to define Estonian interests for being able to act on the basis 
of these is emphasized towards the end of the negotiations process (Political 
Elite article, PM, 05.08.2002a and Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.10.2002). 
Apart from that articles point out a need to define the interests of Estonia as 
EU member state (Political Elite article, PM, 16.04.2003a; see also Cultural 
Elite articles, PM, 01.08.2003d and PM, 15.12.2003). A Political Elite article 
writes that the first real priority of 2004 is surely to form a real Europe-
strategy for Estonia: “One has to define national interests that we are going to 
realize in Europe and have to do it in much more practical way than the general 
discourse offered so far.”85 (PM, 20.06.2003a). The article uses the term 
‘formula’ of Estonian interests as an implicit reference to the natural sciences: 
once figured out, a formula is always valid. Thus, if one is capable of finding a 
formula in this case, it will be suitable from now on and make the further 
discussions needless. 
In addition to the EU related interests, those that refer to the wider world 
context are emphasized in the end of the accession process. At the same time, 
                                                          
85 Vaja on sõnastada rahvuslikud huvid, mida läheme Euroopasse realiseerima, tehes seda väga palju 
praktilisemalt seni pakutud üldistest diskursustest. 
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the country’s new position of EU membership, is taken for granted as a 
background feature. For instance a Readers article writes that in connection 
with Estonia’s imminent accession to NATO and the EU (nobody should 
suspect its necessity) but also the generally changed situation in the world, it 
is about time to start to think how should we act in this new world (PM, 
21.07.2003c). A similar example is given by a Political Elite article which 
writes that as a member of the EU, Estonia needs more than ever before a clear 
worldview and a firm self-consciousness (PM, 06.12.2002). A Journalist 
article claims in connection with the debate whether Estonia should sign a 
treaty that gives immunity to the soldiers of the USA that despite the hopes 
expressed by Siim Kallas (Estonia’s Prime Minister at the time) that the EU 
and USA would reach a compromise, we still have to have a strategy in case 
the compromise will not be reached (PM, 14.08.2002a). 
Similarly to should define own interests, also should act on the basis 
of own interests is either depicted in connection with or by ignoring the EU. 
In connection with the EU, articles write that we have to act on the basis of 
knowledge of what kind of Estonia and Europe we want to (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 01.08.2003d; see also Political Elite article, PM, 18.07.1997b), 
since bargain for the sake of bargaining does not make sense (Journalist 
article, PM, 10.09.1998). After joining the EU, a new way of life should be 
launched inside the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.12.2003).  
At a more concrete level a Cultural Elite article claims that Estonia has to 
take care of the knowledge about history as well as honor towards Estonian 
language, since in changing Europe, self-consciousness of Estonians is needed 
more than ever before (PM, 14.06.2003b). Another similar example indicates 
that for being able to develop the Estonian tourism sector à la Costa del Sol, 
the price level should be kept inexpensive compared to the other states after 
joining the EU (PM, 01.06.2002b; see also PM, 14.11.2003). 
In most cases, however necessity to act on the basis of own interests is 
emphasized independently of the EU (Political Elite article, PM 04.12.1997a; 
Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.07.1997b). 
This means that the relationship between Estonia’s EU accession and the 
country’s interests is questioned by asking why not try to manage by ourselves 
(Readers article, PM, 05.07.2003a) or if it is necessary to choose the EU for 
belonging to the West (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.07.2003), since one can 
even ask if it is useful for Estonia to join the federalizing EU (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 18.11.2002a). Conclusively, as a Readers article writes, if the 
positive side does not outweigh the negative ones, the Estonian nation should 
may be choose the Norwegian way instead and keep standing on our own feet 
(PM, 05.03.1997). The expression ‘keep standing on its own feet’ personifies 
Estonia as human being who is capable to stand without anyone’s support. 
Apart from membership, the timing and speed of the accession process is 
questioned in the Readers articles. At the beginning of the accession process, 
an article writes that concerning the European Union, we will surely 
eventually get there but the old folks (vanarahvas) say: long done, lovely 
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(kaua tehtud, kaunikene) (PM, 03.10.1998). Thus, the wisdom of the former 
generations is presented as an authority that cannot be ignored easily. 
Similarly, another article writes: yes, the fact that Estonia joins the family of 
European countries as a plenipotentiary member is without doubt an uplifting 
perspective. However, the article continues that during the longing and 
wishing for this, remember the prayer of the Father of the Church Augustinus 
from his youth when he was still a perky playboy: omnipotent, let me turn away 
from the sin but not yet today! (PM, 17.11.1998c). A Cultural Elite article writes 
that we should not hurry but see at first, if the EU can become more flexible or 
if it drowns in a swamp of bureaucracy, gigantomania and indecisiveness (PM, 
26.08.1997b). The same logic is used also towards the end of the accession 
negotiations. Readers articles write that one should stay away from the EU as 
long as possible (PM, 14.06.2003a) and claim that the best for us is to remain 
a friendly associated country: we wished to be unyoked (ikkest lahti). We 
achieved this. Why the rush? (PM, 16.06.2003b).   
The idea that accession should be postponed to the future for finding a 
more suitable moment could refer to Estonian interests as process not fixed 
and unchanging entity: even though the EU is not topical at the moment, it is 
not excluded for good. The current examples, however, can be interpreted also 
from another perspective, as border cases between living along Estonian 
interests and protecting these in relation to the EU. In the latter case, staying 
away from the EU as long as possible can be seen as a necessary resistance for 
not giving up without struggle. 
In sum, both should define own interests and should act on the basis of 
own interests are more represented towards the end of the accession process. 
Those who urge the necessity to define Estonian interests either in 
connection with or indifferent of the EU both in the beginning as well as in the 
end of the accession process the most are the Political Elite articles. A 
characteristic feature of these claims is the acceptance of Estonian (future) 
membership either implicitly or explicitly. 
The second part, should act on the basis of own interests is mostly based 
on the Readers articles and the Cultural Elite articles. The latter focuses more 
on Estonia in the EU framework (similarly to own agency from the being side) 
whereas the Readers articles deal with Estonia outside the EU. 
The examples indicate that the necessity to define own interests is dealt 
with as a concrete event (doing it once and for all) whereas the need that one 
should act on the basis of own interests has a bigger variety and more 
alternatives (acting now or later and expressing hesitations). Therefore, it can 
also be interpreted as a freedom to choose from various options and/or a 
freedom to question things without facing actual or potential consequences.  
Failure to form own practice  
Failure to form own practice is based on critical self-recognition in the form 
of failure to define own interests or failure to act on the basis of own interests. 
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Self-evaluation also makes a clear difference between the current recognition 
and the one of European Estonia, where, instead of own criteria, the 
evaluation was based on the norms set by or the practice valid in the EU.  
As failure to define own interests, a Political Elite article writes that 
Estonia should have defined its national interest in relation to the agricultural 
land by the beginning of 2000 at the latest (PM, 05.08.2002a), indicating thus 
a two years delay. Similarly, a Cultural Elite article regrets that until now no 
one has seriously analyzed in Estonia what type of EU would be useful to join 
(PM, 18.11.2002a). 
The claim that the EU is Estonia’s main interest is criticized as an empty 
mantra and a substitute to the substance-based interests (Journalist article, 
PM, 01.12.1997a). A Political Elite article writes that we should admit that 
Estonia is lacking ideas for developing society and the state, since single 
slogans in a form of concrete goals (European Union, NATO etc.) do not 
replace these (PM, 21.12.1998; see also PM, 04.12.1997a and Cultural Elite 
articles, PM, 13.05.1997 and PM, 06.01.2003b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite 
article claims that the religion of the party has been replaced by the religion of 
Europe, America, Radio Free Europe, a free market based economy and other 
values (PM, 04.01.1998). Also Readers article points to the same phenomena:  
A year or a year and a half ago Estonian politicians and diplomats 
ensured that Estonia is in the first round of the NATO enlargement. 
Soon this kind of firmness disappeared and turned into a belief that we 
are in the first round of the European Union enlargement.86 
PM, 15.07.1997b 
Another Readers article asks what are these Estonian politicians doing, they 
who, for a long time already, have promised NATO accession and replies that 
now they promise the European Union (PM 17.03.1997a; see also Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 14.03.2002). 
Apart from ‘promising the EU’, also ‘threatening with the EU’ is 
condemned in the articles (Political Elite article, 21.07.1998 and Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 09.11.1998b). For example a Political Elite article answers the 
coalition's accusations that the opposition wastes tax-payers money by asking 
would not a lack of parliament enable to save even bigger sums of money. The 
article continues: one parliament member who belongs to the government 
coalition found that the opposition dishonors parliament, the other one 
thought lately that the opposition should be quiet otherwise we are not 
accepted to the European Union (PM, 05.07.1997a; similar also Cultural Elite 
articles, PM, 24.04.1997 and PM, 12.12.1997). Other Political Elite articles 
                                                          
86 Aasta-poolteist tagasi kinnitasid Eesti poliitikud ja diplomaadid, et Eesti on NATO laienemisel 
esimeses voorus. Peatselt selline kindlus kadus ja muutus veendumuseks, et oleme esimeses Euroopa 
Liidu laienemise voorus. 
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refer to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was frightening the public with all 
kind of things, including the fact that European Union officials could get 
offended (PM, 15.01.1998) and claims that in the 24th hour the deformed 
demands supposedly got from Brussels were presented in a government 
session (PM, 01.08.1998b).  
Promising and threatening with the EU leads to cynicism concerning the 
EU as an omnipotent argument: everything around is prefixed by “Euro” 
(euro), starting from the “Euro privy” (europeldik) and finishing with the 
“Euro Union” (euroliit) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.1998a). Another 
article writes that access to the European Union has glowed (terendanud) all 
the time to the finish line, and crossing it enabled us to say farewell 
to our current harsh history and pallid being. As if at the other side of this line 
was the end of history, a consumer paradise with the social guarantees, a 
reasonable equivalent to all the utopias on earth (Cultural Elite articles PM, 
14.11.1998 and PM, 28.03.2002). 
The same idea is communicated in several Readers articles. On the basis of 
a fairy tale, a Readers article writes that the EU is served up as a particular 
kind of magic wand that fulfills all wishes. The article continues that still, it 
has to be remembered that the time of self-covering tables and flying carpets 
is over (PM, 19.07.1997b; see also PM, 15.01.1997). Instead of stating that 
fairy-tale connected beliefs are totally surreal, the article claims that the time 
of magic is over. This way, those who still believe in it are seen as a bit 
eccentric, but not from a totally different world.  
Most Readers articles, however, criticise references to the EU in all possible 
circumstances, and point out particularly unrealistic expectations related to 
the EU in a sarcastic manner. In connection with city planning a Readers 
article writes: sure enough, this absolutely modern glass-Godzilla construction 
built according to the best EU standards costs tens of millions. The article asks 
about the need to talk about a so-called priceless view in Tallinn Old Town, 
that will not be brought back irrespective of however much is spent (PM, 
16.06.2003b). Another article deals with new city toilets that have been built 
for two million kroons: we could appeal with an entry in the Guinness Book 
[of Records - SKK]! Hurray! Estonia joins the European Union with its new 
out-houses! (PM, 22.01.2002b). Similarly, an article writes that inside the EU 
all kind of funding aids and foundations appear like magic - no one has to work 
in the garden of Eden under the apple trees (PM, 27.05.2003; similar also PM, 
20.06.2003b and PM, 14.06.2003a). The examples above make a distinction 
between reality and fairy tales: things happen by magic and the EU is 
compared to the garden of Eden.  
This way, the EU (or Europe as used in some examples) becomes an empty 
signifier (Laclau 1996, 36-46): since the term does not have a fixed and clear 
substantial meaning it can be filled with various meanings as well as be 
replaced by other similar terms if needed (see also Raik 2003, 157-158). As a 
result articles criticize the situation where the clear substance of own interests 
is replaced by the EU as an empty signifier usable in all possible cases. 
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In another part of this sub-discourse, failure to act on the basis of 
own interests, articles aim at correcting false information that is given by 
Estonian actors in the name of the EU. The criticism is targeted towards 
following ‘EU guidance’ instead of own interests, whereas the latter are, 
however, not necessarily explicitly defined. For example, a Readers article 
writes that the claims that the Eastern border of NATO and the EU have to be 
set by international treaty, is not true: it is sufficient if the present border line 
of control is fixed (PM, 17.11.1998b). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims 
that it is false to reason the necessity to abandon death penalty with the EU's 
demands, since the issue was not mentioned in the claims presented to Estonia 
by the European Commission (PM, 08.08.1997a and PM; 02.04.1998b; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 08.08.1997c). 
In connection with the debate about the taxation system, claims that the 
progressive income tax is in accordance to the suggestions of the European 
Union are criticized by a Readers article: on the basis of newly audited data 
I/we confirm that the European Union has not made this kind of suggestion 
(PM, 15.09.1998c; see also Journalist article, PM, 01.12.1997a). Another 
Readers article questions the claim that European Union is a tariff union and 
if Estonia does not have the protective tariffs, we are not taken into the gang: 
as far as I/we know, the EU states do not have protective tariffs between each 
other (PM, 20.06.1997). Even though the criticism is presented in a polite 
manner as if correcting minor mistakes, the expression ‘not taken into the 
gang’ points to the familiar relations between children or youngsters. 
Therefore, those responsible for tariff claims are at the same time also shown 
as being youths: not too analytical and guided by the fear of being left alone.  
The examples above criticize incorrect references to the EU instead of 
following own interests whereas in the following cases the criticism is targeted 
towards using the EU as an alibi to soften the intentional malevolent acts of 
Estonia’s political elite. Concerning corruption in Estonia, a Readers article 
writes: should these things be seen as just minor roughness on the way towards 
the European Union? (PM, 27.01.1997). The article characterizes Estonia’s EU 
accession process as a road where ‘roughness’ makes the trip bumpy. At the 
same time an attempt to avoid responsibility and diminish the acts of 
corruption into ‘minor roughness’ as a normal part of any trip is criticized. 
In another similar example, a Political Elite article relates the scandal of 
privatizing apartments to Estonian success story: as if this was apprentice 
money (õpipoisiraha) for getting into the European Union (PM, 07.02.1997). 
The article criticizes Estonia as apprentice and the mess at this phase of the 
EU accession process. Similarly, another Political Elite article writes that 
government wants to get the money from our consumers by appealing to the 
EU demands before the EU gives up its subsidizing policy that has no 
perspective (PM, 19.12.1997b). 
In sum, articles aimed at both failure to define own interests and failure 
to act on the basis of own interests are mostly confined to the beginning of the 
accession process and the frequency decreases towards the end. Readers 
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articles are the most represented, whereas Journalist articles are noticeably 
absent. 
Even though the first part of recognition focuses on defining and the second 
part on living own interests, in both cases the same phenomenon is criticized. 
The irony is targeted towards internal actors who, instead of taking 
responsibility, use the EU as a slogan and excuse for all possible purposes. 
Therefore, the main reason for failure is seen to be acceptance of certain issues 
in the name and under the auspice of the EU and closing the internal 
substantial discussion on that basis.  
Should deny EU authority 
Should deny EU authority as becoming challenges Deny EU authority as 
being. This sub-discourse is based on interaction between Estonia and the EU. 
Here a distinction between should let the EU know own interests and should 
protect own interests can be made as identification. The first one challenges 
equal partnership with the EU and the second one not being able to take the 
EU seriously as sub-discourses of being.  
The idea of should let the EU know own interests is based on two 
objectives: either Estonia should let the EU know its interests for getting an 
understanding from the EU or for spreading own interests to the EU which 
might take these over. As a Journalist article writes, for reasoning own 
interests, sometimes even the method of explain in plain has to be used (PM, 
29.08.2002). The expression ‘explain in plain’ carries the idea that the EU 
might not be that clever after all. The same is indicated by the claim that the 
only possibility left to Estonian hunters and foresters to ensure that hunting 
large wild animals continues in Estonia is a persistent negotiation tactic of 
explaining and persuading (PM, 29.08.2002). 
Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that the EU does not stand for our 
national interests but, of course, unlike our Eastern neighbor, it understands 
our reasoned wishes, if we ourselves do not stop expressing these (PM, 
15.08.1998; similar also Cultural Elite, PM, 17.02.1998). A Readers article 
claims that we definitely have to present our conditions instead of fulfilling 
blindly those of the EU (PM, 17.12.1997c). A Cultural Elite article expresses the 
same idea by using the allegory of coughing: “Whoever realizes a threat should 
cough or quack. Also Estonia. But in a way that it is heard and taken into 
account. /…/ Estonia should, if using a fashionable phrase, cough with 
dignity.”87 (PM, 18.01.2003b). 
At a more concrete level, substance of interests is dealt with by Cultural 
Elite articles. One article argues that it would be much wiser to let the 
European Union know that it is better if the question of widening Estonian 
citizenry was frozen in the accession negotiations (PM, 26.06.1998). Another 
                                                          
87 Kes iganes tajub ohtu, peaks köhatama või kraaksatama. Ka Eesti. Aga nii, et teda kuuldaks ja 
kuulda võetaks. /…/ Eesti peaks, kui kasutada moesõna, köhatama väärikalt. 
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article claims that what if we say in the following negotiations that our first 
interest is actually neither the milk quota nor free movement of labor, not even 
the permission to hunt bears but the question how to liberate Gedhun Choekyi 
Nyima88 (PM, 07.12.2002). 
In addition to letting the EU know what is important for Estonia in some 
articles the necessity to spread Estonian positions to the EU is emphasized. 
For example, a Cultural Elite article suggests that the nuthatch, (Sitta 
europea), should become the EU’s heraldic bird (PM, 30.04.2002). Similarly, 
a Journalist article writes in connection with daylight saving time that if 
turning the clock back is not suitable for most Estonians, what could be more 
glorious than to help Europe to find the right time? (PM, 28.03.1998b). Even 
though the first example reasons the choice by naming the characteristics of 
this bird, implicitly the focus is on bird’s name in Latin, since ‘sitta’ is the 
partitive case of the Estonian word ‘sitt’ that means shit. In the second 
example, the aim of helping the EU to find the right time carries the 
presupposition that the time currently used in the EU is somehow the wrong 
one. 
In some cases, Estonian ideas are valued as those presented by a small and 
smart country. For example, a Journalist article analyzes the usage of rye in 
Estonia and the EU from the perspective of the EU’s backwardness. The article 
writes that Estonian farmers surely remember that in the Soviet period it was 
reasonable to feed cows with bread and continues that may be also the EU 
could use rye for making bread for the cows instead of burning it (PM, 
05.08.2002b). The comparison drawn with the Soviet Union is based on 
Estonian expertise gained from this not too clever giant. Currently, Estonia is 
ready to share its knowledge for the sake of improving the EU. In another 
example, the EU is taken as the Estonian national hero, Kalevipoeg, who 
despite being big and powerful, is simple enough to need a hedgehog’s advice 
in a fight with the Devil. On the basis of this analogy, the article writes that 
maybe we should have an Estonian hedgehog beside every European 
Kalevipoeg who would remind him whenever necessary: edgewise, always 
edgewise (serviti, ikka serviti)89 (PM, 17.06.2003a).  
Another part of this sub-discourse, should protect own interests, is 
based on the conflict of interests between Estonia and the EU. On the grounds 
of their focus, examples can be divided into three categories, those that 
empathize: with Estonia, with the EU and with interaction between Estonia 
and the EU. In the first two cases, interests are protected as a zero-sum game: 
since both sides have fixed interests, it is important to achieve own aims. The 
main idea of the last part, on the other hand, is to find a consensus that is based 
on a common denominator. 
                                                          
88 Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is 11th Panchen Lama of Tibetan Buddhism. 
89 In a fight with the Devil, the advice is to use a plank edgewise for hitting.  
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Especially towards the end of the accession process, several articles express 
a necessity to protect ‘national interests’90 (Political Elite article, PM, 
08.03.2002b). A Journalist article writes that one should not forget in the EU 
about own politics and beliefs (PM, 03.11.2003a) and a Political Elite article 
claims that at the time of the EU accession Estonia needs strong government 
to protect its interests (PM,10.03.2003b). Similar examples about the 
necessity to protect national interests can also be found from the other articles 
(Political Elite articles, PM, 21.06.2002 and PM, 03.02.1998; Cultural Elite 
articles, PM 08.09.1997 and PM, 16.02.2002). Conclusively, as a Journalist 
article writes:  
[E]stonia should finally give up embellishment of the EU and move 
over to pragmatic relations where it is necessary to protect its own 
producers. Brussels takes us seriously and it is time to take also 
Brussels seriously.91 
PM, 08.08.1998; see also PM, 29.10.2002 
The examples above indicate not only that Estonia should give up embellished 
beliefs concerning the EU but also realize that EU is not an authority Estonia 
should please.  
Apart from the rather general ‘national interests’ examples about the more 
concrete issues can be found especially in the Political Elite articles and 
Cultural Elite articles. A Political Elite article writes that in the accession 
negotiations, Estonia should protect its interests in the economic and tax 
sphere (PM, 31.10.1997a). Another article, in the same vein, claims that our 
negotiators have to stand up for the vitality of our rural regions, also if for 
Brussels the name of this vitality consists of quotas and subsidies (PM, 
02.04.2002c; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.08.2002). Therefore:  
In a situation where the European Union offers Estonia irresponsibly 
the milk quota that is 60% of the production level of the year 1938, our 
negotiators should immediately open the chapter number 4, free 
movement of capital, which has been temporarily closed.92 
PM, 19.07.2002b; see also PM 12.08.2002  
In relation to gender equality legislation, a Cultural Elite article writes that one 
should use a possibility to raise a precedent and thus increase Estonia’s 
authority (PM, 20.11.2003; see also PM, 13.05.2002a). Concerning the issue 
                                                          
90 In some articles also mapped as ‘Estonian’ or ‘own’ interests.  
91 [E]estil tuleb lõpuks loobuda ELi ilustamisest ning minna üle pragmaatilistele suhetele, kus on 
vaja kaitsta eelkõige oma tootjaid. Brüssel võtab meid tõsiselt ning aeg on tõsiselt võtta ka Brüsselit.  
92 Olukorras, kus Euroopa Liit pakub süüdimatult piimakvooti, mis on 60% Eesti 1938. aasta 
tootmistasemest, peaksid meie läbirääkijad viivitamatult avama ajutiselt suletud peatüki nr 4 - kapitali 
vaba liikumine. 
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bilingualism, a Journalist article states that Estonia should not in any case give 
up a principle that the Estonian language is the only official language in 
Estonia (PM, 08.08.1997b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article writes 
concerning Estonian citizenship policy that it is clear that we are tried to 
influence and put a pressure on: still, we should not get disturbed by that (PM, 
12.12.1997; see also  Journalist article, PM, 20.10.1997).  
Apart from Estonian development and legislation, articles write that 
Estonia has to protect its interests in connection with the development of the 
EU. A Political Elite article claims that it is important for us as a small country 
that EU’s future action were directed more towards solving the strategic key 
issues and additionally we have to stand for low level decision making also in 
the future (PM, 11.02.2002). The same line is continued by a Cultural Elite 
article which writes that Estonia could support so called multi speed European 
integration in a variety of spheres and, on the basis of the subsidiarity 
principle, apply at the possibility to bring the competences back to the nation 
state level (PM, 19.11.2002a). 
The examples above focus on Estonia’s duty to protect its interests whereas 
in the following paragraphs the articles that emphasize the EU by criticizing 
the EU’s demands are dealt with. Without questioning the EU as a whole, the 
applicability of the EU’s demands is denied by the articles. As a Political Elite 
article writes, EU norms are not necessarily suitable for Estonia in all cases 
(PM, 22.12.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.12.1997).  
At a more concrete level, a Journalist article questions the EU's guidance 
to connect pension index to the salary of the male unskilled workers. The 
article suggests that the EU norm should not be taken too seriously, since the 
salary of very few male unskilled workers cannot be the main indicator on 
which the welfare of pensioners depends (PM, 06.11.2003b). Similarly, in 
relation to the EU's critical position towards the privatization of Estonian 
electricity power plants to USA firm NRG Energy, a Journalist article writes: 
why should Estonia accept EU’s position if, according to the international 
advisors, neither EU nor Estonian law has been broken (PM, 30.09.1998). Also 
a Political Elite article writes that even though Estonia cannot avoid a whole 
mountain of Brussels’ directives, own correct daylight saving time is a thing 
Brussels has nothing to do with (PM, 13.04.1998b). The latter example can 
also be seen as a therapeutic one: even though the EU demands a lot and 
intervenes into many spheres of life, at least this issue does not belong under 
the authority of the EU (see also Readers article, PM, 19.01.1998).  
Towards the end of the accession process, the legislative basis is dealt with 
in relation to the Accession Treaty. A Cultural Elite article writes that one 
should not accept the priority of the EU law in a way that it contradicts to the 
general principles of the state set by constitution (PM, 11.06.2002b). Another 
article claims that in the bill of the third act of constitution, one should avoid 
direct references to the superiority of EU law over the constitution (PM, 
13.05.2002a). 
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In some cases, one is urged to deny EU authority, since Estonia is seen to 
be more progressive than the EU (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 08.04.2003a and 
PM, 02.10.2003c). For example a Readers article writes that Estonia should 
not repeat others' mistakes, since there are conservatives (vanameelsed) in the 
West as well (PM, 07.01.1998a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 07.09.1998b 
and Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.12.1998a). Similarly, a Journalist article 
states that in a situation where developed European countries are not able to 
actualize their rigid tax system, Estonia should not give up its advantages (PM, 
09.03.2002a). 
Here, however, an assumption of Estonian progressiveness might also lead 
to confrontation and thus a denial of the EU as a whole. A Readers article asks 
on the basis of friction related to abandoning the death penalty, what if we did 
not go to this union but learned from the American example instead (PM, 
07.02.1998b; see also Cultural Elite, PM, 28.02.1998a). Similarly, a Journalist 
article writes that if the positions of the small countries are going to weaken 
and those of the big countries are strengthened then the question arises, 
“[w]hy for us the EU that has been advertised for the public exactly as a place 
where Estonia can be an equal among the equals?“93 (PM, 17.05.2003). 
Another example that deals with the potential penalties for the candidate 
countries asks about the need to pay the penalties for poor implementation of 
the accession preparations if one might not necessarily join at all (PM, 
27.07.2002a; see also PM, 30.01.2002). 
The two previous parts above that focused on either Estonia or the EU were 
based on zero-sum logic whereas the third part emphasizes interaction and 
aims at finding a compromise that satisfies both sides. A Journalist article 
writes in the beginning of the accession process: Estonia has to find a proper 
synthesis between its needs and the offers of the EU (PM, 01.08.1998a). 
Another article states that for not undermining its relations with the EU, wise 
strategic decisions have to be made (PM, 04.04.1997). Towards the end of the 
accession process an article claims that as a probable future member Estonia 
is obliged to say how the EU could be changed and at the same time protect its 
own interests (PM, 19.11.2002a). Therefore, the country has a difficult duty in 
the intergovernmental conference: to protect own interests and at the same 
time not to prevent launching a new Europe (PM, 06.10.2003a).  
Also a Cultural Elite article claims that we have to integrate into the 
European Union for sure but at the same time we have to protect our national 
interests as firmly (PM, 05.07.2002a). Another article argues that energetic 
and educated Estonia does not have to be afraid of widening cooperation with 
Europe but rather make better usage of the new possibilities (PM, 
03.09.2003b).  
                                                          
93 [m]illeks meile EL, mida on avalikkusele reklaamitud just kohana, kus Eesti saab olla võrdsena 
võrdsete seas. 
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Negotiations and bargaining, as practical tools for interaction, are pointed 
out by Journalist articles (for example PM, 21.04.2003). In the beginning of 
the accession negotiations an article claims that Estonia has to work for getting 
EU member countries’ support for its accession: for exceeding EU’s threshold 
it is necessary to get the acceptance of the big European countries (PM 
17.02.1997). The term ‘threshold’ makes the EU look like a house and in order 
to enter, one has to get the acceptance of the oldest and largest of the current 
inhabitants. Nevertheless, the article writes about bargaining for shorter or 
longer transition periods and equivalent financial coverage to get into shape 
(PM, 08.10.1998b; similar also PM, 03.04.1998). Also more concrete options 
for getting the transition periods are presented: should we sacrifice tax free 
status, release of corporate income tax or would it be possible to explain our 
situation to the future partners and save us from sacrifices (PM, 09.03.2002a; 
see also Cultural Elite, PM, 27.06.1998a).  
In sum, should protect own interests is equally present both in the 
beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process, it is also clearly 
stronger than should let the EU know own interests. Journalist articles are the 
most represented and Readers articles are the least, in both cases.  
In should let the EU know own interests, a rather patronizing attitude 
towards the big and powerful but not that clever EU is expressed and the 
superiority of small and smart Estonia is indicated. At the same time the actual 
influence of Estonia is expressed in a rather humorist manner by using 
folklore, language games, allegory etc. Also the issues Estonia could contribute 
to are rather marginal ones (daylight saving time, a heraldic bird). 
The necessity to protect own interests is based on implicit or explicit 
confrontation between Estonia and the EU and the first one is urged to deny 
the EU authority that was admired in European Estonia. Therefore, instead of 
a qualitative difference, the necessity to protect own interests is based on the 
same action-reaction model as the necessity to follow EU’s guidance. 
Failure to deny EU authority 
In addition to the identification part, recognition as a Failure to deny EU 
authority can be found in the articles. On the grounds of the general logic of 
Independent Estonia, recognition is given by Estonian actors and is based on 
their evaluations. At the same time the cleavages and the heterogeneity of 
society are emphasized in connection with feedback. Recognition is divided 
into failure to let the EU know own interests and failure to protect own 
interests. The first part focuses on issues Estonia should have told the EU 
whereas failure to protect Estonian interests deals with the cases where 
Estonia should have acted differently. 
In both cases Estonia is depicted as an immature actor incapable of taking 
responsibility and treats the EU erroneously as an authority (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 19.12.1997c). As a Cultural Elite article writes we are still some 
kind of schoolboys who are sent to a penalty period (paneb nurka) by a class 
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teacher (PM, 02.04.2002b; see also in PM, 06.12.2003). Another article writes 
that at the time when Estonian politicians fight for their places in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, Visegrad countries show that a new era 
has arrived for the candidates' relationships with the European Union 
(Cultural elite article, PM, 16.02.2002).  
As part of failure to let the EU know own interests Political Elite 
articles write that we, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should have 
been decisive enough in relation to the EU in the end of the last year (PM, 
15.08.1998) and the indecision of the government has created a great mess in 
the European Union negotiations (PM, 21.06.2002). Similarly, after the 
foreign diplomats and economic specialists have claimed that Estonia is the 
outsider in the EU accession negotiations, a Journalist article asks: 
Against this negative information it remains unclear why does the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn still snooze and does not try to 
change the picture of Estonia /…/ as the poorest country which has 
started the accession negotiations.94 
PM, 14.04.1998  
Here, the reference to ‘snoozing’ as a very passive state of being clearly shows 
a lack of necessary action. 
In another similar example, a Journalist article writes that even though 
Mart Siimann (Estonia’s Prime Minister at the time) could have enforced 
Brussels’ praise concerning Estonia, he did not do so. The article continues 
that in the EU’s Vienna summit, Siimann just said that Estonia wants to 
become an EU member on the first of January 2003, but it is not a problem if 
it happens later: just as one would like to drink beer with friends but is satisfied 
also with swallowing kissel instead (PM, 12.12.1998b). The comparison of beer 
to a dessert kissel (a sweet concoction loosely based on fruit juice) that few 
people hardly if ever drink socially is an allegory, which brings the situation to 
the everyday level and also makes its absurdity very clear. 
In Cultural Elite articles a failure to let the EU know Estonian interests is 
communicated by confronting the EU and Estonian nation as two opposite 
sides (PM, 09.07.2003). One article draws parallels with the pattern that was 
followed during the Soviet time already: the party leaders were toadying to 
(pugesid) Moscow instead of taking into account the needs and opinions of 
own nation (PM, 24.04.1997). Another similar article criticizes the fact that 
the poor living standard of the Estonian people is hidden from the EU by 
Estonian officials (PM, 28.02.1998b). 
In failure to protect own interests, the need to follow of EU guidance 
that was considered as a necessity in European Estonia, is criticized as an 
improper way of action (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 18.12.1998a and  PM, 
                                                          
94 Selle negatiivse info tausta jääb arusaamatuks, miks tukub seni välisministeerium Tallinnas ning 
ei ürita muuta /…/ pilti Eestist, kui vaeseimast Euroopa Liiduga ühinemiskõnelusi alustanud riigist. 
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17.06.2003b;  Journalist articles, PM, 29.12.1997c and PM, 08.08.1998). For 
example, a Cultural Elite article writes about the attempts to regulate gender 
equality as a “non existent sphere” (olematut valdkonda) in Estonia, on the 
basis of the European Union requirements (PM, 27.03.2002; see also PM, 
11.09.2003b). Another article writes that for the extremely slothful 
(mõttelaiskadel) officials it is easiest to transmit EU directive wholly to 
Estonia instead of thinking how it could be implemented in most rational way 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.09.2003; see also PM, 02.12.1998).  
Most examples focus either on the current or potential consequences of the 
failure. As an example of the current consequence, a Political Elite article 
writes that in a situation where land is ten times cheaper in Estonia than in the 
EU, it was totally unacceptable to close the chapter of free movement of capital 
in the accession negotiations without demanding a transition period for selling 
arable and forestry land (PM, 19.07.2002b). Similarly, consequences are 
depicted also by Cultural Elite articles (PM, 23.09.1998; PM, 13.08.2003a and 
PM, 27.11.2002a) and Journalist article (PM, 11.03.1998). 
A Readers article calls it quite shocking that since a sanctuary’s kitchen is 
not in accordance to the EU norms, it is not allowed to cook soup there (PM, 
16.12.2002b; see also PM, 29.01.1997). Another article writes that if we have 
democracy then abandoning the death penalty should be put to the vote 
instead of listening to guidance from Brussels (PM 13.08.1997; see also 
Cultural Elite, PM, 09.10.2003). In the last example, a dual trap is formed 
from the accession perspective. Even though ignoring EU’s norms can lead to 
the disclosure from the EU, ignoring people’s opinion as an undemocratic 
alternative can have the same consequences.  
Apart from the criticism expressed in a general manner, some articles 
criticize concrete scapegoats as being responsible for failures. In the beginning 
of the accession process a Readers article comments on the statement of 
Andres Varik (Estonia’s Minister of Agriculture at the time) that supporting 
Estonia’s exports is not the Ministry's business: What is their business? Only 
tariff-folly (tolli-lollitamine)? The article continues by arguing that quitting 
the export of milk products to the European Union countries is directly a 
failure of the Ministry of Agriculture (PM, 07.01.1998a).  
Towards the end of the accession negotiations, a Political Elite article 
claims that Jaanus Marrandi (Estonia’s Minister of Agriculture at the time) 
acted irresponsibly in connection with selling land and thus not protecting the 
interests of own nation: in a situation where the EU does not treat Estonia as 
an equal partner and offers us only half of the milk and cereal seed quota, the 
Minister of a dignified independent state should not just sing a lamentation 
(nutulaulu laulda) (PM, 12.08.2002). 
In addition to the current consequences resulting from not protecting one’s 
interests, potential consequences are depicted by a Political Elite articles (PM, 
31.10.1998b). An article argues that while Estonia does not implement counter 
measures, rude vicious competition targeted at our producers is faced, in 
which Estonia’s farmers are deemed to be the losers in advance (PM, 
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31.10.1998a). In another article, a similar scenario is given in relation to the 
environmental and energy issues: if long transition periods cannot be achieved 
in the negotiations concerning fulfillment of the environmental norms this 
could mean abandoning of our oil shale energies and cause the dramatic rise 
in the production costs of the other spheres (PM, 21.07.1998).  
Apart from Political Elite articles, a Cultural Elite article writes that instead 
of becoming an active subject of the Western union [the EU - SKK], Estonia 
faces a threat to become a peripheral object of the norms and relations of the 
EU (PM, 27.11.2002a; see also Journalist article, PM, 20.02.2002). In other 
articles the consequences are related to Russia, which imposes its demands on 
Estonia through the European Council, OSCE, and the European Union and 
Estonian government is now ready to fulfill all EU prescriptions (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 19.03.1998). A similar example is given by a Political Elite article 
which claims that the EU does not protect us from the infiltration 
(sisseimbumine) and if also we cannot protect ourselves, we will turn into an 
improper partner for the EU (PM, 15.09.1998b). 
Potential consequences are also referred to in the satire displayed by a 
Cultural Elite article, which suggests that Estonian history should be rewritten 
on the basis of the current needs related to the EU authority. More concretely, 
we should look through the role that Lembitu, the ancient landlord (muistne 
maavanem) of one Estonian region at the time Sakala has in our history. We 
should admit that in his case we can talk about a severe EU opponent who 
suggested to fight against the values of the Western world until a “’[o]ne year 
old or a toddler can be found in the country’”.95 (PM, 06.06.2002).  
In sum, both failure to let the EU know own interests and failure to 
protect own interests are present in the beginning as well as towards the end 
of the accession process whereas failure to protect own interests is stronger 
than failure to let the EU know own interests. The Political Elite articles and 
the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented in both parts, whereas 
Journalist articles and Readers articles are notably quiet. Those most often 
seen in the articles as responsible for failures are the political elite and the high 
level officials related to the accession negotiations. 
For illustrating Estonian passive behavior, various terms are used in the 
articles. The claim about ‘snoozing’ shows the absolute passivity of the 
Estonian side. The ‘lamentation’ refers to a situation where one just complains 
about things without even trying to change them. The EU on the other hand, 
is shown to have an active role which in the current case is seen as potentially 
harmful from Estonian perspective. 
CONCLUSIONS OF INDEPENDENT ESTONIA 
In principle, the discourse Independent Estonia sees Estonia and the EU as 
equal partners. On the basis of the articles, this partnership includes 
                                                          
95 «[m]aal leidub aastavanune või küünrapikkune poisike». 
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harmonious cooperation based on mutual interests, the search for common 
denominators as well as protecting own interests and the need to do so. From 
the identification and recognition side, identification in a form of what should 
be done is more represented here than a failure-part. Therefore, Becoming 
independent is different from Becoming European that was more based on the 
recognition side.  
Similar to European Estonia, Independent Estonia distinguishes between 
the EU as an agency and EU practice. Practice refers to the EU as a context 
that enables Estonia to define its interests and follow them (or Estonia is urged 
to do so). Unlike in European Estonia, EU agency is unwelcome to interrupt 
into Estonian life in Independent Estonia. In line with that, anyone who treats 
the EU as an authority is criticized.  
All categories of authors are present in the discourse. Being independent is 
mostly communicated by Cultural Elite articles but seldom by Readers articles. 
Most of the being-part focuses on Estonian possibilities and agency whereas 
these articles that criticize the EU by denying its authority are clearly in 
minority.  
Journalist articles and Cultural Elite article are the most represented 
articles in connection with the necessity to protect own interests, an issue 
about which Readers articles are almost wholly silent. Since most of the 
articles which urge to protect Estonian interests focus on the official accession 
process the logic is rather in accordance to the European Estonia where 
instead of the EU legislation and official accession process, Readers articles 
focused on the everyday practice of the EU. Nevertheless, in covering the 
everyday practice of Estonia, Readers articles expressed it as a need to define 
own interests and act on that basis. The main criticism is targeted towards 
dealing with the EU as an ‘empty signifier’ that can be used in any kinds of 
situation and filled in with various substance whereas ‘real interests’ are 
neglected at the same time.  
Even though European Estonia and Independent Estonia are based on 
different assumptions of Estonian agency, Estonia, in the latter, is often 
represented as reactive (defining ourselves by denying the EU) rather than 
being pro-active. Instead of visualizing what Estonia should do by forming its 
path in relation to the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 18.11.2002a), the country 
is mostly positioned by denying the path that is formed by the EU. At the same 
time this denial does not necessarily mean any radical action like waiving EU 
membership.  
5.3 DISCOURSE OF HUMBLE ESTONIA 
The discourse of Humble Estonia is based on the realist perception of the 
world that small countries have limited possibilities in the world anarchy. On 
the basis of Wendt's classification (see Section 3.1), the Other is an enemy who 
tries to destroy us. In the current study, a realist perception is combined with 
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the superiority of the EU over Estonia (on the basis of Europeanisation). 
Therefore, instead of destruction, this discourse deals with issues like a threat 
to Estonia’s independence, sovereignty and/or security (for example 
Jakniunaite 2009, 119 and Feldman 2001, 15).  
Also in the academic texts the same logic is communicated and various 
scholars point out the threats a small country is seen to face in the 
international arena: threat to disappear (Berg and Oras 2002, 27), to remain 
invisible and have no influence in the international arena due to its size (Berg 
and Oras 2002, 27; Kirch and Kirch 2001, 140). For example, it has been 
claimed that Estonia is not an equal partner to Russia, Germany or the 
Scandinavian countries (Made 2003, 190-191). Therefore, quite logically, 
maximizing its security can be seen as the country’s main goal. 
Estonia’s location between East and West (Berg and Oras 2002, 47) is not 
seen in this discourse as an option as in the discourse of Independent Estonia. 
Rather it is connected to the unstable position on the border between two 
civilizations (Kuus 2002a, 97) or a periphery in both a geographical and a 
historical sense (Vetik 2003, 267 and Pettai 2005, 58-60). The latter refers to 
the importance of recognition, since in relation to periphery the acceptance 
and opinion of the center is seen to be important (Kivikuru 1996b, 13; see also 
Vetik 2003, 267).  
In Humble Estonia, the center is represented by West or Western Europe 
(more concretely known by the civic society/military duo, EU/NATO). 
Scholars write that Estonia is not really recognized as Western by the West 
(see also Section 3.1). For example Berg and Oras (2002, 48) point to the 
suspicious attitude of the West towards Estonia, since Estonia is located on the 
border and is not a pure West. Furthermore, Estonia is seen to lag behind 
Western Europe due to its history. As Vahur Made (2003, 190-191) writes, 
being fifty years behind the Iron Curtain, under the Soviet regime, has 
influenced both economic and social development. As Lauristin and Vihalemm 
conclude:  
After the jubilation of the initial years, the West did not sincerely 
recognize Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as 
a part of the common past. The border between East and West was 
culturally constructed deep in European history, and breaking 
through this border seemed even more difficult than breaking with the 
Soviet Union. 
Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 57-58  
Even though the focus of my empirical data is on constructing national identity 
in relation to the EU, the dangerous Other of Estonia referred to in the 
academic texts, is Russia. Estonia’s location is mapped from the perspective of 
Russia’s neighborhood (for example Berg and Oras 2002, 46 and Veemaa 
2002, 173-174). Estonia is seen as a ‘grey’ area which is vulnerable to an 
economic or political crisis in Russia, if the country stayed outside the EU and 
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NATO (Kirch and Kirch 2001, 135, 140; see also Berg and Oras 2002, 49; 
Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997a, 118 and Kuus 2002b, 394). Apart from Russia 
the threat is sometimes depicted in relation to the ‘Russian agents’ inside 
Estonia, who, like Merje Kuus writes are due to their background seen as part 
of the civilizational conflict, since Russian speakers are treated as bearers of 
non-Western culture. Therefore the recommendations to integrate non-
Estonians can also be seen as a pressure to compromise Estonia's Western 
identity (Kuus, 2002a, 98-99, 102). 
At the same time, however, the EU is scrutinized critically, both in the 
academic texts as well as in Postimees. According to Kuus, the EU is 
sometimes seen to undermine the undivided authority of the Estonia’s nation-
state over its territory and especially in the matters of citizenship and minority 
rights can be construed as a source of threat (Kuus 2002b, 394). Also in the 
articles of Postimees, the EU as well as the world in general is perceived on the 
basis of the hostile logic of the world. Even though the EU can still be seen as 
unavoidable from Estonia’s perspective, the calculation is not based on the 
high expectations but on the vision of the even worse future outside the EU. 
Similar to the discourse of European Estonia, the EU is seen as superior to 
Estonia in this discourse. However, in European Estonia the EU is admired 
whereas here the EU is seen as either a specific authoritarian actor in relation 
to Estonia or just part of the wider authoritarian world. More concretely this 
means that instead of cooperation and mutual understanding, decisions are 
made by the EU, and Estonia has no choice but to accept. At the same time 
‘authoritarian’ cannot be equated to ‘hostile’, since the EU’s attitude towards 
Estonia is often depicted as indifferent. 
The major difference, between this discourse and the first two, is the 
reflective tone. While in the case of the first two discourses, becoming is stated 
as a goal, something that the country is supposed to reach by improving itself 
or changing its behavior, in this discourse, Estonia is seen as passive and not 
in a position to set these goals. Therefore, Becoming humble is neither a 
purpose nor a progressive goal to work towards, but part of the essential 
development, a threat that cannot necessarily be avoided by Estonia, since it 
is caused by the action of great forces. The only thing that Estonia is capable 
of changing is its attitude/perception of the world as a basis for drawing 
conclusions. The contradiction between being and becoming is thus not based 
on the current action and its improvement but on criticizing and changing 
Estonia’s former attitude towards the EU or towards general reality. Estonia 
can make comments either by understanding and accepting or by expressing 
dissatisfaction and criticism. Still, neither of these leads to changes in practice. 
Structurally, the discourse of Humble Estonia contains sub-discourses that 
are based on the same relations as the first two discourses. In connection with 
being, the discourse contains two sub-discourses. Accept reality as own 
practice grounds on practice and focuses on internal relations. Realize EU 
authority focuses on the discourse/rhetoric and is based on the interaction 
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between Estonia and the EU as an agency. Since in connection with being no 
change is indicated, no separate recognition is given either. 
Similarly to the other two discourses, in the level of becoming, both sub-
discourses contain four parts based on the internal relations/interaction, 
rhetoric (discourse)/practice and identification/recognition axes. While 
Should accept reality as own practice focuses on internal relations, Should 
realize EU authority is based on interaction and EU agency. The axis of 
rhetoric contains of Should realize EU authority as identification but also 
failure to do that as recognition. Practice gives a basis to Should accept reality 
as own practice (identification) and failure to do that (recognition).  
Conclusively, the division of sub-discourses is capsulized in Table 5.3 and 
the hierarchy of the discourse is clarified in Figure 5.3. In the following part, 
Being and Becoming humble (as representation) are dealt with whereas Being 
and Becoming realist (as relations and identities) are analyzed in Chapter 6.  
Table 5.3. Sub-discourses of Being and Becoming humble. 
Being humble Becoming humble (in/due to the 
EU) 
Accept reality as own practice Should accept reality as own practice 
 Failure to accept reality as own 
practice 
Realize EU authority Should realize EU authority 
 Failure to realize EU authority 
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Figure 5.3. Sub-discourses of Humble Estonia. 
BEING HUMBLE 
Being humble consists of two sub-discourses: Accept reality as own practice 
and Realize EU authority. In the former ‘reality’ as a main factor in Estonia’s 
development is understood and accepted whereas EU’s agency is not paid 
attention to. A Cultural Elite article writes about country’s EU membership: 
“Taking into account the more general polito-economic processes of the world 
Estonia is in front of historical (and not only securital) inevitability.”96 (PM, 
15.07.1998).  
In the latter sub-discourse the EU is dealt with as an authoritarian agency 
from Estonia’s perspective. The relationship between the parties is based on a 
lack of influence on Estonia’s side and the ability of the EU to decide upon 
things. The EU’s impact and Estonia’s lack of influence is in the world context 
depicted in a Readers article: “Estonia’s participation in NATO and the EU 
depends largely on the meeting of these organizations in April and May. 
Referring to American proverb: NATO and EU are now ‘a new ball game’.”97 
(PM, 29.12.1998a). 
                                                          
96 Võttes arvesse maailma üldisemaid majandus-poliitilisi protsesse on Eesti ajaloolise (ja mitte 
ainult julgeolekualase) paratamatuse ees. 
97 Eesti osalus NATOs ja ELis oleneb suurel määral nende organisatsioonide kokkutulemisest aprillis 
ja mais. Ameerika kõnekäänuga - NATO ja EL on nüüd ”uus pallimäng”. 
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Accept reality as own practice  
This sub-discourse contains two parts, accept reality and know own limits, 
both based on internal relations. Since as a starting point, (EU as) reality is 
accepted and own limits are recognized the risk of being disappointed at any 
point is rather small. Therefore, in the part of becoming one is urged to ‘take 
life as it is’ (to accept issues).  
In accept reality, reality is seen to exist independently of Estonia as well 
as any other actors. This also means that the responsible actors are either 
completely missing from the examples or the responsibility is blurred and the 
actors are mentioned at a very abstract level, like, the rules of the game and 
power that guide the human world (Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.10.2002b).  
Especially in the case of missing actors, the articles emphasize the 
impossibility to change the prevailing conditions. A Journalist article writes 
that in the current situation, acceptance of Estonia to the international 
organizations is regrettably coinciding with several important changes of the 
power balance (jõujoon) (PM, 23.08.2002). The words ‘regrettably’ and 
‘coincide’ make the whole situation sound like a destiny that cannot be 
changed. Also ‘acceptance of Estonia’ refers to the case when membership just 
happens and no particular actor is responsible for that. 
In a similar example, a Readers article writes that the accession of 2004 is 
inevitable just like the accession98 that took place in 1940: it is also inevitable 
that Estonia’s own constitution turns into a secondary file and it is hardly 
considered rational to print it out after the accession (PM, 17.06.2002b; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.06.2002b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite articles 
claim that world's general international development excludes the possibility 
of Estonia to exist independently between East and West (PM, 12.07.1997a; 
see also PM, 15.07.1998) and the accession is inevitable, since it is 
programmed to the century’s development (PM, 06.03.1998b). 
In the case the EU (and NATO) are mentioned as actors, they are seen as 
subordinate to the bigger forces. A Readers article writes that those who 
followed more attentively the distribution of NATO-invitations to Estonia and 
the other Eastern European countries that took place soon after the countries 
were invited into the EU, could, on the basis of the general rather bitter 
atmosphere, assume a running competition between the USA and the EU (PM, 
05.03.2003b). Even though both EU and NATO are mentioned in this 
example, also they are guided by the ‘general atmosphere’, a major force that 
decides among other things upon Estonia’s fate.  
The same logic is followed in the Cultural Elite articles which see EU 
membership as incapable of preventing things that are determined to happen. 
One article writes that soon Estonians will smoothly become voluntary users 
of the English language - long time before the referendum and hardly even a 
big No to the EU would result in any remarkable change to this communicative 
adoption (PM, 28.06.2003; see also PM, 13.09.1997 and PM, 24.12.1997c). 
                                                          
98 Author uses the word ”accession” (liitumine) instead of ”occupation” (okupatsioon). 
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Another similar article claims that in the current situation a No-decision 
would be quite a threat to independence since even if we did not change the 
constitution it will no more maintain our independence (PM, 10.09.2003b). 
An article also writes that not joining the EU does not prevent the immigration 
(PM, 02.09.2003a; see also Political Elite article, PM, 07.02.1998a). All 
examples are based on determinism: certain things happen since they are 
deemed to happen and no actors are capable of changing them (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 26.11.1997).  
As another option, the examples of blurred responsibility are dated to the 
beginning of the accession process and deal with the uncertainty of the 
countries that are called to the accession negotiations. Even though officially 
Estonia’s goal was to be part of the ‘first group’, here the country is depicted as 
a pawn without any influence. At the same time, the EU’s responsibility is 
rather unclear. For example a Political Elite article writes about “Estonia’s 
possible involvement in the first round of the European Union 
enlargement…”99(PM, 16.01.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article writes how it 
was planned to give the candidate countries a clear message, as to which of 
them are suitable for the accession negotiations, but the plan was postponed 
since no consensus prevailed inside the EU (PM, 27.11.1997). Even though the 
EU is present in these examples, the process is seen as accidental and 
uncontrolled. Instead of EU agency and clear decision making process, unclear 
agency is expected to decide Estonia’s fate.  
In the examples of accepting reality depicted above, one focuses on things 
that just happen to Estonia whereas know own limits concentrates on the 
specific features of the country as limits of Estonia. On the basis of the 
examples, one deals either with fixed, and stable, or flexible features and 
characteristics.  
In the case of fixed and stable features, geographical size but also history 
and location of the country as well as interrelations between these are 
emphasized (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.09.2003b). The division of big and 
small countries is crucial here, since certain rules and regulations are 
considered to be valid for the small but not for the big countries. As Cultural 
Elite article claims, in the region where Estonia is located, the No of a small 
border state to ones inevitably means Yes to the others (PM, 28.06.2003). 
Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that Estonia’s integration into Europe 
derives from its history and geographical location (PM, 29.11.1997b; see also 
Cultural Elite articles, PM, 15.09.2003; PM, 15.08.2003; PM, 28.06.2003 and 
PM, 12.07.1997a). 
For showing the importance of Estonia’s smallness, Estonia is portrayed as 
a “midget state” (kääbusriik) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.11.1997). A 
Political Elite article writes that we balance continuously on the border where, 
by leaning to one direction we could become isolated from the European and 
world structures, but to the other we can give up dangerously lot of our self-
                                                          
99 Eesti võimalik sattumine Euroopa Liidu laienemise esimesse ringi… 
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being (PM, 10.02.1997). Balancing on the border is characterized here as a 
circus trick that includes the real danger of falling: only those who have gained 
virtuous skills by continuous practicing are capable of balancing on the wire, 
and even for them, accidents can easily happen. 
Another example, a Political Elite article writes that for Estonia as a small 
state, there is nothing worse than to remain between two mill-stones (PM, 
14.08.2002b; see also Readers article, PM, 22.07.1997 and Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 12.08.1997b). Since the function of mill-stones is to smash 
everything by raw force, this analogy makes the options of Estonia rather clear. 
Similarly, a Journalist article quotes the speech of Ene Ergma, (Estonia’s 
Speaker of Parliament at the time), who suggested looking at Estonia’s 
situation from outer space: since Estonia is between two big entities – the 
European Union and the Russian Federation – of which the former can be 
imagined as green and the second as blue, Estonia is inevitably only a small 
white spot between them. Thus, the article continues with Ergma’s conclusions 
that while looked from the outer space, this white spot is not visible and does 
not exist (PM, 26.06.2003). Ene Ergma, whose analysis the article uses for 
legitimizing its arguments is an astrophysicist and a member of the Estonian 
Academy of Science. She can, thus, perform as an expert who bases her 
arguments on the rules of natural science being an unquestionable truth. This 
way Estonia’s accession to the EU becomes part of an astrophysicist process, 
not a question of political choice. 
Apart from the stable and fixed features, more flexible factors like the 
economy are referred to as Estonia’s limits (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 
12.08.1997b and PM, 25.09.1998). For instance, a Political Elite article writes 
about a stable EU and the unsettled stock market of Estonia (PM, 09.07.1998). 
Similarly, Readers articles reveal the weaknesses of Estonia’s economy in 
comparison with Norway. One article writes that in Estonia it is of course more 
difficult to find arguments against EU membership than it was for Norway, 
since Estonia neither has a strong economy nor its own gas reserves (PM, 
15.07.1997a). Another Readers article claims that we are not yet that rich that 
European Union could take instead of giving as in the case of Norway (PM, 
22.07.1997). 
In addition to the certain characteristics or spheres of life, some articles 
emphasize Estonia’s action as rather meaningless and without much influence. 
In these cases, on the basis of action, conclusions about the limits are drawn 
and vice versa. A Cultural Elite article writes that Estonia’s possibilities to 
choose are often limited or nonexistent in many important sectors (PM, 
14.02.2002). At a more concrete level, a Political Elite article refers to 
Estonia’s restricted possibilities in building an extensive network of foreign 
embassies (PM, 26.08.2003b; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.03.1998).  
In sum, reference to reality as an argument that cannot be ignored is made 
both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process. 
Those articles most present during the whole accession process are Cultural 
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Elite articles whereas the other three categories of articles are rather equally 
but not very strongly represented.  
Since reality forms the main (f)actor of this sub-discourse, it also makes the 
role of all the other actors insignificant. In the first part of the sub-discourse, 
the EU is seen as part of the reality, and in the second part reality determines 
the limitations of Estonia. In different cases, reality is based on a variety of 
indicators: facts, natural laws, historical logic etc. Accordingly, on the basis of 
these indicators final conclusions about ‘how things really are’ are drawn in 
the articles. 
Realize EU authority 
The sub-discourse Realize EU authority can be divided into two parts, have 
only hope and let the EU form practice. In the first part, Estonia’s (not too 
optimistic) expectations in relation to the EU are emphasized, in the second 
part the focus is the EU’s impact. Both parts are based on the idea that Estonia, 
unlike the EU, is not in a position to define reality or influence developments. 
At the same time, unlike in the previous accept reality as Estonia’s practice, 
here dissatisfaction is expressed about the situation. 
Have only hope is based on an assumption that since Estonia is capable 
of neither managing alone in the world anarchy nor changing the situation, the 
best it can do is to hope. The hopes and expectations are targeted towards the 
EU, which is an actor implicitly or explicitly present in the examples. In the 
beginning of the accession process, a Journalist article claims that in relation 
to the EU, Estonia has nothing left but to hope (PM, 26.03.1997 and PM, 
13.01.1997). 
Some Journalist articles target the hopes towards more concrete actors, for 
instance the Schengen countries (PM, 03.12.1998). In connection with an 
attempt to get into the first round of the accession negotiations, the 
importance of certain powerful allies, like the USA and Great Britain, is 
emphasized and the article continues that the position of Estonia and the other 
Baltic countries is not absolutely hopeless: “With the help of [Bill - SKK] 
Clinton, [Tony - SKK] Blair can make miracles in Europe. Why not in the 
sphere of enlargement?”100 (PM, 26.05.1997). The contradiction between the 
passive Estonia and the active countries is reflected also by wording: while 
Estonia’s situation is not ‘absolutely hopeless’, the other party can ‘make 
miracles’. 
In most articles, however, the claim that the EU is the one capable of 
changing things does not create high expectations. The overall tone is skeptical 
and the situation portrayed as quite bleak. Towards the end of the accession 
process Estonia’s hopes are connected to the development of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a tool for improving Estonia’s positions 
                                                          
100 Clintoni toel võib Blair Euroopas teha veel imesid. Miks mitte siis laienemise vallas?  
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in relation to Russia. A Journalist article writes that the case of the 
International Criminal Court shows clearly that it is too early for the EU to 
dream about the CFSP, and asks what happens then to Estonia’s hopes (PM, 
02.10.2002). Another article writes about the prognosis that the prices of 
goods and services will rise in connection with the EU membership, and 
continues: we cannot escape this unfair order and thus there is nothing to do 
but to hope that we could also get something good from the EU as 
compensation (Journalist article, PM, 22.01.2003). As the only theoretical 
option for Estonia, the article mentions ‘escaping’ but also admits that this is 
not applicable in practice. 
Paradoxically, even though Estonia is admitted to have only hopes, in 
substantial terms the EU is not necessarily seen to be ahead of Estonia. On the 
contrary, in some Journalist articles Estonia is seen as more developed, 
efficient etc. than the EU. For instance, even though Estonia is seen to have 
better understanding of Russia’s action than the EU does, the article does not 
indicate that Estonia could educate the EU but expresses implicit hope that 
the EU is capable of understanding it (PM, 11.01.1997). Another article writes 
that despite EU claims that the candidate countries should speed up their 
reforms, find the solutions to internal problems and develop their economy, 
the main difficulties are on the EU side, since the EU has not solved the main 
issues like a decision making process and a way of dividing the funding. 
Therefore, the article argues that Estonia has been left to wait and hope that 
the EU will implement its internal changes in the near future (PM, 
27.10.1998a). The expressions like ‘left to wait and hope’ and ‘near future’ 
create an understanding of Estonia which would like to see the EU act quickly 
but does not necessarily dare to hope it will. 
Another part of Realize EU authority is let the EU form practice that 
focuses on weakness of Estonia and strength of the EU (Journalist article, PM, 
11.12.1997). For example in connection with the accession negotiations, 
Estonia’s weak or non-existing influence is shown by referring to the EU’s 
strong position and impact on various issues (Journalist article, PM, 
17.12.1997b and Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.08.1997a). As a Political Elite 
article writes, especially in economic and social questions, Estonia can hardly 
bargain for extensive exceptions (PM, 31.10.1997a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite 
article claims that since the tariff union is the main basis of the EU’s economic 
space, it is out of the question that Estonia could shake this (PM, 23.12.1997; 
see also Readers article, PM, 18.12.1997b). 
At a more abstract level a Cultural Elite article writes that if Estonia had 
remained out of this enlargement wave, maybe we would have waited for the 
next one forever (PM, 21.07.1997), since the speed of the enlargement process 
and the amount of the countries accepted into this depend on the EU more 
than on Estonia (Journalist article, PM 07.01.1997; see also PM, 21.05.1997). 
The same idea is also communicated by Political Elite articles (PM, 
05.04.1997; PM, 06.06.1997; PM, 16.06.1997; and PM, 29.11.1997b) and a 
Readers article that argues if the EU wants to receive us (PM, 22.07.1997).   
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Another Journalist article writes about the Intergovernmental Conference 
where the EU was expected to make the preparations for the enlargement, and 
states that since the EU is dancing a slow waltz at the moment, the deadline 
for the enlargement will be postponed in spite of us for two to three years (PM, 
14.12.1998b). Since the Summit was held in Vienna, the article uses the 
analogy with dancing, referring not to the quick tempo of the Vienna waltz 
but the slow tempo of a slow waltz. At the same time a reference to the ’EU 
dance’ shows as the EU having fun instead of dealing with serious issues101. 
Apart from the accession process, Cultural Elite articles deal with the 
accession at a principal level as something Estonia cannot avoid or influence. 
For example, an article writes that as a matter of fact we do not have a choice, 
since the European Union (where we will go in any case) has set clear future 
directions in the Lisbon Summit (PM, 21.08.2003). Therefore, if Estonia’s (or 
some other donor country’s) referendum did not bring about the planned 
result, soon another one will be held (PM, 09.07.2003). All in all, even if 
Estonia did not join the EU, the accession of the other countries would cause 
quite a crash of meteors (paraja meteoriidimürtsu), similar to our own 
accession (PM, 10.09.2003b) and the accession conditions do not improve but 
get worse in the next wave of enlargement (PM, 15.08.2002). Therefore, as a 
Political Elite article writes, Estonia will join the EU: not due to the wisdom of 
Estonia’s EU officials but as a result of a political agreement, since several 
current members of the EU are organically interested in Estonia’s membership 
(PM, 15.09.1998b).  
Even though the above examples indicate the EU's impact and power to 
decide upon things, similar to have only hope, substantially the EU is not 
necessarily seen to be ahead of Estonia. In the beginning of the accession 
process, a  Political Elite article writes about the EU officials whose 
incompetency answered the question why we still do not have visa freedom 
with the Schengen countries (PM, 15.09.1998b; see also Journalist article, PM, 
03.02.1997b). 
In some articles, a distinction is made on the basis of being ‘political’ like 
the EU and appealing to the ‘objective criteria’ in a form of closed paragraphs 
and progress reports, like Estonia. In the beginning of the accession process, 
a Political Elite article writes that if the opinion wins that the same countries 
should be called to the EU and NATO then despite our good economic 
indicators, our accession to the European Union among the first ones can 
become doubtful (PM, 20.03.1997b; see also Journalist article, PM, 
03.06.1997). Similarly, towards the end of the accession process a Journalist 
                                                          
101 The idea about a ‘slow’ union is related to two parallel attempts of the EU, to deepen and widen 
the integration at the same time. When Estonia started the accession process, the Maastricht Treaty was 
valid. In 1999 it was followed by the Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997). However, at the same time the 
necessity of further institutional reforms of the EU and a change of the power-relations between the 
institutions was admitted.  
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article claims that the Irish No to the Treaty of Nice would mean a political 
catastrophe from the perspective of the enlargement despite the progress 
report (PM, 10.10.2002a; see also PM, 11.06.2002a). 
In sum, most of the articles of this sub-discourse are published in the 
beginning of the accession process. Journalist articles are the most 
represented for the part of have only hope whereas Cultural Elite articles are 
the most represented for let the EU form practice. Readers articles are notable 
for their absence from this sub-discourse. 
Since Realize EU authority is based on Estonia’s interaction with the EU, 
the dominance of let the EU form practice in the beginning of the accession 
process indicates the same phenomenon as agency part in the discourse of 
European Estonia. In both cases, the EU agency in forming Estonia’s practice 
is seen as legitimate. At the same time, unlike in Accept EU authority, it is not 
praised here but taken as something one is not capable of changing.  
BECOMING HUMBLE 
The scheme of Becoming humble follows the logic of Being humble: the sub-
discourses Should accept reality as own practice and Should realize EU 
authority both challenge Accept reality as own practice and Realize EU 
authority. Both sub-discourses can be divided into four parts: two based on 
identification (what should be done) and two on recognition (failure to do 
something). One of the identification-recognition pairs focuses on the 
discursive level and the other pair on practice.  
While in connection with accepting reality as being, the responsible actors 
were either missing from the texts or the responsibility was blurred, Should 
accept reality as own practice indicates that the EU should be taken as 
Estonia’s reality, since no alternatives can be found. A Readers article writes: 
“I call all elderly people to vote for the EU since only if being there Estonia’s 
youth will have a future in their homeland…”102 (PM, 18.08.2003). Otherwise 
the articles suggest Estonia should know own limits. 
Accordingly, the recognition part as the failure to accept reality as Estonia’s 
practice is based on the negative scenario of Estonia outside the EU. In 
Fairclough’s (2006, 78-79) terms, as a discursive strategy the focus is on the 
future consequences of failure to act in the present. For example, a Cultural 
Elite article writes about the No vote:  
The result would be very unfavorable for Estonia. Having a large 
number of Russia-minded people with Estonian passports among the 
                                                          
102 Kutsun üles kõiki vanemaid inimesi hääletama ELi poolt, sest vaid sinna kuuludes on eesti 
noortel tulevikku oma kodumaal…  
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electorate, Estonia would at the same time remain outside the 
European Union.103  
PM, 26.06.1998 
The identification of the second sub-discourse, Should realize EU authority, 
focuses on the problems related to EU’s superiority over Estonia. A Cultural 
Elite article writes: “In Estonia, agriculture is until now in vicious competition 
with our close neighbors (EU and Russia). As a result Estonia’s most 
competitive industry is stalled and the rural life is ruined.”104 (PM, 17.10.1997).  
Failure to realize EU authority as recognition is based on the negative 
scenario of Estonia inside the EU. A Readers article writes:  
Due to the salary that is tens of times smaller, specialists (for example 
doctors) and other enterprising youth leave the homeland and this 
trend will increase even more in relation to joining the EU.105  
PM, 22.03.2003 
Should accept reality as own practice 
Should accept reality as own practice contains two parts, should accept the 
EU as reality and should know own limits. The first part indicates that instead 
of trying to find alternative solutions one should accept the EU as reality, 
since no proper alternatives can be found. Similar to being, the vocabulary 
uses words like ‘regrettably’ (paraku) and ‘inevitably’ (paratamatu), but also 
‘only way’ (ainus võimalus) to emphasize determinism. As cultural Elite 
articles write, in the contemporary world the economy of any functioning 
country cannot stay in isolation in any circumstances (PM, 11.12.1998a) and 
concerning the accession to Europe it is clear that one has to go (PM, 
14.08.2003c). Another article concludes that the only way to avoid the 
emergence of a provincial economically regressed state is to join the official 
Europe (PM, 15.07.1998). 
Especially in the beginning of the accession process, one is urged to accept 
the fact that Estonia is moving towards the EU. For example a Political Elite 
article writes that since we move inevitably in the direction of the EU and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) let’s start using the means that are in 
                                                          
103 Tulemuseks oleks Eesti jaoks äärmiselt ebasoodus. Omades valijaskonnas suurt hulka Venemaa-
meelseid, kuid Eesti passi omavaid inimesi, jääks Eesti samas eemale Euroopa Liidust. 
104 Eestis on põllumajandus senini meie lähinaabrite (ELi ja Venemaa) kõlvatu konkurentsi 
meelevallas. Selle tulemusena suretatakse Eestis välja konkurentsivõimeline tootmisharu ja laostatakse 
maaelu. 
105 Kümneid kordi madalama töötasu tõttu lahkuvad kodumaalt spetsialistid (näiteks arstid) ja 
muidu hakkajad noored ning see tendents kasvab seoses euroliitu astumisega veelgi.  
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accordance to the demands of these organizations (PM, 27.11.1998). A Readers 
article claims that Estonia does not have any alternatives to the EU and NATO, 
organizations that are essential for keeping our independence (PM, 
26.07.1997a). Another article states that against the events in Russia I/we 
believe that we really do not have an alternative but we have to speed up the 
negotiations with the European Union in all spheres (PM, 15.09.1998a). In the 
first two examples the EU is paralleled to the other organizations, WTO and 
NATO. This way all three are made part of the same reality Estonia should 
head towards. At the same time one distances itself from Russia, as mentioned 
in the last example.  
Since the EU accession is seen to be tightly interlinked to the other spheres 
of life, articles claim that in connection with the decisions in the other fields, 
the accession process should be taken into account. For example, a Journalist 
article writes about abandoning the death penalty:  
In the death penalty question Estonia has to take into account its wish 
to integrate into Europe: no alternative serious developmental 
scenario is offered by any accountable Estonia’s politician.106  
PM 03.03.1998 
The necessity of EU integration is emphasized by the argument that no serious 
politician has been able to figure out an alternative scenario. At the same time 
the article closes the case implicitly: if someone tries to offer an alternative, 
the focus turns from the idea to the author as the irresponsible one. 
Apart from referring to the lack of numerous alternatives, the articles also 
emphasize that Estonia has ‘two alternatives only’ that are situated at the 
opposite extremes of both space and time107. However, with two alternatives 
instead of one, no qualitative (or substantial) difference is brought to the 
solution. As Cultural Elite article writes the freedom of choice (valikuvabadus) 
is imaginary since we have regrettably a choice only between European Union 
and the grey zone (PM, 06.11.1998c; see also PM, 19.03.1998 and Political Elite 
article PM, 25.07.1997a). Also a Journalist article claims that Estonia has only 
two choices, not the third one of being proudly independent like Norway (PM, 
12.07.1997b; PM, 26.06.2003; see also Political Elite article PM, 22.05.1998 
and Cultural Elite articles, PM, 12.08.1997b and PM, 01.07.1998). Another 
article states on the basis of the novel Rehepapp (translated into Finnish as 
Riihiukko) by Andrus Kivirähk, a nationally recognized author, that if Estonia 
does not want to remain a particular kind of weirdo-land (rehepapla), we 
should go along with the other European countries (PM, 23.08.2003a).  
Some articles state even more clearly that the only alternative to the EU 
membership is East/Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and 
                                                          
106 Eestis peab aga surmanuhtluse küsimuses arvestama soovi integreeruda Euroopaga - mõnda teist 
tõsiseltvõetavat arengustsenaariumi ei paku ükski arvestatav Eesti poliitik. 
107 Katri Vallaste (2013, 98) has referred to the same phenomenon as a usage of false dichotomy.  
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therefore the EU is the only choice one can take seriously (for example Readers 
articles PM, 16.08.2003a; PM, 18.08.2003 and Political Elite article PM, 
23.11.1998). As Political Elite article claims, Estonia can choose between Yes 
(English) or Nyet (Russian): I/we am/are quite sure that this is regrettably 
just like that, since the globalizing world of the 21st century will not allow grey 
zones (PM, 11.07.2003b). Unlike in most of the articles concerning this part of 
the sub-discourse, this last example shows the agency responsible for the 
current situation: the globalizing world of the 21st century. 
Another part of this sub-discourse, should know own limits 
emphasizes Estonia’s particularity as determining factor that one is urged to 
realize and accept. Similar to know own limits, smallness is one factor 
emphasized in the articles. For instance a Cultural Elite article writes that 
Estonia can go to Eastern Asia only together with Europe and the United 
States: alone we are a piece of dust on the feet of Asian giants (PM, 
04.07.1997). The expressions used, ‘piece of dust’ and ‘giant’, make Estonia’s 
size rather clear. At the same time reference to ‘dust’ enables also substantial 
evaluation.  
For a more concrete example, a Cultural Elite article writes that the 
decision makers have to acknowledge the boundaries of Estonia’s possibilities 
and choices: with our 1.4 million population we form at the moment 0.37% 
and after couple of years 0.31% of the eating mouths and working hands of the 
EU (PM, 15.10.2002b; see also Journalist article, PM, 19.11.1998). Also, 
a Journalist article claims that it should not be expected that the EU with 
a population of 370 million, would know the local situation within Estonia, 
which has a population of a bit more than one million (PM, 29.08.2002; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 28.06.2003). Another Journalist article claims 
that Estonia is not a big country that could obstinately present its demands 
and complain that the European Union is some kind of mystical formation that 
it is difficult to understand (PM, 13.11.1997; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 
06.08.2003a). Instead of just pointing out Estonia’s smallness, the article 
denies that Estonia is a big country. At the same time a small country is 
actually seen to be more developed than the big ones which, due to their size, 
have an option to behave ‘obstinately’ like children. 
In addition to small size, Estonia’s location is depicted by the articles as a 
limit one should take into account (Readers article, PM, 02.07.2003a; see also 
Political Elite article PM, 25.07.1997a). For example, a Journalist article writes 
that Estonia’s positions in Europe are not very strong: next-door to unstable 
Russia we still have to prove that taking Estonia into the European Union does 
not cause new problems (PM, 10.09.1998). In this example, however, location 
is not a fixed dimension. The term ‘still’ indicates the current state of order, 
not the status quo. 
Similarly, the following examples indicating the limits are related to the 
current state of order. More concretely, Estonia’s poverty and instability are 
urged to be accepted as limits. For instance a Journalist article writes that the 
GDP that is 50-60% of the EU's average is not yet a result that would enable 
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us to march at forefront (rind ees) among the other European states (PM, 
18.07.1997c; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 20.05.1997; 01.07.1998 and 
PM, 25.10.2002a). Another Journalist article claims:  
Compared to Europe Estonia is so poor that for us joining the 
European Union is as important as was the Marshall aid for the 
Western Europe after the Second World War. Money should fix 
Estonia’s interests to join the European Union.108 
PM, 09.12.1997 
A comparison of Estonia’s current situation with the Marshall Plan gives an 
implicit hope of a brighter future. At the same time a message is sent to those 
who are against joining the EU: by rejecting the EU, Estonia is deemed to 
remain poor. 
Towards the end of the accession process, the Cultural Elite articles and 
Political Elite articles refer to the instability that is related to Estonia’s 
development. An article admits that Estonia’s development has been faster 
than that of the EU but only because we have used the privileges without the 
duties of the EU and NATO (Cultural Elite article, PM, 13.09.2003c). One 
example is that in the sphere of free movement of citizens, an exception has 
been made for us (Political Elite article, PM, 26.08.2003a). Thus, a Yes vote 
means continuity of the current development and way of life, whereas a No 
means principal changes (Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.2003c; see also 
Political Elite article, PM, 19.08.2003b). 
In sum, the necessity to accept reality as well as know own limits are rather 
equally presented in the articles both in the beginning as well as towards the 
end of the accession process. The most represented are Journalist articles and 
Cultural Elite articles.  
Substantially both should accept the EU as reality and should know own 
limits deal with the impossibility of Estonia to exist outside the EU. The 
difference between two parts is made on the basis of focus: in case of a need to 
accept reality, the focus is on the EU (even though no interaction between the 
parties is depicted) whereas the need to know own limits is communicated by 
the examples that deal with Estonia’s characteristic features.  
The main action expected from Estonia is to acknowledge both own limits 
as well as the EU as Estonia’s reality. All other possible actions (preparations 
for membership etc.) are seen as subordinate to this understanding. Therefore, 
no substantial change is expected to take place from being to becoming (both 
focus on the same reality and limits).  
                                                          
108 Euroopaga võrreldes on Eesti aga nii vaene, et meile on ühinemine Euroopa Liiduga mitmeti 
sama oluline nagu oli Marshalli abi Teise maailmasõja järgsele Lääne-Euroopale. Raha peaks Eesti huvi 
ühineda Euroopa Liiduga paika panema. 
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Failure to accept reality as own practice 
Similar to identification, Failure to accept reality as own practice contains of 
two parts, failure to accept the EU as reality and failure to know own limits. 
Both are based on the evaluation from Estonia’s actors, not the EU feedback.  
In the necessity to accept the EU as Estonia’s reality, the inevitability of 
joining the EU was indicated. Therefore, the current part, failure to accept 
the EU as reality, focuses on the negative scenarios for Estonia outside the 
EU. In these scenarios, Estonia is seen as a passive object that faces difficulties 
in various spheres of life. Apart from that the internal heterogeneity is depicted 
in some articles. 
In the case of Estonia as a whole, scenarios are related to the developments 
inside the country as well as Estonia’s position in the world context. As an 
example of internal development, a Cultural Elite article writes that if Estonia 
remained behind the EU’s door, its everyday level Europeanisation would start 
taking place clearly faster and in a more barbarous way than until now (PM, 
14.11.1998). Similar examples from variety of spheres can also be found in 
other Cultural Elite articles (PM, 21.07.1997; PM, 06.08.2003a and PM, 
02.09.2003a).  
Most of the examples that are related to Estonia’s internal development 
deal with enterprise and agriculture (Political Elite article, PM, 19.08.2003b 
and Journalist article, PM, 23.08.2003a). For example, a Cultural Elite article 
writes, in case of a No, in October the hair of some entrepreneurs and 
statesmen will be even more grey and by Christmas most of us will complain; 
due to the decrease in Estonia’s exports and investments a year after No 
Estonia will have 5000 to 7000 more unemployed people than now (PM, 
08.07.2003; see also PM, 13.09.2003c). 
Some articles present the scenario outside the EU in terms of natural 
forces. For example a Journalist article writes that entrepreneurs were sure 
that “[n]o would bring along cold winds to our economic environment”109 as 
well as “[b]igger instability, harder economic conditions and smaller social 
guarantees.”110 (PM, 17.07.2003a). Another article states that if the loan 
holders cannot find additional guarantees, the same can happen in the real 
estate market that happened in 1997 in the stock market, the bubble bursts 
(PM, 14.08.2003a). In the examples above, various processes affect Estonia: 
conditions get hard, cold winds blow and bubbles burst. The unpleasant 
experience of standing outside in the cold wind is familiar to everybody but 
experiencing this as a future status quo situation is something no one would 
probably like to experience. Also the bursting bubble refers to the totality: it 
takes less than a second to burst a bubble and it is impossible to repair it. 
Other similar examples personify Estonia as a tiger. A Journalist article 
writes that for a tiger that tries to move quickly up the development ladder 
would be a knock if one restricted its possibilities to move: at the time when 
                                                          
109 ”[e]i” tooks kaasa külmad tuuled meie majandusmaastikule. 
110 [s]uuremat ebastabiilsust, karmimaid majandusolusid ning väiksemaid sotsiaalseid tagatisi. 
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our Baltic partners hasten their growth in the conditions of the Euro green 
house (eurokasvuhoone), can the economic stand-still, achieved in adverse 
circumstances, seem like a recession that harms motivation and self-belief 
(PM, 17.07.2003a). The ‘tiger’ refers to an understanding of the economies of 
the Baltic countries as the ‘Baltic tigers’ (similar to the ‘Asian tiger’ 
economies). Here the term also indicates that Estonia cannot help its nature: 
if a wild animal is forced to stop or has to move backwards, it gets depressed 
(or its motivation and self-belief gets harmed) and probably dies. For 
emphasizing the violence of the process, the word ‘knock’ is used. At the same 
time the EU is seen as a greenhouse, a place where the plants – like the 
economies of Latvia and Lithuania, will blossom. Therefore, unlike Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania are seen as floral and not wild animals. 
The articles that deal with Estonia in the world context scenario outside the 
EU indicate that the country will have no impact, it will be forgotten and 
disappear from the international arena. As Political Elite article writes, by 
limiting ourselves to participation in the European economic space we would 
give up any possibility to decide upon things that will influence us all on a daily 
basis (PM, 12.07.2003a; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997). 
Another Political Elite article claims that Estonia will be left alone: we can only 
hope that somebody would say a necessary word for us (PM, 19.08.2003b; see 
also Readers article PM, 02.07.2003a and Cultural Elite article PM, 
15.08.2003). As Readers articles write Estonia will stop existing for the EU 
(PM, 14.07.2003b) and it is seen even questionable if the Republic of Estonia 
is going to survive (PM, 25.08.2003b). Conclusively, if the referendum left us 
excluded from the EU, our independence would become even cheaper and 
more vulnerable (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c). Since the terms  
‘survive’ and ‘vulnerable’ refer to actual threat and danger, they make also this 
decision look like a question of life and death.  
In order to show the poor opportunities of existing in the world context 
outside the EU, some Readers articles use spatial and temporal indicators. 
More concretely, the claims about East and the West as well as center and 
periphery are based on spatial references whereas predicting the future on the 
basis of the past is temporal. One Readers article refers to the future location 
of Estonia by asking in whose interest is it we would remain languishing 
(kiduma) on the border of two worlds (PM, 05.08.2003c; see also Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 11.07.2003c). The word ‘languish‘ refers to living organism, 
most probably a plant that is neither dead nor alive. Another Readers article 
states: think how your kids will curse you after ten or twenty years, since you 
have led them away from the European main road, wilting (tohletama) on 
some incidental village road (kõrvaline külatee) (PM, 01.08.2003c). In this 
example, degeneration is symbolized by village roads whereas the main roads 
stand for development. This is emphasized even more with the word ‘wilting’, 
which is used to describe a particular condition of vegetables. This way, 
Estonia’s future outside the EU is similar to old harvested vegetable. 
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In addition to spatial references, temporal ones are used to show a 
connection between past and future. For example a Cultural Elite article writes 
that if No wins in both Estonia and Latvia, our only possible ally would be 
Latvia, exactly like before the Second World War (PM, 14.08.2003d). A 
Readers article sees the camps of the Gulag as an alternative to the EU: “I still 
hope that Estonia’s people have enough sense to say Yes, then we do not meet 
up in the GULAG.”111 (PM, 13.09.2003a). Here, by making a choice between 
Yes and No, one also decides if Estonia moves back to the past, the time of the 
Soviet terror when the GULAG still existed. Implicitly, this is also a reference 
to the East/West dichotomy, in which the GULAG is metonymic of the Soviet 
Union. 
Similarly, a Political Elite article depicts a dilemma between the past and 
the future. However, in this case the past and the present is seen as one, since 
the article writes that if we stay outside the European Union, we might never 
get Estonia’s natural environment settled (korda) and would struggle with 
Soviet mentality in the agriculture sector for a long time yet (PM, 
26.08.2003a). Both past and present are characterized by the Soviet mentality 
that one could get possibly rid of only in the EU future (even though it is not 
explicitly promised). At the same time, the status quo and the current 
condition approach alternate their positions: even though it is stated that one 
would ‘never’ get Estonia’s environment settled, in the end instead of eternity 
reference to ‘long time’ is made. 
The examples above deal with Estonia as whole, whereas the following 
cases focus on internal heterogeneity. More concretely, outside the EU, the 
society is no more seen as one whole but fragmented and full of contradictions. 
In this spirit, a distinction is made between the potential losers, winners and 
those responsible for that development. 
As potential losers, groups like farmers, other rural people and pensioners 
are referred to in separate examples. A Journalist article writes that the biggest 
loss would hit people who due to quitting their work places would lose their 
source of income and this would be a great loss for the rural areas (PM, 
17.07.2003a). In relation to a lower taxation level and more liberal economic 
policy outside the EU, another article writes: those who are going to suffer 
from this are probably, again, both farmers and pensioners, since a tiger 
cannot just withstand the tariffs and large social benefits (Journalist article, 
PM, 05.07.2003b; see also Political Elite article, PM, 22.08.2003). Since 
Estonia is again personified as a tiger (also in PM, 17.07.2003a), the further 
development is no more dependent on the political priorities, choices and 
decisions, but a tiger’s nature. 
Apart from the losers, the articles refer to the winners who, in the scenario 
of a No-referendum, distance themselves from the rest of the country as an 
inevitable reaction. For example, a Readers article writes that Estonia’s 
progressive youth have no reason to stay in Estonia, if Finland or Latvia who 
                                                          
111 Loodan siiski, et eesti rahval jätkub mõistust öelda «jah», siis me ei kohtu GULAGis. 
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will also belong to the EU in the future, offer much better living and studying 
conditions (PM, 18.08.2003). Similarly a Political Elite article writes that if 
[the decision is to - SKK] not join the EU, Estonia’s best youths will leave the 
country: of course they do not leave with their bare hands but take their capital 
along and invest it in other European countries. The article continues that this 
will cause a recession in Estonia that will lead us towards poverty and Estonia 
can slide into being akin to a developing country (PM, 22.08.2003). Even 
though in the last example the regression is caused by the loss of human and 
financial resources, neither the winners nor the losers are seen as responsible 
for the situation. Rather both sides are dealt with as victims who do not have 
a choice. Therefore, the individualist reaction is accepted as inevitability. 
However, those who are seen as responsible for the negative scenario 
outside the EU are those who consider voting No in the referendum. A 
Journalist article writes:  
Estonia’s society is already full of /…/ division lines: urban-rural, 
Tallinn-other regions, young-old, educated-less educated, richer-
poorer etc. Like the analysis of the Estonian Institute of Future Studies 
shows, in the case of No, confrontation between the so called 
ärapanijad and the groups of inhabitants who support the European 
Union accrues to the current tensions.112 
PM, 23.08.2003a 
Even though the opinion polls at the time indicated the presence of both Yes 
and No opinions in Estonia’s society, the article writes about the tension 
between the Yes-No camps as something forthcoming. At the same time the 
Yes-camp is depicted as those who support the European Union whereas the 
No-camp is called ärapanijad on the basis of Estonia’s popular TV program 
that deals with the current affairs from a humorous and ironic perspective. 
However, the program has also been criticized for spiteful overkills while 
making fun of the societal actors. Therefore calling the No-camp as 
ärapanijad shows their decision to vote against the EU as a nasty trick meant 
for irritating the rest of the society. 
Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that in the case of No-scenario we 
have to admit honestly that Estonia is longing for the ‘good old times’ where 
the domicile was given for free and a worker’s salary was at the same level as 
the director’s salary. The article continues with the question, is it even 
necessary to take this mentality to the EU? (PM, 19.08.2003b). The example 
                                                          
112 Eesti ühiskond on juba täis /…/ eraldusjooni - linn-maa, Tallinn - muud piirkonnad, noored-
vanad, haritud-vähemharitud, jõukamad-vaesed jne. Nagu näitab tuleviku-uuringute instituudi analüüs, 
lisandub «ei» korral juba olemasolevatele pingetele n-ö ärapanijate ja Euroopa Liitu pooldavate 
elanikkonnagruppide vastuolu. 
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can also be understood as a provocative trap: for proving that if Estonia is 
actually good enough for the EU, Yes should be voted.  
Another part of the recognition, failure to know own limits, is also 
based on the future prognosis outside the EU and is dated mostly to the time 
preceding the referendum. Most of the examples deal with economy and 
Estonia’s position in the world. However, here the emphasis is not on the 
development of the country but the characteristic features that determine the 
future.  
For example in connection with predicting remarkable growth of Estonia’s 
risk rating and necrostic (dying) investment flows resulting from a No-
scenario, a Journalist article writes: for a state that has a small market and a 
weak export industry this would be like reducing the air in lungs - it can move 
slowly but no longer quickly (PM, 17.07.2003a). Even though the article deals 
with economy, it characterizes the processes as if dealing with living organisms 
- necrosis of the investment flow refers to the death of cells. As a result, Estonia 
as a small and weak country can become seriously handicapped.  
Size is also used as a factor in the arguments. A Readers article writes that 
Edgar Savisaar, as a philosopher and analyst of the global problems and leader 
of the Estonia’s Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond), understands for sure that 
such a small country like Estonia which has a limited population and natural 
resources will sooner or later no longer have a place in the globalized world 
(PM, 09.08.2003c). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article points out Estonia’s 
weakness as a factor that prevents the country’s possibility of existing alone 
(PM, 17.09.1998).  
Concerning Estonia’s geopolitical location but also population as a 
determinant, a Readers article writes: 
Taking into account the geopolitical location of our country, national 
constitution of the population and the fact that big part of the non-
Estonians have tight interaction with the Eastern neighboring 
country, it is quite logical that otherwise the focus of whole interaction 
inclines to this direction.113 
PM, 16.07.2003a; see also PM, 17.09.1998  
While most of the recognition is based on Estonia’s evaluation, some articles 
also take the EU perspective for showing Estonia’s limits. A Cultural Elite 
article writes that in case of a No, Estonia could become the European fool 
(PM, 15.08.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article writes that in the spirit of 
German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder most Europeans will probably 
think that Estonians are the last barbarians of Europe (PM, 19.08.2003b; see 
                                                          
113 Arvestades meie riigi geopoliitilist asendit, elanikkonna rahvuslikku koosseisu ja fakti, et suurel 
osal mitte-eestlastest on tihe läbikäimine just idapoolse naaberriigiga, on vastasel juhul üsna loomulik 
ka kogu suhtlemise raskuskeskme kaldumine sinnapoole. 
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also PM, 12.08.1997b)114. Here, the question is not only about being 
profoundly different from Europe and Europeans but being the one and only 
one of a kind. 
In sum, both failure to accept the EU as reality and failure to know own 
limits are based on the negative scenario outside the EU whereas the first part 
is clearly stronger than the second one. All categories of articles are rather 
equally represented in both sides and the focus of the sub-discourse is clearly 
towards the end of the accession process.  
Concerning Estonia’s limits, a certain sequence is followed through being, 
becoming and a failure to know the limits. In the case of being, Estonia’s limits 
have been stated, whereas in the case of becoming, one argues about the 
necessity to take these into account and in the case of failure to know the 
limits, the consequences of ignoring those are presented. The same logic is also 
followed in accepting reality where the scenario outside the EU can be seen as 
a serious consequence of failure.  
Conclusively, in both failure-parts the support towards Estonia’s EU 
membership is expressed by showing the hopelessness of life outside the EU. 
At the same time no promises are given about the expected developments 
inside the EU. This way, instead of mapping the EU membership as a great 
success, the scenario outside the EU is shown as a clear drop from the current 
situation into a clearly worse one (see also Kaasik-Krogerus 2007). 
Should realize EU authority 
In this sub-discourse, identification contains should not hope and should note 
problems with let the EU form practice, both based on interaction and EU 
agency. As indicated already in have only hope as being, also should not 
hope as becoming is rather pessimistic. Therefore, the substantial difference 
between being and becoming is not a remarkable one: in case of being it is 
stated that hope is all we have whereas in the current part, it is warned that 
one should not hope at all (or too much). 
The cleavage between being and becoming is based on previous 
experiences: in connection with should not hope the current situation is 
evaluated and the conclusion, that there is no reason to hope, are drawn on the 
basis of previous experiences. A Journalist article writes: there is no certainty 
that the promise given by Klaus Kinkel (German Minister of Foreign Affairs at 
the time) concerning visa freedom would hold true (PM, 12.05.1998b; see also 
Readers article, PM, 21.10.1997). Even though Kinkel had not broken his 
promise, one is still supposed to be suspicious just in case, presumably on the 
basis of previous experiences. Similarly, in connection with the agricultural 
sector, a Journalist article writes that there is probably no reason to hope such 
a great concession from the European Union that would allow candidate 
                                                          
114 Even though referring to Estonia’s limits, this example is also based on the agency of the EU and 
can therefore be seen as a border case between two sub-discourses.  
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countries’ quotas to be counted on the basis of the best years (PM, 19.04.2002; 
see also Journalist article, PM, 16.07.1998).  
In some examples, the articles question the hope that things will get better 
in the EU. A Cultural Elite article writes that despite the stories about regional 
policy support to our counties that suffer from unemployment not too much 
hope should be put on the funding foundations of the EU (PM, 23.01.1998). 
Similarly, another article claims on the grounds of Estonia’s experience that 
even though we are soon translated into couple of dozens languages, things 
are still dealt with as they are in the tavern at Vargamäe, where aristocrat 
converses with aristocrat and servant speaks servant [and none the twain will 
meet - SKK] (PM, 18.01.2003b). The article draws conclusions about the EU 
on the basis of Estonian writer’s Anton Hansen Tammsaare’s foundational 
novel “Truth and Justice” (Tõde ja õigus) and deals with Estonia implicitly as 
a ‘servant’. Therefore, despite translating languages, one should not have too 
great substantial expectations.  
While in connection with letting the EU form Estonia’s practice, one 
adapted to that situation, in the should-part a shift from observing the 
situation to ‘taking the EU personally’ is made. The articles focus on the 
problems related to the process but also admit that Estonia is not capable of 
changing things. Therefore, instead of active resistance, should note 
problems with letting the EU form practice expresses criticism towards 
the EU’s ignorance. For instance a Political Elite article writes that of the four 
free movements, goods, capital, services, and people, in relation to the free 
movement of capital it is not taken into account that Estonia’s land reform is 
still incomplete; land owners live to great extent in the cities and farmers do 
not have any land (PM, 05.08.2002b). Similarly, a Journalist article writes 
that Estonia’s milk farms and dairy industries should be in accordance to EU 
demands but their high levels of production should be consumed by ourselves, 
since Europe does not want to allow us to their market:  
At the same time quite a big part of Estonia’s population has low 
income and is not capable to buy high quality food, not talking about 
the green electricity that promises clean environment.115 
PM, 09.03.2002a  
In the last example, the practice formed by the EU is criticized due to two 
problems. First, the EU norms in one sector do not change the whole picture 
(high quality food does not increase people’s income). Second, even though 
Estonia is made to follow EU norms, the EU still does not open its market to 
Estonia’s high quality products. 
                                                          
115 Samas on suhteliselt suur hulk Eesti elanikkonnast madala sissetulekuga ega suuda kvaliteetset 
toitu osta, rääkimata puhast loodust lubavast rohelisest elektrist. 
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One sphere of criticism is the EU’s guidance concerning the Estonia’s 
relationships with both Russia and the country’s Russian-speaking minority. 
A Cultural Elite article writes that with the initiative of the EU, Russia will 
probably achieve the goals in Estonia it has aimed at for the last ten years (PM, 
07.11.2002; see also Political Elite article, PM, 17.11.1998a and Journalist 
article, PM, 20.12.1997). Similarly, a Political Elite article outlines a double 
trap: in the name of economic growth, foreign labor should be imported and 
for getting into the European Union one should give citizenship to foreigners 
born in Estonia. The article continues that these two factors together 
undermine the survival of Estonia as a nation state (PM, 05.12.1997a; see also 
PM, 21.07.1998 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 17.10.1997). Another Political 
Elite article comments on Estonia’s attempts to capture Russia positively: by 
complying with the egoistic attempts of the West, Estonia can waste its 
sovereignty and make itself unacceptable to both the European Union and 
NATO (PM, 16.01.1997). Here, the term ‘waste’ refers to gambling as rather 
unsafe entertainment. 
Conclusively, as a Journalist article writes, the EU’s bureaucracy can soon 
start to harass actors in any economic sphere, the more often and deeper 
beneath the Brussels umbrella we shall crawl. The article also calls the EU ‘a 
large Western neighbor’ (PM, 24.12.1997a). In this example ‘umbrella’ 
indicates Estonia’s wish that the EU would protect the country from negative 
experiences. At the same time, however, new problems are faced, since Estonia 
is not the only one under the umbrella. The term ‘large Western neighbor’ 
creates an analogy with ‘large Eastern neighbor’ – Russia. This way it is made 
clear that the price for protection might be rather high for Estonia. 
In sum, as becoming - should not hope and should note problems with 
letting the EU form practice challenge the being-part by indicating that good 
expectations are not going to be fulfilled and the EU’s guidance is problematic 
for Estonia116. All four categories of articles present arguments in this sub-
discourse, although of note the Readers are the least represented. The articles 
appear at both the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession 
process. Compared to both being as well as the failure-part, the weakest 
representation occurs for Should realize EU authority.  
Failure to realize EU authority 
This recognition part focuses on failure to hope and failure to let the EU form 
practice that are both based on EU agency and the interaction with the EU. 
The evaluation, however, is given by Estonia’s side.  
In failure to hope, it is Estonia’s hopes that had been expressed at the 
discursive level and are now being betrayed in practice. The examples either 
                                                          
116 Similar problems are also pointed out in Independent Estonia discourse. However, there the 
admittance of the problems leads to a necessity to protect one’s interests, whereas in the current case 
Estonia’s possibilities to change the situation are not indicated.  
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point out betrayal or express dissatisfaction as a reaction to betrayal. For 
example a Political Elite article writes of betrayal that we hoped the EU treats 
small Estonia in a precious and equal manner but the negotiations have shown 
that this is not the case (PM, 12.08.2002). Similarly, a Journalist article writes 
the European Commission, which was deemed to be friend of Estonia, now 
finds that Latvia has developed the most and Estonia the least of the Baltic 
countries (PM, 12.10.1998). In the last example, a connection between 
friendship and the accession report is created. Therefore, the Commission’s 
report that praises Latvia but not Estonia is taken as a sign of disloyalty.  
Towards the end of the accession process, a Journalist article writes that 
the European Commission does not follow its own principle that every 
candidate country should be looked at individually on the basis of its 
achievements. The article continues that Commission broke this principle 
concerning the transition period for the free movement of people, and now a 
principle is broken even more rudely with the limitations of agricultural 
support (PM, 30.01.2002; see also PM 04.02.2002).  
The examples above criticize first and foremost an act of betrayal whereas 
in some articles the focus is more on Estonia’s indignation as a reaction to this 
act. This can be seen as passive resistance: even though Estonia is dissatisfied 
with the situation it is not in a position to effect any change. For instance, in 
the beginning of the accession negotiations a Journalist article writes: 
Our leaders have said that Estonia wants to join the EU on the basis of 
objective political-economic achievements. In the name of that all EU’s 
demands were punctually followed and one was trying to show itself 
as a fine small European state. Was it useless?117 
PM, 18.03.1997 
In relation to agreeing upon visa-freedom with the Nordic countries, one 
hoped that the same pattern was going to be followed by the whole European 
Union (Schengen region). Since it was not the case (at the time) a Journalist 
article writes that it is extra embarrassing, since although Estonia has been 
asked to the EU accession negotiations, our negotiators have to apply for a visa 
to travel to Brussels (PM, 02.10.1998a). In the current case, a double 
disappointment can be depicted: letting Estonia attend the accession 
negotiations created pointless expectations of visa freedom, and the visa 
freedom agreement with the Nordic countries did not lead to the same within 
the Schengen area.  
Similarly, at the time when one waited for the EU’s final decision about the 
countries with whom the accession negotiations would be started in 1998, a 
Journalist article writes that Estonia’s government sadly follows how 
                                                          
117 Meie riigijuhid on öelnud, et Eesti tahab liitu astuda lähtudes objektiivsetest 
majanduspoliitilistest saavutustest. Selle nimel täideti punktuaalselt kõiki euroliidu nõudmisi ning püüti 
näidata end tubli Euroopa väikeriigina. Kas asjata? 
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European Union has started to dilute the accession process during 
Luxembourg’s presidency. The article continues that it is especially depressing 
since Estonia is helpless118 (PM, 27.11.1997; see also PM, 27.10.1998a). The 
article uses the terms ‘sadly’ and ’depressing’ to show Estonia’s helpless 
position: despite dissatisfaction, the country is not capable of doing anything. 
Dealing with the accession process as a soup helps to understand that even 
though by diluting one can get more soup, taste and nutritional value suffer 
from that. 
Towards the end of the accession process even stronger words are used to 
characterize Estonia’s attitude towards EU’s action. In connection with 
European Commission’s proposal that candidate countries’ would have only 
partial access to the community’s agricultural foundations, Journalist article 
writes: it was not a long time ago when the candidate countries were shocked 
with the message that their citizens cannot move freely inside the borders of 
the European Union but have to settle with a transition period (PM, 
30.01.2002). The same article comments on the lower than expected 
agricultural support for the new member countries as a painful blow to farmers 
who will now become victims of unfair competition, since it is easy for the EU 
farmers, who enjoy direct support, to flood the candidate countries’ market 
with cheap products (PM, 30.01.2002). Even though the EU does not harm 
Estonia physically, expressions like ’blow’ and ‘shock’ are used to emphasize 
this painful and unexpected experience. At the same time the EU farmers are 
seen as capable of ‘flooding’ the markets of candidate countries with cheap 
produce: their ability to cause conditions that are similar to natural disasters 
gives them an almost divine position. 
The other part of the sub-discourse, failure to let the EU form 
practice deals with the EU membership as a negative scenario for Estonia. 
Therefore, it indicates an opposite of failure to accept the EU as reality that is 
based on a negative future scenario outside the EU. For example a Cultural 
Elite article refers to Estonia’s weak position in the EU by writing that in the 
future Estonia will be shaken into the block of the Nordic countries of the EU 
(PM, 23.08.2003c; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.08.1997b). Another 
article points out that in the EU we can end up in a position that Central Asia 
had in the Soviet Union (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.08.1997a).  
Conclusions about Estonia’s weak position in the EU are drawn also on the 
basis of the country’s minor influence in the decision making process. For 
example a Journalist article writes that since Estonia has only 3 of the 87 votes 
in the Council of Ministers, one can imagine the country’s possibilities to 
enforce its will in the future (PM, 15.05.1998). Also a Political Elite article 
                                                          
118 One characteristic feature of this article is also the attitude that the game has been lost already 
even though the final decision that was favorable for Estonia was made only a month later. The article 
writes that, for Estonia, the best solution would be if the Summit had accepted the Commission’s 
proposal and the Commission had started the negotiations with six countries in the following year (PM, 
27.11.1997).  
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claims that while Estonia can represent itself in EU institutions in decision 
making we could just be voted out, since most of the decisions that deal with 
the internal market are made with a two-thirds majority (PM, 29.05.1998a). 
Similarly, a  Cultural Elite article writes that as a EU member Estonia remains 
a small shareholder whose possibilities to influence the processes are more 
than modest (PM, 17.09.1998; see also PM, 17.12.1997a).  
In some articles, a future scenario in the EU is predicted on the basis of the 
historical experiences, just as it was done for the scenario outside the EU 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 26.07.1997b). For example, a Readers article writes 
that the Soviet empire is about to be replaced by the EU Imperium, and now 
one plans to use the services of the political assistants or politruks 
(abbreviation from the Russian words) as done during the Soviet period (PM, 
02.05.2003a). Another article states that if one was not able to collaborate in 
the Soviet Union to save the nation, it is not going to happen in the EU (PM, 
02.06.2003c). Commenting on the claim that in the EU things will get better, 
a Cultural Elite article writes: I/we say that actually socialism will come back; 
you will see (PM, 24.10.1997). 
A sphere that the articles were also concerned was the migrations of 
peoples; emigration and immigration. Articles write that as an EU member 
country, Estonia faces the threat of losing its human resources to the EU 
(Political Elite article, PM, 15.02.2003; Readers article, PM, 22.03.2003 and 
Cultural Elite articles, PM, 11.12.2002b; PM, 14.06.2003b and PM, 
12.08.2003a). At the same time, immigration to Estonia is projected to 
increase (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 26.08.1997b and PM, 08.03.2003 and 
Readers article, PM, 03.09.2003a). As a Cultural Elite article writes, Estonia’s 
weak and bizarre social protection system does not attract any of the EU's 
unemployed but in the future less competitive specialists as consultants, 
commissioners, controllers etc. will be smuggled here (PM, 23.01.1998).  
Similar to the scenario outside the EU, various articles focus on economy. 
A Cultural Elite article states that the fee for European Union membership will 
take one milliard from the public sector (PM, 29.03.2003; see also PM, 
16.04.2003c and PM, 26.07.1997b). Apart from that the regulations 
implemented in connection to the EU’s membership make Estonia move 
backwards: current liberal economy gets strongly bridled (saab tugevad 
päitsed pähe) (Political Elite article, PM, 29.05.1998a). Also a Cultural Elite 
article writes that by choosing the European Union, we got an increasing 
interruption of the state to the economy (PM, 12.11.2003b; see also PM, 
18.11.2002b and Journalist article, PM, 07.05.2003). Another Cultural Elite 
article claims that it is not easy to manage in the common market with all kinds 
of quotas and direct supports that ‘regulate’ the market (PM, 15.08.2002). At 
a more concrete level an article writes that Estonia’s labor market is threatened 
to become over regulated (PM, 12.08.2003a; see also PM, 18.11.1997). 
Additionally the problem that salaries in Estonia’s academic sector are not 
competitive is seen to deepen in the EU (PM, 15.10.2002a). Another article 
writes that the EU is about to destroy Estonia’s herring culture with the 
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accession treaty (PM, 09.10.2002b; see also PM, 05.09.2002). In conclusion, 
a Cultural Elite article writes:  
Now, from close perspective, this dream-Europe looks rather like a 
boring administrative machinery that produces restrictions and 
bureaucracy. We still have to close a lot of rural shops and township 
pubs, install thousands of steel lavatories to the school cantinas to pass 
strict sanitary quarantine.119 
PM, 09.11.2002 
Apart from that, increasing part of our limited labor force starts to redirect the 
income, laziness deepens and in the end nothing special happens despite the 
rose development plans (Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.11.2003b). 
At a more abstract level, the same phenomena are described by a Cultural 
Elite article which claims the idea that Estonia and the EU will walk together 
towards the future arm-in-arm is an illusion (PM, 25.07.1998). In contrast, in 
the EU it is not possible to talk about thinking liberally like a free man 
(Political Elite article, PM, 31.10.1998a) but one has to walk the tight-rope 
(käia mööda nööri) (Cultural Elite article, PM, 20.11.2003; see also PM, 
15.06.2002a). 
Towards the end of the accession process, Estonia’s membership is also 
compared to colonization. Commenting on the ideas of Estonia’s linguist Jüri 
Eintalu, a Journalist article writes: “As a result, formally Estonia might 
become an equal member of the European Union but this does not save us 
from intellectual colonization.”120 (PM, 09.02.2002). 
Similarly, the idea of colonization is used by a Readers article arguing that 
it is time to understand that by joining the EU, Estonia will remain a wordless 
half colonial state on the periphery for a very long time (PM, 14.06.2003a). 
The current situation is also implicitly compared to the former colonial policy 
by a Cultural Elite article (PM, 14.08.2003c). 
In sum, similar to being and the should-part, failure to hope is weaker 
than failure to let the EU form practice. Also like have only hope (being), 
failure to hope is almost entirely communicated by Journalist articles. The 
absence of the other three categories of articles is in accordance with the 
general line: if one does not initially express hopes, they cannot be betrayed or 
the trust broken. 
In failure to let the EU form practice a future vision inside the EU is 
presented. Both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the accession 
                                                          
119 Nüüd, lähedalt, paistab too unistuse-Euroopa pigem tüütu administratiivse masinavärgina, mis 
toodab piiranguid ja bürokraatiat. Meil tuleb veel sulgeda hulk maapoode ja alevikõrtse, installeerida 
koolisööklatesse tuhandeid terasest kraanikausse, et rangest sanitaarkarantiinist läbi pääseda.  
120 Tulemuseks on, et vormiliselt võib Eestist küll saada Euroopa Liidu võrdõiguslik liige, kuid see ei 
päästa meid intellektuaalsest koloniseerimisest. 
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process the Cultural Elite articles are clearly the most represented. Timely 
articles can be found from towards the end of the accession process.  
Failure to let the EU form practice presents a pessimistic future vision 
inside the EU and therefore indicates implicitly an idea that the current 
situation is better. However, at the same time, the superiority of the current 
situation is not explicitly praised. Also, a negative scenario inside the EU does 
not necessarily correlate to being against Estonia’s membership. In most of the 
cases, the articles criticize certain developments inside the EU without 
drawing any conclusions that Estonia should stay out of the EU. This is also a 
clear difference compared to the negative scenario outside the EU where EU 
membership is indicated.  
CONCLUSIONS OF HUMBLE ESTONIA 
While irony was used in the discourse of Independent Estonia to criticize the 
country’s humble attitude in front of the EU and urge to change that attitude, 
in Humble Estonia variety of expressions and comparisons are used to show 
Estonia’s relative poverty. Besides this notion, the strength of both EU agency 
as well as reality in general are emphasized whereas Estonia’s agency is rather 
weak. The country is seen as an observer which takes notes and sometimes 
criticizes but is not in a position to change anything despite dissatisfaction 
(lack of influence).  
The attitude expressed towards the EU makes a difference between the two 
sub-discourses. In Realize EU authority, the EU is seen as an actor which 
decides and influences things. Estonia in turn is expected to change its attitude 
and get rid of unreasoned optimism and faulty expectations. In another sub-
discourse Accept reality as own practice both abstract reality as well as own 
limitations are presented as factors that determine Estonia’s fate. In this sub-
discourse, the EU is not an actor but a circumstance, part of the inevitable 
reality ahead of Estonia. This way it does not make sense to look for the 
alternatives to the EU.  
However, in the form of a referendum, Estonia is seen to have one major 
and extraordinary possibility to act. Mapping this as a truly special and 
exceptional case also means a great responsibility. In a ‘once in a lifetime‘ case 
it is necessary to make the right decision. This one-time-only approach is 
characteristic of scenarios both inside as well as outside the EU. More 
concretely, after making a decision in the referendum, one can forget about 
Estonia’s agency and simply accept whatever follows.  
In order to argue either for or against the EU, various articles refer to both 
culture and language as being crucial to the existence of a small nation. Both 
joining the EU, as well as staying outside the EU, are claimed to be equally 
disastrous to language and culture. On one hand the dominance of major 
languages, especially English (but also French) inside the EU are seen as a 
potential threat to the small languages like Estonia’s. On the other hand, the 
future of Estonian language is related to the position of Russian-speaking 
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minority and the Russian language in Estonia whether it is inside or outside 
the EU.  
A lack of security is also admitted and debated in the articles. References 
are made to the hostile world and the necessity to admit to cold facts like 
Estonia’s location beside Russia, as well as the historical experience of losing 
independence. The discussion is largely based on the dichotomies of the East 
and West as stable and fixed entities. This is accompanied by the idea that a 
small country has never many options to choose from. 
Compared to the two previous discourses, should be/become is rather 
weakly represented in the current case whereas the failure-part is 
predominantly stronger than should-part (except in the case of own limits). 
This is in line with the overall dynamic of the discourse. Since hoping or 
accepting things do not necessarily have consequences in practice, the 
necessity of doing these might not be considered as too important. In the case 
of failure, however, one focuses on the practical consequences: negative future 
visions as potential consequences of current improper attitudes. This way, 
failure is used to point out the necessary corrections to current attitudes (in a 
form of ‘or else…’). 
Time-wise, negative scenarios inside the EU are presented both in the 
beginning as well as towards the end of the accession process whereas the 
negative scenarios outside the EU are concentrated towards the end, just prior 
to the referendum (mostly in 2003). This can be seen as part of the general 
pro-EU position taken by Postimees.  
Concerning the articles, a scenario outside the EU is equally present in the 
articles of all groups. The Political Elite articles emphasize the scenario inside 
the EU in the beginning of the accession process and the Readers in the end. 
More concretely, Readers almost lack as articles in 1997, no hopes and thus 
also no disappointment is presented in the letters to the editor. On the other 
hand the scenario inside the EU as fears and disappointment is clearly 
represented by Readers in 2002 and 2003. Thus, by the time the accession 
process had become more concrete the negative EU related scenarios had 
strengthened among the Readers and weakened among the Political Elite 
article. 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS: REPRESENTATION OF ESTONIAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES 
On the basis of this chapter, conclusions both about the discourses in 
Postimees as well as discourse of Postimees can be drawn. The first is based 
on the constitutivity of the discourses in the text level and being constituted by 
the sociocultural practice, whereas the second refers to the link between the 
text level and discourse practice in a form of intertextuality.  
While Fairclough (1995, 55) writes that language use can be constitutive in 
conventional ways (reproducing and maintaining existing social identities, 
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relations and systems of knowledge) as well as creative ways (help to transform 
them), in the current analysis both conventional and creative ways can be 
found. In all three discourses, following the terminology of Fairclough (1995, 
55) the creative way challenges conventional way of being constitutive; in the 
representation part of all three discourses, becoming is stronger than being. 
In European Estonia the becoming-part is mostly communicated through 
failure whereas in Independent Estonia where one does not lean on the EU 
norms, recognition is weaker than should-part.  
In general, this struggle in all three discourses can be seen as sign of social 
and political tensions that indicate scope for change (Raik 2003, 37). At the 
more concrete level, in each discourse the necessity of becoming is based on 
the overall logic of the discourse. In European Estonia where EU authority is 
admired, a need to change Estonia and become similar to the EU is 
communicated. The main idea of Independent Estonia is to behave as an 
independent country by changing its actions. Here, however, no explicit 
reference to transforming into something else is made. In Humble Estonia the 
focus is on changing one’s attitude towards the EU as the only aspect Estonia 
is capable of influencing. In all three cases, identity and action are tightly 
interlinked. The articles deal with different forms of action that are taken in 
this study as the basis of identity.  
However, despite the challenge, the term ‘creative‘ could also be questioned 
in the framework of the current study. Although becoming indicates change, 
it also points to concrete (mostly EU-given, in implicit or explicit ways) 
directions and gives guidance to what should be done without leaving much 
space for the ‘free flow of creativity‘. This is though in accordance with the 
character of formative moment (see Section 3.3). Analysis shows that instead 
of seeing this formative moment from the perspective of various possibilities, 
the question is about rational action during this window of opportunity.  
This link indicates a constitutive relationship between the text level and 
sociocultural practice: texts are socio-culturally shaped and they 
simultaneously constitute to society (Fairclough 1995, 34). The strength of 
becoming in discourses is a way that the formative moment as sociocultural 
practice constitutes to discourses. At the same time, the openly normative 
discourses constitute to the disciplined understanding of the formative 
moment. 
Even though the current research follows the logic of Billig (1995) in 
connection with banal stories of identity, it has not been directly applied here.  
First, while Billig writes about us, I analyze the relationship between 
Estonia and the EU that is often explicitly mapped in the media texts as a 
relationship between us and the EU. Here us refers to state, nation, citizens 
but also different spheres of life (for example Estonia’s education or 
agriculture). Therefore, the geographical division into local-regional-national 
community as us is one but not the only characteristic present in the media 
texts (see also Section 2.1).   
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At the same time, Estonia is not necessarily mapped as us. Some articles 
consciously distance themselves from ‘Estonia‘ and criticize it heavily. A clear 
minority of the articles are also written by Estonians living abroad or 
foreigners living in Estonia.  
Second, on the basis of the analysis, a distinction can be made between the 
articles that clearly focus on Estonia-EU relations and those where the EU is 
only mentioned. While asking about the relevance of the latter, in the spirit of 
Billig (1995) it can be claimed that the question is about ‘banal EU‘ – 
something that is not necessarily paid attention to but if continuously used, 
still makes the EU part of the everyday practice.  
Third, a banal communication of pro-EU attitude refers to the fact that only 
a few articles declare explicitly that one should vote for the EU. Implicit ways 
to communicate the same message are used much more often. A rather 
common setting in the articles is that negative developments and failures in 
society are ‘somebody’s fault’ and therefore followed by ambivalent inclusion 
(see Section 3.1 and Bishop and Jaworski 2003, 257, 261-262) whereas ‘all of 
us’ have contributed to the success. Needless to say that in the current case, 
developments in the EU accession process can be mapped as examples of this 
kind of success. As another example of banal support, articles position 
themselves substantially against but formally for the EU in a form of ‘I/we will 
vote for the EU even though I/we am/are not a Euro optimist(s)’. This also 
means that the general tone of the discussion is rather sceptical in the cases of 
all the discourses. Last but not least, the scenario outside the EU pointed out 
in Humble Estonia can be taken as an example where the setting between a 
‘bad and worse options’ is made.  
Although the analysis has focused on the struggle between, as well as 
inside, all three discourses, European Estonia is the most represented and also 
the most coherent. Throughout Estonia’s EU membership, this discourse has 
clearly become institutionalized (Estonia has ‘become European’). At the same 
time, for example, in Humble Estonia the situation is much more confusing 
since the potential consequences of this discourse at any point are not that 
clear cut.  
On the basis of the second point, the discourse of Postimees, the link 
between the text level and actors (discourse practice) in a form of 
intertextuality between official and newspaper discourse can be drawn. 
Logically, Estonia’s official enlargement/integration discourse has been 
widely based on official documents. At the core of this discourse, Kristi Raik 
(2003, 114-115, 123-126) has depicted the documents produced by the 
European Commission which was outlining its position as a non-political 
expert. In this way, the European Commission reports have played a central 
role in the formulation of Estonia’s integration policy and therefore has had a 
power role in constructing Estonia’s political and societal realities (Raik 2003, 
115, 128). 
The current study shows a strong position of the official discourse in the 
discourse of Postimees especially in the beginning of the accession process 
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when the EU as actor was referred to as an authority (sometimes ‘political‘ 
though instead of ‘objective’, see Realize EU authority)121. Also the topics dealt 
with in Postimees clearly repeated the processes taking place at the official 
arena (Estonia-EU relations). From the identity perspective, this means that 
the national identity is not just constructed in relation to the EU, in and by 
Postimees, but that the EU as an actor is allowed to take part of the identity 
construction process. Accordingly, the everyday level of ‘the common people’ 
remains in a rather illustrative role in the opinion articles.  
However, this study shows also that while in the beginning of the accession 
process the EU as an agency was used in Postimees for reasoning necessary 
societal changes and the Political Elite were very much present as the articles 
indicate, by the end of the accession process a shift away from EU as an agency 
and the Political Elite can be depicted. In terms of power relations this means 
that in reproducing the official discourse, and the EU as an integral part, the 
discourse of Postimees was evolving during the accession process. Accordingly 
the voices of the Cultural Elite as well as the Readers strengthened while the 
voice of the Political Elite weakened. 
In order to explain the change, parallels to the research of Kristi Raik can 
be drawn. Raik (2003) writes about a shift in Estonia’s public EU discussion 
from an existential to a pragmatic approach. She claims that it was further 
confirmed by the invitation to Estonia to start membership negotiations with 
NATO in 2002 which weakened the argument that EU membership is 
necessary for the country’s security (2003, 195-199). 
However, the shift can also be linked to Estonia’s opinion polls at the time, 
since the polls showed that references to the EU authority in relation to 
societal reforms as well as EU accession as a project of the elite were both 
indicators behind the low public support towards EU accession (see Chapter 
1). Therefore, it is possible to ask whether or not this shift was based on the 
conscious decision of Postimees to raise public support for Estonia’s EU 
accession.  
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                          
121 Similar conclusions were also drawn by Kristi Raik (2003, 197) on the basis of analysing 
Postimees from 1995-2000. 
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6. RELATIONS AND IDENTITIES: ESTONIAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY DISCOURSES 
Apart from the relationship between Estonia and the EU as representation, 
relations and identities at the meta-level are analyzed in the articles of 
Postimees (see Figures 5.1-5.3). This part of the study is based on an 
interpersonal function of the language that in principle implicitly claims co-
membership and solidarity between the paper and audience (Fairclough 1995, 
71). In the context of representation, the issue is about the (re)action of us in 
relation to the EU as the Other whereas this chapter focuses on self-reflection 
of us and our understandings, (re)producing of subject positions in three 
discourses (see Section 3.1). Therefore, the analysis is focused on the social 
identities and relationships set up in the texts (Fairclough 1995, 5). 
Accordingly, the normativity is not related to EU’s practice or agency 
(substance of the accession) but to the values and virtues appreciated in the 
society122. Since I, as an author, take the citizens’ viewpoint in this section of 
the monograph, my own position is more normative and therefore also more 
visible than it was in the previous chapter.  
Since Fairclough’s discourse analysis does not provide a practical model for 
analyzing relations and identities, the current framework has been built in 
connection to the empirical analysis. The current study understands identities 
either as subject positions that are taken by articles or a way of mapping the 
other societal parties (those who are talked about and talked to). While own 
position is not explicitly named, mapping the other parties starts from 
naming: they can be called Eurosceptics, politicians, people etc. In the articles 
the explicit focus is either on the author of the article, those addressed in the 
texts or both, even though implicitly both sides are present. 
Identities form the basis for reciprocal relations between the writers and 
those addressed in their articles. The tone used for addressing society in 
general or certain parties, varies from friendly to ironical and hostile. The aim 
of the articles, in the first case, is to integrate and include society, to show the 
common worries and duties. In the second case, the aim is to exclude the 
improper element from the common us. This process is an example of 
inclusion and exclusion/alienation for making a distinction between the 
‘proper’ and ‘improper’ citizens (Fairclough 1995, 181; see also Section 3.1). 
For instance a Journalist article that deals with abandoning the death penalty, 
claims that the Estonian state already shares the European level of 
understanding that sooner or later the death penalty should be abandoned. 
The article continues that it might little by little spread also to the masses, to 
                                                          
122 At the same time though, the articles deal with the EU as well and some of them could be (and 
have been) analysed as part of both representation as well as relations and identities (for example 
Political Elite article, PM, 03.02.1998). 
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the conscience of the people who should after for a while become European 
citizens (PM, 18.03.1998a). Instead of citizens, the Journalist article talks 
about the masses, as anonymous and impersonal group of people. While the 
state officials understand what is going on the ‘masses’ are not that intelligent 
and therefore do not qualify as European citizens (yet).  
In all three discourses, European Estonia, Independent Estonia and 
Humble Estonia, similar to representation, the notions of relations and 
identities can be divided into being and becoming, and thus accordingly 
Being/Becoming informed, Being/Becoming rational and Being/Becoming 
realist. The norms communicated by being informed, rational and realist are 
all based on a certain logic of understanding things, not the substance of 
realism or the rationality. Even though information is debated in some articles, 
the notions of being and becoming informed refers mostly to the logic of the 
linear communication model as the basis of being informed.  
6.1 BEING AND BECOMING INFORMED: 
“IT IS A SIN TO SAVE UP FROM INFORMATION” 
(PM, 02.07.2003B) 
In the representation part of European Estonia (where do we belong), the EU 
was seen as an authority whose guidance Estonia is supposed to follow without 
complaining whereas the current part, relations and identities (who we are) 
focuses on the ideal of being informed about the EU. Both sides of the 
discourse, representation as well as relations and identities are brought 
together in an example of a Political Elite article which writes that in addition 
to the technical problems there are nuances that one should also make oneself 
clear before joining the EU (PM, 03.02.1998). The article refers to the 
technical problems that should be solved before the accession 
(representation). In parallel the meta-level (relations and identities) can be 
depicted: it is necessary to make certain issues clear and become informed and 
aware of them.  
BEING INFORMED OR UNINFORMED 
In Being informed one either admits that people know a lot about the EU 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 05.06.1998b) or they lack knowledge (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 06.08.1998). Here, however, the lack of knowledge is presented as 
being acceptable and not as a shortcoming. Accordingly, no one is blamed. 
Especially at the beginning of the accession process, it is admitted that 
nobody actually knows everything about the EU: it is not clear though what 
the act of joining the European Union gives us, since nobody talks about it and 
this leads to the real conclusions that nobody knows (Political Elite article, PM, 
17.03.1997b). Another Political Elite article writes that the curious aspect of 
the forthcoming negotiations is that we do not know and cannot know at the 
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moment into which EU we will go (PM, 29.10.1998). Similarly, a Journalist 
article claims that we do not even know yet what the anthem of the new EU is 
or if it even exists (PM, 08.11.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 
16.09.1998).  
Towards the end of the accession process a Cultural Elite article writes 
allegorically that we do not know if it is allowed to cough in the EU, since from 
our perspective joining the European Union under the current conditions is 
like jumping into the water in an unknown place (PM, 18.01.2003b). Even 
though the articles, and thus their authors by default, referred to above admit 
that nobody knows what the EU accession means in practice, the situation is 
accepted. With the term us everybody is also put into the same position and 
no specific groups are excluded.   
Apart from the articles that deal with ‘all of us’, in some cases certain people 
are pointed out as those who lack knowledge. However, these people are 
understood and helped, not condemned for their ignorance (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 25.10.1997). For example, a Readers article writes about the 
threatened rise of sugar and gas prices in connection with the EU accession 
that inevitably brings about rising prices of other goods and services, all of 
which makes people extremely nervous (PM, 16.07.2003a; see also PM, 
30.07.2003). The connection made between the EU accession and the sugar 
and gas prices also means that the term ‘people’ refers to those who are 
worried about their difficult socioeconomic situation. A similar understanding 
of ‘people’ is also expressed in a Journalist article about the EU information 
day: “In places one is not as much against the Euro Union as against the 
unawareness that joining the EU brings about.”123 (PM, 11.04.1997; see also 
Political Elite article PM, 23.04.2003). The term ‘places’ used by the article is 
a rather exceptional way of talking about the people who live in small towns 
and villages.   
Apart from knowing or not knowing, the articles also deal with 
understanding or not understanding things.  A Cultural Elite article writes that 
on the basis of the research results one can draw the conclusion that at the 
personal level, Estonians have not yet clearly realized the potential positive 
changes that joining the EU infers (PM, 17.09.1998). An opposite view is 
expressed in another article on the basis of an opinion poll indicating that at 
least 60% of people think that Estonia gets direct benefits from the European 
integration process. Article contends that despite some hesitancy, most 
Estonians have quite a clear understanding that while joining the European 
Union, Estonia is more likely to win than lose (PM, 16.06.1998; see also 
Cultural Elite article PM, 12.07.2003b). Another example, a Political Elite 
article claims that probably more and more people have gone deep into the 
accession details and reached to the conviction that joining the European 
Union is a reasonable activity and those who have worked hard for this, have 
                                                          
123 Kohtadel polda meelestatud niivõrd euroliidu vastu, kuivõrd teadmatuse vastu, mis sinna 
astumine kaasa toob.  
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done it well (PM, 13.12.2002). Therefore, the main issue is not related to the 
variety of opinions about the EU membership but correct understanding of 
things. Similarly, a Readers article praises the correct understanding in case 
of the politicians who have been active in connection with regaining Estonian 
independence like Lennart Meri, Siim Kallas, Marju Lauristin, Tunne Kelam 
etc. The article writes that they are clearly for joining the EU, since they 
understand that the EU secures our independence (PM, 12.07.2003c). 
Mapping the politicians as ‘those who helped to regain Estonian 
independence’ gives extra credit to their opinions also on the EU issue.  
Conclusively, even though no openly normative statements are made in the 
being-part, implicitly the examples still contain a message to those different 
from us. Praising those who have understood things in a correct way means 
that the same goal is set for the rest as a precondition for being part of us. In 
the case of ‘people’, one understands and accepts their lack of knowledge but 
also lets the more informed groups know that their help is possibly needed in 
this situation.   
SHOULD INFORM AND BE INFORMED: MODEL OF FIVE “W” 
The logic of Becoming informed can be understood with the help of a 
transmission model as analytical tool. Instead of one single model, various 
models can be depicted (for example Fiske [1982]1990, 6-38), as a common 
feature, they all view the communication process as a linear one (from sender 
to the recipient) with the clear goal to get the message transmitted. From the 
various models, I use Harold Lasswell’s ‘five Ws’ for this study (Lasswell 1948). 
The Ws refer to ‘who’ says ‘what’ to ‘whom’ through ‘which channel’ with ‘what 
effect’. Except for the channel, the current analysis pays attention to all aspects 
of this model as well as the relationships between the aspects. In doing so I 
take the model as a tool for systematizing and analyzing the empirical data 
(similarly to the usage of the IR theories). 
As in representation, normativity is expressed either by criticizing the 
current situation or stating normatively what should be done. Combining this 
distinction with Lasswell’s model would, however, make the whole picture 
rather complicated. Therefore, in this part, both criticism and statements of 
what should be done are dealt with together.  
As an example of criticism, a Readers article writes that the accusation 
expressed in journalism to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as if he did not want 
to present own conditions in the negotiations, shows our scant knowledge 
about EU institutions as well as the principles of action (PM, 18.12.1997b; see 
also Political Elite article, PM, 27.01.2003). As a should-statement, a Readers 
article writes that the information guiding us towards the EU should give the 
rural people a clear and detailed picture of things they consider important 
(PM, 30.07.2003). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that one has to 
know the whole Accession Treaty literally (PM, 04.01.2003; see also PM, 
02.05.2003b) and a Journalist article states: I/we very much hope that 
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Estonians as an educated nation make the situation to themselves as clear as 
possible (PM, 08.10.1998b). Despite the open normativity common to all the 
articles, they each have a different target. In the first example, the article 
focuses on the content of the information whereas the latter emphasize a 
necessity to make things clear.  
In the following analysis, distinctions are made between the four “W”s, 
even though the borders drawn between these are clearly analytical ones. For 
example, in relation to informing people, both the information as a message 
and the people as recipients can be analyzed, although we are not talking about 
the sender who is supposed to deliver the information. However, starting with 
the relationship between sender and recipient and moving on with the 
message and effect enables systematic analysis of the data from various 
aspects. 
Sender and recipient: what is the difference between monologue and 
dialogue? 
Despite the logic of linear communication, most of the articles urge society to 
have ‘debates’ or ‘discussions’ related to the EU (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
12.08.1997b). A Political Elite article writes before the beginning of the 
accession negotiations that Estonia has to form clear positions and know its 
aims: this is the topic political forces should speak out about (oma suud 
puhtaks rääkima), thus later nobody could complain why it was not done in 
this way or that way (PM, 25.07.1997a; see also PM, 05.08.2002b). The same 
logic is used by a Journalist article which writes that conspiracy theories show 
that everything has not been sufficiently explained (selgeks räägitud) in 
Estonia (PM, 01.06.2002a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that issues 
with such importance should be always cleared by finding a solution (PM, 
06.11.1998c) and reaching mutual understanding about things (PM, 
04.09.2002).  
Even though the examples above urge dialogue or debate, the focus is not 
on the process but the final result, reaching a conclusion and thus closing the 
case. Another common feature of the examples is the restrictions on 
participation: the claim that political forces should clear up issues indicates 
that the discussion is meant first and foremost for political decision makers.  
In relation to the wider public, discussion is considered either necessary or 
futile. At the beginning of the accession process a Journalist article argues for 
the futility of discussion:  
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Estonia does not need Euro discussion but Euro enlightenment, Euro 
information like one has used to call it in our state apparatus. In this 
sphere there is really a lot to do.124  
PM, 11.09.1997a 
With the term ‘enlightenment’, the article shows that qualitative change is 
needed before being able to even think about the discussion. In order to make 
the change possible one considers it necessary that a sufficient amount of 
information is initially sent to the recipients.  
In a similar example a Cultural Elite article writes that since both EU 
officials as well as Estonian politicians have emphasized the importance of 
the debate, in their footsteps journalists have tried for several months 
already to desperately find the Eurosceptics for keeping at least some of the 
debate going (vähegi vaidlusena üleval) (PM, 24.12.1997c). Thus, the debate 
is not kept going due to its substantial importance but since some groups 
have considered it necessary. However, as a ‘desperate’ search for the 
Eurosceptics clearly shows, substantially this kind of debate does not offer 
any additional value.  
In most cases, however, societal debate or discussion during the accession 
process is considered necessary (Readers article, PM, 18.12.1997b). For 
example, a Political Elite article calls for serious internal debate and discussion 
at a more advanced level and states that we have to move on from the rhetoric 
used dozen years ago as “federal state or the union of the states” (liitriik või 
riikide liit) (PM, 11.02.2002). Similarly, other Political Elite articles write that 
the wider public discussion concerning changes of constitution should be 
opened (PM, 22.01.2002a) and Estonians have to start discussing now, what 
role we are going to perform in Europe and how it is done (PM, 
16.04.2003a)125. Also a Journalist article points out critically that until now, 
no substantial debate has been held in society (PM, 13.08.2003d).  
At the same time, the articles urging people to participate in the public 
discussion are rather exceptional (Political Elite articles, PM, 28.07.1998 and 
PM, 02.04.2002c). In most cases people are seen as an audience to whom the 
EU knowledge should be delivered in a form of a debate or a discussion. 
Therefore, in substantial means, the calls for debate or discussion do not 
necessarily differ much from the requests to inform people (a monologue). For 
example, a Readers article writes that the media should promote EU 
discussion, since half of Estonia’s population cannot use the Internet, many do 
not have a phone but the newspapers are published in every corner of Estonia 
and everybody reads them (PM, 27.08.2003; see also PM, 18.12.1997b). 
                                                          
124 Eesti ei vaja mitte eurodiskussiooni, vaid pigem eurovalgustust, euroinfot, nagu meie 
riigiaparaadis seda on harjutud kutsuma. Sellel alal on aga küll väga palju teha. 
125 Apart from that the EU is seen in some articles as a good reason to activate general societal debate. 
For example a Political Elite article writes that the future of the EU and Estonian position in it offer a 
good topic for a Prime Minister to talk about to the people (PM, 10.10.2002b; see also PM, 09.06.1997). 
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Another Readers article states that discussion should be open to explain the 
possibilities handicapped people have in the EU (PM, 28.07.2003). Even 
though the examples above emphasize the importance of discussion, people 
are still in a position of recipients: the issue is first and foremost about getting 
knowledge about the EU, not making oneself heard.  
Before the accession referendum, active participation of one more group, 
various experts, is proclaimed by a Readers article (PM, 21.07.2003c). 
Similarly, a Journalist article writes that one task for the politicians, including 
the members of the parliament, is to participate in the debates of the European 
Union enlargement referendum, thus the people can make a reasonable choice 
after being aware of the benefit as well as any possible threats (PM, 
31.03.2003).  
Also substantially, a discussion is emphasized mostly in relation to those 
issues that come from the EU side, not those that arise domestically. For 
example, a Cultural Elite article writes that most of the people do not probably 
wish to give an unclear mandate for cutting their constitutional rights, but 
wish to know exactly what paragraphs of the constitution will be implemented 
on the basis of the EU norms (PM, 04.01.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite 
article writes that unfortunately the government has not considered it 
necessary to talk with the people and its representatives about what the key 
issues of Estonian development are (PM, 09.12.2002b). The terms ‘people’ and 
‘its representatives’ might refer to the ordinary people and the opinion leaders. 
At the same time the ‘representatives of the people’ (rahvaesindajad) means 
members of the parliament. Therefore, the criticism is not necessarily targeted 
towards the lack of public discussion but the lack of discussion between the 
government and the opposition. 
Conclusively, even though the articles urge for ‘debate’ and ‘discussion’ or 
criticize these for being limited and superficial (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
23.01.2003), substantially the issue is rather about informing people as an 
audience of the decision makers. This way from the people’s perspective, the 
term ‘show’ that can be followed would be a more precise definition (Readers 
article, PM, 15.07.1997a) At the time when two teams, for and against the EU, 
get ready for the debate, the rest of the people as an audience can sit back and 
follow how the community is imagined (about similar setting in Finland see 
Kivikuru 1996a, 395).   
In substantial means the debates offered for the people are meant for 
delivering ready-made objective information to the audience. On the basis of 
these debates, people are supposed to learn the pluses and minuses of the EU 
membership. This way the individual aspect is rather excluded from the 
process, since the general basis for the decision making is supposed to be the 
same for everybody. 
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Sender and recipient: one should get informed for informing people 
In the previous part the focus was on linear communication process between 
the sender and the recipient whereas here the roles and relationship between 
these two sides are analyzed. In general, the relationship is based on 
expectation that experts, like the political elite, take the responsibility for 
informing people. In some cases, however, as a starting point, politicians are 
urged to get informed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 24.12.1997c), since during 
the EU accession, competent people are needed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
11.11.2003). Similarly, it is stated that politicians have to make things 
substantially clear to themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 08.09.1997 and 
Political Elite article, PM, 12.08.2002) before they start to teach the others 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.08.2003c).  
In most articles, however, the necessity that politicians should make things 
clear to themselves is communicated by criticism that they are currently 
uninformed (for example Political Elite article, PM, 29.05.1997; Journalist 
article, PM, 20.02.2002; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.02.1997). For 
example a Journalist article writes about the discussion held in the parliament 
during the visit of Finnish high level foreign political actor Jaakko Iloniemi:  
Raoul Üksvärav, with a probable attempt to refer to the bureaucracy 
and the decision making mechanisms was interested if Brussels really 
is like Moscow was once. 
Juhan Aare, in turn was worried if Estonian language is going to 
survive in the European Union.126  
PM, 10.04.1997b  
The article concludes that if the decision making of Riigikogu is based on this 
kind of level of awareness it is quite terrifying to think about the future (PM, 
10.04.1997b). By this conclusion it is also made clear that stupid questions do 
exist and it is always better to avoid than to ask them.   
Some articles take the position of a (not too sincere) therapist, (who 
pretends) to understand why politicians are uninformed. For example, a 
Political Elite article writes that Edgar Savisaar’s superficial knowledge about 
European development is probably caused by his huge work load as the Mayor 
of Tallinn (PM, 11.07.2003b). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that 
those who juggle with the coalition agreement budget numbers have probably 
forgotten about the impact of the EU accession on incoming taxes (PM, 
01.04.2003).  
Apart from politicians the other actors responsible for informing people are 
also criticized for not being informed. A Political Elite article writes that most 
                                                          
126 Raoul Üksvärav tundis huvi, kas Brüssel on ikka nagu Moskva vanasti, tahtes ilmselt viidata 
bürokraatiale ja otsuste tegemise mehhanismidele.  
Juhan Aare omakorda tundis muret, kas eesti keel ikka jääb Euroopa Liidus kestma. 
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of our members of parliament and businessmen not to mention journalists 
have not until now made themselves clear as to what the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) means in practice (PM, 31.10.1998a). Another article claims that 
even this part of the mental elite (vaimueliit) to whom the information is most 
accessible, has not understood European orientations (Political Elite article, 
PM, 10.03.1998 and Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b). 
Journalists are also amongst the uninformed (Political Elite article, PM, 
07.12.1998). For instance a Cultural Elite article asks ironically: Cannot 
Estonia set its conditions in the negotiations with the European Union? Are 
not we able to let them know that we leave part of the European Union 
demands outstanding and from the 80 000 pages of the EU laws we will take 
over only the things we like? These discoveries have in recent weeks struck 
Estonian journalists127 out of the blue (välk selgest taevast) (PM, 17.12.1997a). 
The article also uses an expression ”the forces of the startled ones” (jahmunute 
vägi) to characterize the pathos of Estonian journalists who are struck (by 
surprise) by self-evident things.  
However most of the articles treat politicians, and other leading societal 
groups who are above being criticized for being uninformed, as responsible for 
informing the general public. This accords with what Fairclough (1995, 4) has 
characterized as a relationship between authors and audience: those who 
know have a right to tell whereas the audience as receptive waits to be told. As 
the senders in the 5W model they are urged to inform rather passive people 
and criticized for not doing so.  
The articles widely communicate the attitude that those who are more 
educated/experienced/know more, for example politicians (Readers article, 
PM, 09.02.1998) have to inform the uninformed ones (Political Elite articles, 
PM, 03.07.1997 and PM, 18.06.1997 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 
29.07.1997). As Cultural Elite article writes the EU accession has been a 
priority of all Estonian governments [since 1991 - SKK] and therefore one 
should not be ashamed of this policy but to declare, protect and explain it 
forcefully (PM, 21.07.2003a; see also PM, 08.09.1997). Also the Cultural Elite 
articles emphasize the necessity to enlighten people in the EU issue (PM, 
29.07.1997) and introduce the EU (PM, 24.12.1997c; see also PM, 
04.08.1997a).  
Similarly, Readers articles write that as a preparation for the EU it is 
necessary to tell people what difficulties Estonia has, to date, had in the United 
Nations (PM, 24.03.2003) and the possibility to use the phrase ‘from one 
union to another’ enforces the leaders to make extra careful distinction 
between the aspects that make the EU different from the Soviet Union (PM, 
24.12.1997b). Therefore, the government has to read and translate into 
Estonian all the European Union legislative acts and present them to the 
people (Readers article, PM, 03.05.2003a), since it is government’s duty to 
                                                          
127 In Estonian, the target of criticism is “Eesti ajakirjandus”, of what the direct translation would be 
“Estonian journalism”.  
 200 
 
give people enough knowledge what will bring the EU accession to the 
ordinary citizen (Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997).  
In addition to politicians, other groups, for instance the cultural elite 
(Journalist article, PM, 14.07.2003a) are seen as responsible for, as well as 
entitled to, informing people. For instance a Readers article writes that before 
the referendum one would like to see in all Estonian papers absolutely 
objective analysis where all positive and negative phenomena in politics, 
economy and culture related to the European Union accession are listed (PM, 
05.03.1997; see also PM, 27.08.2003). Journalist article claims that it is 
necessary to have more academic but interesting books about the EU that are 
not unintelligible to people (PM, 10.11.2003a; see also Cultural Elite article, 
PM, 25.10.1997). Another article writes that in the countries where the 
referendum has been held already, practice has shown that sportsmen, actors, 
singers and other well-known people help to explain European Union to the 
people. The article continues that this has been done in a very simple way and 
also Estonia’s campaign could be based on this (Journalist article, PM, 
21.05.2003a). Therefore, being well known in one sphere of life is counted as 
an asset also in EU expertise.  
Apart from urging actors to inform people, they are also criticized for not 
doing so (for example Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.2003). A Cultural Elite 
article writes about the era of minimalist outreach (PM, 21.07.2003a) and a 
Journalist article claims that the obscure moves of the Minister of European 
Affairs and the conferences with difficult names held in the conference halls of 
the capital city do not bring the EU thing closer to the people (PM, 11.09.1997a; 
see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.10.1997). Similarly, a Readers article 
claims that nobody has explained the EU to the people: for your information, 
in the EU this kind of pluses and minuses are waiting for us (PM, 30.05.1997; 
see also Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997).  
At a more concrete level, a Readers article indicates that the head of 
Estonian Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) Edgar Savisaar is the one 
responsible for not giving information about the EU to the supporters of the 
party (PM, 13.08.2003b). Another Readers article writes that President’s 
words that the EU is our first priority are not enough and also the yearly 
drawing and essay competitions do not give pupils an overview of reality (PM, 
04.03.1998; see also Political Elite article, PM, 23.04.2002). 
In the examples above that let the decision makers know their 
responsibility to inform people and explain things to them people are mostly 
implicitly mapped as passive recipients. In some cases, the inability of people 
to inform themselves is also clearly stated. For instance a Journalist article 
writes that at the time when parties compete through the mediation of the PR 
firms and waste several times more money for than it is used for the EU 
campaign, it would suddenly be too much to hope that an individual finds an 
answer to the issue oppressing her in her own head (PM, 06.08.2003b). 
Similarly, a Cultural Elite article outlines the ironic picture about the ideal 
‘common people’ by using their first names only (“Leida” and “Ants”) to whom 
 201 
 
the current elitist EU campaign is targeted. The criticism is directed towards 
putative expectation that people are supposed to make things clear to 
themselves and convince themselves in the positive essence of the EU (PM, 
21.07.2003a). Conclusively, one does not just have to make the accession 
treaty available for everybody but to discuss it comprehensively (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 04.01.2003).  
In addition to ‘people’ in general, certain groups are pointed out as those 
who should be informed or who have not been informed enough. For example 
in the Readers articles, rural people are mentioned as those who should be 
informed. An article expresses an indignation that one has not let the milk 
producers know what are the EU demands and thus, many do not dare to start 
renovation (PM, 06.01.1998b). Another article writes that since the 
inhabitants of the periphery are not as informed as those living in Tallinn, 
Tartu or Pärnu, those who do EU propaganda could travel more around 
Estonia, so that also the people in the smaller places would get more 
information (PM, 15.09.1998a; see also PM, 30.07.2003). In all these 
examples information about the EU is seen as background knowledge that is 
necessary to the people for a variety reasons.  
Conclusively, a Cultural Elite article writes that Estonian voters, whose 
lowest intellectual entertainment are “The Bold and the Beautiful” and other 
programs of that kind, do not want to fidget in the net (võrgus sipelda) of for 
and against arguments for the EU, but gets angry when one demands such an 
effort (PM, 21.07.2003a). It is clear, though, that one cannot ask people to take 
the responsibility for them if they are like fish in the net: not too intellectual 
but get panicked or aggressive in front of too complicated tasks.  
Even though the idea about passive people who are informed by various 
facets is a common way to understand communication process, some articles 
also question the model. In the case of the sender, it means that the role of 
politicians is diminished. In the context of the recipient the responsibility of 
the people is emphasized.  
Sender: not “the only ones called upon” (PM, 21.05.2003a) 
Despite the strong claim that as ‘experts’ politicians are responsible for 
informing people, the overall attitude towards the politicians as informants 
was ambivalent. Apart from admitting their expertise in the EU issue, 
politicians and their statements are also framed as indifferent (Journalist 
article, PM, 26.07.2003) or illegitimate. Another article writes that in the case 
information comes from an unpopular party, the information also becomes 
unpopular. Therefore, the article concludes, it is not good if the government 
will be responsible for delivering EU information (PM, 02.06.1997), since 
people identify the sins of Estonian politicians with the EU (PM, 19.08.2003a).  
In addition to the biblical terms used above, criticism towards the 
politicians is expressed on a secular basis. A Political Elite article blames 
government for messing up things on purpose and seeing the referendum as a 
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game without rules (PM, 13.08.2003c). A Readers article writes in connection 
with the EU passports that our own politicians and officials have, previously 
and now, spoken a lot of humbug (mesijuttu) (PM, 02.05.2003c) and a 
Cultural Elite article expresses criticism that the accession referendum was 
connected to the party propaganda in a way that could have warned of the 
result (PM, 16.10.2003). A Journalist article also writes about the hypocrisy of 
politicians (PM, 14.07.2003a).  
In some examples criticism is directed towards political hassle and the 
conflict of politicians (Political Elite article, PM, 08.03.2002b). A Journalist 
article describes the atmosphere of general rivalry and cockfighting in which 
the European Union accession negotiations were turned in its decisive 
moment into a battlefield of the interested parties (PM, 14.08.2003a). 
Similarly, a reference about the front line between the for and against side is 
made by a Cultural Elite article (PM, 08.09.1997). Another article states that 
mistakenly, the enlargement issue has been turned into the battleground of 
the parties, even though less than ten percent of the society belongs to them 
(PM, 13.08.2003d). On the basis of their membership, the article depicts the 
parties as minor actors of the society and thus implicitly also questions the 
position they have from the perspective of representative democracy.   
Conclusively, a Journalist article writes, it is better if the party politicians, 
especially those who people remember from their hypocrisy in previous times, 
would not take too brave a bow (eriti uljaid poognaid) on the stage of the EU-
dance but give the experts and commoners (lihtinimestel) a possibility to 
discuss the wins and losses that the accession brings about (PM, 14.07.2003a). 
Reference to the dance makes politicians’ action in connection with the EU as 
something that might look nice but does not have any substantial value 
comparable to the discussion of experts and ordinary people. At the same time 
the terms ‘experts’ and ‘commoners’ used for mapping the parties give a 
picture of rather imbalanced communication process where, to the latter, at 
least implicitly recipient’s position is reserved.  
Recipient: guilty of being uninformed or too informed 
Unlike in the previous cases that emphasized the necessity to inform people, 
here the ideal is based on an assumption that people are responsible for 
making things clear to themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.07.2003c and 
PM, 12.07.2003b). A Political Elite article writes, everybody should follow 
what is going on in the EU Summit, since the decisions made there affect 
everyone in Estonia (PM, 20.06.2003a) and it is important to know our rights 
as citizens in the legal space of Europe (PM, 11.02.2002; see also Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 02.05.2003b). As a result of the EU discussion every Estonian 
could define why and how is the EU accession useful or harmful not only to 
Estonia but also to themselves and what are the consequences it will bring 
about (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997; see also Political Elite article, 
18.05.1998).  
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At the same time, responsibility is used as an exclusion mechanism to take 
a distance from the people. For example, a Cultural Elite article criticizes those 
who live in history without any knowledge about the current time: some live 
in the year 1979, others in 1939. The article continues that it is none of their 
business that meanwhile the world and Europe have changed remarkably (PM, 
01.08.2003d). Similarly, a Journalist article confronts itself to those who 
complain about information: 
At the moment, it is popular to yammer that Euro propaganda kills. At 
the same time, in case of not having Euro propaganda, one could 
complain why media and the government do not inform the people. It 
is always possible to moan. 
To crown it all, it seems that in the background of the information 
campaign people are still not informed about the European Union.128  
PM, 06.08.2003b 
The example above criticizes people for two things: continuous complaints 
about the delivery of information as well as lacking EU knowledge. By the term 
‘it is popular…’ the criticism of EU propaganda is shown as fashionable 
attitude, not a substantial position. At the same time complaining is seen as a 
vital condition of the people who are labelled as uninformed. The article also 
uses ‘information’ and ‘propaganda’ as synonyms. However, a distinction is 
made between Postimees which understands the value of the EU information 
and the people who call EU information ‘propaganda’ for underestimating its 
value (see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.12.2002b and Political Elite article, 
PM, 23.08.1997). 
The most criticized people, who are also urged to clarify things to them are 
those against Estonia’s EU accession. Also those who have not decided yet are 
urged to gather information (Readers article, PM, 04.08.2003). The ones 
against the EU are either criticized for being uninformed and not knowing 
what is going on (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 01.06.1998 and PM, 21.07.1997) 
or misunderstanding things (Readers article, PM, 27.04.1998 and Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 19.07.2003a). A Readers article writes that at the moment it 
seems that half of the schoolchildren are Euro optimists and half Euro 
pessimists whereas the latter suffer from lack of information, since they do not 
bother (viitsi) to look for it from the media (PM, 04.03.1998). With the term 
‘suffer from’ being ‘Euro pessimist’ is indicated as a not too comfortable 
position. However, the claim that those who suffer still do not bother to look 
for information, shows that apart from being ignorant, they are also lazy.  
                                                          
128 Popp on praegu haliseda selle üle, kuidas europropaganda tapab. Samas saaks europropaganda 
puudumisel hädaldada selle üle, miks ajakirjandus ja valitsus inimesi ei teavita. Viriseda saab alati. 
Kõigele krooniks tundub, et teavitamiskampaania taustal ei ole inimesed Euroopa Liidust ikka 
informeeritud. 
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In addition to criticizing unawareness, those against EU are also urged to 
find out about things. A Cultural Elite article writes that before getting into 
polemics, they should make the subject they polemicize about clear to 
themselves (PM, 06.08.1997). Similarly, a Journalist article claims that what 
Eurosceptics should learn from the Danes’ EU debates is that stubborn 
thinking can give good results only if one is capable of counting (PM, 
29.05.1998b). Another article states that it would be instructive to read once 
more this part of the state leaders’ statement that predicts what happens if we 
do not join the European Union (PM, 26.06.2003). Also a Readers article 
writes that before making their decision all those who are against the EU 
should get to know the (near) history of Estonia and its neighboring countries 
especially in the Russian context as profoundly as possible (PM, 02.07.2003a).  
Apart from urging people to get informed some articles question how 
uninformed people can participate in the referendum. For example, a Readers 
article asks how can one decide without knowing slightest bit about the 
legislative acts valid in the EU and continues that only after general 
exploration of the EU information people could have their say in the 
referendum (PM, 03.05.2003a). Also Political Elite articles claim that in the 
current situation it does not make any sense to organize a referendum (PM, 
17.07.1997 and PM, 21.08.1997b). 
Paradoxically, in parallel to criticizing people for the lack of information 
and urging them to get informed it is also claimed that one should not ask for 
too much information. A Cultural Elite article writes that it seems that people 
have an unfettered wish to get more explanations and the attitude of the askers 
(pärijad) is especially interesting, since if one answers their questions, 
immediately twice as many new questions and askers (küsijaid) emerge (PM, 
22.06.1998; see also PM, 12.08.1997b). Similarly, a Journalist article uses an 
expression ‘curiosity killed a cat’ to show the absurdness of the claim that one 
should know everything about the European Union before joining it, since it is 
impossible to know everything about the EU. Apart from the impossible, a 
wish to know everything is also claimed to be deadly dangerous by the article 
and therefore we have to be curious but not too curious (PM 13.11.1997). 
The argument that one does not have to be too informed is also illustrated 
by the examples of everyday life. As Journalist article writes: just as not every 
high school graduate has to take a baccalaureate in mathematics, not every 
Estonian has to pass profound EU training (PM, 05.06.1998a). Mathematics 
has an image as a rather difficult and demanding discipline that some people 
are incapable of understanding. Thus, implicitly, the example makes a 
difference between the clever and dim people. At the same time one of the 
main arguments against having a final examination in mathematics is the 
claim that most of the people do not need it in their future life. Therefore, by 
comparing EU training to mathematics, the first is shown as passive 
theoretical knowledge, not something one could use in everyday life. 
The same article also claims that for being able to roast potatoes at home, 
one does not need Peeter Kard’s cookbook. Here, the article refers to an 
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Estonian actor who is also known as an amateur chef and author of cook books. 
Again a difference is made between the simple ‘kitchen tasks’ like roasting 
potatoes, meant for everybody and the more demanding issues (like writing 
cook books or dealing with the EU) that most people do not have to worry 
about. 
A Political Elite article uses similar logic when comparing the EU 
referendum to buying a washing machine. The article writes that instead of 
testing the machine in the store, it is normal to trust the expert information 
got from the shop assistants. The article calls for the same pattern for the issue 
of the EU: in a way it is presumed that all who vote have to read a treaty of 
6000 pages and for being able to understand this they have passed voluminous 
courses of economics, law, European history etc. Until this has been 
completed, one can keep saying that people are not informed enough (PM, 
12.08.2003b). Comparing the EU accession to buying a washing machine 
equates referendum to a rather trivial everyday decision, like whether to prefer 
Siemens or Bosch. In order to help people to decide experts, who are capable 
of providing objective information about the pluses and minuses, are listened 
to. This way the decision whether or not to join the EU, is supposed to be based 
on technical data and pure facts129.   
Conclusively, explicitly or implicitly, the necessity to find out about the EU 
issues or a criticism of doing or not doing that is at large targeted towards those 
who are against the EU. The claims that people should get informed before 
participating in the debates or keep quiet, since they do not know enough are 
based on the logic that knowledge about the EU would probably change critical 
attitude into more positive direction. At the same time those who complain 
about lack of information and knowledge are urged to trust the experts and 
focus on their everyday life where the detailed EU knowledge is not needed.  
Effect: informed people vote Yes or …Yes130 
At the theoretical level, the most important element of the linear 
communication model is the effect aimed at by the sender. In the current case, 
the expected effect is very much related to the support towards Estonian EU 
membership. As Journalist article writes, the information and explanations 
concerning the EU are supposed to help to block the claims as if the European 
Union was a project of the rich guys (rikkurid), the ‘first Estonia’131(PM, 
                                                          
129 Similar observations are also made by a Cultural Elite article in an answer to this article (PM, 
16.08.2003b).  
130 Informing people better about the EU as the main ‘solution’ offered in the articles to reduce 
Euroscepticism is pointed out also by Vallaste (2013, 119, 189). 
131 The term “first Estonia” was launched in 2002 in the public letter of social scientists (see Aarelaid, 
Berg, et al., PM, 23.04.2001) who were worried about the cleavages of society and the division between 
the minority getting along and not caring about the majority, the losers called “second/other Estonia” by 
the authors. The idea that Estonian society is divided into ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ has been cultivated also 
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21.05.2003a) and enable people to make a right decision in the referendum 
(Readers article, PM, 30.05.1997 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.08.1997b). 
A Cultural Elite article claims that despite the current low EU support the 
situation could still be saved if one explained Estonians that the European 
Union would become a factor that increases Estonian security (PM, 
26.06.1998). After the end of the accession negotiations a Journalist article 
emphasizes the need to explain to people the benefits behind the numbers 
achieved at the Copenhagen Summit and their influence on people’s wallets 
(Journalist article, PM, 11.12.2002a). 
Despite the goal of getting a Yes from the people in the referendum, the 
articles do not necessarily talk to the people but to those who are considered 
to be capable of and responsible for influencing people, like politicians 
(Readers article, PM, 18.07.1997a) or the politicians and officials in 
government (Cultural Elite article, PM, 17.09.1998 and Journalist article, PM, 
11.09.1997a). Government’s current measurements are also criticized 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.07.2003a) and for improving the situation, all 
means are seen to be necessary for the ultimate outcome - Yes - in the 
accession referendum:  
The government has to try even harder to explain people the conditions 
achieved in the negotiations. Otherwise the stories about politicians’ 
self-sufficient Brussels-project remain strong and there is no hope to 
get the Yes-word in the referendum held in September.132 
Journalist article, PM, 14.12.2002 
Similar examples are also in a Readers article (PM, 04.03.1998) and a Cultural 
Elite article (PM, 19.07.2003a).  
Conclusively, we will get the answer when people have understood that 
accession is useful for us and does not harm our national interests (Political 
Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997). Similarly, in the context of the necessity of 
people to be aware but not too aware of the EU, a vicious circle is formed: even 
though one has to ask for people’s opinion, it should not be done before they 
are sufficiently informed to be able to give the right answer. Thus, the 
referendum is supposed to be an event where the actual, major, work gets 
sealed not ruined. Implicitly, the setting leaves two options: either behave and 
vote Yes or take a role of an ignorant ingrate. 
                                                          
by the other scholars. For example, according to Peeter Vihalemm (2003, 590) the “losers” included 
people who had participated in the restoration of an independent Estonia like intellectuals, the older 
generation, survivors of Stalinist repressions and people in the villages and small towns. For personal 
reasons they also opposed rapid changes. 
132 Seda enam peab valitsus nüüd pingutama, et selgitada rahvale läbirääkimistel saavutatud 
tingimusi. Vastasel korral jäävad endiselt tugevaks jutud poliitikute omakasupüüdlikust Brüsseli-
projektist ning euroreferendumil septembris pole rahvalt jah-sõna loota. 
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Message: From information to explanations – no secrets, lies and 
propaganda! 
On the basis of the 5 Ws transmission model, the message is supposed to be 
identical in the phase of sending and receiving. In the case this is not so, the 
claim is that noise has disturbed the communication process, not for example, 
that the recipient might interpret the same information differently.  
The articles see the ideal message as true (Journalist article, PM, 11.09.1997a), 
objective and providing impartial information (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
29.07.1997 and Political Elite article, PM, 23.08.1997). The idea is in 
accordance to reality (Cultural Elite article, PM, 06.08.1997 and Readers 
article, PM, 24.07.2003a) and based on the arguments one can take seriously 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 10.08.1998). The Cultural Elite article writes that 
apart from the arguments that have become trivial it would be suitable to look 
for new claims and explanations where and why we will go (PM, 15.07.1998). 
Apart from that, concrete research is needed to find out about things (Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 10.08.1998). The articles also emphasize the importance of 
clarity and clear answers (Political Elite article, PM, 15.07.2002; Readers 
article, PM, 27.08.2003 and Cultural Elite article, PM, 12.07.2003b).  
At the same time a difference is made between proper and improper 
information, numbers versus verbiage (sõnamulin), as explained by a Readers 
article (PM, 03.07.2003b; see also Political Elite articles PM, 10.03.1998 and 
PM, 19.08.2003b). Improper information is framed on the basis of qualitative 
and quantitative means. An example of the former is wrong information, and 
of the latter, a shortage or an overload of the information.  
The articles critique telling lies, half-truths, hiding the truth or transmitting 
propaganda as wrong information. For example, a Political Elite article 
criticizes the Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond) for re-explaining 
the words of the highest agricultural official Franz Fischler on the basis of own 
taste (PM, 04.08.1997b). Also a Cultural Elite article writes that the claim that 
the rise of excise (aktsiisid) has been set by the EU directives, is nothing but 
pulling the wool over our eyes (puru silma ajamine) (PM, 30.03.1998).  
Towards the end of the accession process, criticism towards telling lies about 
Estonia’s future in the EU is expressed (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
02.05.2003b; Readers articles, PM, 25.07.2003b and PM, 02.06.2003c and 
Political Elite article PM, 09.08.2003b). Another Readers article comments on 
the claim that Estonia becomes more independent in the EU by asking why 
people are told lies and no real nature of the EU has been explained? (PM, 
24.07.2003c; see also Readers article, PM, 01.09.2003 and Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 14.08.2003c).  
The articles particularly criticized attempts by politicians to reason their 
actions with the demands of the EU (Readers article, PM, 10.12.1998). As 
Political Elite articles write the incompetent reasoning of the decisions that are 
either unpopular or even harmful to Estonian development with the demands 
of the European Union is a conceptual failure and anti-propaganda to the EU 
(PM, 16.12.1997; see also PM, 09.06.1998; PM, 21.07.1998 and PM, 
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10.02.1998; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.09.2003). Another Political 
Elite article raises the same issue in connection with officials and writes that 
for some of them the European Union seems to be a comfortable shadow for 
hiding suspicious initiatives (PM, 02.04.1997).  
As an example of half-truth a Readers article writes that people think what we 
are going to get from the EU but nothing is told about what we ourselves have 
to give back (PM, 17.12.1997c). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article expresses 
astonishment about the debates where the basic concept of the EU, peace, is 
forgotten (PM, 02.09.2003b). A Journalist article, in turn, writes that negative 
information concerning Estonia’s accession process tends not to spread (PM, 
10.04.1997a) and a Cultural Elite article claims that in the shadow of the 
pseudo discussions, the real mechanisms of the negotiations are quietly 
decided upon (PM, 24.12.1997c; see also PM, 05.09.2003 and Political Elite 
article, PM, 16.04.1998). Another Journalist article states that in the internal 
circle of politicians, one tells how things really are whereas for the people the 
idyllic (roosamanna) version is given (PM, 04.07.2003a; see also Cultural 
Elite articles, PM, 25.10.1997 and PM, 04.09.2002). In the last example, the 
article confronts the dessert that looks nice and tastes good to the truth that is 
supposed to be the opposite.  
Apart from half-truths, incomprehensive information is criticized. For 
example, a Journalist article condemns an unclear picture given about the 
agricultural sector in relation to the EU (PM, 17.04.2002) and a Cultural Elite 
article criticizes the Estonian Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) for not 
offering a clear vision about Estonia outside the EU (PM, 12.08.2003c). In 
addition Cultural Elite articles criticize declarative slogans and arguments 
(PM, 04.08.1997a), contradictory claims (PM, 23.01.2003), Yes-biased 
information (PM, 15.01.2003b) and black and white arguments in connection 
with the referendum (PM, 12.08.2003a).  
One way to show that certain information is not good enough is to call it 
‘propaganda’ (Journalist article, PM, 04.06.1997; Cultural Elite articles, PM, 
06.08.1997; PM, 23.07.2003 and PM, 09.08.2003a and Political Elite article, 
PM, 17.05.1997). Even though in some articles a distinction is made between 
good and poor quality propaganda (Journalist article, PM, 01.08.2003a), in 
most cases the propaganda is mapped on the basis of its poor quality (Cultural 
Elite article, PM, 10.09.2003b). For example a Readers article writes that the 
propaganda of those who are against the EU try to convince the voter that there 
will be no benefits but all kind of restrictions, prices will rise and salaries will 
be cut in the EU (PM, 02.07.2003a). Similarly, a Political Elite article states 
that we do not need any kind of stupid EU propaganda, no unreasoned claims 
about the rise of income and pensions waiting ahead (PM, 09.08.2003b).  
Apart from showing propaganda as useless, it was also depicted as harmful. 
For example a Cultural Elite article writes that possibly due to the shortage of 
the objective information, the attitude of the rural people towards the EU is 
predominantly irrelevant, since anyone who has grown up during the Soviet 
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period does not probably take the cheap propaganda booklets seriously (PM, 
26.08.1997b). 
As a second basis of criticism, the articles deal with quantitative means in a 
form of overload or shortage of information. Cultural Elite articles write about 
the shortage of information concerning the actual negotiation process (PM, 
16.06.1998) and point out that the multitude of articles about a certain issue 
does not show yet that anyone actually knows the topic: if ten fools teach each 
other, this does not mean that they all become wiser (PM, 06.08.1997). The 
last example confronts the qualitative and quantitative side by indicating that 
if they are not in accordance with each other, quality matters. For 
characterizing information overload, a Journalist article writes that there is 
too much information about the EU and it is difficult to orientate what is 
important and what is not (PM, 08.03.2002a), since the EU is urged on with 
all possible methods (Readers article, PM, 08.09.2003). 
Towards the end of the accession process, a shift from giving information to 
providing explanations to the people can be discerned. Even though one 
admits that things can be interpreted in various ways, it is also assumed that 
not all of these ways are equally correct ones and therefore guidance for 
interpretation should be given. For example, a Journalist article writes about 
the necessity to explain to people the pros and cons, as well as Estonian 
accession conditions before the EU referendum (PM, 16.12.2002a; see also 
PM, 21.05.2003a and Readers articles, PM, 15.09.1998a and PM, 
03.07.2003b). Similarly, a Political Elite article claims that politicians should 
properly illuminate (läbi valgustada) the problems connected to the EU in 
front of the voters so that the latter could make a justifiable choice with both 
heart and reason (PM, 10.07.2003). The term ‘illuminate’ refers to X-rays and 
emphasizes the impossibility of the ordinary people to understand anything 
on their own. Just as one needs a specialist to read the radiograph, an expert 
is needed to get to know the EU issues.   
Apart from general explanations, a shift from the macro to micro level is urged 
to explain more specific topics (Readers articles, PM, 16.07.2003a and PM, 
30.07.2003) or take a debate to the level of the citizens (Cultural Elite article, 
PM, 02.05.2003b). For example, a Journalist article writes that the accession 
conditions should explain what is going to change in individual’s life when 
Estonia joins to the European Union. The article continues with a criticism 
that the issue about the constitution surely takes the discussion back to the 
macro level where the main energy is used for arguing about such concepts 
like “nation state” (rahvusriik), “sovereignty” (suveräänsus) and 
“independence” (iseseisvus) (PM, 19.12.2002b; see also Cultural Elite article, 
PM, 25.10.1997). Here, the future scenario in the EU is presented as a certain 
package that ‘brings something along’ to the citizens. From the people’s 
perspective it is possible to either accept or reject the whole package but not to 
influence its content. This way, the call to bring the explanations into the micro 
level for getting closer to people’s everyday life goes hand in hand with the 
restricted agency of the citizens.  
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Conclusively, as an ideal clear, impartial, objective, comprehensive and 
sufficient information should be provided not a propaganda that is based on 
lies or half-truths. Also information overload or shortage is criticized by the 
articles. Analysis shows that the message in a form of information or 
explanations is targeted towards the people as recipients.  
SUMMARY: PASSIVE CITIZENS DECIDE AFTER APOLITICAL 
CAMPAIGN 
In Being and Becoming informed both ideal message as well as ideals for the 
sender and recipient are expressed. It is done similarly in the articles at both 
in the beginning and towards the end of the accession process. Namely, an 
ideal message is true and easily understandable, senders should tell the truth 
and recipients are expected to believe this. Therefore, the articles indicate 
transmission of the information as a general ideal.  
Even though the articles write about informing, explaining and debating, 
all these refer more or less to objective, true and neutral information or clear 
explanations that should be given. On the basis of the general assumption 
present in the articles ‘the people’ as subject (Fairclough [1989]2001, 153-155) 
lacks EU knowledge. Therefore, it should be provided by the politicians, other 
opinion leaders and the media. As part of the same process, EU issues are 
pointed out by the articles as something that people do not have first-hand 
experience about (see also Section 2.1).  
At the same time the ideal of efficiency characteristic to Estonia’s accession 
process (for example Raik 2003) is visible also in the public discussion. 
Instead of an arena for debates and a struggle for finding the best solution, the 
issue is about the debates as a show where the objective information as a 
ready-made truth is delivered to the people (for similar process in Finland see 
Kivikuru 1996a). 
In parallel to the call that political elite should inform people, also a fear of 
making the EU campaign ‘political’ is expressed. Here, the ‘political’ is not 
understood as a struggle for deciding about common things but a way of 
diminishing important things and tarnishing them. In the Estonian case, this 
fear can be connected to the low trust of political institutions and the poor 
image of the politicians at the time (see Chapter 1). It is, however, interesting, 
that the criticism towards politicians as improper informants is presented 
mostly by Journalist articles (see Section 3.2) whereas Readers articles urge 
politicians to give people true knowledge about things.  
For the citizens, the articles set out an ideal of being informed but not too 
informed. Apart from that, a linear connection between knowledge and 
attitude towards the EU is drawn. More concretely, a correlation between 
sufficient knowledge and the pro-EU attitude as well as lack of knowledge and 
being against the EU is seen. On the basis of this logic, any discussion between 
the Yes and No camps is rather impossible, since one is either informed and 
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understands things in a (single) correct way or is not informed and lacks EU 
knowledge.  
As a desirable effect of the communication process, the Yes vote in the 
referendum is pointed out. The one responsible for getting its message through 
and achieving that effect is the sender (see also Kivikuru 1996a, 393). Thus, 
while Katri Vallaste (2013, 115) writes that the articles of Postimees (from 
2000-2006) dealing with Euroscepticism do not present the topic as a result 
of the ways in which national politicians or the media inform the public about 
the EU the current study shows that it is not the people but the experts (mostly 
political elite) are those seen to be responsible. In this context a No vote in the 
referendum could have been proof of a failed communication process and the 
sender is the one responsible for that. 
On the basis of the above mentioned, it can be said that the EU discussion 
is rather separated from the quotidian issues and a distinction is made 
between the everyday life where the people perform and the EU issues as 
expert knowledge. As a result, an individual decision in the referendum is 
expected to be made on the basis of same objective information being made 
available for everybody. In this way, the life world of the ordinary people is 
kept away from the great goals of the state and society. Even though not dealt 
with in the articles, this ideal enables us to ask about the origin and a 
possibility of totally objective information.   
An emphasis on the effect as a characteristic feature of the transmission 
model also means that no separate feedback is expected: the recipient is 
supposed to listen to the message but not to get listened to. Therefore, from 
the psychological perspective of the recipient the transmission model is rather 
problematic. Agreeing with the substance still leaves a question about being 
satisfied with the position of a passive recipient. As a result, frustration and a 
critical attitude also towards the substance can emerge (in the current case of 
EU criticality). At the level of agency, this means distancing oneself from those 
who, not consciously though, frame the people as recipients. In the current 
case, they happen to be the same people who also guide Estonia’s EU accession 
process and support the country’s membership. 
LEAVING OR IMPROVING TRANSMISSION MODEL: FEEDBACK 
Even though the majority of Being and Becoming informed follows the logic 
of transmission model, minor part urges to listen to the people and have a 
wider societal discussion. By that, a link from recipient to sender is created as 
a feedback. Here the focus is no more on the adequate information about the 
EU but a need to listen and/or accept the expectations and positions of 
Estonian people in general or some more concrete groups (like those against 
the EU). In terms of discourses feedback brings this part closer to Independent 
Estonia.  
Several articles critique the current situation where no real discussion 
between the EU pessimists and optimists is held and people are not listened 
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to (Cultural Elite article, PM, 21.07.1997 and Political Elite article, PM, 
07.07.1997133). As Political Elite articles write, the EU accession is seen as an 
inevitable step that is decided for good without taking into account public 
opinion (PM, 02.06.1998 and PM, 27.07.1998). Similarly, a Readers article 
writes that nobody has yet taken into account whether people want to join the 
European Union and nobody has talked about it yet (PM, 18.07.1997a).  
Towards the end of the accession process, the criticism is targeted to 
manipulating people in relation to the accession referendum. A Readers article 
writes that even though the referendum cannot collapse, one has started to use 
this term as an effective psychological tool: the referendum is not meant for 
getting to know people’s opinion but blackmailing the Yes-word with any 
possible means (PM, 08.09.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 
16.08.2003b). A Cultural Elite article claims to prefer the internal wisdom of 
the people to the promotion that has dried up into an insipid (lääge) 
propaganda (PM, 10.09.2003b; see also PM, 04.09.2003). A Political Elite 
article writes that altogether there is about to be a fear that people understand 
what is really going on and vote against joining the EU (PM, 12.08.2002; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 16.08.2003b). Here, the ideal of ‘informed 
citizen’ is dealt with ironically, since the articles claim that the main goal is not 
to spread but to hide relevant information. 
Apart from criticizing the current situation, a need to discuss issues and 
listen to the people is communicated, mostly by the Cultural Elite articles (PM, 
29.08.2003b). One article writes that since in the European Union the direct 
voice of the people has only indicative nature (soovitusik iseloom) to the 
European Commission, for maintaining democracy, at least before the 
accession people should let to discharged to talk (end tühjaks rääkida) (PM, 
24.12.1997c). Here, instead of permanent practice to listen to the people, the 
time before the EU accession is seen as the last chance to listen to them. The 
article takes the attitude of a psychologist: even though people are not capable 
of changing things it is considered important to at least listen to their opinion.  
Concerning the referendum, the necessity to support people’s choice in the 
accession issue is emphasized (Journalist article, PM, 26.06.2003). As a 
Cultural Elite article writes, no matter what the outcome of the referendum, it 
should be the word of the people who have spoken but not the “silence of the 
lambs” (voonakeste vaikimine) (PM, 23.07.2003). Similarly, another article 
writes that since the referendum is not an ordinary event, discussion preceding 
the referendum should be as open and tolerant as possible (PM, 12.08.2003c). 
Last but not least, everybody has to have a right to their own opinion and it is 
wrong to see the Euro pessimists as a homogeneous mass towards whom one 
should target civilizing explanation work (PM, 06.10.2003b).  
Conclusively, like a Cultural Elite article writes:  
                                                          
133 The last example can also be seen as a mixture of European Estonia and Independent Estonia 
discourse. While in connection with the relations and identities, the importance of having a discussion 
is stated, the topic that one should discuss is based on the logic of Independent Estonia. 
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We do not assume that everybody would read thousands of pages of 
juridical text. We assume that both the proponents and opponents of 
the accession have a possibility to present their attitudes publicly. We 
assume that the sides who have deeply different opinions can argue 
without insults, scaring and threatening.134 
PM, 16.08.2003b 
6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RATIONAL 
As a norm, in the representation level of the Independent Estonia discourse, 
Estonia was seen as an active actor capable of and obliged to influence 
processes and form a wider reality. At the level of relations and identities, the 
key phrase is 'rational action' and the actors are urged to give up emotions, 
which are seen as indicative of immaturity. As a basis of Being and Becoming 
rational responsible action based on rational calculations is emphasized (see 
also Kivikuru 1996 a, 398). 
BEING RATIONAL 
In most cases a link between Being rational and having certain attitude 
towards the EU can be found (for an exception see Journalist article, PM, 
26.05.1997). Some examples divide people on the Yes-No basis without, 
however, taking sides. Instead, a rational basis is depicted both in connection 
with being for and against the EU (Cultural Elite articles, PM, 04.01.2003; PM, 
19.07.2003a and PM, 12.07.2003b). Most of the examples, however, focus on 
either the for-EU or against-EU attitude as a rational one.  
An example of emphasizing the for-EU attitude as a rational one, a Political 
Elite article writes that, the result of the accession negotiations could be a good 
reason for the smart people to say Yes in the referendum (PM, 13.12.2002). 
Also a Cultural Elite article writes that after considering all the arguments that 
could have been a reason to vote against the EU, those who had hesitated until 
now have probably found that the decision is too important to defeat it with 
the daily political dissatisfaction (PM, 15.09.2003). Negotiation results as a 
‘good reason’ gives a reasonable basis to support Estonian EU membership. At 
the same time a distinction is made between the smart people who understand 
this correlation as well as the rest.  
However, in most cases not lending strong positive support to the EU 
accession but a calculative and skeptical attitude is seen to be rational 
(Cultural Elite articles, PM, 25.10.1997 and PM, 23.07.2003). As a Cultural 
                                                          
134 Me ei eelda, et kõik loeksid läbi tuhandeid lehekülgi juriidilist teksti. Eeldame, et nii liitumise 
pooldajad kui vastased saavad võimaluse oma seisukohti avalikult esitada. Eeldame, et sügavaid 
eriarvamusi omavad pooled saavad omavahel vaielda ilma solvangute, hirmutamise ja ähvardusteta. 
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Elite article claims “[e]ven though I have supported joining the EU, I do not 
consider myself a particular Euro optimist”135 (PM, 21.07.1997) and in the 
course of time people’s sharpness has grown and of almost unanimous 
excitement of making IME136 one has reached a fifty-fifty relationship in case 
of the EU (PM, 14.03.2002).  
The same logic is applied to the referendum. In comparison to the other 
Baltic countries, Lithuania is seen as the most optimistic, whereas Estonia and 
Latvia are seen to represent more sober lines (Journalist article, PM, 
22.09.2003; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 12.08.2003c; PM, 15.09.2003 
and PM, 06.10.2003b). In these cases ‘sober line’ can also be seen as a gesture 
made towards those who are critical towards the EU and/or who had voted No 
in the referendum. More concretely, even though ‘losing’ in the referendum, 
the sober and pragmatic line is appreciated as a common feature that 
characterizes whole nation. As Journalist article writes this line is based on 
rustic skepticism and a pragmatic adjustment strategy, which helps Estonia to 
manage inside the EU (PM, 17.01.2003).  
Apart from Estonia as a whole, the articles praise certain societal groups 
for their rationality. Here, however, it is not done on the basis of their Yes or 
No attitude (Cultural Elite article, PM, 11.06.2002b). At the beginning of the 
accession process, a Journalist article gives credit to the political line of 
Estonia where European practicality, strictness and perseverance dominate 
over suspicions, accusations and emotions (PM, 19.07.1997a and Political Elite 
article, PM, 18.07.1997b). Similarly, state leaders’ decision to express their 
personal attitude about the EU before the referendum is justified by a 
Journalist article, since the European Union has been talked about as the top 
of the priorities for a long time and being silent in a decisive moment can give 
a signal of uncertainty to the people (PM, 26.06.2003). 
In addition to the groups, the articles also praise concrete actors for their 
rationality. A Journalist article comments on the claim of Mart Siimann 
(Estonia’s Prime Minister at the time) that it is not rational to use a lot of 
taxpayers money for making propaganda, by writing that Siimann has become 
known for his calm and sober attitude towards the EU and he has also toned 
down the rash optimism about our quick entry into Europe (PM, 
05.06.1998a). Towards the end of the accession process, an article 
acknowledges the position of the People’s Union (Rahvaliit) which had 
declared its support for Estonia’s EU membership, because as the article 
writes, the party feels responsible for their supporters (PM, 04.07.2003a; see 
also Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.1997).  
Even though the common feature of all the examples above is praising 
rationality over emotions, some articles see these two as complementary. In 
these cases, emotions are accepted as part of the rational process (Cultural 
                                                          
135 [e]hkki olen ELi astumist kaitsnud, ei pea ma end eriliseks eurooptimistiks. 
136 IME stands for Isemajandav Eesti, plan for economic autonomy within the Soviet Union. The 
term ‘ime’ also means miracle in Estonian.  
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Elite article, PM, 09.10.2003). In a Cultural Elite article, the time after the 
referendum is seen as an emotional break of the rational process: 
I understand why after the EU referendum people were 
congratulating one another, why people were partying. /…/ 
Acceptance to the European Union is or would be the second 
recognition of the Estonian state de iure!137 
PM, 22.12.2003; see also PM, 04.01.1998 
Similarly, a Journalist article claims towards the end of the accession 
negotiations:  
Dedicated to the work as Estonians we still want to party after 
Copenhagen and subsequent to getting sober again, to start to think 
about the duties that wait ahead of us.138  
PM, 14.12.2002  
The example makes clear that for Estonians, work comes first and foremost. 
However, after getting it done (finishing the accession negotiations) one has 
deserved a break, a party that is followed by getting sober and the return to the 
rational everyday life.  
Several articles show an understanding towards the emotions of the other 
people (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.10.2003). A Journalist article writes that 
the Estonian historical experience as a small state certainly makes [us-SKK] 
cautious (PM, 06.10.2003a). Another article states that since the German 
Chancellor has had a weak attitude towards the EU accessions of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, it is no wonder that President [Lennart - SKK] Meri's 
nerves could not stand it (PM, 09.05.1997; see also Cultural Elite articles, PM, 
26.06.1998 and PM, 25.07.1998). Even though the lack of enthusiasm on the 
German side could also be interpreted as calm and rational approach, in this 
case, the article understands the President Meri’s emotions. Similarly, a 
Journalist article comments on the claim that Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary could be the first countries to join the EU by stating that this can, of 
course, make Tallinn even more nervous but fortunately the EU is too busy by 
itself to notice that likelihood (PM 23.05.1997). Even though the nervousness 
of Estonian leaders (referred to as Tallinn) is understood, the article also 
claims that it is still good to hide the nerviness from outsiders (not showing 
Estonia’s weakness to the EU). 
                                                          
137 Mõistan, miks euroreferendumi järel üksteist õnnitleti, miks pidutseti. /…/ Vastuvõtt Euroopa 
Liitu on või oleks Eesti riigi teistkordne tunnustamine de iure! 
138 Eestlaslikult tööle pühendununa tahame siiski pärast Kopenhaagenit pidutseda ja samas 
kainenenuna hakata mõtlema juba eelseisvatele ülesannetele.  
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In the examples above, understanding is mostly shown towards politicians’ 
emotions whereas in some articles, people’s emotions are understood. Some 
articles reflect the people’s fear (Readers article, PM, 10.06.2003) and worry 
(Journalist article, PM, 19.11.2002a and Cultural Elite article, PM, 
02.05.2003b). A Cultural Elite article writes that people certainly have a right 
to be upset, especially in a situation of a shortage of information about the 
accession negotiations (PM, 16.06.1998; see also PM, 04.09.2003). Similarly, 
a Readers article claims that the words “rule of law” (õigusriik) and the “Euro 
demands” (euronõuded) leads anyone with common sense to desperation, 
since these abstract ideas are derogatory to humanity as a whole (PM, 
16.12.2002b). Therefore, as a Cultural Elite article writes, the call to boycott 
the accession referendum is the only normal and thinkable reaction of a deeply 
intellectual person who has a sound knowledge of Europe (PM, 23.07.2003; 
see also Journalist article, PM, 31.07.2003).  
In the context of the proposal, made by the European Commission that the 
farmers of the new member states would get only 40% of the agricultural 
support of the old member countries, a Journalist article does not just accept 
emotions but gives a signal for expressing them. The article writes that there 
is no doubt that the Commission’s plan would cause a tumbling collapse of the 
support in Estonia towards the EU enlargement; the article continues that we 
will wait for the new opinion polls with great interest (PM, 30.01.2002). The 
term ‘cause a tumbling collapse’ refers to the spontaneous process that is, 
however, in the current case planned in advance already. Thus, indirectly 
people are given the hint that now is the time to ‘release the steam’139.  
One way that articles make emotions acceptable is by expressing these by 
themselves (Journalist articles, PM, 10.12.1997 and PM, 05.09.1997). In 
relation to Sweden’s No to the Euro zone, a Journalist article writes that 
calculations and considerations still leave space for emotions: it is a pity (PM, 
16.09.2003a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite article claims that it is a pity that 
voting in the referendum is not followed by personal sanctions: for example 
those who say Yes will get the passport of the European Union whereas those 
who vote against have to start to apply for visas again (PM, 29.08.2003a). 
In addition to pity, other emotions are expressed by the articles. A Political 
Elite article writes that it is sad to read about the project of national 
development plan concerning the structural foundations of the European 
Union (PM, 02.12.2002; see also Readers article, PM, 01.08.2003c and 
Cultural Elite article, PM, 01.03.2003). Cultural Elite articles express 
astonishment (PM, 02.09.2003b), irritableness (PM, 02.04.2002b), relief 
                                                          
139 However, month and a half later an article writes that it will be seen if the local farmers are going 
to feel themselves as the second class EU members and it might also be that they do not consider the 
issues connected to the direct agricultural support that important (PM, 20.03.2002). In this example the 
article has distanced itself from the previous request to get people’s emotional reaction and the topic is 
dealt with as a personal issue of the farmers. 
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(PM, 03.03.2003), worry (PM, 21.05.2003b), being terrified (PM, 
29.08.2003a) and conscious stubbornness as a revenge for those who make 
stupid tickets (sedel) to the referendum (PM, 23.12.2002b). 
BECOMING RATIONAL 
On the basis of the examples, Becoming rational can be divided into three 
parts: Necessity to act rationally, Condemn emotionality and Ignore 
irrational elements. Here Necessity to act rationally (as should-part) is 
weaker than the failure expressed in Condemn emotionality. Ignore irrational 
elements can be seen as a mixture of both.  
Since rational action is largely reasoned with awareness, similarities 
between Necessity to act rationally and Becoming informed can be found. 
Here, however, information and awareness are seen as tools necessary for 
rational action in various spheres. As Journalist article writes before the 
accession negotiations, citizens, producers and tradesmen have to make 
themselves clear these legitimate and reasoned demands that could be given 
to Estonian negotiations delegation (PM, 14.12.1997; see also Political Elite 
article, PM, 20.06.2003a).  
At the same time people are urged to make personal Yes or No decision on 
a rational basis (Readers article, PM, 25.10.2002b; see also Political Elite 
article, PM, 25.07.1997a). As  Cultural Elite articles write everybody makes a 
decision concerning the EU accession by oneself and for that, people have to 
break through the whole information sea (PM, 12.08.2003a) and pay attention 
to the right things (PM, 28.06.2003) for being able to make a choice in the 
referendum (PM, 23.01.2003). Similarly, a Political Elite article suggests that 
one should calmly think how to continue life without the EU (PM, 22.08.2003; 
see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 22.06.1998).  
In addition to awareness as a basis of rationality, the articles urge being 
rational as an opposite of being emotional (Journalist article, PM, 17.09.2003 
and Political Elite article, PM, 04.12.1997c). Writers call for peace and only 
peace (Political Elite article, PM, 08.03.2002b), not to hurry with the EU 
discussion (Journalist article, PM, 05.06.1998a), state that there is no need for 
an exaggerated optimism (Cultural Elite article, PM, 09.11.1998a) and Euro 
euphoria should not be followed uncritically (Political Elite article, PM, 
31.10.1997a). The other way round, it is important to stay calm and not get 
desperate (Journalist article, PM, 08.05.1997), since the calmer we stay, the 
better we seem to get ahead in a chosen road (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
11.12.1998a). From rational perspective it has to be admitted that the EU and 
the Soviet Union have a principal difference (Political Elite article, PM, 
17.05.1997; see also PM, 23.08.1997). Also, in relation to the fear of losing itself 
in the EU, a Journalist article writes that we should be encouraged by the 
knowledge that, in the end, Malta with hardly 400 000 inhabitants was not 
afraid of diffusing to the European Union (PM, 10.03.2003a). Here, instead of 
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an emotional approach (fear), Malta’s example should be taken into account 
as a rational basis for Estonia’s decision. 
Condemn emotionality 
In this part emotional fiddling as improper basis for the action (Cultural Elite 
articles, PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 15.07.1998) that brings quick but instable 
results (Cultural Elite article, PM, 15.10.2003) is condemned. For example, 
gathering signatures for an appeal that aims at a ten year long transition period 
for selling land to foreigners is seen as useless campaign that does not stop 
selling land but provokes emotions (Political Elite article, PM, 05.08.2002b; 
see also Journalist article, PM, 02.05.1998).  
At a more concrete level, Euro euphoria (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
25.07.1997b) or two kinds of madness are seen to have seized the people: the 
EU referendum and gathering mushrooms (Readers article, PM, 11.09.2003a). 
Also the EU campaign is depicted as too emotional where emotions boil and 
ferment (keevad ja käärivad), debates and campaigns are organized and tens 
of millions [of money - SKK] are delivered here and there without question 
(Readers article, PM, 03.07.2003b). Another Readers article writes that the 
EU has been made a question of life and death (PM, 27.08.2003). Cultural 
Elite articles refer to senseless hysterical shouting to organize  referendum 
immediately (PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 08.09.1997) and Political Elite articles 
characterize Estonian EU policy during previous year as much noise and a 
poor outcome (palju kära, vähe villa) (PM, 04.01.1997 and PM, 07.07.1997). 
As an example of useless noise, a Journalist article writes:  
Remember, how loud it was drummed in Estonian accession 
negotiations with the European Union when the tax-free was talked 
about. /…/ 
As a result of abandoning tax free status in Europe, Estonia’s economy 
was supposed to be on all fours. Now things seem to be the other way 
round: The Finnish interest in buying alcohol, especially beer, 
increases while the borders disappear and thus also the amount of 
money left in Estonia increases.140 
 PM, 05.08.2003a 
                                                          
140 Mäletatavasti löödi kõvasti trummi Eesti liitumiskõnelustel Euroopa Liiduga, kui jutt käis tax-
free’st. /…/  
Paha Euroopa Liit kaotas tax-free ja Eesti olla seetõttu käpuli. Nüüd paistab hoopis vastupidine - et 
soomlaste huvi piiride kadudes Eestist alkoholi, eriti õlut osta kasvab ja järelikult ka Eestisse jäetava 
raha hulk suureneb. 
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The article condemns emotional reaction by referring to drumming as loud 
unpleasant sound. Also ‘being on all fours’ refers to clear and ridiculous 
emotional overreaction. 
Similar to the previous article, several others condemn fear. One article 
writes that at the threshold of the referendum substantial dispute has been 
replaced by the carnival of fear and hope (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
10.09.2003b). Fear as unreasoned basis for action is also condemned in 
Cultural Elite articles (PM, 13.08.2003a and PM, 23.07.2003) and Journalist 
article (PM, 10.09.2003a)141.  
In addition to emotional behavior certain groups are criticized for their 
emotionality and lack of rationality (for example Cultural Elite article, PM, 
12.07.2003b). As responsible party politicians are also condemned for 
appealing to people’s emotions. For example, in relation to viewing at Russia 
as a threat, a Political Elite article writes that if the supporters of the EU cannot 
figure out better arguments, there is no reason to practice this kind of 
frightening language (PM, 10.07.2003; see also Cultural Elite article, PM, 
09.07.2003). 
Thus, it is not surprising that the groups criticized the most are politicians 
and those against the EU but also those who support EU accession too eagerly 
(or to both at the same time as in Political Elite article, PM, 21.08.1997b and 
Cultural Elite articles, PM, 06.08.1997; PM, 01.07.1998 and PM, 
10.09.2003b). The ones against the EU are criticized as irrational, whereas the 
politicians and the eager pro-EU people are mostly condemned for too much 
enthusiasm (for example Cultural Elite articles, PM, 28.02.1998b; PM, 
06.08.1997 and PM, 04.01.2003).  
As an example, a Journalist article criticizes Toomas Hendrik Ilves 
(Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) for too spontaneous claims 
that Estonia is not going to set any conditions to the EU and will, for sure, join 
the European Moneatary Union (EMU) as well. The article continues that it is 
probable that the Minister will get over his euphoria concerning Estonian 
accession process and understands that he should not forget about whose 
interests he should protect in Europe (PM 15.12.1997; see also Political Elite 
article, PM, 21.08.1997b). Towards the end of the accession process, a 
Journalist article writes similarly about Siim Kallas (Estonia’s Prime Minister 
at the time) that he should know that waving with (vehkimine) all kind of 
deadlines does not give a good result (PM, 08.03.2002a). Another article calls 
for Euro propagandists to stop pointless and poor whacking (PM, 
01.08.2003a). The term ‘waving’ draws a picture of the over-enthusiastic and 
emotional Prime Minister. ‘Whacking’ on the other hand refers to 
unintelligent aggressive behavior. In all cases those criticized are assumed to 
be incapable of controlling themselves. 
                                                          
141 In her doctoral thesis, Katri Vallaste (2013, 76) has pointed out how media frames Euroscepticism 
as a “phobia”. 
 220 
 
The rhetoric tool used the most for criticizing the political elite for their 
enthusiasm is, irony. A Journalist article writes that the politicians and 
officials talk about the EU as if it had been decided already and the issue would 
only be about the final deadline - just to get in (saaks aga sisse!) (PM, 
08.11.1998). Similarly, a Readers article claims that thinking only (mõelda 
vaid) European Union opened the door to the accession negotiations to 
Estonia from all Baltic countries. The article continues that our authorities 
seem to have got into euphoria after this message: as if Prime Minister had 
forgotten that for joining the EU it is necessary to get over one more obstacle, 
a referendum (PM, 23.07.1997). Confronting the reluctant people to 
enthusiastic politicians makes clear that the elite and the people are not on the 
same side. Reference made to the referendum as an ‘obstacle’ also shows 
people as those who prevent politicians from achieving their goals. 
Also other ironical terms are used by the articles. For example a Cultural 
Elite article writes about cold weather (PM, 14.08.2003d) and a Political Elite 
article about cold shower that calms down those against the EU if staying 
outside the EU (PM, 19.08.2003b). At the same time a Journalist article uses 
shower-rhetoric to characterize those who aim at the EU too eagerly. The 
article writes that if after the Commission's positive decision we could already 
hear the cry of victory about reaching the EU, the day before yesterday in 
Brussels was like a cold shower to the hotheads (PM, 24.07.1997; see also 
Cultural Elite article, PM, 25.07.1997b). The ones who are not capable of 
handling their emotions are mapped by the article with the terms like ‘cry of 
victory’ and ‘hotheads’. This way the process can be seen as similar to the 
sporting competition where timing matters. Spectators are allowed to express 
overflowing emotions after a victory as a proper moment. In the current case, 
however, they did not act rationally but rejoiced at the wrong time.  Similar 
logic that emphasizes an importance of timing in connection with emotions is 
used also in the other, though, not ironical articles (Journalist articles, PM, 
16.05.2002; PM, 21.10.2002 and PM, 26.06.2003).  
Apart from those who are overly enthusiastic about Estonian EU accession 
process, articles condemn irrational and emotional stubbornness of those 
politicians who are critical towards the EU or its rules. Concerning agricultural 
tariffs, a Journalist article writes that according to the treaties it is forbidden 
to set tariffs for EU countries as well as Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine but the 
political parties of the Country Union (Maaliit) and the Country People’s Party 
(Maarahvaerakond) still want the tariffs: they know that it is impossible, but 
they still demand the tariffs (PM, 07.01.1998b). Both the content and the form 
of this example make the subjects look like children: they have been told 
several times that one is not going to buy candy today, they know that but keep 
arguing about the same topic. Instead of the rational calculations, their 
stubbornness is based on their desires and wishes. Postimees, on the other 
hand stands for voice of reason: if something is set out in a treaty, one has to 
accept that without further arguments. 
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A similar reference to childish irrational behavior can be found in a 
Journalist article towards the end of the accession process concerning the 
decision of the leading figure of the Estonian Center Party 
(Eesti Keskerakond), Vilja Savisaar to say No to the EU. The article writes that 
by this decision Savisaar starts to support those who want to drop the work 
done by all Estonian governments since 1995 (PM, 23.05.2003a; see also PM, 
10.03.2003a and PM, 26.08.1997a). In this case, being for or against the EU is 
not a personal choice but a great responsibility one has to take. The childish 
wish to say No is therefore an egoistic and irresponsible solution. 
In addition to the political decision makers, a more abstract group of those 
against the EU, Eurosceptics, is criticized for their overreaction as well as 
irrational arguments and behavior142. A Cultural Elite article states that in 
comparison to their Polish counterparts, Estonian Eurosceptics are rather 
immature (PM, 01.06.1998). Similarly, a Journalist article writes, Euro 
pessimists have not presented the arguments that would be even a bit 
waterproof (PM, 15.05.1998). Another article claims that without deploring 
the more substantial part of the Euroscepticism, one should start to prevent 
its possible emotional bursts (PM, 08.11.1998; see also Cultural Elite articles, 
PM, 21.07.1997 and PM, 12.08.1997b).  
In most cases, instead of Eurosceptics, an expression ‘those against the EU’ 
is used for making a distinction between activists and the greater public. A 
Political Elite article writes about rural people who, emotionally heated up, 
start to deny Estonian accession to the EU (PM, 05.08.2002b; see also PM, 
26.08.2003b and Readers article, 30.07.2003). A Journalist article claims that 
the arguments of those against the EU can in any future EU discussion be 
based mostly on the emotional exclamations (previously Moscow, now 
Brussels) or stupid claims (à la EU norms are about to destroy our specialty) 
(PM, 11.09.1997a). Saying No is also seen as madness (PM, 29.08.2003a) and 
related to bitterness (PM, 02.07.2003b). According to this classification, it is 
no longer possible to use the loss of sovereignty as a rational argument, since 
it is seen to be based on emotional fear. 
The logic of condemning emotionality also works the other way round: it 
enables to discredit certain arguments on the basis of their emotionality as well 
as condemn the No-campaign as the one that appeals to people's sub-
consciousness and emotions (Political Elite article, PM, 12.08.2003b). For 
example a Political Elite article writes that looking for the parallels between 
the Soviet Union and the EU has an emotional effect (PM, 17.05.1997) and a 
                                                          
142 Also opposite examples can be found. For example a Cultural Elite article writes about those who 
are willing to stay outside the EU, since it is economically beneficial for them. Among them great global 
investors who have specialized on acting in extremely dirty water and the local actors who are still 
tethered by the KGB and restore quietly the Soviet Union are mentioned. The article continues that 
questions they ask are of course totally rational and deserve respect in this sense (PM, 22.06.1998). 
Therefore, though respecting their rational action, the article also creates a framework for these people: 
either one is criminal or related to the KGB.  
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Journalist article concludes after the referendum that one has often individual 
and emotional reasons for being against the European Union (PM, 
17.09.2003)143. Implicitly, more general objective rational reasons are 
depicted in the background of the Yes-votes.  
Apart from simply condemning the No-camp, in some cases the articles 
express understanding towards their motives, without, however, accepting 
these144. A Cultural Elite article claims to understand those who are suspicious 
about the capability of the parliament and its representatives to organize valid 
negotiations with the EU (PM, 06.08.1997) and shows understanding towards 
victims of the EU-poisoning (PM, 06.11.1998c). Similarly, a Political Elite 
article writes:  
Of course I understand today’s aged people who have toiled their whole 
life in the Soviet Union and are today bitter due to the changes that 
were brought along by Estonian re-independence. But do they have a 
right to vote against joining the EU on the basis of revenge or some 
other excuse putting this way a brake to Estonian development?145 
PM, 19.08.2003b 
 
Similarly, a Journalist article writes about Estonian farmers who are not doing 
well since as a response to Estonia’s decision to give up tariffs Brussels 
prohibited the export of Estonian milk products to the EU. The article 
continues that this naturally causes anger and thus it is hoped to get at least 
symbolic tariffs for instance for South East Asian or Latin American 
agricultural products (PM, 07.01.1998b). On one hand the article shows 
understanding for those who feel upset about this unfair deal: Estonian 
farmers made a gesture but the EU answers in an unexpected way. On the 
other hand, even though the reaction of Estonian farmers is seen as 
understandable, it is also considered to be irrational, based on the need to 
dissolve the anger. More concretely, tariffs are wanted for the sake of principle, 
since these parts of the world are rather minor trade partners for Estonia.  
Ignore irrational elements 
While in the previous examples related to the referendum the voters were 
implicitly or explicitly urged to base their decision on rational calculations 
                                                          
143 This is somewhat similar to the marginalization of the ‘losers’ as people who are unable to manage 
their own lives and thus for personal reasons, oppose rapid changes (Vihalemm 2003, 591). 
144 In some cases also acceptance towards these who are too optimistic ones is expressed (Journalist 
article, PM, 08.03.2002a). 
145 Muidugi mõistan ma tänaseid eakaid, kes kogu elu on rüganud NSVLis ja on täna kibestunud 
muudatuste pärast, mis Eesti taasiseseisvumine kaasa tõi. Kuid kas neil on õigus kättemaksu või mõnel 
muul ajendil hääletada ELiga liitumise vastu, pannes sellega Eesti arengule piduri? 
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Ignore irrational elements ignores general public146. Instead, articles address 
more trustworthy facets to ensure that one will get the Yes- answer from the 
referendum (Journalist article, PM, 10.03.2003a). 
Several articles focus on the strategies that would enable Estonia to get the 
expected result from the referendum. Unlike in the part Effect: informed 
people vote Yes or …Yes (Section 6.1) here the strategies do not include 
people’s agency but aim at an efficient campaign and referendum that people 
are not able to ruin. For example, in connection with forming a new 
government that would include the People’s Union (Rahvaliit), a Journalist 
article writes that this would give the EU referendum held in September a 
stronger guarantee of success (PM, 04.03.2003). Similarly, a Cultural Elite 
article asks if Arnold Rüütel (Estonia’s President at the time) has to take 
Estonia to the European Union with his authority (PM, 21.05.2003b).  
Concerning the question asked in the referendum, a Journalist article 
criticizes forming it of two parts as nothing but a dilettante act of parliament, 
because with two sided question it can easily happen that the hoped Yes-word 
is not coming from the referendum (PM, 19.12.2002b). Also a Cultural Elite 
article writes about No as a failure of referendum (PM, 21.07.2003a). 
Therefore, the possibility that people vote on the basis of their convictions is 
not foreseen but the success of the referendum is based on the organizing skills 
of the responsible ones.  
Since Estonia’s referendum was almost the last among the new member 
states (only Latvia had its referendum after Estonia), a Journalist article refers 
to the favorable international climate as important for finishing our 
referendum with Yes (PM 10.03.2003a) and several more articles use the 
experience of the other countries as a basis for Estonian strategy. One 
Journalist article writes about the Lithuanian campaign as simple and easy to 
remember and claims that the Estonian government should learn from them 
because their main worry is not the low participation of voting but to ensure 
the Yes-word to the European Union. However, the Journalist article 
continues that at the same time participation should not be left without any 
attention, since in case of low participation those against the EU can always 
say that Estonia went to the EU without people's mandate (PM, 12.05.2003 
and PM, 14.04.2003). A necessity to get a blessing from the people shows the 
referendum as a formality, a ritual with no substantial meaning, since people 
are not expected to influence the substance. However, for the sake of 
correctness and avoiding further criticism, the organizing work has to be strict. 
Conclusively, here the focus is on the strategy of making politics. This is, 
however, made public in the articles that address the more reliable actors of 
the society than the actual voters.  
                                                          
146 As a similar phenomenon, Katri Vallaste (2013, 188) has written about making a distinction of 
pro-EU us and anti-EU them in Estonian, Finnish and Swedish daily newspapers. 
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SUMMARY 
The current discourse condemns irrationality and emotionality and praises 
rationality as a firm basis for action. The scheme works also the other way 
round: for praising something, it is mapped as ‘rational’ whereas for criticism, 
things or behavior are depicted as ‘emotional’ or more widely ‘irrational’ (see 
also Raik 2003, 169). At the same time emotionality is not necessarily seen as 
an opposite of rationality but as suitable during ‘relaxation points’ when no 
clear task is waiting ahead. At these times proper amount of emotionality is 
accepted as part of the rational action. Especially Journalist articles deal with 
the emotions as a logical part of the rational process and thus subordinate to 
the overall rationality.  
Among the articles, the Cultural Elite articles and Journalist articles are the 
most represented both in the beginning as well as towards the end of the 
accession process. Especially in relation to referendum, the articles address 
Postimees’ readers as voters, urged to calculate things and act rationally. 
Towards the end of the accession process, however, several articles are 
targeted to the (political) decision makers where the agency of the people as 
irrational elements is defused. 
The groups criticized the most in connection with becoming-part, mostly 
by Journalist articles, are those against the EU membership, those too eager 
about it and the political decision makers (as often overlapping with either the 
Yes- or No-side). Similar conclusions have been drawn also in the other 
studies. For instance Kristi Raik (2003, 134-135, 147) writes that for being 
ready to join the EU as soon as possible as well as at any price have been the 
most criticized aspects of the whole accession process. Concerning the media 
debate, Katri Vallaste (2013, 100) argues that irrationality was used in the 
media for labeling those critical towards the EU. In the context of Finnish EU 
accession in the first half of 1990s, the same has been indicated by Finnish 
scholars who have analyzed the process (for example Mörä 1999, 216). 
However, this study shows that both EU optimism as well as skepticism are 
seen as acceptable at certain points (sceptics as rational and calculative). At 
the same time both sides are also criticized for their irrationality and 
emotionality whereas essences of the criticism in Yes- and No-case are 
different. In the case of those overly enthusiastic about Estonian EU accession, 
the criticism is not targeted towards undermining the actual point (being for 
the membership) but towards the way this point is expressed (wrong timing, 
emotional statements instead of expressing the same positions in a rational 
way etc.). Thus, their action and methods, not goals behind that (EU 
membership) are criticized. Even further, in some cases it can be said that the 
articles consider the goals too important to be threatened by irrationality. In 
the No-case, on the other hand, the actual substantial point is questioned by 
mapping it as emotional and/or irrational. Therefore one can talk about 
principal disagreement where being against is not a rational choice147. 
                                                          
147 The substance here cannot be mixed with the representation level where articles focus on Estonia-
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Conclusively, even though by criticizing both Yes and No camps, a certain 
objectivity is maintained, at the same time also implicit or explicit support 
towards Estonian membership is expressed. 
6.3 ESTONIANS, KNOW YOUR LIMITS! 
The relations and identities part of the discourse of Humble Estonia titled 
Estonians, know your limits! emphasizes realism in connection with 
understandings and misunderstandings (vis-à-vis representation part where 
realism was used in relation to the EU as an actor or general world practice). 
On the basis of the distinction made between realists and illusionists as well 
as fake and real, being realist and accepting circumstances mapped as ‘reality’ 
is used as an acknowledgement. This is similar to Sami Moisio’s (2006, 446) 
findings as to how Finland’s membership in the EU is explained by political 
realism and wisdom. 
I start the analysis from Being realist that is however, more weakly 
represented than the becoming-part. On the basis of the position given to the 
actor, both parts are divided into two. First, it is argued that one lives or should 
live in reality, not in illusions. This means for instance that it is important to 
understand and be aware of what is ‘really’ going on. Second, honesty is 
evaluated in the articles: it is important not to falsify but show the real 
position.  
BEING REALIST 
In the case of living in reality certain things are accepted as facts (Cultural 
Elite articles, PM, 15.01.2003b and PM, 02.10.2003a) whereas being real 
indicates honesty instead of faking. As an example of living in reality, a 
Cultural Elite article writes that somebody can just have a susceptive nature 
and be suspicious about Estonian success both inside the EU as well as outside 
that (PM, 09.08.2003a; see also PM, 15.09.2003).  
Another Cultural Elite article claims that since we are not the first but at 
least the tenth of those who join the EU, any discussion about this topic can be 
generalized and the main features of those who are against and who are for the 
European Union can be depicted. The article continues that integration is 
supported by more developed economic branches and regions as well as 
professions and people connected to these, in a word more competitive forces 
in the society whereas against are these whose current way of life is crumbled 
by modernization (PM, 12.07.1997a; see also PM, 12.08.2003c). In this 
example both those who are for and those against the EU are seen as part of 
the fixed and widely spread reality. Therefore, an attempt to influence those 
                                                          
EU relations.  
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who are against does not make much sense. At the same time, by being against, 
one finds oneself among people who are not that progressive.   
After the Estonian Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) congress decided to 
be against Estonia’s EU membership, a Cultural Elite article writes that 
political representativeness concerning the EU issue is now more adequate, 
since it would to a certain extent have been abnormal had the 40% of the 
electorate who were suspicious about the membership not had political 
representation in parliament (PM, 12.08.2003c). Another article answers the 
question as to who decides about the accession as the issue defines Estonian 
political reality (PM, 11.06.2002b).   
Second, as an example of being real, a Journalist article writes that no 
tricks are needed in the referendum to urge the people to vote, since Estonia 
does not have to reach the compulsory fifty per cent of participation (PM, 
21.05.2003a). Here, flagging up the necessity to raise the participation 
proportion in the referendum is seen as a trick, similar to the long endured 
refusal of the Center Party to tell whether it is for or against Estonian 
membership.  A Journalist article writes about some ministers of the party as 
those who do not give an impression as if they did not have a clear attitude 
concerning the European Union and continues that this Center Party would 
already be bought by the cats (PM, 11.03.2003). For praising certain ministers 
as opposed to the rest of the party, the article uses a reference to the cats taken 
from the commercial of Whiskas (cats would buy Whiskas). Even though one 
emphasizes quality here, reference to the cats also leaves a question, what 
would the citizens do.  
BECOMING REALIST 
Becoming realist is based on the necessity to see what is and what is not ‘real’. 
For example, instead of a methodologically correct answer in the referendum, 
it is important to get the real result in a form of Yes or No from the people 
(Cultural Elite article, PM, 04.01.2003; see also PM, 11.06.2002b). Another 
Cultural Elite article replies to the issue of trying prevent EU membership if it 
seems dangerous to Estonia: it is necessary to know and analyze how things 
are, not what those are imagined to be148 (PM, 21.07.1997; see also PM, 
28.06.2003; PM, 10.09.2003b and Political Elite article, PM, 27.10.1998b). 
One article emphasizes the seriousness of reality by urging not to talk 
nonsense and continues: the referendum is not another rehearsal of design in 
the style of if it fails we can do it again, it is a serious act: if the referendum 
fails, nobody will pay for Estonia’s loss (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
21.07.2003a).  
In general, however, more than urging to hold a realist understanding of 
things  (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.10.2002) the articles of Becoming 
                                                          
148 This example is close to becoming informed. However, here, the focus is on real vs imagined 
knowledge, not true vs false one.  
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realist are based on wide usage of negation where the mistaken views are 
criticized. Therefore, instead of claiming what should be done, criticism is 
expressed towards a failure to understand reality as well as act honestly. On 
that ground next sections are titled Failure to live in reality and Failure to be 
real.  
Failure to live in reality 
As an example of Failure to live in reality a Readers article writes that it is not 
realistic to demand a “neutral campaign” (neutraalset kampaaniat) from the 
government since all Estonian governments since 1991 have had the goal to 
become a member of the EU (PM, 24.07.2003a). Similarly, a Cultural Elite 
article claims in connection with the accession referendum that on the basis of 
journalism one has got the impression that the Estonian accession to the 
European Union will not be decided by the referendum of 14th of September 
but at the congress of Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) held in Tartu on the 
9th of August (PM, 12.08.2003c; see also Political Elite article, PM, 
01.08.1997b). 
Also the articles analyze the background of unrealistic understandings with 
the aim of finding the causes. For example, mental sickness is pointed out as 
one reason for losing a sense of reality. As a Journalist article writes, some of 
my foreign acquaintances have referred to our “’complex of going from one 
union to another’”149 and continues that they understand the reasons but think 
however, that this kind of fear is paranoid (PM, 03.07.2003a). Similarly, a 
Cultural Elite article states that the claim that Europe needs us that much is 
another megalomanic summer imagination (PM, 14.08.2003d).  
Apart from mental problems, especially in Cultural Elite articles other 
reasons for unrealistic understandings are depicted. The articles criticize 
beliefs (PM, 29.11.2002), religion (PM, 21.07.1997; PM, 06.08.1997 and PM, 
04.01.1998), mythological imaginations (PM, 14.11.1998), magic (Readers 
article, PM, 27.05.2003) and fairy tales (Readers article, PM, 19.07.1997b). A 
Readers article claims that it is naïve to think that those who decide upon 
acceptance to the EU base their decision on the external indicators of the state 
only (PM, 31.05.1997; see also Political elite articles, PM, 23.08.1997 and PM, 
29.12.1997b and Journalist articles, PM, 13.11.1997 and 31.03.1998b).  
Also forgetting about (Cultural Elite article, PM, 14.08.2003d) and not 
understanding certain things is criticized in the articles. A Journalist article 
writes: “Does not Estonia understand that even the United States that pushes 
any Baltic country into the EU as a counterbalance of staying out of the NATO, 
makes geopolitics.”150 (PM, 18.03.1997).  By asking rhetorically ‘does not 
Estonia understand’, the article distances itself from those criticized. At the 
                                                          
149 «[ü]hest liidust teise minemise kompleksile». 
150 Kas Eesti siis ei taipa, et isegi Ameerika Ühendriigid, kes suruvad mõnd Balti riiki ELi 
vastukaaluks NATOst väljajäämise eest, teevad geopoliitikat.  
 228 
 
same time, there is still a sense of concern for Estonia’s capability to 
understand things. Even though on the basis of substance, the last message is 
targeted at the political decision makers, it is presented as a common worry 
that concerns everybody.  
The last example can also be seen as an example of not just criticizing but 
expressing astonishment towards those who do not live in reality. The same 
can be found also from the other articles. For example, a Cultural Elite article 
asks how was it possible to believe that these two goals – nostalgic and dreamy, 
the last one standing for EU, are achievable at the same time (PM, 09.11.2002). 
Similarly, A Journalist article questions the statements as if the EU supported 
Estonian delegation behind the negotiations table:  
But how can they anyway support us if from the 31st of March on one 
side of the negotiations table sit the EU and European Commission and 
on the other side Estonia. How can the EU member states be on our 
side, if they still have to protect their interests and those of the EU? 151 
PM 06.03.1998c; also PM, 06.09.1998 
The example uses negotiations table as an argument that visualizes how things 
really are: the fact that one sits on the opposite side means also that one is in 
opposite team. 
In addition to Estonia as a whole, some examples focus clearly on certain 
groups of the society, mostly politicians and Eurosceptics152. Here, criticism is 
targeted towards unrealistic imaginations and expectations as well as 
forgetting about reality. For example, a Journalist article writes that some 
politicians imagine as if the EU did everything for us that we have not managed 
to do, as if the EU were our relative who had unlimited love for us and who 
waits for us (PM, 13.12.1997; see also PM, 11.11.2002). Similarly, in relation to 
the expectations that Lithuania supported Estonian access to the EU 
negotiations,  another Journalist article claims that instead of a true 
agreement, one can talk about Estonian imagination: if Estonian leadership 
(Toompea) has not noticed Lithuanian stubbornness in the EU direction one 
can only blame oneself (PM, 17.06.1997).  
In addition to ‘some politicians’ the false imaginations of certain people are 
criticized. For instance a Journalist article writes that Estonia’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs at the time, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, should be helped to come 
back to earth (PM, 15.12.1997). Another article questions the statements of 
                                                          
151 Ent kuidas ikkagi saavad nad meid toetada, kui alates 31. märtsist istuvad ühel pool 
läbirääkimistelaua taga ELi ja Euroopa Komisjoni esindajad ning teisel pool Eesti. Mil moel saavad ELi 
liikmesriigid olla meie poolel, kui nad peavad kaitsma ikkagi endi ning euroliidu huve? 
152 Also opposite examples can be found in Cultural Elite articles. One article confronts wise 
Eurosceptics with blue-eyed EU optimists (PM, 08.09.1997), another one writes that the analytical mind 
and intellectual potentials of the Eurosceptics are useful for Estonia (PM, 21.07.1997). 
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Hardo Aasmäe, a politician of Progressive Party (Arengupartei) at the time, 
by equating his criticism towards vagueness of the EU with an aim that the 
prices of Estonian gas stations are cut into stone (PM, 13.11.1997). It is difficult 
to take seriously somebody who has left the earth as well as the one who 
suggests that the gas prices should be cut into stone.  
In addition to wrong imaginations, ironical criticism is targeted towards 
‘forgetting’ about (Estonian) reality. As a Political Elite article writes, during 
the especially short time of continuous blowing back and forth to Brussels 
(lendlemine Brüsseli vahel) erases from the memory the pictures of 
Paunvere153, not talking about the cowshed (talulaut) during the morning 
milking (lüpsiaegne) or autumn plowing (sügiskünd) in the end of October 
(PM, 12.11.1998b; see also Readers article, PM, 30.12.1997b). The term ‘blow’ 
instead of ‘fly’ equates politicians to a butterfly which just blows around 
according to the vagaries of the weather without a clear goal or understanding 
of its action. As an opposite to Brussels, signs of the real life that one can 
experience in Estonia are listed (small village Paunvere, cowshed, milking and 
plowing). 
In addition to the politicians, the social groups against EU membership, for 
example, pensioners are called to take into account the economic and political 
realities (Journalist article, PM, 23.08.2003a) and Eurosceptics are ironically 
criticized for living in illusions. For instance, a Readers article urges the 
Eurosceptics to move ahead of time to their “dreamland” (unistustemaale) 
(PM, 01.08.2003b). Another Readers article calls the statement of 
Eurosceptics that we become happy by trading with America and China 
ironically a “lovely idea” (kaunis mõte) (PM, 05.08.2003c; see also Cultural 
Elite articles, PM, 04.07.1997 and PM, 14.08.2003d).   
Similarly, a Journalist article writes that the fall in Tallinn’s stock market 
and the liquidity crisis of banks should dispel euphoria and self-confidence 
that has emerged among some entrepreneurs, as if Estonia did not need the 
European Union that much154 (PM, 11.11.1997a). The terms like ‘dreamland’, 
‘lovely’, ‘happy’ and ‘euphoria’ are used to show the absurdness of these 
proposals that can also lead to serious consequences, which another Journalist 
article points out. The article writes about the case when an Estonian citizen 
urgently needed organ transplant in Italy and reveals that the patient was 
lucky to be there (Italy) and not in Estonia, since smaller states have even 
fewer possibilities to get organ transplants:  
                                                          
153 A fictional place from the works of Estonian writer Oskar Luts. 
154 On the basis of “euphoria”, this example is similar to the former, rationality part. However, since 
the main focus is not on the emotionality but the absurdness of this unrealistic idea, it is part of the 
current discourse.  
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Maybe those who see the European Union only as an eternal monster 
and paint it to the others as well would think also about this kind of 
human aspect. Maybe then many ‘euro opposed’ words die in the 
mouth already.155 
PM, 19.11.2002b 
The argument is based on the logic of market economics: the bigger market, 
the bigger are the possibilities. However, as a consequence, those critical about 
the EU are not only seen as illogical but also responsible for the lost lives 
caused by the lack of organs. EU criticism as ‘seeing and painting the monsters’ 
also enables us to ask how seriously one can take the people who suffer from 
delusions.  
Failure to be real 
In the current failure-part, a conscious attempt to deny reality or perform 
falsely is criticized. While in the examples above, living in an illusion is seen as 
a problem, here the criticism is targeted towards giving consciously the wrong 
impression of things or of themselves (Cultural Elite article, PM, 
18.12.1997a).  A Journalist article writes in relation to EU demands that 
concern Estonian language policy, it is not realized or wanted to realize that 
most of these demands have come from Russia (PM, 20.12.1997). Another 
article comments on the scenario leaving Estonia outside the EU and claims 
that we are not tough guys even though we sometimes want to believe that we 
are those who have been given some unprecedented world historical role (PM, 
23.08.2003a). 
As in the examples above, those considered responsible for lying and 
creating wrong impressions on purpose are the political decision makers (for 
example Journalist article, PM, 26.01.2002; Political Elite articles, PM, 
02.06.1998 and PM, 23.11.1998). A Political Elite article writes that it is not 
possible to take seriously the Minister of Finance who ensures that he has not 
even for a year had any idea what was going on in the EU negotiations 
concerning the taxation chapter (PM, 08.03.2002b). Concerning the 
government as a whole, a Cultural Elite article writes that externally 
everything seems to be fine, the main coalition party states that it supports the 
EU direction whereas other members of the coalition keep conspiratorially 
silent (PM, 23.12.1997).  
Similar to the previous example, in most cases the criticism is targeted 
towards those politicians who are either against the EU (Cultural Elite articles, 
PM, 17.07.1998 and PM, 14.08.2003d) or who hide their position (Journalist 
articles, PM, 08.08.2003b and PM, 11.08.2003a). Attitude towards those who 
                                                          
155 Ehk tasuks kõigil neil, kes Euroopa Liidus vaid lõputut kolli näevad ja seda teistelegi maalivad, 
mõelda ka niisugusele inimlikule aspektile. Võibolla siis surevad paljud «eurovastased» sõnad juba suus. 
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have expressed anti-EU views is rather suspicious, since it is not seen as 
sincere as the pro-EU position. As Cultural Elite article writes, it is fashionable 
to be Eurosceptic in the forthcoming elections, since this brings in a lot of votes 
(PM, 23.12.1997). Another Political Elite article writes that the referendum 
campaign will be a big circus show where the clowns and provocateurs who 
call themselves Euro opponents are superbly better actors than those who are 
for the EU (PM, 12.08.2003b). In both cases being against the EU is depicted 
as a role played to get votes or to have fun. It is made especially clear in the 
second example where the fakers, the clowns and provocateurs who ‘claim to 
be against the EU’ are confronted by those who ‘are for the EU’.  
Apart from those who claim to be against the EU, those who have taken a 
hesitant position towards the EU are seen to be fake and therefore 
irresponsible. A Journalist article claims to understand the opinion leaders 
who have formed a clear and reasoned attitude, be it Yes or No and continues:  
But I have no understanding at all towards these compatriots whose 
words matter but who turn it over as if it were a hot potato. From day 
to day, from week to week, from month to month. Who else if not they 
should have a firm attitude that one is also brave enough to express.156  
PM, 03.07.2003a 
Instead of naming either certain party or concrete politicians, the article refers 
to ‘these compatriots whose words matter’. The sincerity of those who are 
incapable of forming their own opinions are questioned in the last sentence. 
Thus, the real question is not a difficulty to form one’s position but cowardice 
to take responsibility. While both Yes and No are seen as acceptable positions 
before the referendum, the response of ‘have not decided yet’ is not acceptable 
(Journalist article, PM, 19.08.2003a). 
Since among the parties represented in Estonian parliament at the time, 
the one which had not taken a clear Yes or No attitude well in advance of the 
referendum was Estonian Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) (Cultural Elite 
article, PM, 21.03.2003), several articles specifically addressed this issue. A  
Journalist article writes that even No would be better than hesitation and there 
would for sure have fewer who were suspicious about the EU (eurokõhklejaid) 
if the party had had a firm position (PM, 18.06.2003a; see also PM, 
16.06.2003c). The Party’s hesitation is also called a “home made circus” 
(kodukootud tsirkust) (Journalist article, PM, 13.08.2003d) as a low level  
entertainment for making the absurdness of the situation clear. 
While the political decision makers are seen as responsible for the failure 
to be real, people as a wider public are given the position of being the 
                                                          
156 Aga ma ei mõista üldse neid kaasmaalasi, kelle sõnal on kaalu, ent kes veeretavad ühinemisteemat 
nagu kuuma kartulit. Päevast päeva, nädalast nädalasse, kuust kuusse. Kellel siis veel kui mitte neil peaks 
olema kindel seisukoht, mis julgetaks ka välja käia. 
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politicians’ victims. In relation to Estonia’s foreign political year 1997, the 
article writes about EU related brainwash from the political decision makers 
that some media believe and reinforce (Journalist article, PM, 29.12.1997a). 
Similarly, towards the end of the accession process a Cultural Elite article 
writes after the People’s Union of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvaliit) exited from 
the coalition that in reality one needed the party only to guarantee success of 
the EU accession referendum (PM, 19.11.2003). Another Cultural Elite article 
claims that since Estonian leaders ask for permission to change the 
constitution after it has already been done and we are already in the domain 
of the EU, this referendum cheats the nation (PM, 13.08.2003a). In the same 
spirit, following the assumption that despite official claims, the accession 
referendum is not a confidential event, a Readers article suggests humorously 
that instead of spending money on the referendum people should be invited to 
Tallinn song festival grounds where an instrument for measuring decibels had 
been installed:  the one who screams loudest is the winner (PM, 13.09.2003b). 
SUMMARY 
While the necessity to be informed operated at the level of rhetoric and made 
a distinction between proper and improper information as well as being or not 
being informed; in Becoming realist the emphasis is on a difference between 
rhetoric and reality. As an ideal, the articles aim at bringing these two together.  
In this discourse Being realist focuses on the end of the accession process, 
whereas in the context of becoming, no remarkable difference between the 
beginning and the end can be found. In this section of the discourse, the 
Journalist articles and the Cultural Elite articles are the most represented. 
At the beginning of the accession process being naïve is seen as a common 
worry one should get rid of whereas by the end, faking had turned out to be 
the worst option. Both naivety and faking are used to accuse mostly politicians 
either for unrealistic expectations or their hypo criticism. Since hesitation is 
seen to be based on insincere behavior, hesitators are not seen as a resource 
that could still be used by the Yes-side and therefore no gunpowder is wasted 
in ‘converting’ them. Instead, the Yes-campaign is seen to be in danger due to 
the unpredictability of those who hesitate. 
A clear distinction between reality and illusion, as well as equality of 
hesitations and faking, shows that this discourse is also based on the logic of 
the transmission model. More concretely, certain statements are seen to bring 
along particular effects. Since hesitation is supposedly followed by unclear 
effect it can be seen as an example of dysfunctional communication. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
Since most of the studies that deal with Estonia’s EU integration were 
published at the time when the final result of country’s accession process was 
anything but certain, the studies inevitably contributed to the accession 
process in a form of supporting or opposing the country’s membership. 
Similarly, the criticism expressed in the studies was aimed at removing the 
problems Estonia was facing from the Yes/No perspectives.  
Returning to Estonia’s EU accession process more than ten years after the 
country has joined the EU makes the general approach of this study different 
of those mentioned in the previous paragraph, since it is no longer neither 
necessary nor possible to contribute to the actual accession process. 
Consequently, the current study can be criticized as hindsight that ignores that 
Estonia’s accession process was guided by Estonian elites whose mission was 
to secure the country’s future as a sovereign state as quickly as possible, since 
the lessons of the past hold that the ‘windows of opportunity’ are open for only 
a short time (Pettai 2005, 53-54). On the other hand, the current research can 
also be seen as an interpretation made without any hidden agenda related to 
the actual accession process.  
The study is based on the assumption that national identity is constructed 
in societal texts, including media, of which the study’s chosen paradigm, 
Postimees, was and is Estonia’s oldest and most stable daily newspaper. I 
claim that during Estonia’s EU accession process, viewed as a formative 
moment, the EU became ‘the new official Other’ in relation to whom Estonian 
identity was constructed in Postimees with certain consequences. On that 
basis, this interdisciplinary case study combines media studies with political 
science, EU studies and nationalism studies to analyze the construction of 
Estonian national identity in the discourses.  
On the basis of the analysis of the three discourses: European Estonia, 
Independent Estonia and Humble Estonia, conclusions can be drawn about 
Estonia’s rather reactive position in relation to the EU by either following EU 
guidance (European Estonia and Humble Estonia) or rejecting it 
(Independent Estonia). At the same time, ideas about Estonian contribution 
to develop the EU were rather absent from Postimees. Sometimes these were 
also expressed in a humoristic way pointing out the minor issues with little 
importance157. This shows the connection between the foreign political and the 
journalistic practice: while the official accession process was mostly based on 
preparing Estonia for membership, the same was also present in the 
newspaper articles. For the future research this leaves an intriguing issue: has 
                                                          
157 Kristi Raik (2003, 174) concludes on the basis of analyzing the EU debate that EU membership 
was mostly framed in terms of how Estonia could profit from it whereas less mentions was made of the 
broader values related to European integration.  
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the reactive approach in the media turned pro-active in the context of Estonian 
membership and self-positioning as an active EU member country.   
Although the discourse of Independent Estonia is based on equal 
partnership between Estonia and the EU and in the other two discourses the 
EU’s superiority over Estonia is accepted, a distinction on the basis of what 
has been called “thick” or “thin” Europeanisation (Flockhart 2008, 6) can be 
made concerning the superiority. While Flockhart has defined ‘thin’ 
Europeanisation by referring to the changes in behavior and rhetoric and 
‘thick’ one as internalization of the rules and norms to the structures of 
consciousness of a certain group; the current study interpreted both terms in 
a different manner. Namely, instead of measuring the actual index of Estonian 
Europeanisation on the basis of certain criteria, I have applied both to media 
analysis. The notion of ‘thick’ Europeanisation is based on the sincere 
admiration of the EU and its practice in Postimees, whereas the notion of ‘thin’ 
Europeanisation, is based on admitting formal superiority of the EU and the 
rules of the game that Estonia is incapable of changing. Thus, the need to 
follow the EU’s guidance may be accepted as a formality necessary for pleasing 
the EU (similar also Kuus 2008, 260-262).  
In order to analyze the daily construction of national identity in Postimees, 
I have approached it in terms of Fairclough’s discourse analysis that occurs 
simultaneously at the level of text, discourse practice and sociocultural 
practice. In this framework I have combined international relations theories 
with the studies of Europeanisation to analyze the public discussion. While 
European Estonia communicated support for Estonia’s EU accession, in the 
other two discourses the relationship between the explicit Yes/No debate 
concerning EU membership and the basis for forming the discourse are less 
clearly interlinked. Precisely, the Yes/No attitudes did not reflect the borders 
of the discourses but both opinions could be represented in the same 
discourses. One method of doing this is through denial or criticism towards 
the content (for example EU norms) or actors (for example political elite) 
without however, being able to escape and/or criticize the discourse. This is an 
example of how discourses as systems of meaning reproduce social structure 
and condition our ways of thinking (see Fairclough [1989]2001, 32; Raik 
2003, 24-25).  
At the same time, the example shows the opacity of discourse, since people 
can legitimize particular power relations without being aware of doing so 
(Fairclough [1989]2001, 33). From the article writers’ points of view, 
participation in the Yes/No discussion cannot be equated to participation in a 
certain discourse even within European Estonia. The writer of a letter to the 
editor or an editorial for instance about the regulation of playgrounds in the 
EU, probably does not think that at the same time they write an Estonian 
national identity story or contribute to identity construction in relation to the 
EU as the Other. Rather, the question is of what Agnew and Corgridge (1995) 
have depicted as an unconscious adoption of the often implicit rules of living, 
thinking and speaking (cited in Berg 2003, 103), of which the credible political 
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language necessary for entering the discussion is an example (Moisio 2006, 
460). In this process the writers of the newspaper articles unconsciously 
position themselves as subjects in the framework of the discourses. As a result, 
the variety of writers (as discourse practice) does not necessarily increase the 
variety in the content of the articles (text level).  
However, especially in connection with societal changes the role of actors 
in connection with discourses still acquires importance (see also Raik 2003, 
27). The opinion articles were, especially in 1997 and 1998, largely dedicated 
to the issues that were dealt with in the official accession process and 
presented by those who were familiar with or involved in this process. This 
way only a very limited group of people had legitimacy to write about the EU 
issues and imagine Estonia as a candidate country (a new community) in the 
discourse of Postimees. At the same time, they were also forming a credible 
way of talking about the accession process with the probable consequence that 
those incapable of using the same language would be marginalized from the 
discussion (see also Moisio 2006, 460). Since the main categories of writers in 
the initial years of the accession process were Staff Journalists and Political 
Elite, the process is also an example of the general closeness of the media and 
the political elite of the country (see for example Kivikuru 1996a, 396).  
Apart from the text level, discourse practice is linked to sociocultural 
practice. In Fairclough’s (1995, 60) terms one would expect a creative 
discourse practice in connection with fluid and shifting sociocultural practice 
and a conventional discourse practice in relatively stable and fixed 
sociocultural practice. In the current study fluid and shifting although 
disciplining sociocultural practice is applicable to the formative moment. In 
this context Estonia as a candidate country is imagined and recognized by 
societal actors (creativity of discourse practice).  
In Postimees, instead of a clearly dominant discourse in the Foucauldian 
sense (for example Harle and Moisio 2002, 45), a struggle between and inside 
three discourses can be depicted from the empirical data. Harle and Moisio 
(2002, 45) explain that giving up the idea of a dominant discourse could also 
mean that the political context of the discourses is forgotten. In the current 
case, however, the political context is communicated exactly by the struggle 
between the three rather equal discourses as well as inside each of them.  
While understanding national identity as a normative process where the 
distinction between us and the internal as well as external Others is made, the 
struggle inside the discourses means that the norms, ordinarily taken for 
granted as truth become openly visible. More concretely, the question of ‘who 
we are’ is challenged both internally and externally by ‘who we should 
become’. Internally, the question is about aiming to socialize readers into 
becoming rational, realist and informed citizens of the candidate country (see 
Chapter 6). Externally, in relation to the EU, the necessity to become 
European, independent or humble is emphasized in the pertinent discourses. 
A common aspect to both the internal and external construction is the open 
normativity in Postimees’ articles that criticized the then state of order and 
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emphasized what should be done. As a result, the implicit claim of co-
membership with the audience based on the solidarity between the paper and 
the audience (see Chapter 6) was flavored by the necessity to improve us and 
become someone else. It was accompanied by exclusion of the uninformed, 
emotional and illusionist citizens.  
Nevertheless, while locating the discourse of Postimees as one but not the 
only discourse that maps Estonian EU accession process in the society, the 
strength of the discourses in Postimees can be connected to their 
institutionalization as well as appearance on the other societal forums 
(Fairclough [1989]2001, 33). As an example of intertextuality, European 
Estonia has the clearest links of the three discourses to the official accession 
process constructed by the decision makers of Estonia and the EU in official 
documents. 
The usage of identity for legitimizing political decisions related to Estonia’s  
EU accession process (Lagerspetz 1999, 388, see also Raik 2003, 64) is 
paradoxical in the case of media analysis. The presupposition that identity is 
constructed in the media texts (Billig 1995) means that the national identity 
stories and the EU accession as a political process are tightly interrelated in 
the analyzed articles. Therefore, the EU ‘to do-lists’ are present in the stories 
of us and consequently it is rather questionable, if the accession process can 
be legitimized by the same stories.   
However, the idea of legitimation brings us to the question of how the 
public discussion and the public opinion are interlinked to each other at the 
everyday level. According to the opinion polls, most Estonians saw themselves 
in a more or less equal numbers as the carriers of Estonian as well as European 
identity (Kirch 2002, 94-95). Thus the idea of Estonia being European in a 
general sense is widely accepted. However, the attitude towards the EU was 
rather heterogeneous as well as contradictory during the accession process. 
This resulted in low public support towards Estonia’s accession despite society 
in general recognizing the benefits of membership (Vetik 2003, 262 and Raik 
2003, 166). Several studies have emphasized the responsibility of Estonia’s 
political elite for this low level of public support whereas the current study 
points out the communication process between Postimees and its readers. 
First, the connections between communication process and public opinion 
can be interpreted on the basis of the sequence of informing, explaining and 
listening. As the surveys conducted during the accession process show, the 
Estonian public’s knowledge about the EU was rather weak (Pettai 2005, 48). 
Simultaneously, those who were more informed about the EU supported 
Estonia’s membership (for example Kaasik 2001; Vetik 2003, 265 and Raik 
2003, 153-154, 178). Therefore, in order to raise the level of support to join the 
EU, the logical conclusion was to inform people through the media, which was 
the most important information channel in EU issues (Kaasik 2001). There is 
no evidence Postimees consciously followed the guidance to get public 
informed. Nevertheless, the current study shows that in the articles the 
necessity of giving people information as well as avoiding irrelevant noise that 
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might just confuse them is emphasized. While the whole accession process was 
aiming at efficiency at the expense of politics (Raik 2003, 117-135), the idea of 
efficient informing was present also in the paper. 
From the perspective of the “ideal audiences” (Fairclough 1995, 40) 
constructed by Postimees, subject position of responsible citizens rather than 
audience as consumers are formed (see also Fairclough [1989]2001, 41). On 
one hand it can be reasoned by the characteristic features of the newspaper as 
a medium whose entertainment capability is rather limited for instance, in 
comparison to the television. On the other hand, the EU accession process as 
a ‘national priority’ both in the official as well as in Postimees discourse 
minimizes the entertainment dimension.  
In this process, however, the question is not just about constructing an 
audience for the newspaper on the basis of knowledge held about the 
readership (ideal drawn on the basis of what is known about the readers and 
their preferences) but also about consciously affecting the audience to make 
them ‘ideal’ subjects. The top-down strategy by Postimees in the EU accession 
process was to go beyond the norm of ensuring the audience followed the 
newspaper to ensuring the readers ‘lived up to the ideal’, which the newspaper 
defined as citizens who would vote in favour of EU membership. As with any 
top-down strategy the outcome implied the readership would read about as 
well as understand the EU issues (see also Kivikuru 1996 a, 394-395, 398, 403) 
and talk about the topics guided by the paper in the framework of the 
discourses. As Moisio (2006, 460) suggests criticism of top down processes 
that do not reflect the daily life practices of the people is justified. 
Although in the EU referendum, called also a “test of domestic democracy” 
(Pettai and Ehin 2005, 9), the ‘correct’ outcome was achieved with (or despite) 
this kind of communication it is still important to note the inherent problems. 
The point that it was difficult to combine the ideal of effectiveness to the ideal 
of participatory citizens that slow down the accession process has been made 
in relation to the Estonia (Raik 2003, 117-135). However, apart from the 
problems related to the ideal of citizens’ participation, the efficiency of this 
kind of communication at a pragmatic level is open to doubt: might it simply 
lead to a sense of frustration. For example, Vetik et al. (2006) contend 
Eurosceptism is a reactive identity to the wholesale adoption of EU legislation 
without further dialogue between us and the Other. Similarly, the lack of 
dialogue between Eastern and Western Europe has been pointed out by Maria 
Mälksoo (2006). This study indicates similar lack of dialogue in the internal 
public discussion. One of the reasons is that also in general the messages of 
mass communication have been characterized as monologic to which the 
audience cannot directly contribute (Fairclough 1995, 40). However, current 
case highlights the differences between effective administering of the official 
EU accession process and the problems of applying the same efficiency to 
informing the public about the process (see Kivikuru (1996a, 393-394) for 
similar results in Finland’s EU accession process). Although Fairclough 
([1989]2001, 171-172) argues that if people are daily obliged to occupy the 
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subject position of consumer, they will probably become consumers, the issue 
is not about actively informing people that they are now supposed to become 
consumers. Therefore, in this context, low EU support can be interpreted as 
an example of how people negotiate and also struggle their relationship with 
ideal subject positions. In terms of a power struggle, the imposition of power 
in the discourses (what should be done) leads to resistance (in the form of 
disagreement) (see also Fairclough [1989]2001, 57, 171-172). 
The necessity to “bring the Union closer to its citizens” (Raik 2003, 150) 
was realized and debated in Postimees during the accession process. 
Therefore, it is not fair to talk about the intentional disregard of the citizens. 
Also in this “good old campaign”, as Kivikuru (1996a, 395) characterizes 
campaigns based on clear divisions between senders and recipients, 
discourses in the political agenda are easily taken as the basis for top-down 
media discussions. In the current study, however, the need to ‘bring the EU 
closer to the people’ was accompanied by downplaying everyday problems 
and labeling certain groups of people. Thus, even though the newspaper tried 
to deal with the questions that could presumably interest people it also let 
them know occasionally they could not be taken seriously.  
Second, in the context of Postimees’ construction of Estonian national 
identity and its links to public opinion, the study shows that the paper 
communicated the same message in all three discourses. The current state 
(being) of the national identity is sufficiently flawed to be worthy of 
improvement (becoming), before the EU will welcome the nation into the club. 
According to Vetik (2003, 259-260) key topics dealt with in the EU related 
public discussion were economic development through market diversification 
and foreign investment as well as external security. The impact of ‘to do’ issues 
in these spheres on everyday life promoted the No vote (see Vetik 2003, 264). 
The current study opened an alternative perspective on identity related to 
being (‘who we are’) and becoming (‘who we should become’). Emphasizing 
the notion of becoming over the notion of being does not give confidence and 
security and moreover undermines self-understanding. The study also shows 
the paradox in constructing a national identity requiring significant 
development in parallel to claiming that ‘Estonia as an EU member does not 
have to change much’.  
The paradox indicates that in connection with ’imagining’ Estonia as a 
candidate country the question about national vs. candidate country 
identity also deserves attention. More precisely, the issue is not a clear case, 
since neither the idea of imagining and establishing a community, nor of 
maintaining an existing one (see Edensor 2002) is directly applicable in 
current case. Rather the process can be depicted as a mixture of these two 
ideas, in which the national identity is challenged by the identity of a candidate 
country.  
In this context, the temporality of the new community as a candidate 
country has to be emphasized since the main aim of Estonia was full 
permanent membership in the EU. Therefore, from the perspectives of both 
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Estonia and the EU as well as logic of the enlargement process, hastening the 
rate of development towards membership is eminently understandable. The 
key topics of this issue are the integration/enlargement discourses (Raik 2003, 
112), the logic of enlargement/integration158 (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009, 
21) as a framework that conditions, constrains and enables democratic 
practices (Raik 2003, 112). 
However, while scrutinizing the same process in the media from the 
identity perspective, the picture becomes more complicated. In the articles, in 
which the us-versus-the Other setting is formed, Estonia is dealt with as a 
candidate country that has to follow EU norms to become acceptable as quickly 
as possible. At the same time, ‘Estonia’ is not understood in the texts as a 
temporary community. Since no explicit distinction between these 
communities (Estonia, and Estonia as a candidate country) is made in 
Postimees, the contradiction between the national identity and the temporal 
identity of a candidate country becomes visible as tension between being and 
becoming. The idea that change is a pre-requisite for being accepted 
(becoming) as well as the temporality of the whole process (Estonia would not 
always be a candidate country), is incompatible to the general understanding 
of the national identity as a stable and durable concept. From the citizens’ 
perspective it is rather difficult to identify oneself with something that is seen 
as both not good enough as well as temporary.  
In order to evaluate the results of the research, the contra-arguments to, as 
well as the limitations of the study have to be recognized. The initial point is 
that I designed the study process to be as transparent as possible. 
Transparency is achieved by profound explaining of how the empirical data 
has been selected, and the discourses formed and analyzed. 
Concerning the limitations of the study, I have considered alternative 
interpretations and defined the grounds for the preferred interpretations. 
Apart from that the study can be submitted for critical assessment (see also 
Raik 2003, 32). Even though a national daily paper offers a good possibility to 
analyze mainstream discourses, the nature of the paper excludes marginal 
discourses. Therefore, in the context with the conclusions drawn here, from 
the societal perspective the discourses are not exhaustive, since not everything 
and everybody is represented. The discourse analysis has focused on the 
meanings made possible by and present in Postimees, and not the alternative 
ones, which the same process excluded (see Foucault [1969]1972, 28).  
In relation to the grounds for the preferred interpretations, as well as 
possible alternatives, choices were made during the phases of the study, such 
as the decision to focus on daily stories and not the master narratives as well 
as the EU as the Other instead of various Others. The empirical analysis’ foci 
on the normativity of identity as well as the usage of IR theories are examples 
                                                          
158 The “logic of enlargement/integration” is used also by Kristi Raik (2003, 117), however, not as a 
synonym to the discourse of enlargement/integration but as an applicant country’s perspective of the 
EU and integration.  
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of preferred interpretation. In connection with sociocultural practice, the 
formative moment could have been replaced with a more concrete practice or 
analyzed on the basis of some other societal sources.  
On that basis, the same study could have also been made from alternative 
perspectives. Instead of focusing on the relations between Estonia and the EU, 
the main focus could have been on the topics of the articles. Also if the 
theoretical basis (combination of international relations theories and 
understandings of Europeanisation) had been replaced by some other 
theoretical framework the focus of the study would have changed. For 
instance, if I had focused on a variety of spatial entities present in the articles, 
Estonia as Finno-Ugric or Estonia as Nordic identity stories (Feldman 2000, 
416-418) could also have been found. Another example concerning all the 
Baltic countries, Miniotaite (2003, 210) writes that the political reality of the 
Baltic States may have been conceptualized on the basis of at least two 
competing discourses: the discourse of sovereignty and the integration 
discourse that both reflected distinct discursive practices. In her analysis, the 
integration discourse is tied to globalization, integration processes in the 
Baltic States and the politics of inclusion whereas the sovereignty discourse is 
related to the construction of nation-state identity and to the politics of 
exclusion. Therefore, her setting based on Yes/No division makes the basis of 
the discourses distinct from these of European Estonia and Independent 
Estonia.  
Also the way national identity as a process is analyzed in the current study 
can be criticized. First, it can be asked if the results would have changed, had 
the data for 1999, 2000 and 2001 been included. Although, a more detailed 
picture of Estonian accession process would have been depicted, the added 
value of this more detailed picture is not that clear, since no great differences 
between the beginning and the end of the accession process were depicted in 
the current study. Therefore, taking into account the work-economic aspect, 
inclusion of the articles from all years of the accession process did not seem an 
optimal solution.  
Second, focusing on the process means that the aspects of the national 
identity, in the form of what the identity is made of with a potential focus on 
ethnic and civic side (see Section 2.1) is given less attention, partly because the 
stories of us formed on a daily basis do not necessarily focus on what have been 
characterized as aspects of the national identity (Pääbo 2011). This enables the 
question to be asked if media texts are necessarily the best empirical data for 
scrutinizing national identity aspects. Additionally, the aspects of Estonian 
national identity have been analyzed in other studies that all have emphasized 
largely the same issues (for example Kirch and Kirch 2001; Pääbo 2011).  
At the same time the current study did manage to deal with the topic that 
has received less attention, the relationship between the aspects of national 
identity and the banal everyday stories present in the media texts. Even though 
the newspaper focuses on the everyday issues and does not explicitly deal with 
the national identity, at a more general level the EU accession topics in the 
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paper fairly closely followed the line of Estonian national identity aspects. In 
some cases, mutual understanding of the topics prevailed whereas some other 
issues were heavily debated. For example, educational issues were mostly dealt 
with by the representatives of universities and the general understanding 
about their importance was clear. Also in the context of language, citizenship 
and foreign policy issues a strong internal consensus can be depicted against 
external pressure. Rural issues, on the other hand, focused on agriculture and 
in the beginning of the accession process also internal confrontation. 
Therefore, the notion that competitions between the political constructions of 
state and national identity typically play themselves out through debates on 
‘Europe’ is rather suitable also to the current situation (Wæver 2002).  
Additionally, one can ask if the relationship between the daily debate and 
national narratives can be seen as an interaction between the more stable ‘core’ 
and the flexible ‘outer sphere’ of identity issues (Kivikuru 2004, 26). On the 
basis of this logic, variety of ‘core issues’ were discussed in the ‘outer sphere’. 
It is possible that as a result of these debates, ‘core issues’ do, occasionally, get 
updated. It is also possible that the same ‘core issue’ lies behind a variety of 
daily stories between us and Others. 
Third, while focusing on the construction of the national identity that 
appeared in Postimees, two important aspects, those of recognition and 
reception have been omitted from the direct scope of this research, since the 
media texts offer only an indirect access to both. Analyzing how the EU as the 
Other recognizes Estonia on the basis of Estonian media texts gives access to 
the perception of the EU’s recognition, which is included in this study. 
Similarly, I find it problematic to draw any causal conclusions about the 
identity constructed in the media texts and the reception of this story by the 
people (see also Madianou 2005). Thus, instead of causal connections, I have 
linked these two together on the basis of wider societal framework that 
includes public opinion about the EU during the accession process.  
Fourth, one more issue to be reflected on is the choice of discourse analysis 
not quantitative content analysis or a combination of both for a substantial 
corpus of empirical data (1780 articles)159. In this context the question if and 
how the results of this study can be generalized is relevant. Since the sample 
included all the opinion articles from four years, the three discourses and the 
internal struggle found in the texts are indeed characteristic to the public 
discussion held in Postimees at that time. Apart from that I claim that due to 
the small size and homogeneity of the Estonian media market the results fairly 
characterize the general public discussion held in Estonian language national 
media during the EU accession process.  
Since the literature review of this study has first and foremost focused on 
‘case Estonia’, a question about the wider framework can be asked. Over the 
course of the EU’s existence over twenty new member countries have passed 
through one form or another of the continually developing accession process. 
                                                          
159 See Lotta Lounasmeri (2010) doctoral dissertation for a similar example.  
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Consequently, analyses similar to the current study have been conducted 
amongst member states. Logically there are aspects universal to the process. 
For example, the media and public opinion during Finland’s EU accession 
process indicates rather similar results: the media’s clear support towards the 
EU accession process; concern that people are capable of making ‘right’ 
decision; the necessity to inform the public; and as a result a mass media 
monologue to ensure the efficiency of the process and to keep it under control 
(see Kivikuru 1996a). Media trends are not, however, the only aspect that are 
universal in the EU’s accession process. The setting of being for or against 
membership as the main issue during the process is the basis for what Daniel 
Esparza (2010) has depicted as the EU being both a positive and negative 
Other on the basis of Czech example. Also the three discourses of this study 
emphasize the ambivalence of the EU.  
A common trend in the EU accession process of the Central and Eastern 
European countries can be depicted also when comparing the results of this 
study to those made, for example about Slovenia or Croatia who ‘left the 
Balkans to rejoin Europe’ (Lindstrom 2003). Also, similar to Estonia, Poland’s 
accession to the EU was regarded as a ‘return to Europe’, not only in the 
geographical sense, but also in the sense that it served to reaffirm Poland’s 
European identity (Killingsworth et al. 2010, 358). Simultaneously, the semi-
Europeanness of the Central and Eastern European countries communicated 
by the EU is seen to challenge the idea of ‘return’ (see Section 3.1).  
In the current study, depicting the EU accession as an example of the 
formative moment enables the researcher to see the link between the actual 
accession process that ended with EU membership and the construction of the 
identity in relation to the EU as wider process that did not end at the point 
when membership was gained. Here it is also important to note that formative 
moments do not exist independently of the societal actors because media have 
an important role in mapping certain periods as special ones for being able to 
deal with certain developments in this particular framework. 
For the further analysis, this study offers interesting starting points. In 
addition to the qualitative analysis used in the current study, the data gathered 
can be analyzed quantitatively for being able to statistically show the trends 
and developments during the accession process. This thesis also provides a 
good foundation for a broader study to investigate identity construction across 
other national titles during the accession process. Last but not least, a worthy 
topic for future analysis is a comparison of the ‘Other’ group of writers (see 
Section 3.2) with the four categories involved in this study: Journalists, 
Political and Cultural Elite and Readers.  
The results of the thesis can also be compared to the post-accession period. 
For example the question, what happened to the open normativity in the 
public discussion after Estonia gained membership deserves further attention. 
One can also ask about the development of the discourses during Estonian 
membership: since the official goal to become European in a form of EU 
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membership has been achieved, its impact on the discourses in the media can 
be scrutinized.  
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ARTICLES OF POSTIMEES  
The Postimees articles published in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003 that formed 
the data for my research are stored in the newspaper's digital archives. When 
I was collecting the data, in 20011-2012, the archives were publicly accessible. 
This is no longer the case. Google Search enables researchers to check the 
validity of the articles with the caveat that in December 2015 the publishing 
dates of the articles of 2002 and 2003 had been systematically advanced by 
one day. In the list of the articles below I will give the original dates as they 
appear in Postimees digital archive and thus also in the body text of this 
dissertation. 
REFERRED TO IN II CHAPTER (LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER) 
PM, 07.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti välispoliitilised võimalused 1997. aastal  
PM, 11.01.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa autu käitumine õhutab 
ohtlikku vastasseisu 
PM, 14.04.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa tahab Eestit tagasi võita  
PM, 05.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: President siseministreid vahetamas  
PM, 10.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Rahapesu on näpuga näidata  
PM, 09.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Kiuslik riik  
PM, 12.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel  
PM, 21.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Õppetund vähemusvalitsusele  
PM, 14.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Vahejaam Luksemburg  
PM, 22.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Murranguaasta välispoliitikas  
PM, 03.04.1998 - Mikko, Madis: Liitumisläbirääkimiste sujuv algus  
PM, 03.11.1998 - Bahovski, Erkki: Euroreferendumi vastused puudu. Eestis 
euroreferendumi kiire korraldamine on nonsenss  
PM, 26.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Laienemise kiire lõppmäng  
PM, 19.11.2002 - Juhtkiri: Mida teha Euroopaga. Eesti peab Euroopa 
Liidu tulevikudebatis oma huve kaitsma   
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PM, 14.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Joon alla. Eesti liitumiskõneluste lõpp ELiga 
tähendab terve ajajärgu lõppemist  
PM, 31.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Lehekülge keerates. Hoidkem üksteist, seeläbi 
hoiame ka Eestit! 
PM, 03.01.2003 - Juhtkiri: Suursaadikuks leti alt? Sisepoliitiline kemplus ei 
tohi ohustada välispoliitikat  
PM, 31.03.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ootame tarku tegusid. Noorenenud Riigikogule 
õpipoisiaega ei anta  
PM, 18.06.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Aega ei ole  
PM, 26.06.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Aeg teha õige valik  
PM, 04.07.2003 - Juhtkiri: Enam ausust ja selget juttu!  Hämamine ja 
pooltõed toovad kaasa euroskepsise tõusu  
PM, 17.07.2003 - Veidemann, Rein: Sada päeva tuulte pöörises  
PM, 15.09.2003 - Juhtkiri: Euroopalik enesemääratlus. Euroopa Liidu 
liikmelisus väärtustab solidaarsusele rajatud iseseisvust  
PM, 04.11.2005 - Postimees: Ajaleht Postimees hakkab ilmuma ka 
venekeelsena  
ARTICLES OF POSTIMEES REFERRED TO IN III CHAPTER (IN 
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER) 
PM, 26.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Uue Euroopa koidik 
PM, 27.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Millal sulgub uks? 
PM, 02.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurotoetus kaob käest 
PM, 28.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kahepalgeline eurotormakus 
PM, 12.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel 
PM, 19.07.1997 - Juhtkiri: Tants euroliidu raporti ümber 
PM, 24.07.1997a - Alaküla, Allan: Eurodiagnoos on karm kuid õiglane 
PM, 24.07.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Eurovaidlus alles algab 
PM, 28.07.1997 - Zartes, Urmas: Tartu linna akadeemiline eripära 
PM, 14.08.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Europrovokaator 
PM, 05.09.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eurosügise stardipauk 
PM, 11.09.1997 - Floren, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon: mäng ühte väravasse 
PM, 13.09.1997 - Müntel, Jüri: Kolm suurt ja rasket teemat  
PM, 22.10.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Vanem õde Soomest 
PM, 31.10.1997 - Tarto, Enn: Politseiriik ilusa eurokesta sees  
PM, 12.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Palanga manöövrid 
PM, 13.11.1997 - Bahovski, Erkki: Liigne uudishimu tapab 
PM, 17.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurokummardus muulastele 
PM, 26.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroliit toob positiivse diskrimineerimise 
PM, 09.02.1998 - Olesk, Peeter: Haridus ees, arusaamatused taga 
PM, 18.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Raske otsus  
PM, 26.05.1998 - Püvi, Jüri: Euroturvakodud vanglate asemele  
PM, 18.06.1998 - Lepp, Toomas: Kas telesõjad on veel võimalikud? 
Telekanalid peavad reklaami suhtes uuesti kokku leppima  
PM, 31.07.1998 - Tallo, Ivar: Usalduse defitsiit ja Eesti. Usalduse 
taastamiseks tuleks loobuda loosungitest 
PM, 04.01.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvahääletuse mõistetav tulemus 
PM, 10.10.2002 - Juhtkiri: Aeg on küps. Soodus õhkkond liitumiskõneluste 
lõpetamiseks  
PM, 12.11.2003 - Kõnnusaar, Tiia: Vanemahüvitis: võrdne või palga järgi? 
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ARTICLES OF POSTIMEES REFERRED TO IN IV AND V CHAPTER 
(LISTED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER) 
1997 
PM, 04.01.1997 - Laar, Mart: Õnne uueks aastaks 
PM, 07.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti välispoliitilised võimalused 1997. aastal 
PM, 09.01.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Udutamine Euroopa Liiduga 
põllumajandustollide ümber 
PM, 11.01.1997 - Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa autu käitumine õhutab 
ohtlikku vastasseisu 
PM, 13.01.1997 - Juhtkiri: Euroopa Euroopa vastu 
PM, 15.01.1997 - Aaloe, Mati: Elu 1000 krooniga kuus  
PM, 16.01.1997 - Nutt, Mart: Kas Venemaad saab positiivselt hõlmata  
PM, 25.01.1997 - Juvakka, Kai: Ametnike moraal ja riigi maine 
PM, 27.01.1997 - Treial, M.: Eetika – retooriline sõnakõlks  
PM, 29.01.1997 - Lodjak, Bernhard: Kingitus maarahvale 
PM, 03.02.1997a - Betlem, Jaanus: Proovikivil on Eesti demokraatia 
PM, 03.02.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liit ei taha meid?  
PM, 06.02.1997 - Raik-Hiio Mikelsaar: Teaduskorraldusest ja seadustest 
PM, 07.02.1997 - Betlem, Jaanus: Luukere koalitsioon 
PM, 10.02.1997 - Junti, Arvo, Kangur, Oleg & Tamme, Rein: Poliitika – kelle 
jaoks ja mille nimel? 
PM, 12.02.1997 - Metsmägi, L.: Eetiline Eestimaa  
PM, 13.02.1997 - Kask, Ahto: Kontrolljoon ajutiseks riigipiiriks 
PM, 14.02.1997 - Leetjärv, Laurits: Lendobjektidest Euroopa Liiduni 
PM, 17.02.1997 - Juhtkiri: Prantsusmaa hea toon 
PM, 20.02.1997 - Korrovits Viktor: Piirilepingut on vaja Venemaale 
PM, 22.02.1997 - Vald, Jüri: Üksikisiku tulumaksust 
PM, 01.03.1997 - Leetsaar, Jaan: Maarahva kongressile mõeldes 
PM, 04.03.1997 - Laar, Mart: Millist valitsust vajame 
PM, 05.03.1997 - Mäemets, Aare: Kas Eesti säilub Euroopa Liidus? 
PM, 17.03.1997a - Kari, Maido: Iga nurga taga Jalta tont 
PM, 17.03.1997b - Leps, Ando: Maarahva ainus ellujäämise võimalus  
PM, 18.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti jääb Euroopa eeskotta? 
PM, 19.03.1997 - Frey, Toomas: Riigikogu andis hinnangu 
keskkonnastrateegiale 
PM, 20.03.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Eurointegratsiooni tagasilöögid 
PM, 20.03.1997b - Neljas, Aap: Eesti enne NATO laienemist 
PM, 24.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kaitseühendus kaitsevalliks  
PM, 26.03.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liidu lauast minema 
PM, 02.04.1997 - Laar, Mart: Rahu, ainult rahu 
PM, 03.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Jälle Tootsi taskud 
PM, 04.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: USA julgeolekupakt Eestiga tekitab küsimusi 
PM, 05.04.1997 - Veidemann, Andra: Euroopa Liit mõjutab Eestit igal juhul 
PM, 08.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Tollipealetung 
PM, 10.04.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Eurohäirekellad 
PM, 10.04.1997b - Kivine, Märt: Pidulik paigalmarss 
PM, 11.04.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Maakondadele ei meeldi Tallinna-Brüsseli telg 
PM, 14.04.1997- Mihkelson, Marko: Venemaa tahab Eestit tagasi võita 
PM, 15.04.1997a - Andla, Enn: Tolle pole vaja 
PM, 15.04.1997b - Kuusmann, Arne: Bensiinist ja pensionist  
PM, 15.04.1997c - Nutt, Mart: Üleminekuperiood jätkub  
PM, 16.04.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Van den Broeki sõnad pole kuld 
PM, 16.04.1997b - Margus, Sulev: Kes igatseb Euroopa Liitu 
 264 
 
PM, 19.04.1997 - Varik, Andres: Tollid pole kuradist 
PM, 23.04.1997 - Betlem, Jaanus: Opositsioon riigikaitse eesotsas 
PM, 24.04.1997 - Tereping, Avo-Rein: Igasugune karistus on kättemaks 
PM, 29.04.1997 - Kont, Vambola: Minister ei oska matemaatikat 
PM, 05.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: President siseministreid vahetamas 
PM, 06.05.1997 - Luts, L.: Muudkui sahkerda 
PM, 08.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Sammaste otsa ronimine 
PM, 09.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eesti advokaadi seljapööramine 
PM, 13.05.1997 - Jakobson, Lembit: Haritlaste lastel pole tulevikus enam 
ülikooli asja 
PM, 15.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Tabamata eurominister 
PM, 16.05.1997 - Uibu, Jaak: Sündimata lastest välditavate surmadeni 
PM, 17.05.1997 - Nutt, Mart: NSV Liidu ja Euroopa Liidu kodakondsus 
PM, 20.05.1997 - Tarand, Kaarel: Tsunft seljatas riigi 
PM, 21.05.1997 - Juhtkiri: Väheviljakas eurosuvetöö 
PM, 22.05.1997 - Vetka, Alvar: Matemaatikaga raskusi  
PM, 23.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroliit Noordwijkis raskustes 
PM, 26.05.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Uue Euroopa koidik 
PM, 28.05.1997 - Floren, Kaido: Poola riigi uus alus 
PM, 29.05.1997 - Varik, Andres: Analüüsi asemel endiselt vee segamine 
PM, 30.05.1997 - Peedu, B.: Kokku hoida on tõesti vaja 
PM, 31.05.1997 - Jaeger, Andres: Kas oleme ikka tõelised eurooplased? 
PM, 02.06.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurotoetus kaob käest 
PM, 03.06.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Euroopa diiva 
PM, 04.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Abortide keelamise vastu  
PM, 06.06.1997 - Tamm, Eino: Kas Eesti neutraliteet tänapäeval on 
võimalik? 
PM, 09.06.1997 - Jürgenson, Kalle: Surmanuhtlus – surmamine või 
nuhtlemine? 
PM, 12.06.1997 - Jakobson, Lembit: Tuld õpetaja pihta 
PM, 16.06.1997 - Nutt, Mart: EL – geopoliitilised eelistused või võrdsed 
võimalused? 
PM, 17.06.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eesti ja Leedu eurotülis 
PM, 18.06.1997 - Alatalu, Toomas: Palju välispoliitikuid, vähe villa 
PM, 20.06.1997 - Andla, Enn: Tollitaotlejate pentsikud argumendid 
PM, 03.07.1997 - Alatalu, Toomas: Täienduseks kahele kommentaarile 
PM, 04.07.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti ja Ameerika Ühendriigid 
PM, 05.07.1997a - Kallas, Siim: See ebamugav demokraatia 
PM, 05.07.1997b - Lahe, Jaan: Ka suvel loetakse 
PM, 07.07.1997 - Junti, Arvo: Muutuv NATO Madridi istungi eel 
PM, 10.07.1997a - Juhtkiri: Suurepärane toetus Eestile 
PM, 10.07.1997b - Made, Vahur: Konstantinoopol tungib tasahilju peale 
PM, 12.07.1997a - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti ja Euroopa Liit 
PM, 12.07.1997b - Juhtkiri: Jalg on ukse vahel 
PM, 15.07.1997a - Aus, T.: Euroskeptikutel läheb kiireks 
PM, 15.07.1997b - Kari, Maido: Poliitikute enesepett? 
PM, 17.07.1997 - Nutt, Mart: Eesti Euroopa Liidu ukse ees  
PM, 18.07.1997a - Kari, Vello: Võidutseda on veel vara 
PM, 18.07.1997b - Made, Vahur: Pärast Euroopa Komisjoni arvamust 
PM, 18.07.1997c - Postimees: Majandus paneb mõtlema 
PM, 19.07.1997a - Juhtkiri: Tants euroliidu raporti ümber 
PM, 19.07.1997b - Loo, Arne: Hurraaga Euroopa Liitu 
PM, 21.07.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti alternatiividest 
PM, 22.07.1997 - Kaasik, Maia: Miks mitte Euroopasse?  
PM, 23.07.1997 - Aaloe, M.: Riigimeeste eufooriapuhangud 
PM, 24.07.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Eurovaidlus alles algab 
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PM, 25.07.1997a - Ojuland, Kristiina: Parem euroliidus sees kui väljas 
PM, 25.07.1997b - Salupere, Malle: Kuhu jääb inimene?  
PM, 26.07.1997a - Ploom, Urmas: Alternatiivid puuduvad 
PM, 26.07.1997b - Valge, Kristjan: Euroopa Liit on liiast 
PM, 29.07.1997 - Nõmm, Eha: Vene turg ja Eesti kurgid 
PM, 30.07.1997 - Tarand, Andres: Eesti ja edetabelid 
PM, 01.08.1997a - Made, Vahur: Kes pääsevad, kes ei pääse ELi pildile 
PM, 01.08.1997b - Varik, Andres: Libaliberalism ohustab maaelu arengut 
PM, 02.08.1997 - Kallas, Siim: Millele teeme panuse? 
PM, 04.08.1997a - Mäeltsemees, Sulev: Vallad ja linnad ühinevas Euroopas 
PM, 04.08.1997b - Telgmaa, Juhan: Mis lahti, Reformierakond? 
PM, 06.08.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon on hädavajalik 
PM, 07.08.1997 - Ojuland, Kristiina: Eesti muutuvasse Euroopa Liitu  
PM, 08.08.1997a - Alatalu, Toomas: Uus hämamine surmanuhtlusega 
PM, 08.08.1997b - Jarne, Aivar: Donner wetter! 
PM, 08.08.1997c - Rahman, Jan: Vabatahtlikult kolhoosidesse 
PM, 11.08.1997 - Välja, Ari: Absurdne idee 
PM, 12.08.1997a - Taimla, Andres: Maaerakondade pealetung valitsuses 
PM, 12.08.1997b - Saarpuu, Hannes: Mõttetu mudamaadlus ELi ümber 
PM, 13.08.1997 - Merendi, K.: Vangid elagu töötu abirahast 
PM, 14.08.1997 - Kivine, Märt: Europrovokaator 
PM, 16.08.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Valitsuse europettus 
PM, 21.08.1997a – Enn U.: Kui piiluks Euroopa Liidu rahakotti? 
PM, 21.08.1997b - Saatpalu, Vello: EL: Teabepuudust ei tohiks kurta 
PM, 23.08.1997 - Maripuu, Maret: Euroopa Liitu: mitte kas, vaid kuidas 
PM, 26.08.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Stagnatsioon keskerakonnas 
PM, 26.08.1997b - Kaasik, Marko: Eesti ja Euroopa Liit: üheksa korda 
mõõda 
PM, 26.08.1997c - Thomasson, Kuno: Üks halvakolaline lühend 
PM, 28.08.1997 - Ruutsoo, Rein: Omavahel ühte, rahvale teist, Euroopale 
kolmandat 
PM, 30.08.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Meri Lukashenko jahil 
PM, 02.09.1997 - Luksep, Peeter: Alusetud hirmud 
PM, 05.09.1997 - Juhtkiri: Eurosügise stardipauk 
PM, 08.09.1997 - Jaanson, Kaido: Miks erakorralised valimised on parem kui 
õlu 
PM, 11.09.1997a - Floren, Kaido: Eurodiskussioon: mäng ühte väravasse 
PM, 11.09.1997b - Hansen, Vootele: Tollid stabiliseerijana 
PM, 13.09.1997 - Välja, Ari: Kakskeelsus küll, aga milline? 
PM, 17.10.1997 - Reiljan, Janno: Tollivõhiklikkusest 
PM, 20.10.1997 - Juhtkiri: Nuhtlus surmanuhtlusega 
PM, 21.10.1997 - Liblik, M.: Kiiret pole kuhugi 
PM, 22.10.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Vanem õde Soomest 
PM, 22.10.1997b - Ojuland, Kristiina: Haridusprobleem 
PM, 23.10.1997 - Alatalu, Toosmas: Surmanuhtlus kaob…öösel  
PM, 24.10.1997 - Made, Vahur: Sotsialism tuleb tagasi 
PM, 25.10.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Poliitilise eliidi pärusmaa 
PM, 28.10.1997 - Stolovitsh, Anu: Kas diferentseerida kooliharidus? 
PM, 31.10.1997a - Laar, Mart: Eesti jäägu Eestiks 
PM, 31.10.1997b - Raudsepp, R.: Tehkem maanteed korda! 
PM, 04.11.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Venemaa Balti-poliitika on endiselt ummikus 
PM, 06.11.1997 - Pettai, Vello: Naturaliseerimine käiku! 
PM, 10.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Piibliga vaidlemise aeg 
PM, 11.11.1997a - Palk, Paavo: Kas doominoteooria võib olla õige? 
PM, 11.11.1997b - Ruutsoo, Rein: Halvad ajakirjanikud ja head diplomaadid  
PM, 12.11.1997 - Kukk, Kalev: Hoiuste tagamise seadusega ei tohi venitada  
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PM, 13.11.1997 - Bahovski, Erkki: Liigne uudishimu tapab 
PM, 18.11.1997 - Made, Vahur: Euroopa Liit toob Eestisse ametiühingud 
PM, 19.11.1997 - Suurmaa, Aigar: Nii palju halba? 
PM, 21.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroametnike dilemma 
PM, 22.11.1997 - Savisaar, Edgar: Rahanduskriisist ja Tiit Vähi 
mõtteavaldustest 
PM, 25.11.1997 - Siimann, Mart: Eesti tahab olla usaldusväärne 
PM, 26.11.1997 - Simpson, Erik: Euroliit toob positiivse diskrimineerimise 
PM, 27.11.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Luxembourg’is sikud ja lambad taas kokku 
PM, 28.11.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Suhted Venemaaga paranevad 
PM, 29.11.1997a - Made, Vahur: Gluhhovi uued lubadused 
PM, 29.11.1997b - Savisaar, Edgar: Kas osa standardsest euroomletist voi 
euromuna Eesti moodi? 
PM, 01.12.1997a - Klaas, Urmas: Euroopa Liit, kõikvõimas ratsu 
PM, 01.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liit otsib sõnu 
PM, 04.12.1997a - Junti, Arvo: Meil puudub riigi arendamiseks 
kontseptsioon 
PM, 04.12.1997b - Laar, Mart: Kas teame, kuhu läheme? 
PM, 04.12.1997c - Raidal, Jaanus: Eesti majandus vajab investeeringuid 
PM, 05.12.1997a - Niitsoo, Viktor: Eurointegratsioon kui topeltlõks 
PM, 05.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liidu laienemine on seni ebaselge 
PM, 09.12.1997 - Palk, Paavo: Euroopa Liit ja raha 
PM, 10.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Euroliidu helde käsi 
PM, 11.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Kuidas Euroopa Liit laieneb 
PM, 12.12.1997 - Made, Vahur: Integratsioon valest otsast 
PM, 13.12.1997 - Klaas, Urmas: Euroopa Liit ei ole Punane Rist 
PM, 14.12.1997 - Juhtkiri: Vahejaam Luksemburg 
PM, 15.12.1997 - Kalmre, Vahur: Liiga enesekindel välisminister 
PM, 16.12.1997 - Olesk, Peeter: Miks me kardame teisitimõtlemist? 
PM, 17.12.1997a - Made, Vahur: Eesti võimalustest tingida 
PM, 17.12.1997b - Palk, Paavo: Peaminister loobus ametlikust optimismist 
PM, 17.12.1997c - Põder, M.: Kaks suhtumist 
PM, 18.12.1997a - Kaplinski, Jaan: Illusoorne Euroopa identiteet 
PM, 18.12.1997b - Tippi, Toomas: Ühinemise otsustavad ikkagi kodanikud 
PM, 19.12.1997a - Aaloe, M.: Miks oleme umbusklikud 
PM, 19.12.1997b - Jürgenson, Kalle: Kes suudab ainult nina ette vaadata? 
PM, 19.12.1997c - Sild, Tarmo: Eurostandardeid pole olemas 
PM, 20.12.1997 - Jarne, Aivar: Moskva-Brüssel-Tallinn 
PM, 22.12.1997 - Aasma, Viive: Kummaline koostöö  
PM, 23.12.1997 - Made, Vahur: Euroopa Liit lõhestab valitsust 
PM, 24.12.1997a - Juhtkiri: Eesti piim ei kõlba juua 
PM, 24.12.1997b - Ots, Heido: Usust sõna maagiasse 
PM, 24.12.1997c - Tallo, Ivar: Potjomkini küla Euroopa moodi 
PM, 29.12.1997a - Jarne, Aivar: Ajuloputus Euroopa Liiduga 
PM, 29.12.1997b - Kallas, Siim: Mõtlemise aeg 
PM, 29.12.1997c - Palk, Paavo: Eesti viisasüsteem täiustab 
PM, 30.12.1997a - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu vaatega uude aastasse 
PM, 30.12.1997b - Tamman, Tiina: Eesti huvid Euroopa Liidus 
1998 
PM, 04.01.1998 - Kaplinski, Jaan: Eesti välispoliitika usk ja keel 
PM, 05.01.1998a - Cook, Robin: Väljakutse Suurbritannia eesistumisele 
euroliidus 
PM, 05.01.1998b - Kikas, M.: Kellele on vaja erakorralisi valimisi? 
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PM, 06.01.1998a - Made, Vahur: Eesti-Vene suhted ei muutu? 
PM, 06.01.1998b - Otsing, E.: Asi pole piimas 
PM, 07.01.1998a - Andla, Enn: Tollidest pole mingit abi 
PM, 07.01.1998b - Jarne, Aivar: Toompea põllumeeste pealetung 
PM, 08.01.1998 - Leetsaar, Jaan: Hobuseliha, kvoodid ja tollid 
PM, 12.01.1998 - Parve, Valdar: Professor ju ongi ülikoolis dotsent! 
PM, 15.01.1998 - Tammsaar, Tiit: Ilvese nahk on antud jagamisele 
PM, 19.01.1998 - Jänes, K.: Enne kui on liiga hilja 
PM, 23.01.1998 - Kõre, Jüri: Eestlased teel euroliitu 
PM, 31.01.1998 - Made, Vahur: Valitsusliit tahab valimistel kaotada  
PM, 03.02.1998 - Jürgenson, Kalle: Kust otsida euroskeptitsismi? 
PM, 04.02.1998 - Saar, Jüri: Balti ühtsus – kas sõnakõlks?  
PM, 07.02.1998a - Aasmäe, Hardo: Tollisõja neli õppetundi 
PM, 07.02.1998b - Raudsepp, K.: Euroopa asemel Ameerikasse 
PM, 09.02.1998 - Tamman, Tiina: Sularaha ei jäta jälgi 
PM, 10.02.1998 - Neljas, Aap: Kodakondsuse seadus eurotuules 
PM, 13.02.1998 - Õnnepalu, Tõnu: Pax Americana: rahu läbi ülekaalu 
PM, 17.02.1998 - Mälksoo, Lauri: Euroopa Liidu ja Eesti läbirääkimised: kas 
mäng ühte väravasse? 
PM, 19.02.1998 - Tulvite, Peeter: Ülikooli arstiteaduskond hädas 
PM, 21.02.1998 - Metsis, Toivo: Vene keele jätkuv soosimine 
PM, 28.02.1998a - Pullerits, Priit: Pea ees läppunud Euroopasse 
PM, 28.02.1998b - Tallo, Ivar: Saun ehk presidentaalne äratuskell 
PM, 03.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Surmanuhtlust kaotamata ei saa 
PM, 04.03.1998 - Vesiroos, Merle: Kooliõpilane ja Euroopa Liit 
PM, 06.03.1998a - Erson, P.: Skandaaliderohke poliitika on Eestile hukutav 
PM, 06.03.1998b - Gross, Villem: Mis mind erutas 
PM, 06.03.1998c - Jarne, Aivar: Euroopa Liidus ei teenita kahte isandat 
korraga 
PM, 06.03.1998d - Kuurme, Tiiu: Akadeemilise rahva turuväärtusest  
PM, 10.03.1998 - Varik, Andres: Hurraaga pea ees illusioonidesse! 
PM, 11.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Alustada tuleb arutelust 
PM, 13.03.1998 - Alatalu, Toomas: Las laps ise valib kodakondsuse 
PM, 14.03.1998 - Made, Vahur: Eesti, Läti ja Leedu vajavad koostööd 
PM, 16.03.1998 - Juhtkiri: Moskva taastab Balti üksmeelt 
PM, 18.03.1998a - Juhtkiri: Raske otsus 
PM, 18.03.1998b - Kallas, Siim: Uinutav rahu   
PM, 19.03.1998 - Made, Vahur: Kas Sõssujevi antud lootus kestab? 
PM, 25.03.1998 - Hänni, Liia: Vaade ühiskonnale läbi soolise prisma 
PM, 26.03.1998 - Ennet, Priit: Hüpped (euro)rongile 
PM, 28.03.1998a - Gräzin, Igor: Mida näitab üks parandamata aken 
PM, 28.03.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Õiget aega otsides 
PM, 30.03.1998 - Raagma, Garri: Kütuseaktsiis ja regionaalne areng 
PM, 31.03.1998a - Betlem, Jaanus: Eesti talu võimalused Euroopa Liidus 
PM, 31.03.1998b - Juhtkiri: Läheb lahti  
PM, 01.04.1998 - Vitsur, Heido: Ohu märgid 
PM, 02.04.1998a - Palk, Paavo: Ameeriklased rääkisid Euroopast 
PM, 02.04.1998b - Riibe, Marmelt: Keelame hundijahi? 
PM, 03.04.1998 - Mikko, Madis: Liitumisläbirääkimiste sujuv algus 
PM, 06.04.1998a - Stolovich, Anu: Millist diferentseerimist me vajame? 
PM, 06.04.1998b - Sutrop, Margit: Ebaõiglusest Eesti haridussüsteemis  
PM, 08.04.1998 - Tarand, Kaarel: Valitsus põlvili pedagoogide ees 
PM, 13.04.1998a - Männik, Jaanus: Tollid tulevad 
PM, 13.04.1998b - Tarand, Andres: Valitsuse kolmekordne viga 
PM, 14.04.1998 - Palk, Paavo: Kui Brüsselis naerdakse Eesti üle 
PM, 16.04.1998 - Kulbok, Kalle: Varastatud raha 
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PM, 17.04.1998 - Nestor, Eiki: Raamatute käibemaks tuleb nullida 
PM, 18.04.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Maa tuleb täita autodega 
PM, 20.04.1998 - Juhtkiri: The Economist Eestit avastamas 
PM, 27.04.1998 - Niidas, Hando: Jüriöölaste kavatsustest 
PM, 02.05.1998 - Juhtkiri: Leedu president klaaris apsud 
PM, 12.05.1998a - Juhtkiri: Kommünikeede kolmik Riias. Balti presidentide 
viisakuskohtumistele tuleb leida töine eesmärk 
PM, 12.05.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Viisavabadus ja maine – ainult üks, kumb? 
PM, 15.05.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Lillkapsaste reguleerimise vastu. Mõned 
tähelepanekud Eesti euroskeptikute tarvis 
PM, 18.05.1998 - Varik, Andres: Mida maaga ette võtta. Maakasutusest ja 
põllumaade metsastamisest 
PM, 22.05.1998 - Siimann, Mart: Miks ühineme Euroopa Liiduga? Naabrid ei 
lase Eestil üksinda jätkata 
PM, 25.05.1998a - Rummo, Paul-Erik: Ringhäälinguseaduse uuendamine 
käib üle kivide ja kändude 
PM, 25.05.1998b - Tarand, Andres: Valitsemise vastutus. Eesti sisepoliitiline 
areng edeneb vintskelt 
PM, 28.05.1998 - Tallo, Ivar: Eetika ja erasektor 
PM, 29.05.1998a - Ojuland, Kristiina: Euroopa Liidu laienemise hind. 
Suveräänsusega maksame kinni majandusliku ja julgeolekualase kindluse 
PM, 29.05.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Isemõtlejatest sõltuv referendum. Rahaasjad 
olulised ka euroküsimuste otsustamisel Taanis 
PM, 01.06.1998 - Jaanson, Kaido: Eesti tee Euroopa Liitu. Lähedus 
Läänemere piirkonnale tähendab kiiremat arengut kui side Kesk-
Euroopaga 
PM, 02.06.1998 - Silberg, Uno: Majandus lapsekingades. Euroopa Liiduga 
ühinemine on kitsaste gruppide huvides 
PM, 03.06.1998a - Betlem, Jaanus: Parteid Eestis ja Euroopas. Erakondade 
paljusus on normaalne nähe 
PM, 03.06.1998b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Regionaalpoliitika ja Euroopa 
Liit. Eesti peaks oskama Euroopa Liidu regionaalpoliitikat ära kasutada 
PM, 05.06.1998a - Juhtkiri: Igal asjal on piir. Euroasjadest teavitamisega ei 
maksa liiale minna 
PM, 05.06.1998b - Kirch, Aksel: Eesti eurovalmidus on tõusnud. 
Eurobaromeetri uuring näitab, et Euroopa Liidu maine Eestis paraneb 
PM, 09.06.1998 - Mereste, Uno: Miljonid sekeldamise kuludeks. Himu 
käsumajanduslikke noorusunistusi teostada ei rauge 
PM, 16.06.1998 - Kirch, Aksel & Talts, Mait: Võitjad ja kaotajad. Kas 
eurointegratsiooniprotsess on kasulik Eestile või Euroopa Liidule? 
PM, 20.06.1998a - Aru, Peep: Maapank ei vii Puhjat pankrotti. 
Monofunktsionaalne Puhja ja polüfunktsiooniline minister 
PM, 20.06.1998b - Talts, Mait: NATO ja EL soosing Eestis. NATO 
populaarsus langes Madridi tippkohtumise mõjul 
PM, 22.06.1998 - Ennuste, Ülo: Eesti majandus üle ELi lävepaku. Kõigile 
küsimustele ei saa anda ühest ja täpset vastust 
PM, 26.06.1998 - Made, Vahur: Eesti välispoliitika on muutumas. Euroopa 
Liit kallutab Eestit järeleandmistele Venemaa suhtes 
PM, 27.06.1998a - Tereping, Avo-Rein: Miks mulle ei meeldi europiim. 
Steriliseeritud piim võib põhjustada allergiat 
PM, 27.06.1998b - Tõnission, Liina: Avameelselt astmelisest maksust. Ohud 
ja hirmud, mis seostuvad astmelise tulumaksuga, on liialdatud Maapanga 
languse põhjused ja vajalikud järeldused 
PM, 01.07.1998 - Lukas, Tõnis: Üksi me sureme välja. Enne ELi 
kritiseerimist peame oma majanduse jalule saama 
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PM, 02.07.1998 - Tuisk, Jarmo: Iseseisvuse võlu ja valu. Eesti ei tohi oma 
iseseisvust Brüsselile odavalt müüa 
PM, 03.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Seljakotid selga! Reisimine on muutumas 
eestlaste rahvushobiks 
PM, 04.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Euroametnikud saavad higistada. Austria 
paljulubav algus Euroliidu juhtriigina 
PM, 09.07.1998 - Rüütel, Arnold: Külm ja närviline suvi. Panganduse 
stabiilsus peaks huvitama kõiki 
PM, 15.07.1998 - Pohl, Tiiu: Eesti ajaloolise paratamatuse ees. 
Üksiküritajatest riikidel on vähe võimalusi 
PM, 16.07.1998 - Juhtkiri: Advokaadi teosammud. Saksamaa lahendab 
viisavabaduse küsimust aeglaselt 
PM, 17.07.1998 - Jaanson, Kaido: Euroskeptitsism. Võrreldes Eestit ja 
Euroopa Liitu  
PM, 21.07.1998 - Neljas, Aap: NATO ja Euroopa Liidu maine. NATO ja 
Euroopa Liit turvalisuse pakkujatena 
PM, 25.07.1998 - Remmel, Mart: Hakkame huulde hammustama. Millisena 
paistavad euroläbirääkimised mänguteooria valguses 
PM, 27.07.1998 - Silberg, Uno: Integratsioon tagantvaates. Erinevusest 
konföderaalse ja föderaalse liidu vahel 
PM, 28.07.1998 - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu vajab sisemisi muutusi. Kuidas 
tõsta parlamendi langema kippuvat mainet 
PM, 01.08.1998a - Juhtkiri: Põllumajanduse kehvad päevad. Valitsuse ja 
põllumajandustootjate kõnelused lõppesid tulemuseta 
PM, 01.08.1998b - Tammsaar, Tiit: Kõikehõlmav Rahvaerakond. End 
universaalsena reklaamiv partei pole suutnud midagi ära teha 
PM, 06.08.1998 - Kulbok, Kalle: Eurodebatt vindub endiselt 
PM, 08.08.1998 - Juhtkiri: Brüsselit tuleb võtta tõsiselt. Tollid Eesti 
tootjatele tõestavad meie konkurentsivõimet 
PM, 10.08.1998 - Talts, Mait: Eesti vajab eurodiskussiooni. Euroopa Liidu 
üle vaieldes on vähe argumente 
PM, 14.08.1998 - Raudsaar, Mart: Eesti NSV kaart teeb endiselt ilma 
PM, 15.08.1998 - Männik, Jaanus: Tollipoliitika apsud ja võimalused. Ilma 
kindla tollipoliitikata jääme maha isegi Lätist  
PM, 22.08.1998 - Klaassen, Mait: Koolide tühjenemise aegu. Maksukoormus 
tuleb siduda laste olemasolu ja arvuga 
PM, 25.08.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Kahe isanda teener  
PM, 28.08.1998 - Cook, Robin: Ehitades uut ühinenud Euroopat, 
Suurbritannia ettekujutuses on Eestil uues Euroopas oluline koht 
PM, 29.08.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Näpuviibutusest ei piisa 
PM, 01.09.1998 - Made, Vahur: Lätist tuleb häid uudiseid. Läti referendum 
loob pretsedendi 
PM, 06.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: Miks nad kinki ei toonud. NATO juhtide visiitide 
rohkus lisab Eesti turvalisust 
PM, 07.09.1998a - Haug, Arvo: Tarbijakaitseta Euroopasse ei saa. Eestis on 
tarbijakaitse veel lapsekingades 
PM, 07.09.1998b - Villem, Andrus: Läti vajab toetust. Venemaal pole 
adekvaatset pilti Balti riikidest 
PM, 10.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: Euroopa mõõdud sobivad. Eesti ei ole leidnud 
Euroopa Liiduga ühinemist takistavaid probleeme 
PM, 15.09.1998a - Mõttus, A.: Alternatiivi ei ole 
PM, 15.09.1998b - Nutt, Mart: Kas Euroopa Liit tagab julgeoleku. Brüsseli 
kodakondsussoovitused on võrreldavad Trooja hobusega 
PM, 15.09.1998c - Saatpalu, Vello: Tulumaksuskaala astmestamisest 
PM, 16.09.1998 - Saluäär, Hille: Eesti keele jäämisvõimalus. Euroreeglite 
tõlkimine suurendab huvi eesti keele vastu 
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PM, 17.09.1998 - Talts, Mait: Eesti eurodiskussioon. Sissetulekud on 
isemõtlemise soovist olulisemad 
PM, 23.09.1998 - Reiljan, Janno: Mõõdutundetu ebamaine itk 
PM, 24.09.1998 - Vahtre, Lauri: Astmeline tulumaks ei tarvitse tulla 
PM, 25.09.1998 - Made, Vahur: Oli kord suur Vene turg. Ärimeeste ida-lobby 
viinuks Eesti katastroofini 
PM, 30.09.1998 - Juhtkiri: NRG sai etapivõidu Valitsus otsustas jätkata NRG 
Energyga läbirääkimisi 
PM, 01.10.1998 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Et kinnistada Eesti Läände. 
Põhjustest, miks lahkun välisministri kohalt  
PM, 02.10.1998a - Jarne, Aivar: Kuhu küll kõik lilled jäid? Välisminister 
Ilvese lahkumisel olid ka välispoliitilised põhjused 
PM, 02.10.1998b - Tamm, Eino: Vildakas kodakondsusloogika. Eesti ja Läti 
on kodakondsusküsimustes taas paarisrakendis 
PM, 03.10.1998 - Unt, Arnold: Vivat Latvia! 
PM, 07.10.1998 - Varik, Andres: Põllumees krediidikõlbulikuks. Maareform 
peab avama tee ettevõtluse arengule 
PM, 08.10.1998a - Metsaveer, Jaan: Tulumaks piiraku ülemaksmist 
PM, 08.10.1998b - Mikko, Madis: Horoskoop või pühakiri. 80 000 lehekülge 
ELi seadusi on vastuvaidlematuks täitmiseks 
PM, 09.10.1998 - Hansson, Ardo: Pangandus vajab ikka konkurentsi. 
Välismaalaste pessimism häirib pangandust muust majandusest enam 
PM, 12.10.1998 - Palk, Paavo: Usk levib kiiresti 
PM, 13.10.1998 - Varik, Andres: Populistliku kriitikaga riiki ei ehita. Raske 
majandusaasta ärakasutamine valimiskampaanias on vastutustundetu 
PM, 20.10.1998 - Rüütel, Arnold: Maarahvas välistuulte keerises. IMFi 
memorandum pärsib integreerumist Euroopa Liiduga 
PM, 21.10.1998 - Neljas, Aap: Eesti konarlik tee WTOsse Meie suureks 
üllatuseks on Läti selle edukalt läbinud  
PM, 22.10.1998a - Hansen, Vootele: Veest algab kõik. Kvaliteetse elu 
eeltingimus on kvaliteetne joogivesi 
PM, 22.10.1998b - Juhtkiri: Kodakondsus surve all. Eesti ei pääse 
kodakondsuspoliitika liberaliseerimisest 
PM, 27.10.1998a - Jarne, Aivar: ELi poliitiline piknik. ELi laienemist 
pidurdab liidu otsustamisvõimetus 
PM, 27.10.1998b - Palmaru, Raivo: Asjatundmatuse karuteene. Inimesi 
õnnistatakse päevast päeva üsna kummalise informatsiooniga 
PM, 29.10.1998 - Ojuland, Kristiina: Pimesi Euroopa Liidu poole. 
Liitumisläbirääkimiste alustamine novembris on ennatlik 
PM, 31.10.1998a - Leetsaar, Jaan: Põllumajanduse kindlad reeglid Eesti 
lubab ELil kasutada enda suhtes kõlvatut konkurentsi 
PM, 31.10.1998b - Tamm, Eino: Konarused teel WTOsse. Eesti on absoluutse 
kaubandusliberalismiga jõudnud ummikusse 
PM, 01.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Ikka veel pailapse osas. Liitumiskõneluste alguses 
ei taotle vaid Eesti Euroopa Liidult üleminekuperioode 
PM, 03.11.1998 - Tamm, Eino: Pilk võõrasse peeglisse. Poola ja Eesti tee ELi 
on sarnasem kui üldiselt arvatakse 
PM, 06.11.1998a - Järvan, Aare: Põllumees ei vaja propagandiste. Valitsusel 
puudub põllumajanduspoliitika kujundamisel partner 
PM, 06.11.1998b - Kortspärn, Heiki: Olematu turvalisus 
PM, 06.11.1998c - Raud, Rein: Eurovari Eesti kohal. ELile alternatiivi otsijad 
ei tunnista sattumist halli tsooni 
PM, 08.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Ootame eurodetaile. On aeg hakata ka laiemat 
üldsust tutvustama Brüsseli tuhandete direktiividega 
PM, 09.11.1998a - Buisson, Marie-Laurence: Uued tuuled Eesti ja ELi 
suhetes. Eestit kiitnud Euroopa Komisjoni raport osutas ka probleemidele 
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PM, 09.11.1998b - Piirimäe, Kristjan: Alatalu alusetud süüdistused 
PM, 12.11.1998a - Lahe, Virge: Saksa keele oskus – on see vajalik? 
PM, 12.11.1998b - Männik Jaanus: Brüsselis läheb Paunvere meelest. 
Põllumees ootab euroopalikku suhtumist ja kohtlemist 
PM, 14.11.1998 - Raud, Rein: Pilk kõverpeeglisse ristteel. Euroliitu 
astumiseks võiks igaüks leida ka isikliku põhjuse 
PM, 17.11.1998a - Herkel, Andres: Karaganovi doktriini tulek. Riigikogul pole 
mandaati sisulise nullvariandi kehtestamiseks 
PM, 17.11.1998b - Kortspärn, Heiki: Milleks Eestile piirileping? 
PM, 17.11.1998c - Mikiver, Ilmar: Ühinemine ELiga - hüpe tundmatusse 
PM, 17.11.1998d - Palk, Paavo: Hoolekanne või majandus 
PM, 18.11.1998 - Tammsaar, Tiit: Vaade hääletustabloole - 66 : 5 : 5. 
Sündmuse võtit tuleks otsida EME kongressilt 
PM, 19.11.1998 - Juhtkiri: Kodakondsus jõulukingiks. Rahvusvaheline 
arvamus sunnib kodakondsusseadust muutma 
PM, 21.11.1998 - Vetik, Raivo: Tasub õppida teiste riikide vigadest 
PM, 23.11.1998 - Nutt, Mart: Veel lihtsustatud piiriületuskorrast. Hirm 
Venemaa ees halvab välisministeeriumi ametnikke 
PM, 27.11.1998 - Kuks, Jaak-Hans: Murelaps põllumajandus. Maaelu 
küsimuste lahendamiseks vajame rohkem analüüsi 
PM, 28.11.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: NATO lipsunõel särab taas. Eesti 
välispoliitikas on taas tähtsaimaks pürgimine Põhja-Atlandi allianssi 
PM, 02.12.1998 - Eamets, Raul: Nõrk tööpoliitika. Tööpuudusega peaks 
tegelema eraldi ministeerium 
PM, 03.12.1998 - Bahovski, Erkki: Kaugemale N Liidust 
PM, 06.12.1998 - Juhtkiri: Jõnksutav eurovedur. Euroopa Liidu laienemine 
peab jätkuma praeguses tempos 
PM, 07.12.1998 - Palmaru, Raivo: Tere tulemast stagnariiki. Stagnatsioon ja 
tõusutee: uued mõisted uudis- ja unarsõnade leksikonis 
PM, 10.12.1998 - Krittel, Toomas: Lubamatu vale   
PM, 11.12.1998a - Valton-Vallikivi, Arvo: Mis asi on euro-ökk. Euroopa Liit 
on Eestile vajalik euroküllastumisest hoolimata 
PM, 11.12.1998b - Varik, Andres: Lunastagem võlg maarahva ees. 
Põllumajanduse toetamine eeldab süsteemset lähenemist 
PM, 12.12.1998a - Juhtkiri: Kui lehmad õpivad arvutama. Uus toetusskeem 
muudab maaelu keeruliseks 
PM, 12.12.1998b - Palk, Paavo: Peaministril pole naelkumme. Kas Mart 
Siimann tuleb libedal teel juhtimisega toime? 
PM, 14.12.1998a - Erson, P.: Murelikud poliitikud 
PM, 14.12.1998b - Juhtkiri: Aeglane Viini valss. Euroopa Liidu 
tippkohtumine lükkas laienemisotsused tulevikku 
PM, 18.12.1998a - Fogel, Rainer & Prikk, Kristjan: Põllumajanduspoliitika 
eilne päev 
PM, 18.12.1998b - Õnnepalu, Tõnu: Vürtspoodnik, pankrotimeister ja EL. 
Keegi pole märganud, et Euroopa Liitu juhivad jänesed 
PM, 20.12.1998 - Juhtkiri: Küpsustunnistus on käes. Viisavabadus 
Euroopaga lõpetab ühe etapi Eesti suhetes välisriikidega 
PM, 21.12.1998 - Junti, Arvo: Kuritegevus ühiskonna peegliks. Kas leebe 
karistus ja madal elatustase määravad kuritegevust? 
PM, 22.12.1998 - Aasmäe, Hardo: Mõtleme veel turumajanduse üle. Eestit 
aitavad vaid enda targad otsused 
PM, 28.12.1998 - Jarne, Aivar: Viisavabaduse aasta 
PM, 29.12.1998a - Mikiver, Ilmar: Pöörates palge uue aasta poole 
PM, 29.12.1998b - Tallo, Ivar: Aasta Eesti riiki. Riigivalitsemise süsteemi 
peab ümber korraldama  
 272 
 
2002 
PM, 04.01.2002 - Lukas, Tõnis: Teaduspoliitika tähendab valikut 
PM, 11.01.2002 - Krusell, Siim: Pooltühjalt töötav haridussüsteem 
PM, 16.01.2002 - Mihkelson, Marko: Püha lehma ootuses 
PM, 17.01.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eurotasalülitamine  
PM, 22.01.2002a - Hänni, Liia: Jah, härra justiitsminister! 
PM, 22.01.2002b - Pääsuke, Ants: Kahe krooni eest miljonäriks! 
PM, 26.01.2002 - Bahvoski, Erkki: Leedu maadilemma  
PM, 28.01.2002 - Laurson, Jüri: Majaomanik vajab inimväärikat kohtlemist 
ja kaitset 
PM, 30.01.2002 - Juhtkiri: Suu puhtaks! Euroopa Komisjon rikub 
põllumajanduspiirangute kavaga oma põhimõtteid  
PM, 31.01.2002 - Altmäe, Arvi: Kutseharidus väärib tulevikku  
PM, 01.02.2002 - Männik, Jaanus: Täpsemalt põllumeeste toetustest  
PM, 04.02.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Vahe sisse  
PM, 09.02.2002 - Veidemann, Rein: Eesti vaimu lahkumine  
PM, 11.02.2002 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Euroopa tulevik ja meie valikud  
PM, 13.02.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Maksud ehk aus äri ausse  
PM, 14.02.2002 - Susi, Mart: Riiklikud huvid ja haridusosak  
PM, 16.02.2002 - Helme, Mart: Visegradi teeviit  
PM, 19.02.2002 - Tallo, Ivar: Vorst ja poliitika 
PM, 20.02.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eesti huvid lihaletil  
PM, 22.02.2002 - Veteallik, Jüri: Jätke Ilves rahule! 
PM, 23.02.2002 - Juhtkiri: Omariiklus kohustab. Riik on nii tugev, kui tugev 
on ühiskond 
PM, 08.03.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Kust saab Ilves veel kabelimatsu?  
PM, 08.03.2002b - Laar, Mart: Rahu, ainult rahu  
PM, 09.03.2002a - Juhtkiri: Vaidlused Brüsselis. Eesti peab Euroopa Liidult 
nõudma oma seisukohtadega arvestamist 
PM, 09.03.2002b - Mõistlik, A.: Miks nii? 
PM, 11.03.2002 - Sokk, Arvi: Liigume Aafrikasse 
PM, 14.03.2002 - Allik, Jaak: Ühiskondliku leppe miraazh  
PM, 16.03.2002 - Viikberg, Jüri: Ei saa me võru keeleta  
PM, 18.03.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Head seadused ja paha eelarve. 
Politseinike eripensionid pole ainuke rahata jäänud vääramatu kulu 
PM, 19.03.2002 - Mikiver, Monika: Suuremad õigused suhtlemisel 
ametnikega  
PM, 20.03.2002 - Juhtkiri: Pudrumägede ootuses. Kas ühine 
põllumajanduspoliitika on ka pärast teisenemist Eestile kasulik? 
PM, 23.03.2002 - Männik, E.: Ametiühingute tulumaksuvabastus 
PM, 27.03.2002 - Raun, Mait: Et mees püsiks kauem värske   
PM, 28.03.2002 – Sundelevitsh, Ilja: Elu ja seadus   
PM, 30.03.2002a - Helme, Mart: Migratsioonituul puhub vaid idast 
PM, 30.03.2002b - Mattson, Toomas: Klantspilt purunes  
PM, 01.04.2002 - Kranich, Heiki: Hoia, mida armastad! Natura 2000 
sihtidest Euroopas ja Eestis 
PM, 02.04.2002a - d’Estaing, Valéry Giscard: Avalik kiri 
PM, 02.04.2002b - Juske, Ants: Berliini müür püsib  
PM, 02.04.2002c - Varik, Andres: Mitmekäiguline Euroopa  
PM, 17.04.2002 - Juhtkiri: Tühjenev maa. Eestis puudub siiani selge 
arusaam maaelu tulevikust  
PM, 18.04.2002a - Aaviksoo, Jaak: Haridus kui prioriteet  
PM, 18.04.2002b - Juhtkiri: Kõik valimisvõidu nimel!  Keskerakonna soov 
teha riigiametitest oma propagandaasutused on lubamatu  
PM, 18.04.2002c - Maitse, Meelis: Sotsiaalmonoloog Eesti moodi 
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PM, 19.04.2002 - Juhtkiri: Valitsuse dilemma. Kauplemisruum Euroopa 
Liiduga on kitsuke 
PM, 23.04.2002 - Savi, Toomas: Riigikogu lahtised uksed 
PM, 30.04.2002 - Kallis, Ain: Kompleksideta EU roopasse!  
PM, 06.05.2002 - Tepandi, Jaan: Tabamused väljaspool märklauda 
PM, 13.05.2002a - Mälksoo, Lauri: Kuidas muuta põhiseadust?  
PM, 13.05.2002b - Sildam, Toomas: Ustimenko näitas piiriauku  
PM, 16.05.2002 - Juhtkiri: Selge sõnum Eesti peab jätkama NATO suunal 
siseriiklikku ettevalmistustöö 
PM, 17.05.2002 - Ubar, Raimund: Lühinägelik rahastamislahendus   
PM, 28.05.2002a - Juhtkiri: Loosungid seadusteks. Valimiskampaaniale 
pühendunud Riigikogu peab jääma suvetööle 
PM, 28.05.2002b - Suija, E.: Ignar Fjukil on õigus 
PM, 30.05.2002 - Aunin, Urmas: Sallimatu eestlane 
PM, 01.06.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Ei juudi vandenõu ega sotsialism 
PM, 01.06.2002b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Põhjala päikeserannik Eestisse! 
PM, 06.06.2002 - Parve, Ralf R.: Uus ajalugu  
PM, 07.06.2002 - Juhtkiri: Ohutus eelkõige. Mängu- ja spordiväljakud 
peavad vastama euronormidele  
PM, 11.06.2002a - Juhtkiri: Peatükkide sulgemise vaevad. Poliitilised 
vaidlused Brüsselis kipuvad varjutama Eesti eurokõnelusi 
PM, 11.06.2002b - Varul, Paul: Põhiseadust muudab rahvas  
PM, 12.06.2002a - Barkalaja, Anzori: Kivikuningamängust, kukepoksist ja 
jalgpallist  
PM, 12.06.2002b - Kallas, Siim: Kümme aastat Eesti krooni  
PM, 15.06.2002a - Soone, Ivar: Identiteedi kriis või identiteedikriis?  
PM, 15.06.2002b - Suits, Maimu: Puhtus eelkõige! 
PM, 17.06.2002a - Juhtkiri: Raha paneb rattad käima. Paljuräägitud 
haldussuutlikkus pole sõnakõlks 
PM, 17.06.2002b - Siim, Tõnis: Liitumise paratamatusest 
PM, 21.06.2002 - Laar, Mart: Valitsusel napib otsustusjulgust   
PM, 01.07.2002 - Mųller, Per Stig: Euroopa unistus täitub  
PM, 05.07.2002a - Bronshtein, Mihhail: Idapoliitika on tundeline teema  
PM, 05.07.2002b - Juhtkiri: Eelista eestimaist!  
PM, 15.07.2002 - Reiljan, Janno: Rahvas põhiseaduse kaitsjana 
PM, 16.07.2002 - Reinap, Aivar: Tugiostud kapsaturul   
PM, 19.07.2002a - Juhtkiri: Kõdu läikiva fassaadi taga. Lagunevad 
politseimajad ja lääpas piirivalvekordonid häbistavad Eesti riiki  
PM, 19.07.2002b - Reiljan, Villu: Kelle oma on maa?  
PM, 27.07.2002a - Juhtkiri: Kaheldavad trahvid. Euroliidu kavandatav 
karistusmehhanism sisaldaks endas küsimärke 
PM, 27.07.2002b - Ruutsoo, Rein: Kuidas saada eurooplaseks  
PM, 30.07.2002 - Jaeger, Andres: Reisijateta rong 
PM, 02.08.2002 - Tiit, Valdur: Eesti tuulikud talupõllul  
PM, 05.08.2002a - Marrandi, Jaanus: Maa vajab harijaid. Tugevad 
kannapöörded maa müügil näitaksid Eestit ebastabiilse riigina 
PM, 05.08.2002b - Reinap, Aivar: Rukki saatus  
PM, 06.08.2002 - Aaloe, Mati: Vaeste appikarje  
PM, 12.08.2002 - Reiljan, Villu: Valitsus teenigu rahva ühishuve  
PM, 14.08.2002a - Juhtkiri: Tundlik küsimus. Puutumatuseleping USA 
sõduritele paneb Eesti raske välispoliitilise valiku ette  
PM, 14.08.2002b - Luik, Jüri: Eesti ja tema liitlased  
PM, 15.08.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Pudrumäed ja piimajõed  
PM, 23.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Küpsuseksam. USA kompab Eestit kui tulevast 
liitlast 
PM, 22.08.2002 - Lerman, Jonna: Kes aitab? 
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PM, 29.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Püssid palge?  Piiratud jahipidamise jätkumine 
Eestis sõltub läbirääkimisoskustest  
PM, 30.08.2002 - Gross, J.: Eesti kutseharidusest - vaadatuna Saksamaalt 
PM, 31.08.2002 - Juhtkiri: Jälle must päev. Tööõnnetuste arv Eestis kasvab 
iga aastaga  
PM, 02.09.2002 - Heidmets, Mati: Milline on Eesti laiem eesmärk  
PM, 04.09.2002 - Tallo, Ivar: Avatud riik ja suletud erakonnad 
PM, 05.09.2002 - Tanner, Risto: Miks me oma võimalusi ei kasuta? 
PM, 06.09.2002 - Buiter, Willem & Michell-Thompson, Vanessa: Kuidas 
Eesti saavutab ELi jõukuse 
PM, 12.09.2002a - Juhtkiri: Tootsi rehkendus. Endale võetud kohustused 
tuleb täita 
PM, 12.09.2002b - Taagepera, Rein: Riigikogu praegune suurus on hea 
PM, 14.09.2002 - Kuusk, M.: Lõpp lömitamisele! 
PM, 18.09.2002 - Juhtkiri: Alati väike eelarve. Riigieelarvet pole vaja 
defitsiitseks jätta 
PM, 25.09.2002 - Luiker, Lauri: Rahast mitme kandi pealt 
PM, 26.09.2002 - Ideon, Argo: Kui ei oska, siis õpi   
PM, 02.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Kriips peale ideaalidele?   
PM, 09.10.2002a - Ojuland, Kristiina & Tuomioja, Erkki: Oleme muutuste 
künnisel  
PM, 09.10.2002b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Suur maa, suur silk  
PM, 10.10.2002a - Juhtkiri: Aeg on küps. Soodus õhkkond liitumiskõneluste 
lõpetamiseks  
PM, 10.10.2002b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Soo-inimesed ja demokraatia 
PM, 11.10.2002 - Berg, Eiki: Eesti välispoliitika küsimärgid 
PM, 14.10.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Võimaluste ja valikute raamid 
PM, 15.10.2002a - Maimets, Toivo: Tuba ei jää tühjaks  
PM, 15.10.2002b - Soosaar, Enn: Võimaluste ja valikute raamid  
PM, 16.10.2002 - Eesti Heliloojate Liit, Eesti Kinoliit, Eesti Kirjanike Liit et 
al.: Riigikogule ja Riigikogu kultuurikomisjonile 
PM, 21.10.2002 - Bahovski, Erkki: Iiri oluline impulss  
PM, 24.10.2002 - Õunapuu, Harri: Ka vähesega saab teha palju  
PM, 25.10.2002a - Leetsaar, Jaan: Heade kavatsustega sillutatud põrgutee  
PM, 25.10.2002b - Siim, Tõnis: Intellektuaalse dialoogi tähtsusest 
PM, 28.10.2002 - Kurs, Kalmar: Eesti valikud: inimsed või asfalt 
PM, 29.10.2002 - Juhtkiri: Laienemine ukse ees. Kopenhaageni kohtumine 
kinnitas jälle ELi laienemist õigel ajal  
PM, 30.10.2002 - Valm, Tiiu: Raamatukogu kui sfinks  
PM, 01.11.2002 - Metsaveer, Jaan: Kuidas saada rikkaks?  
PM, 02.11.2002 - Kriis, Mare: Kuidas karud tantsima pannakse 
PM, 06.11.2002 - Männik, Jaanus: Kas demokraatiast ametnike riiki? 
PM, 07.11.2002 - Helme, Mart: Matvijenko mõrud präänikud  
PM, 09.11.2002 - Õnnepalu, Tõnu: Ideaal ja spliin  
PM, 11.11.2002 - Sildam, Toomas: Tundmatu Venemaa  
PM, 12.11.2002 - Eesti Teadlaste Liidu juhatus: Eesti kavatseb ELiga ühineda 
vähesuutliku inimkapitaliga 
PM, 13.11.2002 - Kauba, Tõnu: Eluasemepoliitikast Eestis 
PM, 16.11.2002 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Revolutsioon pole eksportkaup  
PM, 18.11.2002a - Raig, Ivar: Millise ELiga on kasulik liituda?  
PM, 18.11.2002b - Soone, Jüri, Rudi, Ülo & Adamson, Alo: Peidetud energia 
põlevkivis  
PM, 19.11.2002a - Juhtkiri: Mida teha Euroopaga. Eesti peab Euroopa Liidu 
tulevikudebatis oma huve kaitsma  
PM, 19.11.2002b - Vöörmann, Mai: Õpetlik lugu  
PM, 26.11.2002 - Soosaar, Enn: Koduvillast väitlust NATO ümber  
 275 
 
PM, 27.11.2002a - Mälksoo, Lauri: Eesti välispoliitika idealismi ja realismi 
vahel  
PM, 27.11.2002b - Nõmm, Eha: Õigus elule 
PM, 29.11.2002 - Aava, Katrin: Inimesed otsivad müüti  
PM, 02.12.2002 - Lang, Rein: Avameelselt haridusest. Haridusreform ei ole 
sisuliselt veel alanudki 
PM, 06.12.2002a- Kelam, Tunne: Rahvusliku aate jõud  
PM, 07.12.2002 - Saat, Mari: Üks laps 
PM, 09.12.2002a - Aarna, Olav: Haridusreformi unutatud eesmärk. 
Tähelepanuta on jäänud keskne probleem: muutused hariduse sisus  
PM, 09.12.2002b - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik, Lauristin, Marju & Tarand, 
Andres: Euroopa Liidu raha saab paremini kasutada 
PM, 10.12.2002 - Taal, Olari: Gladiaatorid ja vangid  
PM, 11.12.2002a - Juhtkiri: Soodsad numbrid. Eesti peab suutma 
liitumiskõnelustel saavutatud raha ära  
PM, 11.12.2002b - Susi, Mart: Lõpetage segadused kõrghariduses  
PM, 13.12.2002 - Kallas, Siim: Euroopa läbirääkimiste lõpp  
PM, 14.12.2002 - Juhtkiri: Joon alla. Eesti liitumiskõneluste lõpp ELiga 
tähendab terve ajajärgu lõppemist  
PM, 16.12.2002a - Bahovski, Erkki: Sõnum Kopenhaagenist 
PM, 16.12.2002b - Salupere, Malle: Millega mõtlevad bürokraadid? 
PM, 19.12.2002a - Helemäe, Jelena & Vöörmann, Rein: Tööpoliitikaga tagasi 
Euroopasse?  
PM, 19.12.2002b - Juhtkiri: Oskus küsida. Küsida ELi rahvahääletusel ühes 
küsimuses kahte asja ei ole mõttekas 
PM, 23.12.2002a - Laane, Marek: Sõda hakkab, sõda hakkab...  
PM, 23.12.2002b - Rast, Aadu: Saagu valitsejad targemaks 
2003 
PM, 04.01.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvahääletuselt mõistetav tulemus  
PM, 06.01.2003a - A.M.: Meie sisemisest küpsusest 
PM, 06.01.2003b - Ost, Imbi: Naised müügiks?! 
PM, 07.01.2003 - Õunapuu, Harri: Ootame pensionitõusuga kevadeni  
PM, 09.01.2003 - Berg, Maimu: Miks eesti naine ei sünnita? 
PM, 11.01.2003 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Kas Eesti liitub ikka õige NATOga?   
PM,13.01.2003 - Heidmets, Mati: Haritus ja professionaalsus. Vajame 
kokkulepet nii rahastamisalustes kui riigitellimuse loogikas 
PM, 15.01.2003a - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Haridusfoorum: kas õitseng või 
hääbumine  
PM, 15.01.2003b - Raig, Ivar: Raha eurovastastele, aga kui palju?   
PM, 17.01.2003 - Juhtkiri: Köhides Euroopa Liitu. Kompleksivaba arutelu 
ELi üle 
PM, 18.01.2003a - Allaste, Airi-Alina: Millist uimastipoliitikat vajame?   
PM, 18.01.2003b - Mutt, Mihkel: Kas Euroopa Liidus tohib köhida?   
PM, 22.01.2003 - Riikoja, Hindrek: Kindlustuse kaks külge   
PM, 23.01.2003 - Berg, Eiki: Eesti otsus või matus? 
PM, 27.01.2003 - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Raskesti hoomatav Euroopa Liit. Paljud 
tähtsad asjad on kaalul ELi uues aluslepingus  
PM, 29.01.2003 - Einasto, Jaan & Leedjärv, Laurits: Võimu ja vaimu tüli   
PM, 30.01.2003 - Oviir, Siiri: Kas ühekordne pensionitõus enne valimisi on 
õige?   
PM, 01.02.2003 - Juhtkiri: Kui palju ust avada. Võõrtööjõu 
sissetoomisega ei tohi kiirustada 
PM, 04.02.2003 - Monticelli, Daniele: Eurooplased sõja vastu  
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PM, 06.02.2003 - Mihkelson, Marko: Ohtliku pretsedendi lävel  
PM, 08.02.2003a - Engelbrecht, Jüri, Haller, Kristjan, Harro, Jaanus et al.: 
Teaduse tippkeskuste ühine tegevus  
PM, 08.02.2003b - Kelam, Tunne: Millised on Eesti rahvuslikud huvid? 
PM, 12.02.2003 - Mölder, Leevi: Uus (vana) kord 
PM, 15.02.2003 - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Kas Eesti võitleb Eesti eest 
PM, 18.02.2003 - Tonsiver, Krister: Miks meile Euroopa Liit 
PM, 19.02.2003 - Juhtkiri: Selg sirgu. Mart Laari vastus Jacques Chiracile 
lisab Eesti välispoliitikale selgust 
PM, 21.02.2003 - Kolga, Voldemar: Uusi värve poliitmaastikule  
PM, 25.02.2003a - Kallas, Siim: Peame mõtlema 85 aastat ette!  
PM, 25.02.2003b - Rüütel, Arnold: Riik tähendab ühisvastutust  
PM, 26.02.2003 - Tammert, Paul: Reformida või mitte  
PM, 27.02.2003 - Annus, Tiina: Sarnased hariduslubadused  
PM, 01.03.2003 - Mutt, Mihkel: Mammukesed ja kruusikesed  
PM, 03.03.2003 - Remsu, Olev: Ülepolitiseeritud. Depolitiseerida!   
PM, 04.03.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Ülesoolatud kurgid 
PM, 05.03.2003a - Kelam, Tunne: Valimiste peaeesmärk täitus  
PM, 05.03.2003b - Rooba, Jaanus: Lihtsas keeles 
PM, 08.03.2003 - Raag, Ilmar: Elu pärast eestlust  
PM, 10.03.2003a - Juhtkiri: Esimene pääsuke. Malta «jah» ELile loob 
meilegi soodsama rahvusvahelise õhkkonna 
PM, 10.03.2003b - Parts, Juhan: Koosmeele koalitsioon. Miks eelistame 
nelja erakonna liitu 
PM, 11.03.2003 - Ideon, Argo: Keskerakonna valik 
PM, 14.03.2003 - Hammer, J.: Tsivilisatsiooni ohvrid 
PM, 15.03.2003 - Riikoja, Hindrek: Põllumees vajab kaitset  
PM, 20.03.2003 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Tõde varjub eesriide taha  
PM, 21.03.2003 - Tarand, Indrek: Kaotatud võimalus ja võimalus kaotada  
PM, 22.03.2003 - Sirg, Veera: Emapalga karid 
PM, 24.03.2003 - Tamman, Tiina: Eesti maailmas 
PM, 28.03.2003 - Raagmaa, Garri: Maakond vajab maavanenmat 
PM, 29.03.2003 - Aaviksoo: Õhku kirjutatud haridus   
PM, 31.03.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ootame tarku tegusid. Noorenenud Riigikogule 
õpipoisiaega ei anta  
PM, 01.04.2003 - Tallo, Ivar: Kas uus teerull või uus poliitika? 
PM, 02.04.2003a - Marrandi, Jaanus: Eesti põllumees vajab võrdseid 
tingimusi   
PM, 02.04.2003b - Sillaste, Juhan: Väljakutsed Venemaa suunal 
PM, 08.04.2003a - Luiker, Lauri: Majanduskasvust tähtsam on heaolu 
PM, 08.04.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Hindadega Euroopas  
PM, 14.04.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Väljakutse Doonau kallastelt  
PM, 15.04.2003a - Juhtkiri: Erastamispähkel. Koalitsioonipartnerid on 
edasise erastamise suhtes eri meelt 
PM, 15.04.2003b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Rünnak, millest on raske aru saada  
PM, 16.04.2003a - Ilves, Toomas Hendrik: Samm euroliidule lähemale  
PM, 16.04.2003b - Juhtkiri: Õpipoisiaeg on käes. Eesti ühinemisleping ELiga 
viib Eesti senisest rohkem Euroopasse 
PM, 16.04.2003c - Raju, Olev: Koalitsioonilepet on võimatu täita  
PM, 19.04.2003 - Arjakas, Küllo: Eesti ajalugu pole peenraha 
PM, 21.04.2003 - Dreving, Marek: Võitlev võrdsus 
PM, 23.04.2003 - Ergma, Ene: Uued väljakutsed riigikogu ees 
PM, 24.04.2003 - Reinap, Aivar: Erastada või taasriigistada?   
PM, 02.05.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Politrukid uuesti tegevusse 
PM, 02.05.2003b - Laffranque, Rodolphe: Euroopa Liit pole NSV Liit   
PM, 02.05.2003c - M.M.: Mõttetu ID-kaart 
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PM, 03.05.2003a - Aas Elmu: Mida teha 14. septembril? 
PM, 03.05.2003b - Mikelsaar, Raik-Hiio, Rosenberg, Tiit, Piirimäe, Helmut 
et al.: Avalik kiri kultuuriministrile 
PM, 05.05.2003 - Ojuland, Kristiina: ÜRO roll muutuvas maailmas  
PM, 07.05.2003 - Erilaid, Erkki: Eesti minetab konkurentsieeliseid   
PM, 12.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Leedu ütles “jah”. Eestil oleks Leedu 
eurokampaaniast üht-teist õppida 
PM, 16.05.2003 - I.S.: Paljude noorte mure 
PM, 17.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Euroummik. Eesti peab seisma riikide 
võrdõiguslikkuse eest ELis 
PM, 19.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Pilved tervishoiu kohal. Arstide streik looks 
siinmail pretsedendi ja tõstataks palju küsimusi 
PM, 21.05.2003a - Juhtkiri: Rääkigem inimestega. Eurokampaania peab 
keskenduma inimlähedusele  
PM, 21.05.2003b - Saar, Andrus: Sotsiaalne kurtus ruulib. Kui poliitik lubab 
endale piiride tõmbamist, on tegu kaksikmoraaliga 
PM, 23.05.2003a - Juhtkiri: Selgust häma asemele. Viivitamine ELi asjus ei 
too keskparteile kasu 
PM, 23.05.2003b - Vetik, Raivo: Eduviljad kuuluvad kogu ühiskonnale  
PM, 24.05.2003 - Kender, Kaur: Vali kord, vaestemaja ja preestrid   
PM, 27.05.2003 - Kortspärn, Heiki: Eestlane Eedeni aias  
PM, 31.05.2003 - Juhtkiri: Abitud abiministrid. Põhiseadus annab 
abiministrile sisuliselt nõuniku staatuse 
PM, 02.06.2003a - Cannon-Jõe, Ilvi: Ühiskonnale vajalik seadus 
PM, 02.06.2003b - Juhtkiri: Euroopasse tööle. Euroopa Liidu 
personalipoliitika pakub uutele riikidele eeliseid 
PM, 02.06.2003c - Siim, Tõnis & Vanja, Rein: Eesti pole Leedu 
PM, 05.06.2003 - I.S.: Kuidas jääda ausaks?  
PM, 10.06.2003 - Lääts, A.: Kuidas saada miinimumpalka? 
PM, 14.06.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Euroliidu invasioon 
PM, 14.06.2003b - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Suurte muutuste keerises   
PM, 16.06.2003a - Juhtkiri: Aeg selgeks seisukohaks. Keskerakond tahab olla 
peigmees mitmes pulmas korraga  
PM, 16.06.2003b - Ostrat, E.: Milleks tormata? 
PM, 17.06.2003a - Olesk, Arko: Suured on inimesed, mitte riigid   
PM, 17.06.2003b - Uusen, Enn: Peatagem pahupoolsus! 
PM, 18.06.2003a - Bahovski, Erkki: Aega ei ole  
PM, 18.06.2003b - Juhtkiri: Eurolaienemine kabinettides. ELi toetustest 
kasusaamiseks tuleb ka endal kulutusi teha 
PM, 20.06.2003a - Parts, Juhan: Valija ei pea pettuma   
PM, 20.06.2003b - Pikko, Ain: EL - ametnike paradiis 
PM, 20.06.2003c - Polikarpus, Viido: Naabri valik  
PM, 26.06.2003 - Klaas, Urmas: Aeg teha õige valik   
PM, 27.06.2003 - Kaevats, Ülo: Arengukiirendus või ääremaastumine  
PM, 28.06.2003 - Vseviov, David: Eesti valib Lääne ja Ida vahel   
PM, 02.07.2003a - Jaeger, Andres: Tundkem ajalugu 
PM, 02.07.2003b - Repliik: Patt infolt kokku hoida  
PM, 03.07.2003a - Karuks, Tiit: Kuum kartul   
PM, 03.07.2003b - Raidväli, Jüri: Salu-Vilosiuse sündroom ja EL 
PM, 04.07.2003a - Juhtkiri: Enam ausust ja selget juttu!  Hämamine ja 
pooltõed toovad kaasa euroskepsise tõusu 
PM, 04.07.2003b - Kreitzberg, Peeter: Parlamentaarse demokraatia katsekivi   
PM, 04.07.2003c - Renno, Olav: Vastutustundetud vastalised 
PM, 05.07.2003a - Merekülski, Maret: Noortes on potentsiaali 
PM, 05.07.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Ei või jah?   
PM, 08.07.2003 - Lauri, Maris: Hääletad «ei», valid majanduskriisi   
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PM, 09.07.2003 - Raun, Mait: Eesti küsib, mis on Lääs   
PM, 10.07.2003 - Savisaar, Edgar: Tehkem põhjendatud valik  
PM, 11.07.2003a - Langemets, Andres: Uue valitsuse sõnadeta laul  
PM, 11.07.2003b - Lang, Rein: Pealiskaudsuse viljad   
PM, 11.07.2003c - Pere, Aare: Noorte võimalused 
PM, 12.07.2003a - Berg, Eiki: Mineviku õppetunde tuleviku tarvis  
PM, 12.07.2003b - Ehlvest, Jüri: Ostan nurga taga eurosid   
PM, 12.07.2003c - Venden, Hermann: Savisaare uus mäng 
PM, 14.07.2003a - Repliik: Kuulakem Klasi 
PM, 14.07.2003b - Roostal, Ilmar: EL ja Eesti identiteet 
PM,16.07.2003a - Jaeger, Andres: Aeg selgeteks sõnadeks 
PM, 16.07.2003b - Juhtkiri: Kultuurkeel kohustab. Euroseaduste eesti keelde 
tõlkimine seab eeskätt nõuded Eesti riigile 
PM, 17.07.2003a - Juhtkiri: Majandus kaalukausil. Euroopa Liit tagab 
inimeste ja majanduse heaolu kasvu 
PM, 17.07.2003b - Veidemann, Rein: Sada päeva tuulte pöörises  
PM, 19.07.2003a - Kolga, Voldemar: Eesti erinevad elumaailmad   
PM, 19.07.2003b - Pullerits, Priit: Masendav eurotee   
PM, 21.07.2003a - Made, Vahur: Elitaarne euroreferendum. 14. septembril 
võivad ei-hääled võita  
PM, 21.07.2003b - Maimets, Toivo: Meie lapsed väärivad parimat haridust  
PM, 21.07.2003c - T. P.: Eesti 21. sajandi maailmas 
PM, 23.07.2003 - Gräzin, Igor: Vajame euroaktivismi   
PM, 24.07.2003a - Krüger, Andreas: Eestlaste asjatud kartused 
PM, 24.07.2003b - Pomerants, Marko: Milano kingsepa sõnum   
PM, 24.07.2003c - Silberg, Uno: Kas meie põhiseadus on müüt? 
PM, 25.07.2003a - Kaplinski, Jaan: Impeerium ja riikide liit  
PM, 25.07.2003b - Soodla, Vello: Lurnitsemisest 
PM, 26.07.2003 - Juhtkiri: Personalikarusell. Ametnike selgitusteta 
tagandamised vähendavad riigi usaldusväärsust 
PM, 28.07.2003 - M.P.: Unustatud osa rahvast 
PM, 29.07.2003 - Seppik, Ain: Selgelt poliitiline probleem  
PM, 30.07.2003 - Kask, Rein: Sapakas või mersu 
PM, 31.07.2003 - Korv, Neeme: Ratastel instituut  
PM, 01.08.2003a - Otsmann, Kristjan: Jah-hääl hakkab värisema  
PM, 01.08.2003b - Tamm, Milja: Häving versus vaba valik 
PM, 01.08.2003c - Trulli, Karita: Mul on kurb 
PM, 01.08.2003d - Tulviste, Peeter: Muutuv maailm, muutuv Euroopa 
PM, 04.08.2003 - Oras, Maarja: Euroopa-kogemus  
PM, 05.08.2003a - Bahovski, Erkki: Hirmul on suured silmad   
PM, 05.08.2003b - Juhtkiri: Riik eestlastele liiga suur. IMFi mure Eesti 
paisuva eelarve üle on arusaadav 
PM, 05.08.2003c - Pajula, Ene: Konnatiigistumise oht 
PM, 06.08.2003a - Aaviksoo, Jaak: Ülikool, Eesti teadus ja Euroopa   
PM, 06.08.2003b - Bahovski, Erkki: Paradigmade heitlus 
PM, 08.08.2003a - Viivi Luik, Elmo Nüganen, Jüri Arrak, Jüri Engelbrecht, 
Hirvo Surva & Andrus Kivirähk: Eestlaseks saab jääda vaid eurooplasena  
PM, 08.08.2003b - Muuli, Kalle: Euroruletis terendub peaministritool  
PM, 09.08.2003a - Eintalu, Jüri: Tulevikku on raske prognoosida   
PM, 09.08.2003b - Leppikson, Robert: Tulevikuotsuseid tehes mõelgem oma 
lastele 
PM, 09.08.2003c - Mäe, Ülo: Mõtlemiseks Keskerakonna juhile 
PM, 11.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Keskerakond ütles «ei». Keskerakond vastandub 
euroküsimuses teistele parlamendierakondadele  
PM, 11.08.2003b - Salupere, Malle: Eesti alkoholiseerumine 
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PM, 12.08.2003a - Eamets, Raul: Mis juhtub Eesti tööturul pärast ELiga 
ühinemist  
PM, 12.08.2003b - Kallas, Siim: Eurokampaania ei tohi olla palagan  
PM, 12.08.2003c - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahu, ainult rahu! Rahvahääletuseni 
jäävat perioodi ei tohiks muuta poliitiliseks poriloopimiseks 
PM, 13.08.2003a - Bauman, Riho, Kivisildnik, Lepa, Margus et al.: Eesti 
rahvale 
PM, 13.08.2003b - Kangur, U.: Keskerakonna eestkõneleja 
PM, 13.08.2003c - Sepp, Evelyn: Keskerakonna südametunnistuse päev 
PM, 13.08.2003d - Veidemann, Rein: Tsirkus Barcelonas  
PM, 14.08.2003a - Erilaid, Erkki: Ähvardav mull   
PM, 14.08.2003b - Jokiniemi, Rauno: Savisaare kahepalgelisus 
PM, 14.08.2003c - Peterson, Aleksei: Eestlaseks saab jääda vaid eestlasena   
PM, 14.08.2003d - Õnnepalu, Tõnu: Hoia hoogu, suur Eesti!   
PM, 15.08.2003 - Haavel, Tõnis: Eesti ja EL aastal 2020   
PM, 16.08.2003a - Praks, Rein: Toetan Kallast 
PM, 16.08.2003b - Raig, Ivar, Helme, Mart & Gräzin, Igor: Eesti juhid ei 
soovi demokraatiat 
PM, 18.08.2003 - T.N.: Mõelge noortele 
PM, 19.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Tubli tulemus «eurorindel». Augusti esimesel 
poolel oli toetus Euroopa Liidule selle aasta kõrgeim  
PM, 19.08.2003b - Ojuland, Kristiina: Lõikusaeg on käes  
PM, 21.08.2003 – Heidmets, Mati: Eesti tulevikuarmastus   
PM, 22.08.2003 - Sooäär, Imre: «Ei» öeldes kaotame ajud ja kapitali  
PM, 23.08.2003a - Juhtkiri: Ei Rehepaplale! «Ei» euroreferendumil 
tugevdaks sotsiaalseid vastuolusid 
PM, 23.08.2003b - Lepp, T.: Oh seda edevust! 
PM, 23.08.2003c - Teder, Tarmo: Augustileitsakuline Euroopa 2020 
PM, 25.08.2003a - Keskküla, Ando: Karu peied   
PM, 25.08.2003b - Walace, Jim: Siim Kallasel on tuline õigus 
PM, 26.08.2003a - Kallas, Siim: Lõpp nõukogudele!   
PM, 26.08.2003b - Mihkelson, Marko: Euroopa Liit kasvatab Eesti 
mõjujõudu   
PM, 27.08.2003 - Keha, Anti: Salapärane Euroopa Liit 
PM, 28.08.2003 - Veri, Margus: Kas haridus on prioriteet? 
PM, 29.08.2003a - Kender, Kaur: Isiklikud asjad   
PM, 29.08.2003b - Viies, Tiiu: Kuidas müüa ideed euroliidust 
PM, 30.08.2003 - Taagepera, Mare: Veel üks Nõukogude Liidu igand 
PM, 01.09.2003 - Russak, Ülo: Tagasi maale, vanaema juurde 
PM, 02.09.2003a - Erelt, Mati, Klaas, Birute, Külmoja, Irina et al.: 
Keelenõukogu avaldus 
PM, 02.09.2003b - Lapin, Leonhard: Rahu tagatis   
PM, 02.09.2003c - Teesalu, M.: Kuri rahvas 
PM, 03.09.2003a - Allikas, Rein: Vene kaart teostub ELi kaudu 
PM, 03.09.2003b - Engelbrecht, Jüri, Ergma, Ene, Jaaksoo Ülo et al.: Eesti 
Teaduste Akadeemia avaldus 
PM, 04.09.2003 - Treier, Märt: Arukuse aeg 
PM, 05.09.2003 - Broch, Lave K.: Kes tegelikult rahu tagab 
PM, 06.09.2003a - Allik, Jüri: Eesti asend maailmakaardil  
PM, 06.09.2003b - Mõtsnik, Harri: Pidagem veel aru 
PM, 08.09.2003 - K.K.: Hirm 
PM, 10.09.2003a - Juhtkiri: Ootamatu küsitlustulemus. 
Integratsioonipoliitikas tuleb mängumaad avardada 
PM, 10.09.2003b - Strandberg, Marek: Kobrutav eliidipsühhoos  
PM, 11.09.2003a - Nõmm, Eha: Seenesportlased 
PM, 11.09.2003b - Poll, Liisi: Lumivalgeke tegi karuteene 
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PM, 12.09.2003 - Jakobson, Max: Paisuvalt arenev Euroopa Liit   
PM, 13.09.2003a - Kaska, Valev: Eurovangla 
PM, 13.09.2003b - Kundla, Rene: Kas eurohääletus on salajane? 
PM, 13.09.2003c - Lippmaa, Endel: Kuulume Euroopasse   
PM, 13.09.2003d - Raun, Mait: Paabeli segaduse anatoomia   
PM, 13.09.2003e - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Sarnased hirmud  
PM, 15.09.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Euroskeptilise Eesti «jah»-sõna   
PM, 16.09.2003a - Juhtkiri: Rootsi ütles «ei». «Ei» eurole soodustab 
kahekiiruselise Euroopa teket 
PM, 16.09.2003b - Truve, Erkki: Geneetiliselt muundatud toit eestlase 
toidulaual  
PM, 17.09.2003 - Poll, Liis: Eurovastased ei esinda kedagi   
PM, 20.09.2003 - Veidemann, Rein: Eesti Vabariik kuubis  
PM, 22.09.2003 - Juhtkiri: Läti kopeeriv «jah». Eesti saab Läti näol 
laienenud Euroopa Liidus juurde kindla liitlase 
PM, 02.10.2003a - Kaalep, Ain: Eiardid on ohtlikud  
PM, 02.10.2003b - Metsaveer, Jaan: Kas tõesti muutus? 
PM, 02.10.2003c - Pilv, Mihkel: E-kooli uued suunad 
PM, 03.10.2003 - Bahovski, Erkki: Eesti sõna kaalukam  
PM, 06.10.2003a - Juhtkiri: Kaua tehtud, kaunikene. Eesti kaitsku oma huve 
ja seisku toimiva ELi eest 
PM, 06.10.2003b - Raun, Eero: Ohtlik suhtumine 
PM, 09.10.2003 - Priimägi, Linnart: Hobuseraua lõgin 
PM, 15.10.2003 - Priimägi, Linnar: Mittesöödav paber 
PM, 27.10.2003 - Soosaar, Enn: Kaitseväel on mitu tahku 
PM, 31.10.2003 - Juhtkiri: Vajalik pensionitõus. Valitsus kaalub erakorralist 
pensionitõusu 
PM, 03.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Vangerdused Euroopa Liidus. Eesti peab 
Euroopas endale liitlasi leidma 
PM, 03.11.2003b - Kaljulaid, Kersti: TALO kahjustab haritlaste huve  
PM, 05.11.2003 - Juhtkiri: Ohud raudteel. Raudtee minek Vene investorite 
kontrolli alla pole riigi huvides 
PM, 06.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Keerukas lõimumine  
PM, 06.11.2003b - Reinap, Aivar: Statistiline võlukunst  
PM, 10.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Pilk tagasi on pilk edasi 
PM, 10.11.2003b - Sildam, Toomas: Kordoni lugu  
PM, 11.11.2003 - Virmavirta, Jarmo: Vaid jalgpall on tähtis 
PM, 12.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Inglise keel päästab. Välistudengite õppemaksu 
alandamine lööb TÜ eelarvesse augu 
PM, 12.11.2003b - Luiker, Lauri: Haug, luik ja vähk riiki juhtimas  
PM, 13.11.2003a - Juhtkiri: Vigade parandus. Naiste ja meeste 
võrdõiguslikkuse seaduse eelnõu püüab eksimusi vältida 
PM, 13.11.2003b - Tiit, Ene-Margit: Rahvastikupoliitika võimalused 
PM, 14.11.2003 - Jõesaar, Andres: Panus avalik-õiguslikku ringhäälingusse 
PM, 19.11.2003 - Kivirähk, Juhan: Rahvaliidu uus poliitika 
PM, 20.11.2003 - Raun, Mait: Milleks võrdõiguslikkus?  
PM, 21.11.2003 - Vetik, Raivo: Sotsiaalteaduse seosed poliitikaga 
PM, 28.11.2003 - Lill, Märt-Matis: Kas soomlased on lollid?  
PM, 03.12.2003 - Koslov, Vladimir: Nõudmised reaalseks 
PM, 05.12.2003 - Langemets, Andres: Milleks meile riik ja rahvas 
PM, 06.12.2003 - Heidmets, Mati: Vedajad ja pingutajad 
PM, 08.12.2003 - Normet, Ingo: Väike Venemaa  
PM, 15.12.2003 - Allik, Jüri: Teadusraha ülikoolidele?  
PM, 22.12.2003 - Runnel, Hando: Aasta murelikud palgejooned 
 
